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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL PARTY ELITES AND THE BREAKDOWN OF 
DEMOCRACY: THE TURKISH CASE, 1973-1980
Tanel Demirel
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor; Prof Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
December 1998
This study aims to analyze the behavior of Turkish political party elites during 
the 1973-1980 period. It is particularly concerned with the extent to which political 
party elites seemed to have contributed to the breakdown of Turkish democracy in 
1980. It starts from the assumption that breakdown of democracies is not determined 
by structural factors alone, however important they might be. Political actors, 
particularly those who professed commitment to a democratic regime, have a space for 
manuevre so as to lessen the unfavourable effects of these structures. It is argued that 
trials and tribulations of the Turkish democracy can be understood better if they are 
examined within the broader social-political framework in which it evolved, a 
framework which has both generated constraints and provided opportunities for 
political actors. At its simplest, that broader framework can be said to have consisted 
of the complex encounter and interaction of Ottoman-Turkish strong state tradition 
and traditional social structure undergoing modernisation process. It is concluded that, 
although the interaction in question did not create particularly favourable soil for 
democracy to flourish, it certainly did not mean that democracy was doomed to fail in 
the 1980. Political party elites did have room for manuevre so as to affect the 
constraining conditions and to enhance the efficacy, effectiveness and therefore 
legitimacy of the democratic regime. The principal argument of the thesis is that 
political party elites, far from taking such a course of action, through their actions and 
non-actions -particularly their reactions to problem of terrorism and economic crisis- 
have done much to undermine the belief in the democratic system and paved the way 
to its breakdown in 1980.
Keywords: Breakdown of Democracy, Turkish Democracy, Turkish Political 
Party Elites
m
ÖZET
SİYASAL PARTİ SEÇKİNLERİ VE DEMOKRASİNİN KESİNTİYE 
UĞRAMASI: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ, 1973-1980
Tanel Demirel
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Damşman: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
Aralık 1998
Bu çalışma, 1973-1980 döneminde Türk siyasal parti seçkinlerinin 
davranışlarını incelemeyi amaçlamakta; özellikle de siyasal parti seçkinlerinin, 
demokrasinin 1980 yılında kesintiye uğramasma ne ölçüde katkıda bulundukları sorusu 
ile ilgilenmektedir. Tez, demokrasilerin kesintiye uğramasımn, ne kadar önemli olursa 
olsunlar sadece yapısal faktörlerle açıklanamayacağı varsayımmdan yola çıkarak, 
siyasal aktörlerin, özellikle demokrasiyi savunanların, yapısal faktörlerin olumsuz 
etkilerini azaltacak bir manevra alamna sahip olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Çahşma, 
Türk demokrasisinin problemlerinin daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için, siyasal aktörler için 
sımrlamalar kadar fırsatlar da yaratan, demokrasinin içinde evrildiği yapısal nitelikli 
sosyal-siyasal ortamın gözönünde bulundurulması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu 
ortam, en basit anlatımıyla, güçlü devlet geleneği ile modernleşme sürecinde olan 
geleneksel toplumsal yapımn karşılıklı etkileşiminden oluşmaktadır. Adı geçen 
etkileşimin demokrasinin yerleşmesi için özellikle elverişli bir ortam yaratmadığı 
sonucuna varılmakla birlikte bu durum, demokrasinin 1980’de başarısızlığa mahkum 
olduğu anlamına da kesinlikle gelmemektedir. Türk siyasal parti elitleri, sımrlayıcı 
koşullara etki etme, diğer bir söyleyişle demokrasinin etkinliği ve meşruiyetini artırma 
konusunda bir manevra alamna sahiptirler. Çalışma, siyasal parti seçkinlerinin, sahip 
oldukları manevra alamnda gerçekleştirdikleri ve gerçekleştiremedikleri davramşlan- 
özellikle terörizm ve ekonomik kriz konusunda- ile demokratik rejime duyulan inancı 
zayıflattıkları ve demokrasinin kesintiye uğramasında etkin bir rol oynadıkları tezini 
savunmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler; Demokrasinin Kesintiye Uğraması, Tüık Demokrasisi, Türk 
Siyasal Parti Seçkinleri
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
In the morning of 12 September 1980 the Turkish military high command 
announced that they had taken over the administration of the country. Prior to the intervention, 
the death toU resulting from mounting terrorism had reached an average of twenty people per 
day. The economy, plagued by industrial unrest, had stagnated for almost two years, while the 
inflation and unemployment continued to rise. The dvil bureaucracy (including security forces) 
were heavily politicized, while political party elites continued to tear each other ^ art. The 
Grand National Assembly M ed evra to elect a head of the state let alone finding effective 
remedies for the crisis. The purpose of the intervention, as declared by newly formed National 
Security Council, was hardly an exaggeration;
to preserve the in t^ ty  of the country, to restore national unity and togetherness, to avert a possible 
civil war and fiatricide, to reestablish the authority and the existence of the state and to eliminate all the 
Actors that prevent the normal functioning of the democratic order.'
The advent of democracy in Turkey that was installed in 1946 was far from a 
tranquil one, to say the least. Since the transition to a multi-party politics, it was the third 
time (the first in 1960 and the second in 1971 by pronounciamento) that Turkish 
democracy was interrupted by the military intervention, leaving aside unsuccessful coup 
attempts and intrusions of the military to civilian affairs in normal times. The quality of 
democracy that was in place never ceased to attract severe criticism. By any account, 
clearly, Turkish democracy suffered from chronic stability problems. At the most general 
level, this dissertation is concerned with the question of why democracy in Turkey has 
had such troubled existence. Specifically, it aims to analyze the factors that triggered the 
breakdown of democracy in 12 September 1980.
’ The General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 12 September in Turkey -Before and 
4 ^ er (Ankara:Ongun, 1982), 221.
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The study uses the term democracy as Diamond, Linz and Lipset defined it in a 
recent major study. According to this definition (derived fi'om Schumpeter and Dahl’s 
seminal formulations) democracy is a system of government that meets three essential 
conditions. First, there should be a “meaningful and extensive competition among 
individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of 
government power through regular, fi"ee, and fair elections that exclude the use of force.” 
Second, there should be “a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection 
of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is precluded fi-om 
exercising the rights of citizenship.” And third, there should be a level of “civil and 
political liberties...suflBcient to ensure that citizens (acting individually and through 
various associations) can develop and advocate their views and interests and contest 
policies and offices vigorously and autonomously.”  ^It goes without saying that no country 
in the world can ever satisfy these conditions in full but only to a varying degrees. 
Therefore, it is more accurate to speak not of existence or absence of a democracy, but of 
different degrees o f democracy.
This dissertation opts for this definition because various participatory definitions of 
democracy that stipulate socio-economic advances for the majority of the population, 
and/or active involvement of citizens in taking decisions that affect their lives broadens the 
criteria for democracy and makes the study of the phenomenon extremely difficult.^ 
Otherwise, the study does not claim that it is either the sole or the ideal definition of 
democracy. In line with this definition, the study assumes that the breakdown of 
democracy occurs when the democratically elected rulers are changed through force (or 
with the threat o f force), that is, when rulers are no longer determined by electoral 
competition, and the various guarantees that protects civil and political rights are
Lany Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Introduction; What Makes for 
Democracy,” in Politics in Developing Countries-Comparing Experiences With Democracy, second, ed. 
Lany Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1995), 6.
 ^For a similar assessment, Samuel P.Huntington, The Third Wave-Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Norman and London; University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7.
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suspended.^ It is obvious that such a definition of breakdown of democracy makes no 
reference to “quality” of the democracy that had been ended. One can argue (and it has 
been argued) that an authoritarian government that did not take its legitimacy fi'om 
electoral competition but is more successful in delivering security of life and functioning 
state authority is better than a democratically elected government that fails in both. But 
still, this is a hypothetical case and even if authoritarian ruler may seem to be succesfiil for 
a while, in the long run there is no guarantee that (s)he would be replaced by a another 
benevolent ruler. Therefore, it is more accurate to conclude that the way to improve the 
quality of democracy is not to appeal to an authoritarian methods but to seek remedies 
within the democratic system as it is the only system that can gradually improve itself over
time.^
Though, so far there has not been a single scholarly study focusing exclusively on 
the 1980 democratic breakdown, it is possible to find various accounts purporting to 
explain it in some more general studies on Turkish politics. The majority oT scholars have 
tended to single out the role played by the political party elites in the breakdown as the 
most significant variable. It is argued that political leaders with their uncompromising 
attitude and short-sightedness were primarily responsible for the breakdown. Kemal *
* The definition of what is to be understood by “breakdown of democracy” is important. Heper, 
for instance, does not characterize the 12 September military intervention as the breakdown of democracy. 
The military, he suggested, never discarded the the ideal of democracy and promised (and more 
importantly kept its promise) quick return to democracy. In that conceptualization, open and 
straightforward renunciation of democracy as a system of government by military, is the requirement if 
the military intervention is to be regarded as breakdown of democracy. See, Metin Heper, “The ‘Strong 
State’ and Democracy: The Turkish case in Comparative and Historical Perspective,” in Democracy and 
Modernity ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 157. Similarly, the study uses the term 
“military intervention” rather than “coup d’etat” to characterize 12 September breakdown. Although both 
terms are usually interchangeably used, “coup d’etat” (which literally meant “stroke of state”) is rather 
used to refer to sudden and illegal seizure of governmental power usually to satisfy desires of the 
executioners, while “military intervention” is a more neutral term, which implies that the move is 
motivated by some other aims other than pure power motivations of its executioners, and which concerns 
with the legitimacy of the move more than coup d’etats ever do.
 ^That does not mean, on the other hand, there would certainly be improvements with the passing 
of the time, particularly in new democracies. As O’Donnell suggests, in what he called delegative 
democracies, democracy may still be enduring while being &r from consolidated (i.e. institutionalized). 
Guillermo O’Dotmell, “Delegative Democracy.” Journal o f Democracy. 15, 1 (1994), 56.
Karpat, for instance, argued that “The failure of democracy in Turkey was essentially a 
failure in leadership.”  ^ He even did not hesitate to state boldly that “all three crises 
resulted solely from the failure of civilians to compromise or learn to live with each other 
whether in power or in opposition.”  ^İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayan, despite their emphasis 
on objective determinants of a regime change, saw the 1980 breakdown as being a result 
of “the inabihty of the centrist forces and leadership.” * In the same line, Dodd argued that 
“polarization between the major party elites” was a major factor in the breakdown of 
democracy.^ Likewise, Özbudun pointed out that political leaders’ failure to show a high 
capacity for accommodation and compromise in moderating poUtical crises was “...directly 
responsible for both the 1960 and the 1980 military interventions.” ®^ William Hale, too, 
advanced the view that the intervention could have been prevented only if the party 
leaders had been determined to rescue Turkey from the abyss.”
Not all authors, however, assigned as much importance to the political leadership. 
Influenced by world-system and dependency perspective. Çağlar Keyder 'and others had 
placed a premium on the crises that the Turkish economy underwent throughout 1970s as 
the decisive factor that led to breakdown.”  Metin Heper (though not directly touching *
* Kemal Karpat, “Tuiidsh Democracy at Impasse; Ideology, Party Politics and the Third Military 
Intervention.” IntemationalJoumal o f Turkish Studies. 2 (1981), 41.
’ Ibid, 7.
* Okay Sunar and Sabri Sayan, “Democracy in Tuiicey:Problems and Prospects,” in Transition 
From Authoritarian Rule- Southern Europe, ed Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C.Schmitter and 
Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 182.
® Clement H. Dodd The Crisis o f Turkish Democracy, second ed. (London; Eothen, 1990), 43.
Ergun Ozbudun, “Turitey; Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations,” in Politics in 
Developing Countries -Comparing Experiences with Democracy, second ed. ed Larry Diamond, Juan 
J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Lyime Rienner; Boulder, 1995),253.
” William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London;Routledge, 1994), 241.
See, Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey- A Study in Capitalist Development 
(London; Verso, 1987), 228; Irvin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak, “Conclusion,” in Turkey in Transition, 
ed. Irwin C.Shidr and Ertugrul A.Tonak, (Oxford;Oxford University Press, 1987), 374. Kq^der, in the 
recent study, somewhat modified his earlier beliefs and argued that “the 1980 coup was not a
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upon the 1980 breakdown) criticized those approaches that take the resourcefulness of the 
political actors as the crucial independent variable for the fortunes of democracy in the 
countries concerned.*^ Instead, he proposed a more historical approach that pays special 
attention to institutionalization patterns of previous regimes and subsequent cultural traits. 
In his view, one should study “the imprint left on the present political systems by their 
particular paths of development.” *^ He, therefore, inclined to explain sources of instability 
in Turkish democracy with reference to the conflict between state elite and political elite, a 
conflict that has its roots in the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition.**
Those explanations, though extremely helpful in understanding such phenomena as 
complex as breakdown of democracy, appear to have been in need of further development 
and refinement. For instance, the economic crisis that Turkey underwent during the 
seventies was extremely serious and caused tremendous economic and social problems 
such as inflation, unemployment, chronic balance of payments deficits, worsening income 
distribution and the like. But as recent scholarship has shown, *^  a democracy facing a 
severe economic crisis does not inevitably have to face breakdown. It would be 
misleading to attribute increasing violence; political elites’ inability to reach a compromise 
on some critical issues; ever-present tendencies toward polarization; paralysis of state 
authority; low levels of legitimacy -all symptoms of a democracy on the brink of a 
breakdown- largely to economic crises.*^
bureaucratic-authoritarian one.” See, Çağlar Keyder, “Democracy and the Demise of National 
Developmentalism; Turkey in Perspective,” in Democracy and Development, ed. Amiya Kumar Bagchi 
(New York: StM artin Press, 1995), 209.
Metin Heper, “Transitions to Democracy Reconsidered: A Historical Perspective,” in 
Comparative Political Dynamics - Global Research Perspectives, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth 
P. Erickson (London: Harper Collins, 1991), 194.
Ibid.,1%.
Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (London: Eothen, 1985)
See, p. 14-16 below.
In the same line, Barkey argued that the crisis of import substitution industrialization (ISI), 
(and by implication crisis of democracy) was not inevitable. Rather than assigning critical significance to
5
The argument that the breakdown of democracy in Turkey should be considered in 
the context of state elite/political elite conflict is much more explanatory in understanding 
the military’s self-appointed role as guardian of the state, the polarization, lack of 
consensus, destructive political party struggles that preceded the breakdown. It is very 
useful in describing the parameters of Turkish politics at a macro-level since the 
conflicting visions (of how society is to be organized) of the state and the political elites 
generated far-reaching legitimacy problems for the democratic regime. But, it is less than 
satisfactory at a micro-level, that is, in explaining why a breakdown occurs at a given time, 
but not others, despite the ever-present legitimacy problems. An explanation of 
breakdown of democracy at a micro-level would have to take into consideration, 
economic, international, institutional and rather contingent factors that appear to have 
contributed to breakdown. Besides, as it will be shown below, the distinctions between the 
state elite and political elite were somewhat blurred in the late seventies. There had been 
rapprochement between the Justice Party (IP), representative of the political elite and the 
military, the state elite. They seemed to have been united, at least, in their opposition to 
communism and ethnic separatism. Moreover, the IP was no longer perceived by the 
military as the party associated with religious reactionism and in opposition to the 
Republican principles. Meanwhile the Republican People’s Party (RPP), the party of state 
elite, began to flirt with several ideas which were an anathema to the military. Therefore, 
the alliance between the militaiy and the RPP started to look very feeble. In that sense the 
1980 breakdown was not directly related to the conflict between political elite (the JP) and 
state elite (the military and civilian bureaucracy in implicit alliance with the RPP) as in 
1960, and to a lesser extent in 1971, but between the military and all political elites. The 
military intervention was not conducted to overthrow a party believed to have betrayed 
Atatiirk’s principles, but to all political parties that were believed to have brought the
the economic factors he emphasized the lack of state autonomy vis-a-vis variety of interests. As he put it 
there were solutions but “the absence of political leadership which combined with external pressures 
spiralled Turkey into crisis.” Henri J. Barkey, The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey 
(Boulder; Westview, 1990), 104.
country through in-fighting to the brink of civil war. It is the endless party struggles 
between the political elites, equally disapproved by the military, that incapacitated the 
democratic system and paved the way to a breakdown.
Those explanations that placed a premium on political parties and leaders provided 
worthwhile insights, especially when they tried to situate political party behavior in a 
larger social-political context. These studies, moreover, did not seek to analyze in detail 
how the political party elites behaved during the crucial junctures before the breakdown. 
They did not, for instance, seek to find answer to the question of whether there appeared 
to be any other policy options that party elites could have chosen which might have 
alleviated the crisis of democracy. Nor did they aim to delineate the democratic regime’s 
erosion of legitimacy that paved the way to its breakdown. Finally, they did not dwell on 
the question of why the party elites behaved in the way they actually did.
This study, which greatly benefited fi’om these analyses and attempts to build on 
them by refining above mentioned points, starts fi-om the assumption that the breakdown 
of democracies can not be completely explained by reference to underlying structural (or 
macro social-political) variables, however important they might be. Although structural 
conditions surely limit the possibilities for political actors, they do not totally determine 
it.‘* The actions and non-actions of the political actors’’ might have decisive impact on the 
fortunes of democracy. Political actors have room for maneuver that may increase or 
decrease democracy’s chances of survival. Corollary to that assumption is that actions 
and non-actions of political actors can not completely be determined by the underlying
The structure versus action controvert is one of the central problems in social sciences. 
Following Anthony Giddens, we believe that the way forward in bridging the gap between the two 
approaches can be found if we recognize that the people, while influenced by social political structures, 
make and remake them in every day life through their actions. See, Anthony Giddens, The Constitution o f 
Society (Cambridge; Polity Press, 1984)
19 By political actors the reference is made to those incumbents or opposition politicians who 
profess commitment to democratic regime, or at least whose loyalty to democratic regime is not dubious. 
The term excludes various interest groups (such as media, trade and business unions) and the military. It 
is, of course, true that the military is one of the central actors in the any process of democratic 
breakdown. But in this conceptualization the military variable is considered as structural constraint.
macro social-political variables either. That is to say political actors, though influenced and 
constrained by social-political structures of which they are a part, are not the mere bearers 
of those structures. If they had been mere bearers of structures, then the very notion of the 
autonomy of the political, (and indeed politics) would be in jeopardy, since what we can 
regard as “political” would have been determined solely by the underlying social- 
structures. What is needed then, is an approach which while recognizing the autonomy of 
political actors, tries to situate it in the underlying structural context which introduces 
constraints and provides opportunities for them. In this way, it is hoped, one can avoid 
the pitfalls of subscribing to an action-oriented approach while ignoring the context in 
which actions take place or vice-versa.
1.1. WHAT MAKES FOR DEMOCRACY ? MACRO VARIABLES
Here we are concerned with what we called underlying structural variables that, 
presumably, increase and/or decrease the likelihood of the emergence and the stability* of 
democracy. Seeking roots of democratic (in)stability in socio-economic development 
levels, Seymour Martin Lipset, for instance, has asserted that there was broad and 
multistranded relationships between socio-economic development levels and democracy.^* 
His argument was simply that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it 
will sustain democracy.”*  He arrived at such conclusion after comparing several 
countries’ (of Europe, Latin America and other English speaking ones) experience with
“  Following Diamond, Linz and Lipset, we use the term stability to refer to “the persistence and 
durability of democratic and other regimes over time, particularly through periods of unusually intense 
conflict, crisis, and strain.” Diamond, Linz and Lipset, “What Makes,” 9.
Lipset was not the only scholar in seeking to uruavel structural conditions that are conducive to 
democracy. For an influential attempt see, Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and 
Democracy- Lord and Peasant in the Making o f the Modem World (Boston; Beacon Press, 1966).
^  Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases o f Politics, e?q>anded and updated ed. 
(London; Heinemarm, 1983), 31. The first edition of the book was published in 1960, and Lipset has 
developed many of his ideas in an earlier article published in 1959. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some 
Social Requisities of Democracy; Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political 
Science Review. (1959); 69-105. Note that subtitle of this book is read as “The Social Bases of Politics.”
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democracy and dictatorship. He compared democracies and dictatorships on a range of 
indicators of socio-economic development; industrialization, per capita income, education, 
urbanization and communication, and found that the more socioeconomically developed a 
country the more likely that it will sustain a democratic regime. Similarly, the less 
socioeconomically developed a country, the lesser the chances that it will have a 
democracy.
Lipset claimed that socioeconomic development is likely to give rise to a more 
democratic political culture in which values such as toleration, moderation and restraint 
are highly valued.^ High levels of education is likely to broaden man’s horizons and thus 
“enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to 
extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices.”^^  It also 
tends to increase trust in fellow citizens. The higher level of income and security that it 
provides tends to reduce intensity of class struggles. The relative abundance of resources 
encourages (on the part of the lower classes) an attitude that favors longer time 
perspectives and more flexible and gradualist view of politics. “A belief in secular 
reformist gradualism,” Lipset claimed, “can be the ideology of only a relatively well-to-do 
lower classes.” Related to this aspect, Lipset maintained that high levels of socio­
economic development would reduce the premium on political power as “it does not make 
too much difference whether some redistribution takes place. In this case the loss of 
office does not necessarily mean serious losses for major groups. Finally, Lipset stressed 
that economic development would contribute to democracy by encouraging the 
multiplication of intermediary, voluntary organizations which act as sources of
23
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Ibid., 40. 
Ibid., 39. 
Ibid., 45. 
Ibid., 51.
countervailing power.
Despite his stress on the significance of economic development, Lipset did not 
fully develop the argument that socio-economic development “leads” to democracy. He 
provided the example of Germany where many indicators of socio-economic development 
favored the establishment of a democratic system but “a series of adverse historical events 
prevented democracy from securing legitimacy and thus weakened its ability to withstand
„29cnsis.
Ever since the publication of his findings, it has become the starting point, for all 
future works which analyze the relationships between economic development and 
democracy. His thesis has been (re)criticized, (re)interpreted, (re)tested but never been 
conclusively refuted. Critics have pointed out several shortcomings. Dankwart Rustow 
argued that Lipset’s thesis establishes only correlation, not causality. To say that, Rustow 
continued, socio-economic development is associated with democracy does not 
necessarily mean that they are the causes of democracy.^ That is to say, Lipset was not 
clear whether socio-economic development brought democratic system into existence or it 
only contributed to the stability of the legitimacy of democracy which was assumed to be 
already in existence. Although Lipset had claimed that all he intended to show was a 
correlation and that “a political form may develop because of a syndrome of unique 
historical circumstances even though the society’s major characteristics favor another 
form” °^, Rustow was in secure ground in arguing that Lipset had repeatedly slipped “from 
the language of correlation into the language of causality.” '^
27
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Ibid., 52.
Ibid., 28.
Dankwait A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Approach,” in The State
-Critical Concepts, ed. John A. Hall (London: Routledge, 1994), 348. (Originally published in 1970) 
^  Lipset, Political Man. 28.
Rustow, Transitions,” 348.
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Another line of criticism argued that Upset was ignoring the strains and diflBculties 
that the economic development created and its consequences for the stability of political 
system. A more radical challenge came from the dependency perspective to which we shall 
turn later. In an influential critique within the modernization school, Samuel P. Huntington 
criticized the classical modernization theory for assuming that “all good things go 
together” or compatibility assumption.^^ He argued that good things often did not and 
could not go together. Contrary to the widely held beliefs of the late fifties and skties, 
Huntington asserted that “Rapid economic growth breeds political instability.”^^  Economic 
development was likely to increase expectations to a level where nothing but 
disappointment followed, to change the traditional patterns of authority, and to intensify 
conflicts between major groups to share increasing wealth (economic growth is likely to 
increase social inequalities) which leads to extensive political participation. But institutions 
were often too inflexible or to weak to accommodate such demands. Failure to contain 
those pressures, Huntington has argued, results in breakdown or decay of the political 
system. Huntington, however, did not rule out the possibility of the emergence of strong 
institutions. As such, Huntington’s contribution was a “correction” to the optimistic 
expectations of some of the advocates of modernization theory rather a than sweeping 
rejection of it.^’
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Goals of Development,” in Understanding Political Development, 
ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Boston; Little Brown, 1987), 8.
“  Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay.” World Politics. 17 
(1%5), 406.
”  Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven:Yale University 
Press, 1968); See also, Samuel P. Huntington and Joel Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in 
Developing Countries ((Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976)
In his subsequent woiks, Huntington took a more sympathetic approach to the Lipset's thesis. 
He indeed, can be said to have refined it by developing the concept of “transition zone.” According to 
Huntington, economic development tend to produce a transitional phase in which political elites and the 
prevailing political values can s h ^  choices that decisively determine the nation’s future evolution 
towards democracy. Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More (Countries Become Democratic.” Political Science 
Quarterly. 99, 2 (1984).
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Such critics aside, Upset’s claim that there is a close correlation between the level 
of economic development and democracy seems to be supported by the vast majority of 
empirical studies which have appeared since late sixties. Larry Diamond summarized the 
findings of various statistical exercises in the period of 1963 and 1991. He noted that 
every one of those studies revealed statistically positive relations between the level of 
economic development and democracy . The experience o f East Asian countries seemed 
to provide another strong boost for Lipset’s thesis. The emergence of ever stronger 
demands (which is yet to led a greater visible democratization in practice) for more 
democracy after years of impressive economic growth under non-democratic regimes, led 
many authors to revitalize the traditional arguments between economic development and 
democracy.^* All in all, it seems fair to conclude that though the emergence of 
democracy is not an automatic result of socio-economic development and modernity, the 
socio-economic development plays an important role for in the making of stable
^  As early as 1971, Dahl have provided support for the Lipset thesis by arguing that the chances 
for a country developing competitive political regime was dependent on “the extent to which the country’s 
society and economy (a) provide literacy, education and communication, (b) create a plurahst rather than 
a centrally dominated social order, (c ) and prevent extreme inequUties among the politically relevant 
strata of the country.” Dahl, Polyarchy. 74.
Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy reconsidered,” in Reexamining 
Democracy: Essays in Honor o f Seymour Martin Lipset, ed. Garry Marks and Larry Diamond (Newbury 
Park: Sage, 1992), 109. From that time to the time of writing yet more studies were published all noting 
positive correlation between the socio-economic development levels and democracy. See, Seymour Martin 
Lipset, Kyoimg-Ryoung Seong and John Charles Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Requisites of Democracy.” International Social Science Journal. 45, (1993), 155-175; Mick Moore, 
“Democracy and Development in Cross-National Perspective: A New Look at the Statistics.” 
Democratization. 2, 2, (1995), 1-19.; Mark J Gasiorowski, “Economic Crisis and Political Regime 
Change: An Event History Analysis.” American Political Science Review. 89, 4, (1995), 893; Adam 
Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongo, “What makes Democracies 
Endure.” Jo«/7ia/ ofDemocrac. 7, 1 (19%) 41.
^  See, Francis Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy.” Journal o f Democracy. 6,2, (1995), 
21; Robert A. Scalapino, “Democratizing Dragons: South Korea and Taiwan.” Journal o f Democracy. 
4,3, (1993), 72.; Karen L. Remmer, “New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization.” Comparative 
Politics. 28, 1, (1995) p.l08. Similarly Martin.A Seligson makes the similar argument for the Latin 
American democratizations. He argues that by the 1980s “the socioeconomic foimdations for the stable 
democracy had finally been established in Latin America” and subsequent democratizations should be 
situated in this context See, his “Democratization in Latin America: The Current Cycle,” in 
Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, ed. James M. Malloy and Martin A. 
SeUgson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 7-10.
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democracy. As Prezworski and Limongi neatly summed up “the chances for the survival 
of democracy are greater when the country is richer” and “if they succeed in generating 
development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nation.”^
Another influential approach which emphasizes socio-economic determinants of 
democracies was developed by Guillermo O’Donnell. In a total contrast with Lipset, 
O’Donnel defended the view that socio-economic development levels and democracy was 
inversely related. He, in an explicit critique of the modernization theory, employed the 
premises of dependency theory that questioned the compatibility of capitalist economic 
development in periphery with the political democracy.^* Impressed both by increasing 
number of Latin American countries that have experienced military coups and by the 
similarities in policies that those authoritarian governments followed, O’Donnell tried to 
explain the rise of what he called “Bureaucratic-Authoritarian” regimes. Although, he 
developed his hypothesis with reference to several Latin American countries, he added 
that “its analytical fi-ontiers extend to cases on other continents, subject to'similar patterns 
of industrialization and incorporation into the world capitalist system.”^^
In a nutshell, he saw the emergence of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state as a 
response to resolve the crisis of import-substitution industrialization (henceforth ISI) 
strategy. Import substitution is a policy of replacing imports by domestic production under 
the selective protection of high tariffs or import quotas.^ It was a fashionable
39 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization-Theories and Facts.” World
Politics. 49 (1997), 177.
40 Ibid-, 177.
Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South 
American Politics (Beikeley:Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973)
Those countries in which the military as an institution seized power were Brazil (1964), 
Argentina (1966), Chile and Umguay (1973).
Guillermo O’Donnell, “Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian State.” Latin American Research Review. 12, (1978), 29.
^  For ISI, see, Albert O. Hirschman, “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting 
Industrialization in Latin America,” in A Bias fo r Hope, ed. Albert O.Hirschman (New Haven; Yale
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developmental strategy implemented by many undeveloped countries which, after the great 
depression, tried as much as possible not to be dependent on world economy. According 
to O’Donnell, at the initial stages of ISI (or what is called at the easy phase of ISI) 
considerable socio-economic development took place. The rapid expansion of consumer 
goods was able to satisfy the already existing domestic market that was heavily protected 
by the imposition of tariffs or import controls. Production for domestic markets also 
enabled the domestic producers to afford high wages to increase the purchasing power of 
workers. Trade Union activities were allowed, generous benefits for the workers were 
accepted. Thus, a multi-class political coalition that supported such strategies was 
consolidated and an “incorporating alliance” between the bourgeoisie and the working 
class that favors political democracy emerged.
The problems, however, started once the domestic market was satisfied and 
opportunities for industrial expansion became limited. What was required at this stage was 
the “deepening of industrialization.” That is, the expansion of industrial production other 
than consumer goods, the intermediate and capital goods employed in the production of 
consumer goods. Due to the low level of technology and human capital, this deepening 
necessitates higher saving rates for investment and for attracting foreign capital. To 
achieve higher saving rates and to attract foreign investment measures such as tariff 
reduction, abolition of import and price controls, adoption of floating exchange rates, 
reductions in the cost of labor, creation of flexible labor market need to be implemented. 
But these measures are likely to attract stiff opposition from the already active popular 
sector.
Besides, with higher levels of social differentiation the role of technocrats 
(especially civilian and military bureaucracies in the public sector) becomes enlarged. By 
its very nature, they are likely to perceive the effective policy making as something that 
needs to be freed from political considerations. Disturbed by the ongoing economic and 
political crises and inability of the system to resolve the crisis within a competitive
University Press, 1971)
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democracy, these military and civilian technocrats ultimately establishe a “bureaucratic- 
authoritarian” regime that proceed by repressing the active popular sector.
O’Donnell’s thesis has led to considerable debates. Though popularized versions of 
it appeared to have enjoyed widespread acceptance, especially in non-academic circles, it 
was severely criticized in academia even in the heyday o f the dependency perspective. 
Albert O. Hirschman, for instance, pointed out the need to look at purely political factors 
for a complete explanation of a regime change. He argued that, however great the crisis of 
ISI might have been, the rise of the authoritarian regimes in Latin America can not be 
explained without giving consideration to political factors, such as the fear and the 
determination of the United States and other ruling groups in Latin America to prevent a 
second Cuba and/or the spread of gerilla tactics on the left.^  ^ One can add to those 
political factors, the military’s propensity to intervene, the behaviors and attitudes of 
incumbent leaders who appear to have triggered regime breakdown through gross 
miscalculation and/or indecisiveness.^
In a similar vein, it has been argued that the crisis of ISI in particular, and 
economic crisis in general do not necessarily lead to a breakdown of democracy. Countries 
such as Columbia and Peru in 1960s and 1970s and Mexico were able to resolve the crisis 
without the establishment of a bureaucratic-authoritarian state, suggesting that the 
implementation of painful economic measures does not necessarily require authoritarian 
governments simply because historical-political framework does have an autonomy (to a 
varying degrees of course) from economic structure. Robert Kaufinan, for instance, 
explained those cases with reference to state structures’ ability to insulate themselves from
45 See, Albert O. Hirchman, “The Search for Economic Determinants,” in The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America, ed. David Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 71. 
In the same line, Nicos Mouzelis, “On the Rise of Postwar Military DictatorshipsrArgentina, Chile, 
Greece.” Comparative Studies in Society and History. 28,1 (1986), 80.
46 For instance, it was argued that Brazilian president Goulart’s actions escalated the political 
crisis that paved the way to breakdown of democracy in 1966. See, Alfred Stepan, “Political L e ^ rsh ip  
and Regime Breakdown: Brazil,” in The Breakdown o f Democracies: Latin America, ed. Juan J.Linz and 
Alfred Stepan, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 110-138.
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those pressures emanating from active populist forces without having to rely on direct 
military rule.^’ Since then, many empirical studies cast doubt on the effect of economic 
crises on regime changes. In an insightful study which presented both diachronic and cross 
sectional analysis of the IMF standby programs, Remmer, for instance, concluded that 
“democratic regimes have been no less likely to introduce stabilization programs than 
authoritarian ones, no more likely to breakdown in response to their political costs, and no 
less rigorous in their implementation of austerity measures.”^  Likewise, Muller pointed 
out Greece, Peru and Philippines cases, which faced military coups despite good economic 
perfonnance further dissociating the military intervention from economical causes. He then 
concluded that “democracy can survive in developing countries despite the severe crisis of 
economic performance.”^^  Reaching a similar conclusion, Juan Linz pointed out that in 
capitalist economies, the blame for an economic crisis can be imputed to a variety of 
factors such as the impersonal forces of markets, monopolies, trade unions or 
international financial capital. He then arrived at the conclusion that “a crisis in the 
economic system does not necessarily carry with it a crisis of the political system.”*®
The fact that in his subsequent works O’Donnell himself emphasized the centrality 
of political actors suggests that the bureaucratic-authoritarian model (which was 
unambiguously and unabashedly structuralist in its approach) explaining democratic 
instability has been deserted even by its chief proponent.** The significance of O’Donnell’s
Robert R_ Kaufman, “Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule,” in The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America, ed. David Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 250.
^  Karen L. Remmer, “The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin 
America, 1954-1984.” Comparative Politics. 18, (1986), 23. For similar argument that the IMF stand-by 
arrangements do not significantly appear to increase or promote political instability, see, Scott R. Sidel, 
The IMF and Third-World Political Instability- Is there a Connection ? (London: Macmillan, 1988).
Edward N. Muller, “Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States 
and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World.” International Studies Quarterly. 29, (1985), 457. See 
also, Gasiorowski, “Economic Crisis,” 812.
^  See, Juan J. Linz, “Legitimacy of Democracy and Socioeconomic System,” in Comparing 
Pluralist Democracies, ed. Mattei Dogan (Boulder: Westview, 1988), 65.
Guillermo O’Doimell, Philippe C.Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, ed.. Transitions From
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thesis lies in the fact that it related regime changes with the economic crises (whatever its 
sources might be). As such it is an advancement that enhances our understanding of 
democratic breakdowns. This is especially so when it is supplemented with the two 
propositions that economic crises, “though trigger democratic breakdowns,” do not 
necessarily have to lead to it and that democratic breakdowns can occur even in the 
absence of economic crisis.
Apart from those paradigms that emphasize the underlying socio-economic 
structures for the (in)stability of democracy, the other powerful approach in the same 
tradition singled out underlying cultural traits as the most significant variable. It has been 
argued that various cultures contain some inherent obstacles which inhibit democracy from 
taking root. In the late sixties, many authors pointed out that Catholicism, with its alleged 
tradition of intolerance and hierarchy, with its failure to separate religion from politics was 
a significant obstacle for democracy. Since many Catholic countries have replaced 
authoritarian regimes and have had fairly succesful experiences with democracy, this 
argument appears to have been seriously weakened.*^
Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also review article 
by Daniel H.Levine, “Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy.” World Politics. 3, XL (1988).
52 CJaiorowski, “Economic Crisis,” 812.
A somewhat different approach in this tradition was developed by Напу Eckstein. Rather than 
pointing out various cultures' (in)compatibility with democracy, he pointed out the congruence (and/or the 
lack of it) between the authority patterns of democratic regimes and the socio-cultural norms that prevail 
in such intermediate institutions as family, schools and voluntary organizations as the most significant 
factors to explain democratic (in)stability. See, Eckstein, “A Theory of Stable Democracy,” in Regarding 
Politics -Essays on Political Theory, Stability and Change, (University of Chicago Press;Oxford, 1992), 
186. (the article originally pubUshed in 1966).
^  See, for instance, Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism, ed with an introduction by 
Roy Иегсе (Arm Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 1990) (original publication 1%5); Seymour Martin 
Lipset, “The Centrality of Political Culture.” Journal o f Democracy. 1,4 (1990), 80-83. For an argument 
that the Latin American (a mix of C^athoUc-Iberian tradition) cultures involve arrtiKlemocraiic elements, see 
Howard Wiarda, ed. Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition (Amherst; University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1974).
** As Huntington noted “the third wave of the 1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic 
w ave,... Roughly three-quarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were 
predominantly Catholic.” Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave.” Journal o f Democracy. 2, 2
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Yet, culturalist arguments are by no means exhausted. The Catholicism and Iberic 
tradition (which had been assumed to be as an obstacle for democracy) is now being 
replaced by Islam and Confucianism. The allegedly consummatory character of both 
religions are held to be inhibiting factors for the emergence and stability of democracy. It 
is argued that their emphasis on group over individuals, authority over liberty, and their 
failure to disassociate the religious from the political sphere makes democracy difficult to 
establish and (if established) maintain. Elhe Kedorie, for instance, writes that “ ...there is 
nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world -which are the political traditions of 
Islam- which might make familiar, or indeed, intelligible, the organi2ing ideas of 
constitutional and representative government.”*^  The basic difficulty with this culturalist 
argument is that social scientific analysis just can not tell whether and to what extent the 
absence of democracy in Muslim or in Confiician societies is to do with these religions but 
not with other possible variables. It can justifiably be argued, for instance that, the absence 
of democracy in Arab lands is more to do with the existence of “rentier state,” or 
dominance of kinship and tribal bonds in the social structure than the impact of Islam as 
such. Moreover, it is becoming widely accepted that contrary to the claims of many 
culturalists, cultures are not unchanging, realities fixed once and for all. By contrast, they 
change, albeit slowly, as a result of socio-economic changes, international diffiision and 
political learning.*’
(1991), 13.
** EUie Kedorie, Democracy and Arab Political Tradition (Washington D.C: A Washington 
Institute Monograph, 1992), 5. For other examples in this line, see. See, George F. Kennan, Clouds o f 
Danger: Current Realities o f American Foreign Policy. (Boston; Little Brown, 1977); For an argument 
that the Asian cultures involve some elements that does not go hand in hand with democracy. See, Lucien 
Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f Authority. (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University, 1985); Huntington, “Third Wave,” 24-29; Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of 
Democracy Revisited.” American Sociological Review. 59 (1994), 5-7; Farced Zakaria, “Culture is 
Destiny- A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew.” Foreign Affairs. 72, 2 (1994). For a counter view, Russell 
Arben Fox, “Confucian and Communitarian Responses to Liberal Democracy.” Review o f Politics. 59,3 
(1997); Fukuyama, “The Primacy,” 21.
”  See, Larry Diamond, “Introduction; Political Culture and Democracy” in Political Culture and 
Democracy in Developing Countries, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder; Lynne Rienner, 1993), 9; Lipset, 
"Social Requisites,” 7; Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” 50.
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Rather than studying some specific cultures’ (in)compatibility with democracy, 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba attempted to identify the kind of political culture within 
which a democracy is more likely to survive.^* They were concerned with the question of 
“why some democracies survive while others collapse more than with the question of how 
well democracies perform,”*^  particularly m the aftermath of collapse of German and 
Italian democracies and the chronic instability of French Fourth Republic. Their study was 
based on extensive surveys conducted in the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy 
and Mexico. What they called “civic culture”, which presumed to enhance the stability of 
democracy, denoted a mixed political culture in which participant political culture is 
balanced by a more apathetical and subject political attitudes. They contended that the more 
“civic values” “  -such as belief in one’s own competence, partidpation in public afiairs, pride 
in political system, limited partisanship, the propensity to cooperate with others, tolerance of 
diversity -prevailed, the more the chances that democracy would remain stable.^* Linking the 
emergence of such values with sodo-economic devdopment levels, they implied that these 
values were more likely to be found in sodo-economically developed urban sodeties than the
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture-Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations (Princeton NJ; Princeton University Press, 1%3).
See, Sidney Veiba, “On Revisiting the Civic Culture,” in The Civic Culture Revisited, ed. 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 407.
^  These values (sometimes also called civility or civic virtue) basically refers to the qualities and 
attitudes expected of citizens. In its essence, it require members of the society to show “a solicitude for 
the interest of the whole society , a concern for the common good.” Edward Shils, “Civility and Civil 
Society,” in Civility and Citizenship in Liberal Democratic Societies, ed. Edward C. Banfield (New York: 
Paragon House, 1992), 1. More specifically, it refers to; citizens’ sense of identity and how this is 
perceived when contrasted to competing forms of regional, ethnic or religious identities; their ability to 
work with others; their desire to participate in public affairs; their willingness to show self-restraint and 
exercise personal responsibility in their public demands. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of 
the Citizen: A Surv^ of Recent Woik on Citizenship Theory,” in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ronald 
Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 284.
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic. There is a renewed emphasis on the significance of 
civic values for the democracy revolving around the recent work of Robert D. Putnam (with Robert 
Leonardi and Rafiaella Y. Nanetti), Making Democracy Work -Civic Traditions in Modem Italy 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993). See also, Larry Diamond, “Nigera: The Uncivic Society and 
the Descent into Praetorianism,” in Politics in Developing Countries- Comparing Experiences with 
Democracy, second ed, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Lyime Rieimer: 
Boulder, 1995).
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economically backward peasant ones. Indeed, long before them, well-known dichotomies 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesselchaft (of Ferdinand Tönnies) or mechanical or organical 
solidarity (of Emile Duricheim) have all juxtaposed an urban or modem life with the traditional 
or peasant life.^  ^While the former was characterized with high level of division of labor, the 
development of contractual relations alongside the growth of commerce and trade, the 
development of individualism and tolerance, the latter was characterized with low level of 
division of labor and subsistence economy, the primacy of shared values and sacred traditions, 
which were likely to result in communitarian stmcture. It was assumed that urban societies are 
capable of developing the means of organic solidarity as it is in the urban context where 
rational and material interests were likely to replace commonly subscribed communitarian 
outlooks as the bases of social relations. While the findings of the recent research^^ has cast 
some doubt into the validity of these dichotomies, it did not wholly reject them. David Karp 
and others, for instance, argued that in the fece of the great diversity that both and urban 
communities displayed one should be careful not to overgeneralize. But they, nevertheless 
concluded that the city does produce “a distinctive culture of civility.”^
Almond and Verba’s emphasis on values was criticized in several respect. First, the 
precise mechanisms “linking culture to structure” (that is in which ways culture affected 
the structure or were affected by it) was said to be not clearly specified.^* Second, it was
“  Influenced by such dichotomies, George Simmel and Louis Wirth had emphasized the 
distinctive features of city life. While Wirth placed a premium on size, density and hetereogenity of the 
city life, Simmel dwelled on psychological-cultural traits that are more likely to be found in the city 
residents. See, Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as Way of Life,” in On Cities and Social Life-Selected Papers, ed. 
Albert J. Reiss, Jr (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964). (Originally published in 
1938); Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” in Readings in Introductory Sociology, ed. 
Eiennis H. Wrong, Harry L. Gracey (New York: The Macmillan, 1968)
® Mike Savage and Alan Warde, Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity (London: 
Macmillan, 1993), 97 ff; David A. Karp, Gregory P.Stone, William C. Yoels, Being Urban- A Sociology 
o f City Life, seconded, (New York: Praeger, 1991), 130.
^  Ibid., 130. Putnam similarly found that the least civic areas of the Italy were precisely the 
traditional southern villages. Putnam, Civic. 112.
** See, Arendt Lijphart, “The Structure of Inference” in The Civic Culture Revisited, David D. 
Laitin, “The Civic Culture At 30.” American Political Science Review. 89, 9, (1995), 169.
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argued that the political culture can be seen as the effect not the cause of political 
processes. That is, stable democracies are not stable because of the prior existence of civic 
values but rather the reverse, because they are stable they tend to produce civic culture.“  
While the first criticism appears to be plausible, the second one is based on a somewhat 
distorted picture of the Civic Culture. Almond and Verba, as they later indicated, nowhere 
in the study asserted that the political culture caused political structure. Instead they 
treated political culture as both “an independent and a dependent variable, as causing 
structure and being caused by it.”*^^
Culture in general, political culture in particular is obviously a significant variable 
for the establishment and the maintenance of democracy, and after two decades of 
ignorance, it has now “returned” to the inainstream of political science.“  No serious 
student of politics can ignore the impact of culture or values on the fimctioning of 
democracy. But, as with socio-economic development levels, by itself political culture can 
not account for the existence or the absence o f democracy. There are always many other 
factors, alongside the political culture, that (dis)favor democracy. As Michael Hudson 
argues, political culture “is not likely to explain dependent variables as general as stability, 
democracy or authoritarianism. But it may help explain, why certain institutions (such as 
legislatures) function as they do.^^ Besides, an approach putting a premium on values or 
culture should also explain the mechanism of what factors led to these values in the first
^  Carol Pateman, “The Civic Culture: A Philosophic Critique,” in The Civic Culture Revisited 
66-8.; Brian Валу, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), 
51.
Gabriel Almond, “The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept” in The Civic Culture 
Revisited,.29.
“  See, Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” American Political Science 
Review. 82, (1988), 1203-1230.; John Street, “Political C!ulture; From Civic Culture to Mass Culture.” 
British Journal o f Political Science. 24, (1993), 96; Diamond, “Introduction”; Francis Fukuyama, “The 
Primacy”; Michael C.Hudson, “The Political Culture approach to Arab Democratization: The Case for 
Bringing It Back in, C^arefiilly,” in Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, vol I, 
ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble (Boulder, London: Lyrme Riermer, 1995).
69 Hudson, “The Political Culture,” 64.
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place, and once a set of pattern has been established how it tend to reproduce itself in a
changing socio-political environment 70
1.2. WHAT MAKES FOR DEMOCRACY ? POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Alongside those approaches that emphasized underlying macro variables, there 
existed, though certainly in minority, another tradition which placed a premium on political 
actors and their behavior as crucial variable for explaining democratic (in)stability. In a 
seminal article appeared in Comparative Politics in 1970, Dankwart A.Rustow had argued 
that given the single pre-condition of national unity, a stable democracy might emerge 
through respective phases of preparation (characterized by polarization among elites), 
decision (characterized by an agreement on the rules of the game) and habituation 
(internalization of the rules of the game by the elites). Rustow thus suggested that a 
functioning democracy could be established through elites disposed to bargaining.^* 
Though concerned largely with the emergence of democracy, Rustow’s arguments 
prepared the ground for a shift away from macro-structural variables towards more 
contingent political ones.^
We do not treat institutional factors (presidentalism vs parliamentarianism, proportional 
representation vs plurality, federalism vs unitarism and the like) as macro-variables and discuss it here. 
Because the institutional side, in comparison to socio-political structures, is more susceptible to 
manipulation in the short term. Even if we had included these (as we might) in our discussion, we would 
have seen that no scholarly agreement exists as to which institutional structure (or combination) is more 
conducive to democracy. As the recent major study on institutions has shown institutional structures 
“provide risks and opportunities, not certainties. They facilitate or hinder, but do not directly determine 
the outcomes.” Bert A. Rockman, “Institutions, Democratic Stability and Performance,” in Institutions 
and Democratic State Craft, ed. Metin Heper, Ali Kazancigil, Bert A. Rockman (Boulder; Westview, 
1997), 22. What is important is not so much a particular institutional stmcture but rather, as Heper noted, 
their “appropriateness vis-à-vis the existing social structure and political culture” and their “capacity to 
fulfill salient goals and expectations of key actors” which is to be inquired in each particular case. Metin 
Heper, “Introduction,” in Institutions and Democratic State Craft, ed. Metin Heper, Ali Kazancigil, Bert 
A. Rockman (Boulder; Westview, 1997), 8.
” Rustow, “Transitions.”
One should also refer to Otto Kircbeimer’s work which appeared in 1965 that emphasized 
micro-political variables. Kircheimer argued that “The social and economic frame of the particular society 
... lays down a conditioning perimeter within which the original choice had to be made and solutions
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Actor-oriented approaches, (exemplified by Rustow) which appeared to be out of 
touch with the spirit of times, began to gain ground in late seventies and eighties and 
theorists have begun to pay more attention to the political processes, particularly to the 
behavior of political actors in explaining the (in)stability of democracies.^ The discrediting 
of Marxist determinism and structural-functionalism, the prevailing intellectual climate of 
postmodernism (which is more sensitive to cultural-historical specificities, human action 
and distrustful of grand theories) and dissatisfaction with structural theories appears to 
have stimulated such development.
The failure of the structural theories to account for regime change -either transition 
from authoritarian rule or the breakdown of democracy was at the heart of that 
dissatisfaction. As we remarked above, although various macro variables can be shown to 
be facilitating or hindering democratic stability, they are not very helpful in explaining 
regime change.’  ^ For instance, despite its impressive achievement in comprehending the 
relations between socio-economic development levels and democracy, Lipset’s arguments 
have a lesser relevance for explaining the breakdown of democracies. It seems safe to 
conclude that poor countries are more likely to prone democratic breakdowns. Yet, still 
the mere fact of being poor is not in itself enough to lead to breakdown, while the mere 
fact of being rich is no guarantee that the democracy will survive forever. As Lipset 
himself accepted “a political form may develop because of a syndrome of unique historical
have to be sought.” Otto Kircheimer, “Confining Coniditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs.” 
American Political Science Review. LIX, 4 (1%5), 966.
Juan J. Linz, Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdowns and Reequilibration. 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and 
Laurence Whitehead, “Transitions,”; Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on 
Democratic Transitions (Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of C!alifomia Press, 1990); John Highley 
and Michael G. Burton, “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns.” American 
Sociological Review. 54, (1989), 17.; and Terry L. Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin 
America.” Comparative Politics. 23, 1, (1990), 1.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the two most important books in that tradition (that of Linz 
and O’Donnel et al) is concerned with the regime change.
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circumstances even though the society’s major characteristics favor another form.”’  ^
Regardless of the levels of economic development, the breakdown of democracy needs to 
be accompanied by some other factors like violence, polarization, erosion of legitimacy 
which are not necessarily related to socio-economic conditions, but rather have to do with 
specific political variables. Similarly, political culture is obviously a significant variable for 
the establishment and the maintenance of democracy. But an explanation of the 
breakdown of democracy with reference to political culture is less than adequate. The 
political culture of the country concerned would obviously be useful in sorting out broader 
parameters of political process, but it would be of little help in explaining how the 
breakdown (which is the result of a complex constellation of various contingent and 
unique variables) occurred.
In this tradition, it was Juan J. Linz who wrote a novel essay on the breakdown of 
democracies. He claimed that those approaches putting a premium on underlying societal 
variables, though indispensable to proper understanding of any regime change, were 
inadequate. Even if they could explain “why” breakdown occurred, they are less than 
successful in explaining “how” it is realized in practice.’  ^ Beginning with the initial 
assumption that structural characteristics of societies “constitute a series of opportunities 
and constraints for the social and political actors, both men and institutions that can lead 
to one or another outcome.”^  Linz offered a dynamic analysis of political processes 
(instead of an exclusive analysis of underlying social-political variables at a given time) 
during which the actions of political actors increased or decreased the chances of survival 
of democracy.
In so arguing Linz was attentive not to belittle the impact of underlying structural
Lipset, Political Man. 28. 
Linz, The Breakdown. 4.
Ibid, S. Edward R  Carr have similarly noted that ‘‘Nothing in history is inevitable, exoqX in the 
formal sense that, for it to have happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have to had to be diffetenL” 
See, his excellent discussion, Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1964), 96.
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features, but pointed out that they were, by themselves, inadequate to account for 
breakdowns because it was the political processes which precipitated the ultimate collapse 
of democracy7* In that sense, Linz’s attempt was concerned less with replacement and 
falsification of these theories that put premium on macro variables than supplementation 
(and refinement) of them with an approach more sensitive to political processes.
Unlike structural theories, his approach allowed the discussion of significant 
political variables. The most important of those variables is the behavior of incumbents. 
Linz argued that one-sided emphasis on the actions of opponents of the democratic regime 
such as radical and violent movements, the military’s dispositions, disgruntled segments of 
society, has led to the underestimation of the actions of those who are interested in the
survival of democratic regime.^ Particularly important was the actions of political elites
<
who professed commitment*“ to survival o f democratic regime, namely presidents in 
presidential systems, and political party elites (both incumbents and loyal oppositions) in 
parliamentary regimes.
This is because in a democracy it is the incumbents (and not the other political or 
social actors such as the media and other interest groups, who usually also have an 
interests in maintaining democratic regime) who are primarily expected to deal with urgent 
problems and are held responsible through periodic elections. They occupy the positions 
of effective decision-making. Though these groups (that have a stake in maintenance of 
democratic regime) have also significant roles to play for democratic stability, none of
78 For an interesting argument that emphasis on political leadership and strategic choices has 
gone to far at the expense of structural factors, see, J.Maik Ruhl, “Unlikely Candidates for Democracy; 
The Role of Structural Context in Democratic Consolidation.” Studies in Comparative International 
Development. 31, 1 (1996), 4. Another major woik in structuralist tradition, that emphasized the role of 
the woiking classes in the emergence and consolidation of democracy, appeared in 1992. See, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, Evelyne R  Stephens & John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1992).
79 Linz, The Breakdown. 39.
80 How real that commitment is, or whether these elites really internalized “democracy” are 
different questions. What is important, they do not, implicitly or explicitly, aim to replace democratic 
regime, despite the fact that in the final analysis their actions could trigger such an outcome.
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them are expected to be directly responsible as political party elites and leaders are. For 
instance, imagine that a country suffers from rampant terrorism that has reached such 
horrendous proportions that it threatens the democratic regime. Though the attitude and 
responses of media and trade unions, of religious and other intermediary associations 
surely matter, it is up to the incumbents to envisage and devise effective ways of fighting - 
better law enforcement, better intelligence gathering, isolating terrorists etc..- with 
terrorism. If they fail in that task, no other group is likely to fiilfill the same job. Therefore 
Linz maintained that the behavior of the incumbents was central to the any understanding 
of political process leading to democratic breakdown. The incumbents might have 
triggered democratic breakdown more than any other group that have a stake in the
democratic system. They do so through their responses to violence,*^ if they create the
(
impression that the state authority is used with lenience against some groups due to 
political sympathies; to their treatment of loyal or semi-loyal opposition*^; to their setting 
of goals that can not be achieved,*^ thus reducing their credibility which is likely to be 
associated with that of the regime; to their political strategies that heighten the 
polarization and like.
This emphasis on political process brought the study of political leadership, which 
has been ignored in the literature on democracy,*^ back into the mainstream. The 
significance of political leadership for the survival of democracy became an established 
postula even among those who emphasized macro variables. Lipset, for instance, argued 
that “whether democracy succeeds or fails continue to depend significantly on the choices, 
behaviours and decisions of political leaders and groups.”*^  In a similar line of argument
Linz, The Breakdown. 57-58. 
Ibid, 38.
Ibid, 53.
84 ,Giovanni Sartori, The Theory o f Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debates 
(Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987), 171. Also Jean Blondel, Political Leadership (London: 
Sage, 1987), 36.
85 Lipsel, “The Social,” 18.
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Samuel Huntington asserted that “Economic development makes democracy possible, 
political leadership makes it real.”*^  In an attempt to combine relationships between macro 
and micro variables. Diamond, Linz and Lipset offered an interesting observation that “the 
more constraining and unfavorable the structural circumstances, the more skiMil, 
innovative courageous, and democratically committed, political leadership must be for 
democracy to survive.”*’ Conversely, if the structural circumstances were very favorable, 
the role of leadership mattered less. Indeed, long before these authors, Tocqueville had 
observed that although leadership mattered less in democratic societies than in aristocratic 
ones, he still remained “ ...very well convinced that even among democratic nations the 
genius, the vices, or the virtues of certain individuals retard or accelerate the natural 
current of a people’s history.”** Thus, it was largely accepted that if there is “transforming 
leadership” as distinct from mere “power-holders,”*’ the democracy can survive even in 
the most unfavorable conditions.
Central to the Linzian approach to the breakdown of democracies is the erosion 
(or loss) of legitimacy. Linz defined legitimacy as “the belief that in spite of the
86 Huntington, Third W ave3\6.
Diamond, Linz, Lipset, “What makes,”. 16. In the same line, Tatu Vanhanen, The Process o f 
Démocratisation: A Comparative Study o f 147 States, 1980-1988, (New Yoik: Crane Russak, 1990), 12.
** Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol 2, translated by Phillips Bradly (New Yoik: 
Vintage Books, Alfred Knopf, 1945), 91. He cautioned that “if this doctrine of necessity ...infects the 
whole mass of community and gets possession of the public mind, it will soon paralyze the activity of 
modem society and reduce Christians to the level of Tuiks.” Ibid., 93.
^  Following Bums we use the term “transforming leadership” to refer to a leadership pattern 
(which is also characterized as mobilizing or inspiring leadership) in which “one or more persons engage 
with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and 
morality.” It has a moral purpose. It aims “to shape and alter and elevate the motives and values and goals 
of followers through the vital teaching role of leadership.” It is not a leadership that is willing to perform 
under constraining conditions, but tries to affect or transform them. By contrast, “transactional 
leadership” or mere power-holding refers to a leadership pattern that is more like that of exchange 
relations in that leaders and followers “may exchange goods or services or other things in order to realize 
independent objectives.” James MacGregor Bums, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 20, 
425. (Italics are his) See also Blondel, who defined leadership as “the power exercised by one or a few 
individuals to direct members of the nation towards action.” Jean Blondel, Political Leadership (London; 
Macmillan, 1987), 3.
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shortcomings and the failures the political institutions are better than any others that might 
be estabUshed in a particular country and therefore can demand obedience.”^  Some points 
needs to be emphasized in that definition. First of all, because legitimacy is a belief on the 
part of the citizenry regarding the “rightfiilness” of the political institutions, no country in 
the world enjoys (and/or is likely to enjoy) 100 per cent legitimacy, there always being 
citizens who question the legitimacy of their regime. Secondly, “no legitimacy is definitely 
anchored that ... .one day or another it could not be threatened.”^' Likewise no legitimacy 
is doomed to fail for forever. Decreases or increases in legitimacy are possible and fairly 
common. And third, the legitimacy of given regime is closely related to whether there are 
available alternatives to that regime or not. Traditional definitions of legitimacy did not 
dwell on that point. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, has defined political system’s 
legitimacy as “the degree to which it is generally accepted by its citizens.”^  The problem 
with such a definition is that it just does not allow for a distinction between citizens’ 
acceptance of regime due to their sincere belief in it and because of the lack of any better 
alternative that might be envisaged. This point has crucial importance.^^ Imagine that two 
democracies, roughly similar in socio-economic development level, political culture, the 
longevity of democratic experience and in the capability of civilian political institutions, are 
suffering from similar problems, say, terrorism and economic crisis. Imagine that in one of 
the countries, the military has no tradition of intervention to politics and nobody expects 
it to intervene regardless of the seriousness of the problems, while the military in other 
country sees itself as the guardian of state and the country and its intervention is sought or
90 Linz, “Legitimacy,” 65.
”  Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, How To Compare Nations -Strategies in Comparative 
Politics, second ed. (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1990), 109.
92 Lipset, Political Man. 22.
”  In emphasizing this point Adam Przeworski goes as far as saying that “What matters for the 
stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or 
absence of preferable alternatives.” Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to 
Democracy,” in Transitions From Autoritarian Rule-Comparative Perspectives, ed. Guillermo O’Doimel, 
Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore and London; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1988), 51-2
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treated as normal by the bulk of its citizens. In that case the trajectories of the two 
democracies, which suffer from the similar problems, might be radically different. The 
existence of an available alternative, military takeover, to civihan democracy in one 
country might constitute an impediment to those efforts directed to resolve crisis within 
the democratic system as the majority believes that there are alternatives whose costs 
might be less than insisting on the democratic regime.
What affects (either negatively or positively) the legitimacy of regime ? Though 
specific historical-political factors namely initial conditions,^ perceptions of regime’  ^ or 
citizens’ perceptions of government in power heavily affect a regime’s legitimacy, it is 
possible to make generalizations applicable (within the limits, of course) to all regimes. 
One such generalization, offered by Linz, is that both regime’s “efficacy” and 
“effectiveness” can strengthen, reinforce, maintain, or weaken the belief in legitimacy.^ 
Efficacy refers to “capacity of a regime to find solutions to basic problems facing any 
political system (and those that become sahent any historical moment) that are perceived 
as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens.” Chief among these basic 
problems are the maintenance of civil order that makes peaceful living possible, security of 
life and property, adjustment of conflict through judicial process, and of course providing 
opportunities for a decent life for its citizens. To the extent that the regime successfully 
performs these duties it is likely to enhance its legitimacy.
Effectiveness refers to “the capacity actually to implement the policies
If the preceding regime was so badly failed (or if there was nothing like anything resembling 
regime) in its expected functions, the new regime might enjoy the benefits of bad memories of old regime 
since by comparison it is likely to be perceived better, even if its eflBcacy and effectiveness were to be low.
^  For instance, Almond and Verba found that while Mexico had the lowest scores both in the 
frequency they attributed significance to government and its citizens’ expectations of equal and 
considerate treatment from the bureaucracy and the police, thq^ expressed pride in the political system 
nearly as much as civic culture countries (US and UK). They explained this apparent anomaly with 
reference to the continuing attachment to a set of revolutionaiy ideals associated with Mexican revolution. 
See, Almond and Verba, Civic. 414.
96 Linz, Breakdown. 18
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formulated,with the desired results.”^  As such effectiveness is related to regime’s abilities 
to perform its expected functions of ensuring security of life and property, enforcability of 
contracts, providing opportunities for decent life and the like. Without effectiveness, 
efficacy defined as capacity to find solutions can not be realized since it does little to 
enhance the legitimacy of regime to say that we find (or know) solutions but can not 
actually able to implement it. The regime can be said to be effective to the extent that it 
penetrate society and implement political decisions throughout the realm.^ As such 
effectiveness depends on the complex constellations of various historical-political factors 
and needs to be studied in the context of particular cases. But it is suffice here to note that 
the state-society relations (particularly how state and regime is perceived by society at 
large) and the mode of integration of various sectors of the society have crucial 
importance in determining the effectiveness of the regime.^
Relations between efficacy and effectiveness of the regime and its legitimacy are 
far cry from being simple and straightforward. A high level of effectiveness is likely to 
enhance legitimacy of the regime, but as Upset*“® pointed out in the cases of Weimar 
Germany and Austria of 1920s, high effectiveness does not necessarily translate as higher 
legitimacy. Similarly, low level of efficacy and effectiveness does not necessarily mean 
weak legitimacy, at least in the short run, if the political system can engender the belief
97 Ibid., 22.
^  Here, the reference is made to efifectivenes of democratic regimes. Effectiveness of 
authoritarian regimes qualitatively different and depend upon rather the degree to which state has (and 
prepared to use) naked force. Effectiveness of democratic regimes, on the other hand, rather depend on 
the degree to which the regime can obtain the allegiance of citizens.
^  For instance, if the regime is perceived as something alien that had been imposed on society 
regardless of society’s preference, or if it is seen as something that neither responds nor satisfies the 
expectations of society despite it ensured initial support, its efiectivenes is likely to be low. Because in that 
case its efforts to penetrate society and implement decisions are likely to face active or passive resistance. 
Similarly, if some sections of the society feel that they are not the part of the larger society, (i.e,. they had 
not been integrated) and their distinctiveness is not properly recognized, efiectivenes of the regime, again, 
is likely to be low since those who feel excluded is likely to mount effective resistance to regime’s efforts 
to penetrate and implement political decisions.
too Lipset, Political Man. 69.
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that in the long run it would able to overcome problems. Though it might seem 
hypothetical, even a high level of efiBcacy and effectiveness does not guarantee high level 
legitimacy, if those who challenge existing regime can make people believe that they could 
bring about even higher levels of eflScacy and effectiveness.
Legitimacy is important because “changes in regime occur with the transfer of 
legitimacy from one set of political institutions to another.”’“^  That is to say, regime 
change is likely to occur when a regime is no longer seen by its citizens as better than any 
others that might be established.*“^  This formulation, however simple it might appear at 
first sight, is beset with many difBculties. Citizens do not assemble to decide whether are 
there better alternatives to their existing regimes. It is true that regular surveys regarding 
citizens’ attitudes towards the regime might be useful in measuring legitimacy. But in the 
world of real politics, abstract attitudes of citizens towards the regime measured by 
opinion polls might not matter much, not least because these polls can not measure the 
“intensity” of beliefs. At that point, we need to make fiirther refinement and add that in 
addition to the use of various attempts (where available) to measure belief in the
Another point to be discussed concerns with whether democracy as it is defined in this study 
can itself produce legitimacy. One could reasonably claim that a democracy which neither encourages full 
participation of its citizens, nor aims at quickly advancing socio-economic equality among citizens can 
hardly be successful in producing -sustaining legitimacy since without full participation of citizenry and 
visible narrowing down of inequalities between citizens would not likely to look at democratic system with 
a sense of belonging. This critic, which contain much elements of truth, does not necessarily have to be 
in sharp contrast with the procedural definition of democracy which is used in this dissertation. Since it 
neither discourages full participation of citizens nor opposes narrowing down of the inequalities nor 
improvements in the daily life of its citizens. Where it differs from participatory variants is that while the 
latter takes these elements as ‘indispensable’ and to be realized as quickly as possible, it regards them as 
‘desirable’ and favours a longer time perspective to realize them. In fact, this approach can be said to be 
much realistic and prudent and therefore be better at producing legitimacy. Simply because it does not 
inflate expectations of its citizens given the various constraints that market system poses for democracy, 
and thus prevents the possible disappointments that might follow which is likely to be detrimental to 
legitimacy of democracy. For a discussion of how markets can pose limitations on democratization 
process, see David Beetham, “Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization.” Political Studies. 
XL (1992), 83-98; Andrew Gamble, “The Limits of Democracy.” The Political Quarterly. (1996), 117- 
131.
102 Linz, Breakdown. 27.
103 .This assumes, of course, there is a disloyal opposition ready to challenge the existing regime 
and to establish an alternative one.
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legitimacy of system on part of the bulk of citizenry, one should also look at some critical 
groups namely army, business, press and international actors. Not only because these 
groups might have a manipulative power over citizen attitudes towards regime, but also 
because regime change is not an ordinary event that is done in accordance with the wishes 
of the people, though it is pretended to be as such. But rather, it is very much an elite 
dominated, elite-led event, giving ordinary citizens a secondary, if any, role.
Particularly important in that respect is the belief in the legitimacy of the regime on 
the part of those who have direct control of armed forces. When the armed forces come 
to believe that the political system has failed so miserably in the performance of functions 
expected of it that the establishment of a new political order (despite the uncertainty about 
its character) is only way out the democratic breakdown (through military intervention) is 
likely to occur.
It seems unlikely, however, that the armed forces would try to overthrow the 
government if they do not see that “the significant segment of society shared their lack of 
belief and that others were at least indifferent to the conflicting claims for allegiance.”*®^ 
That is the armed forces are not by and large the central independent variable in the 
breakdown of democracies. They usually take into consideration, alongside the assessment 
of possible mass attitude towards the intervention, how the other social-political groups 
and international actors would react to their attempts to take power. Particularly, they are 
likely to look for the support, or at least indifference, of the business, the press and the
104 Upset indicates the big business and the armed forces as powerful groups. We thought it 
appropriate to add these the press and international actors. See Upset, Political Man. 64.
105 Linz, Breakdown. 17.
106 1’ Needless to add that we have in mind here the breakdown of democracy as a result of militaiy 
intervention. The military intervention is not the only way to end the democracy. Bingham Powell adds 
that democracies can be overthrown through anti-democratic party’s seizure of power (as in Weimar 
Germany), the collapse of all-governmental authority in the face of civil war (as in Ld>anon) and the 
suspension of democratic process by the elected head of state. See, Bingham Powell, JR., Contemporary 
Democracies-Participation, Stability, anrf F/o/ence (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 170-1.
107 Linz, Breakdown. 17
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international actors. 108
The possible reaction of the business community is important because in a market 
economy where investment decisions affecting the country’s economic might is 
dominantly taken by the business, their support is indispensable to the survival of any 
regime. As Charles Lindblom put it, in market economies the businesses are structurally 
advantaged position vis-à-vis governments because they have been entrusted with the 
power to decide whether and where to invest,’”’ a decision that affects whole of the 
community.
The press or the media, as is often claimed, is the fourth power in a democracy. In 
the words of one observer, the media “ ...do not simply report the world for us in any 
neutral or objective sense, they interpret the world for us.’’” ” The press’ evaluation of 
regime performance is clearly veiy important in assessing to what extent the belief in 
democratic regime appears to have declined. As Raymond Aron remarked “In a country in 
which, every day, the newspapers state that the regime has reached the last stages of 
decomposition, a crisis point has undoubtedly been reached. In matters of this kind, 
opinion is reality and creates, in part, reality.”’” Therefore, the armed forces would try to 
ensure that the bulk of the press support their move, or at least would not oppose it for 
long.
Finally, in an increasingly interdependent world, international actors’ (both
108 These are, by no means, the only critical aaors the army would be likely to assess their 
possible reactions. In exceptional cases, the armed forces might also look for a possible reaction of single 
person with a moral authority to act. For instance, İsmet İnönü, the hero of war of independence and 
commonly regarded as the second man of Turkey, seems to played such a role in the 1960 military 
intervention. As we learn from the memoirs of the 1960 coup leaders’ they wanted, among other things, to 
make sure that İsmet İnönü “even if he would not support a move, would at least not oppose to it.” See, 
Orhan Erkanh, v4m/ar, Sorunlar, 5brum/u/ar (Istanbul; Baha, 1%7), 310.
109 Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York.Basic Books, 1977)
no Ralph Negrine, Politics and the Mass Media in Britain (London; Routledge, 1991), 5
(authors’ italics)
in Aron, Democracy. 135.
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economic and political organizations and various powerful states) support or indifference 
is as much, if not more, important. Particularly important is to get the support or at least 
to secure apathy of the powerful state(s) that the country in question has conducted 
bilateral agreements, supranational organizations such as EU, and to a lesser extent non­
governmental organizations. If the military see that those national and international actors 
would oppose such a move, they are likely to think twice before acting. Or even if they 
act in such conditions, their chances of seizing power will be remote.
Therefore we agree with the recent major study on democracy in developing 
countries that the military’s “size, autonomy, professional doctrine, and role conception 
may determine its threshold for intervention, but do not constitute and independent cause 
of breakdown.”"^ The military (even the ones which are ready to use force at ease) is 
likely to assess what sort of reactions its move would likely to generate from social and 
political forces. It is also important to note here that one always should take into 
consideration that these critical groups are not likely to behave similarly in different 
contexts. Historical specificities must not be ignored. For instance, if the business thrives 
on state support rather than its success in competitive markets, if it, historically, lacks the 
tradition of opposition to what comes from the top down then its views are not likely to be 
attached much importance by the military.
1.3. METHODOLOGY
As indicated above, in this dissertation it is the Linzian approach to the breakdown 
of democracies which is used. Such an approach allows us to analyze the 12 September 
breakdown in a way that takes into consideration both the underlying social-political
112 1Diamond, Linz and Lipset, “What Makes,” 47. Earlier, Samuel P. Huntington had arrived the 
same conclusion arguing that “The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not 
military, but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military 
establishment, but the political and institutional stmcture of society.” Hrmtington, Political Order. 194.
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constraints and actions of political elites and other political variables. Following Juan 
Linz it is assumed that the structural characteristics of the societies (or macro-political 
variables) do not completely determine whether democracy survives or not. Since 
democracy is a particular kind of political regime, it is the political processes rather than 
underlying structural features that primarily affects the breakdown of democracy. Despite 
unfavorable structural conditions, political actors, chief among them political parties and 
leaders, “have certain choices that can increase or decrease the probability of the 
persistence and stability of the regime.”" “*
With this approach in mind, the thesis seeks to answer three closely related sets of 
questions. Firstly, what were the larger framework (or basic parameters) of Turkish 
politics that generated both social and political constraints and/or opportunities for the 
advent of the democratic regime? It is argued here that at the most general level two 
prominent factors appears to have played a crucial role. Namely, the tradition of a strong 
state, and the traditional social structure undergoing the process of modernization. It is the 
complex encounter and interaction of these two strains that heavily affected the fortunes 
of Turkish democracy by creating constraints and opportunities for political party elites. 
We are interested in such questions as; how did the strong state tradition affect the 
Turkish army’s disposition towards intervention, its perception of itself and its place 
within the political system over time ? How does the same tradition appear to have 
affected the culture of the periphery and its representatives in the political system ? How 
does the traditional social structure appear to have placed its imprint on, for instance, the 
emergence of the party system, or the organizational structure of parties ? How does it 
relate with the presence/absence of the civic values at mass level ? What kind of 
consequences followed for the political system as migration to cities and strains of
Linz indicated that his analysis is applicable “only to democratic regimes in consolidated 
nation-states that had achieved independence or a measure of political autonomy a considerable time 
before the crisis of the regime. In addition, all the democracies analyzed are based on majority rule rather 
than on complex consociational mechanisms.” Linz, Breakdown, 8. Prior to 1980 the Turkish democracy 
satisfied both conditions.
114 Ibid., 4.
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industrialization gained pace in sixties and seventies ? It goes without saying that our 
intention is not to treat the larger social-political framework of Turkish democracy in 
detail as this would require a separate (and much larger) study, but rather to emphasize the 
constraints and opportunities for political party elites. We believe that it is only through 
the understanding of such social-political framework that we can put party elite behavior 
in perspective.
Secondly, after outlining the larger framework within which political actions took 
place, the study inquire into political party elite'behavior in detail since it is the basic aim 
of this dissertation. We are concerned with how, in terms of enhancing and/or 
undermining the legitimacy of democracy, political party elites who professed open 
commitment to democratic regime acted during the period in question. Particularly, how 
did they respond to various problems, namely terrorism and economic crisis, that 
democracy faced? How did they (both incumbents and those in opposition) respond to 
those policy options (such as the formation of a coalition government bétween the two 
major parties; cooperation among major parties represented in the parliament to effect 
package of measures as favored by the military; agreement among those parties to achieve 
the election of a president; putting an end to politicization of civilian bureaucracy and the 
police force; reducing the tension in the country, etc.) which is presented by critical actors 
(the military, press, business and trade unions) as potentially effective remedies that might 
have alleviated the crisis of democracy ? It is not possible to reach a firm conclusion 
whether those options (had they been chosen) could have successfully ended the 
stalemate. But the crucial issue is that those policies seemed to be perceived (or at least 
presented as such) by the influential groups (particularly the military) as potentially
115 Using positional definiton of elites, by political party elites’ we mean those who occupy 
decision-making positions in political parties, and if their parties in government, in govenunental 
positions. Moreover, we use terms like political party elites, political parties and leaders’ interchangeably. 
In the Tiukish context, as we shall see, it is hardly possible to imagine political parties without reference 
to their leaders. Indeed, it would not be misleading to say that quite often leaders alone decide which 
direction their party would take. Following Pareto, the notion of elite as used in this study does not 
necessarily implies elite’s having some sort of superiority, be that moral, or ability, vis-a-vis non elites, as 
the term might imply.
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effective remedies to resolve the crisis,“ ® and that political actors’ inability to achieve 
them, and to offer other viable policy options as alternative, appears to have shaken their 
belief in the system. Since “changes in regime occur with a transfer of legitimacy from one 
set of political institutions to another,” their coming into the conclusion that there 
remained no way to resolve the crisis within the system was decisive for the fate of the 
democratic regime.
Thirdly, we are interested in the explanation of why political party elites behaved 
in the way they actually did. It goes without saying that we do not attempt to explain 
leadership behavior believed to be deviated from “rightful” leadership behavior, whatever 
it could be. In other words, the study, does not treat actual leadership behavior as 
pathological deviation which is in need of explanation. Quite the reverse, our concern here 
is, first, to understand, in a Weberian manner, the meanings attached to actions (and non­
actions) of political elites themselves as well as understanding their mentality (zihniyet in 
Turkish) that underlies (guides) their actions. We, then, attempt to explain their action by 
taking into account institutional, political, and economic constraints that limited their room 
for manuevre. For instance, why was coming to power and staying there so important for 
them ? why have they intensified ideological polarization ? Why was government- 
opposition relations always tense ? Why have they tended towards extreme partisanship ? 
Why they could not end the politicization of bureaucracy ? Which factors appears to have 
prevented them taking those alternative course of action proposed-favored by critical 
groups ? Our explanation of elite behavior is, admittedly, incomplete. The fuller 
understanding of the elite behavior requires, first, taking into consideration the larger 
social-political framework, (environment so to speak) of socio-economical, cultural, 
institutional factors that presented obstacles and provided opportunities. It also requires a 
study of elites themselves -their culturally grounded orientations and beliefs, ideologies.
We discuss in detail whether these policy options were put forward by the military so as to 
justify their intervention or not (i.e. whether there was a ‘double talk’ on the part of the military) in 
chapter six.
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and short-term political considerations.**^ To fully understand the latter aspects, i.e, why 
they tend to hold some beliefs or ideologies rather than others, the study of childhood 
experiences, education and post-recruitment socialization patterns needs also to be taken 
into consideration. This study is incomplete in the latter. It is because ours is not a study 
aiming to explain behavior patterns of a single leader, but two major party elites 
(including their leaders, of course) as a whole in the specified period. Therefore, although 
we attempt to consider culturally grounded orientations, beliefs, ideologies, and short­
term political considerations of party elites, we can not delve into detailed consideration 
of their political socialization process and more personal factors that surely have an impact
on these. 118
The study does not intend to test any grand theory or hypothesis, not least because 
specific cases are always too complicated to piove (or disprove) a single theory. But also 
because, however novel his analysis of breakdown of democratic regimes might be, Linz 
(whose approach that we use) did not develop the “highly abstract generalizing of a 
historical social scientific models of the type susceptible to computer simulations and 
applicable to all past and any future cases.”**’ Believing that the “historicity of macro­
political processes,” *^ precludes such theory building, Linz preferred a “highly eclectic
As Fred Greenstein argued behaviour “ ...is a function of both the environmental situations in 
which actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to those situations...” Fred 
1. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago, Markham Publishing Company, 1969), 7. Similarly, 
Putnam remarked that “..a leaders’ behaviour is a function, not just of his personal opinions, but also of 
the objective situation in which he finds itself.” Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study o f Political 
Elites, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976), 80. Also, Jean Blondel, Political Leadership (London; Sage, 
1987), 4.
The fuller understanding of the origins of the elite belief systems, as Putnam remarked, 
require at least an analysis of childhood experiences, education and post-recruitment socialization 
patterns. Putnam, Elites. 92-98.
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Editor’s Preface and Acknowledgements” in The Breakdown 
o f Democratic Regimes, Crisis, Breakdown & Reequlibration (Baltimore and LondoniThe Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), XI.
120 Ibid., XI.
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and broadly inductive” approach. He did not, for instance, explore deductively the 
generic properties of democracies and motives of political actors resulting in eventual
breakdown which might have led to some models 122
This study, therefore can be said to be in what Peter Evans called “eclectic messy 
center” of the comparative politics. That is, it “draws on general theories whenever it 
can” it uses general theories as “lenses to identify what is interesting and significant about 
particular cases.” ^^  ^ The concern with general theories is important because particular 
cases might provide further support for or disconfirmation of general theories which is 
likely to result in refinement of the theory in question. As Dogan and Pleassy indicates 
especially the analysis of deviant cases “...may disclose new causes and oblige the 
observer to develop or reformulate theory.” ’^  In that sense, this study, for instance, can 
be taken as counter-case for the view that presidential systems are more breakdown-prone 
than parliamentary ones. It also constitutes another counter case for the argument that 
moderate multi-party systems are likely to produce moderate politics.
It goes without saying that a concern with particular cases compels researches to 
do historical analysis. Without a rich and detailed historical narrative it would hardly be 
possible to understand specific sequences of events. History is necessary to place social- 
political groups and institutions in their proper place. This is especially so in a country
Philippe C. Schmitter, “Book Review: The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes.” American 
Political Science Review. 74, 3, (1980), 849.
In fact, there has been a notable tendency in social sciences to abandon a simple overarching 
paradigm like modernization or dependency. Instead, scholars began to felt the need to develop “concepts 
and theories of medium range aimed at the description, analysis and interpretation of relatively precise 
and delimited process.” See, Manuel Antonio Carretón, “Political Démocratisation in Latin America and 
the Crisis of Paradigms,” in Rethinking Third World Politics (London:Longman, 1991). See also, Karen 
L. Remmer, “Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development -The Resurgence of InsUtutional 
Analysis.” World Politics. 50, (1997).
123 See, Peter Evans, “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposiiun.” World
Politics. 48, (1995), 4.
124 Ibid. 4
Dogan and Pelassy, How To Compare. 123.
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(such as Turkey) beset by cultural cleavages, an understanding of which is not possible 
without reference to formative influence of the past. The study of the past is also vital to 
analyze particular perceptions, and ways of, “doing politics” without which the 
mentality(ies) of the actors can not be properly understood.
Though the study does not make any comparison (in the strict sense) between two 
or three cases, we believe that an understanding of a breakdown of democracy (or any 
other particular phenomenon for that matter) in particular case is only possible if it takes 
into consideration how the democracy broke down in other countries. We believe that 
“one knows one’s own country better when one knows other countries too.”*^ It is 
through such a comparative approach that one could get an idea of what is distinctive 
about the Turkish case, and what is not, hence leading to better understanding of the 
particular case.
Qualitative analysis is employed as the prime research method. Because the study 
aims to achieve an understanding of phenomena that do not lend itself to precise 
measurement. We heavily rely on secondary historical materials that would allow us to 
delineate the essential developments precipitating the breakdown. Such a reliance on 
secondary materials risks temptation to select the historical evidence (and omit others) to 
fit a preconceived framework. But, apart from interviews, other ways of collecting 
historical knowledge has yet to be found. An awareness of the problem as well as the 
nature of the thesis which does not aim to falsify or verify any preconceived framework, 
we believe, diminishes the magnitude of the problem. Yet another pitfall that we tried to 
avoid concerns with the tendency to present the flow of events (leading to 12 September 
breakdown) as if they had to happen, since we already knew the result. This tendency, if 
left unchecked, might obscure our understanding of unique and open-ended characteristics 
of historical process.
126 Ibid., 126.
See, for an insightful discussion by Albert O. Hircshman, “The Search For Paradigms as a 
Hindrance to Understanding.” World Politics. 22 (1970).
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Editorials and other influential writers in chief Turkish newspapers (Hürriyet, 
Milliyet, Cumhuriyet and Terciiman) of the time is given attention both in their coverage 
of specific events and their evaluation of performance of the democratic regime at 
particular junctures. Other newspapers and weekly magazines (both Turkish and 
international) are consulted with respect to their coverage of specific events. The 
proceedings of the Grand National Assembly are also considered where necessary as it 
constitutes an indispensable guide for the analysis of political elite behavior. Our other 
basic materials are books by politicians (especially those closely involved in political 
developments in that period) expressing their views and memoirs, political party programs 
and election manifestos. Regarding the army’s views and how it came to believe that the 
intervention was the only viable option, we rely heavily on, the memoirs of General Kenan 
Evren, the chief of staff at that time, and an interview that we conducted with him.
The dissertation has sbc more chapters. In the second chapter, the basic 
characteristic of Ottoman-Turkish social-political structure, which ' defined basic 
parameters of the Turkish democracy, is discussed in historical perspective up until the 
1960 military intervention. The primary focus is on both the Ottoman-Turkish strong state 
tradition and the traditional social structure undergoing the process of modernization and 
their complex encounter and interaction. It is claimed here that this interaction has 
generated both constraints and opportunities for the advent of democracy.
The third chapter attempts to delineate the underlying social-political context in 
which the 1980 breakdown could be situated. It considers momentous changes that 
occurred both in the strong state tradition and in the modernizing social structure in the
128 Of these. Hürriyet and Milliyet are considered to be at centre, while Ciunhuriyet and 
Tercüman can be characterized moderate left and right respectively. In terms of daily circulation (between 
1975-1980) Hürriyet secured an average of 450 to 550 thousand, followed by Tercüman with 350 to 400 
thousand. Milliyet and Cumhuriyet, on the other hand, averaged 250 and 100 thousand respectively. See 
for more detail, Bülent Ozükan, ‘^ Basında Tirajlar” [Newspaper Circulations] Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, cilt 1, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 232.
129 Our efibrts to interview the pre- 1980 leaders of Justice and Republican People’s Party 
remained imsuccessful.
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sixties and early seventies. It advances the view that both changes in socio-economic 
structure -industrialization and urbanization- and the post-1960 political developments 
have affected previous constraints and opportunities for democracy as well as introducing 
new constraints and providing new opportunities. They ushered in a new era in which new 
forces were aroused, previous alliances dissolved, and perceptions of various political 
actors of themselves and others underwent critical changes. Following Sunar and Sayan 
we argue that those developments promised both a danger and hope for the stability of 
democracy depending, to a large extent, on choice, actions and responses of the political 
parties and leaders. The remaining chapters, it would not be an exaggeration to say, tells 
the story of the inability of political actors to act on that promise for democracy and the 
subsequent realization of the danger as a result.
The 1973-1978 political developments are the subject o f the fourth chapter. The 
chief theme of this chapter is that the National Front (1975-1977) governments are crucial 
to the understanding of the 1980 breakdown. It is argued that ideological polarization and 
party patronage, though these did not begin with the NF governments, were the hallmarks 
of the period. These policies led to heavily politicized, under-performing civilian 
bureaucracy as well as less than prudent economic policies, whose basic purpose, it 
seemed, was the distribution of public resources to party supporters. They were critical in 
the paralysis of state authority, that in turn negatively effected the democratic regime’s 
ability to contain terrorism, and the emergence of the economic crisis that would make 
itself fiilly felt in the years to come.
The fifth chapter considers the Republican People Party government (1978-1979) 
which appears to have been perceived by the critical actors (the military, the press, trade 
and business unions, international actors) as the hope that would tackle economic 
problems and increasing terrorism. It considers in detail how and why the RPP
130 1Okay Sunar and Sabri Sayan, “Democracy in T uik^: Prx)blems and Prospects,” in Transitions 
From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C.Schmitter and 
Lawrence Whitehead (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 177.
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government failed to satisfy expectations in both grounds and how this disappointment 
affected the critical actors’ perception of the democratic regime. The dismal performance 
of the RPP government in power, it is argued, was a heavy blow for the democratic 
regime. Critical groups (particularly the army high command) began to think that the 
possibility of solving problems within the democratic system were Umited as the Justice 
party led NF governments were already discredited and were not perceived as viable 
alternative. Thus the view that the only hope for democracy was the co-operation (not 
necessarily coalition) of two major (the JP and the RPP) parties became prevalent.
It is the subject of sixth chapter how and why the political party elites have been 
unable to follow policy options that are perceived (and presented) by critical actors as 
opportunities that might have alleviated the crisis of democracy. It also considers their 
inability to come up with other potential alternative viable course of action(s) that might 
have led the way to alleviate the crisis of democracy. After the resignation of the RPP 
government, despite the calls for a cooperation between major parties, thé JP insisted on 
forming a minority government with its former NF allies. Instead of co-operation political 
actors continued to tear each other apart engaging in mutual delegitimation. Even the 
army’s warning in January 1980 did not seem to change their determination to pursue 
party lines. Alongside the increasing terrorism and continuing economic problems, the 
political parties’ inability to elect a president, added fuel to the flames and further 
weakened belief in the democratic regime’s ability to solve problems. The intervention, 
which appears to have took nobody but the leaders of two major parties by surprise, 
finally came on 12 September 1980.
The seventh chapter is an overall evaluation of basic findings of the dissertation. It 
argues that democracy in Turkey has not found particularly favorable soil to flourish. Both 
the legacy of Ottoman-Turkish state tradition and the traditional social structure 
undergoing modernization appears to have created several constraints for the development 
and stability of democracy. But these constraints by no means required that democracy in 
Turkey was doomed to fail as they also generated opportunities for democratic
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development. Political actors, particularly those who professed open commitment to 
democratic system, did have room for maneuver so as to affect these confining conditions 
and enhance the likelihood of democracy’s survival. It is the basic thesis of this 
dissertation that political party eûtes, far fi'om taking such stance, through their actions 
and non-actions (particularly important was their reactions to problem of terrorism and 
economic crisis) undermined belief in the democratic system and paved the way to its 
breakdown in the 1980. That does not mean on the other hand that breakdown was solely 
the result of the failure of party eûtes. But rather poûtical eûtes found it impossible to 
overcome the impact of various constraints. In a sense, they could not show a 
‘ transformatory’ pattern of leadership, but, were proven to be mere ‘power-holders. ’
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CHAPTER II: THE STRONG STATE AND THE
“MODERIVIZING’’ SOCIETY: AN UNEASY SETTING FOR
DEMOCRACY
This chapter attempts to analyze the basic characteristics of the Ottoman-Turkish social 
and political structure that established the fundamental setting and affected the initial conditions 
within which Turidsh democracy emerged. It advances the view that the basic parameters of 
Turkish democracy are closely related to, and have been influenced by, the Ottoman-Turkish 
strong state tradition, and the traditional social structure undergoing the process of 
modernization. It is the complex encounter and interaction of these two strains that had been 
instrumental in transition to democracy as well as introducing constraints and providing 
opportunities for the consolidation of democratic regime in Turkey.
2.1. THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Students of Ottoman-Turkish politics have quite often observed that the polity in 
question was marked by the existence of a strong state. The idea that Ottoman-Turkish polity 
evinced characteristic of strong state tradition and /or high level of stateness and that this fector 
has had an crucial impact on the fortunes of democracy have been put forward by Metin 
Heper.* He has drawn upon Nettl, Dyson and Badie and Bimbaum’s seminal 
conceptualizations that degree of “..stateness is a useful variable for comparing western
' Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington; The Eothen Press); “The ‘Strong 
State’ and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective” in Democracy and 
Modernity, ed. Shmuel. N.Eisenstadt (Leiden: Brill, 1992); “The Strong State as a Problem For the 
Consolidation of Democracy: Tuikqr and Germaity Compared.” Comparative Political Studies. 25,2 
(1992). As Heper admits he was neither the first nor the only scholar who emphasised the distinctiveness 
of the Ottoman-Turkish state, but it was Heper who first thoroughly examined impact of such tradition on 
the fortunes of democracy. For an earlier attempt, see, Engin D. Akarh, “The State as a Sodo-Cultural 
Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey,” in Political Participation in Turkey: Historical 
Background and Present Problems, ed. Engin D. Akarh and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul: Boğaziçi 
University, 1975).
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societies...”  ^ and that some societies are state societies “which have a historical and 
intellectual tradition of the state as an institution that embodies the ‘public power, while 
others not. Heper argued that Ottoman-Turkish polity, like certain continental European 
countries, had a “generalizing, integrating, and legitimizing state, that is a strong state.”  ^In that 
use, the term strong state referred to a state “that is able to frustrate the development of dvil 
society into an entity with political eflScacy, by placing too great an emphasis on the long-term 
interests of the community at the expense of sectional interests.”  ^ In terms of the categories 
formulated by Nettl, strong state was both sovereign -sovereignty referring to “its 
independence in formulating goals for society” and autonomous -autonomy referring to its 
independence in working out its internal organization- vis-à-vis civil society.® Simplifying 
somewhat, it can be said that the societies with a state tradition were characterized by the 
existence of state as a formal organization and as an idea and state elites who had been 
socialized into distinct state norms, and who tend to perceive thanselves as the true guardians 
of the state and the public interests vis-à-vis civil societal elements.’
 ^ J.P Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable” in Comparative Politics in the Post- 
Behavioural Era ed. L.J Cantor! and A.H.Ziegler (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 327 (originally 
published in 1%8)
 ^ Keimeth Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: Study o f an Idea and Institutions 
(Oxford; Martin Robertson, 1980), 19 ; Bertrand Badie, Pierre Bimbaum, The Sociology o f the State, 
translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago; London, The University of Chicago Press, 1983).
'*  Heper, “The strong state as a problem”, 176. The state as an integrating idea referred to state’s 
attempts for unification of “disparate elements of society around the norms and values in question,” while 
the state as legitimizing idea required that “only that political power which is exercised according to said 
norms and values is legitimate.” (Ibid., 143-4) Both concepts, drawn from Keimeth Dyson, in turn 
constituted complementary aspects of state’s generalizing character.
* Ibid., 189.
® Heper, Tradition. 5.
’ Strong state does not necessarily mean capable (a state which has a strength to penetrate 
society, regulate its relations, extract and appropriate resources for its policy aims) state as the adjective 
‘strong’ implies. It rather refer to the fact that state elites’ tendency to perceive themselves as capable. In 
that sense, our use of the term strong state differs from, for example, that of Nordlinger, who 
characterized strong state as one which possessed high autonomy and high societal support Eric 
Nordlinger, “Taking the State Seriously,” in Understanding Political Development, ed. Myron Weiner 
and Samuel P. Huntington (Boston, Toronto, Little Brown C:ompany; 1987), 369. It also differs from Joel 
S. Migdal’s characterization, who tended to equate strong state with capable one. Joel S. Migdal, Strong
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There is a virtual agreement amongst scholars that a complex constellation and 
interaction of various historical fectors bears upon the emergence (and once emerged, 
enduration) of strong state. In what follows, an attempt is made to delineate the trajectory of 
strong state in the Ottoman-Turidsh polity with an emphasis on wliere and how it seemed to 
divert from West European experience. From the very inception of the Ottoman Empire (1299) 
a constellation of several social-political and historical factors contributed the emergence of the 
strong center. Research has indicated that in the foundation of the empire the military elements, 
known as ghazis or frontier forces which had devoted themselves to the gaza, (Holy War) had 
played crucial role.*  The geopolitical situation of the empire -Byzantine empire on the west and 
nomadic Turkish-muslim peoples on the east- combined with frontier mentality have put its 
imprint on the character of the Ottoman state, which is organized on the model of that military 
class.
Drawing upon islamic idea of Dar-iil-Harb -lands and people that are not under 
domination of Islam, and that should be brought into the area of Dar-iil-Islam,^ the Ottomans 
emerged as major principality expanding to westwards at the expense of Byzantine. Despite 
their success against Byzantine increased its power and prestige among other Muslim 
principalities in Anatolia, their drive to build a strong state attracted stiff opposition from the 
native military class in Anatolia. After the Ankara war (1402), which resulted in defeat of the 
Ottomans by Timur and ensuing civil strife that continued for a decade, the consolidation of 
empire was finally achieved. It was during the reign of Mehmet II (Fatih the Conqueror) that 
the distinctive characteristics of the Ottoman state was already spelled out. The need to be 
strong both against an external enemies and divisive forces (military overiords, local and 
nomadic chieftains) within the country was one of its chief leitmotive. Drawing upon Turko-
Societies and Weak States, State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1988).
* Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire-The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London, Phoenix, 1993). 
For a recent insightful study on the origins of the Ottoman state. Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: 
The Construction o f the Ottoman State (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1995).
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modem  second edition (Oxford; Oxford University
Press, 1%7), 13.
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Iranian state traditions rather than pure islamic theory, the Ottomans believed that the state had 
to be strong so as to defend and expand the realm of Islam against the infidel; to that end, one 
can take and implement various measures that might not, stricüy speaking, be in accordance 
with Islam, that the state supposed to promote.*® Thus, there developed the concept of örf-i 
sultani -laws that derived fi’om Sultans in their edacity as secular ruler and that is differentiated 
fi-om örf-i şeri- laws based on islamic rules.** Not only did sultans have secular powers, but 
they were also supposed to use them not in an arbitrary way but in accordance with definite 
rules and traditions based on “necessity” and “reason.”*^  With the passing of time these 
developments signaled the emergence of the secular oriented state tradition, developed as a 
consequence of efforts to fi"ee the state fi'om personalistic whims of the sultan and instead to 
“identify it with the established values.”*^ This was, then, called “adab” wfiich were assimilated 
by the bureaucratic state elite. To be sure, the Padişah or Sultan concentrated all powers in his 
hands. With some notable exceptions, the lands and administrative personel were thought to 
belong to Sultan. He was claimed (and believed) to be shadow of God on earth, *^  and 
demanded absolute obedience. But his powers in reality were not without limits that derived 
from bureaucratic character of the state and the need to rule with justice. In that sense, the 
characterization of the Ottoman empire as purely “patrimonial” or “suhanistic”** is less than 
adequate. It was true that, as İnalcık indicated, in the reigns of powerful sultans (Fatih, Selim I,
Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modem Turkey,” in Islam in the Political Process ed. 
James.P. Piscatori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 139.
” Halil İnalcık, “Osmanli Hukukuna Giriş: örf-i sultani Kanunlan ve Fatih’in Kammlan.” [An 
Introduction to Ottoman Law: örf-i Sultani and Fatih’s Laws ] in Osmanli İmparatorluğu-Toplum ve 
Ekonomi (Istanbul: Eren, 1993) (first publication in 1958)
Heper, Tradition. 25.
Carter V.Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922 
(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1980), 9.
İnalcık, “Decision-Making,” 11.
It was, of course. Max Weber who argued that the Ottoman system was based on 
patrimonyalism. Max Wdier, Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretative Sociology, 2 vols., ed. 
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1025.
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Murat IV, Mahmud II) the system tended to lean the patrimonial principle but in other times 
one can speak rather of “the supremacy of objective rules which place limits and guide the 
ruler in making decisions and determining policies
These developments give rise to the emergence of Ottoman bureaucracy, which though 
dependent on Sultans and far from approaching legal-rational bureaucratic model, did 
nevertheless have its distinct values and norms into which bureaucratic cadres had been 
socialized through distinctive recruitment and training process. It was called “Askeri” and 
consisted of the officers of the court and army, “ulema” and the other civil servants.*’ 
Dankwart Rustow must have had in mind this fact when he observed that the Ottoman State 
was “a military camp and educational institution.”** The Askeri did not pay any taxes and 
constituted the ruling group under the absolute dominance of Sultans. To secure absolute 
independence of the state from society, the Ottoman Sultans used a variety of devices. They 
entrusted executive power to the “Kuls.” Non-muslim youngsters were brought into the palace 
to be converted to the Islam and educated to be the loyal servants of the Sultans. Thdr removal 
from former social environments ensured the total devotion to the Sultan who could take their 
lives and confiscate their wealth at any moment. They were well aware that they were chosen 
from non-muslim subjects and having no roots whatsoever with their families, and therefore, in 
the case of “siyaseten katl” (execution based on the orders of the Sultan or Grand Vizier) no 
one would make much protest about them. Besides, they were taught that “death in the
Halil İnalcık, “Decision Making in the Ottoman State,” in Decision Making and the Change in 
the Ottoman Empire, ed. Caesar.E.Faiah (Missouri; The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 15. 
Similarly, Eisenstadt remarked that the Ottoman center was “a mixture of imperial and patrimonial 
elements.” Shmuel N. Eisentadt, “The Kemalist Regime and Modernization; Some Comparative and 
Analytical Remarks,” in Atatürk and the Modernization o f Turkey, ed. Jacob M. Landau, ed. (Boulder, 
Colorado; Westview, 1984), 14.
’’ Halil İnalcık, “The Nature of the Traditional Society, ” in Political Modernization in Japan 
and Turkey ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A.Rustow (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1964), 
44.
'* Dankwart A. Rustow, “Turkey; The Modernity of Tradition,” in Political Culture and Political 
Development, ed. Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1965), 173.
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Suhan’s service was the greatest blessing.”*^  The Sultans also tried to enlist the “ulema” 
(members of the religious institutions who also had administrative functions) in their service. 
The acceptance of örf-i sultani and the dependence of Şeyhülislam (the highest religious 
authority) to the Sultans for their positions,^ appears to have diminished the impact of purely 
Islamic norms on the state.^‘
The subordination of the economy to political power spears to have been another 
factor reinforcing the strength of the state. In fact, as was the case in most traditional societies, 
the distinction between the state and the society (and economy) did not seem to be recognized 
by the Ottomans.^ The land as well as subjects all belonged to Sultan. The Ottomans showed 
the utmost care to ensure that the “Tımar” system, in which arable lands were given to fief 
holders in exchange for the military men, would not get out control -producing landlords that 
might challenge the state authority. Those fief holders were entrusted to coflect taxes and to 
supervise the peasant under their jurisdiction. They could not themselves cultivate the land 
other than their own small pieces. Nor could they transfer peasants fi'om one land to another as 
long as peasant tenants fulfilled their obligations. The fiefs were given by the Sultan and could 
easily be taken back. The peasants were treated equally vis-à-vis fief holders before the law. As 
such, fief holders, at least in the classical age of the empire, by no means constituted the kind of 
faidal lords found in the Western Europe. ^
The strict enforcement of the Tımar system accompanied by the various ingenious 
devices to assure the state’s control of the economic activity fi’om production to distribution. It
19 İnalcık, Ottoman. 79.
^  İnalcık cites the case of Selim 1 (1512-1520) who once denounced Şeyhülislam Ali Cemali for 
interfering in state affairs. But adds that in the period of decline “it became established practice to seek the 
opinion of şeyhülislam’s opinion on every governmental matter of importance.” İnalcık, “The nature,” 43- 
44.
Meün Heper, “The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative 
Perspective.” British Journal o f Middle Eastern Studies. 18,1 (1991), 46.
^  nkay Sunar, State and Society in the Politics o f Turkey's Development (Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bügiler Fakültesi, 1974), 5.
“  İnalcık, Otto/mm. 109-112.
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was the state, “as the linchpin of the redistributive mechanism, the pervasive network of 
patron-client relations, and the overarching political-administrative system” that provided for 
“the provisioning o f society through the movement of goods from the producers to the 
political center and from the center to populace.”^^  For the administrative controls of artisans 
and craftsmen, guilds were used. Even merchants could not escape the overbearing state which 
provided the security of trade and granted monopolies in exchange for loans, assistance in 
taxation, and supply of luxury goods.^ To ensure that the reaya (or ruled) was protected 
against the fluctuations of prices in a protected- market, the central authority even determined 
the highest price at which goods could be sold.
In addition to its political and economic supremacy the Ottoman ruling groups took 
every opportunity to demonstrate their cultural preeminence.^ They developed highly elitist 
great culture, an operational code for themselves > ^ch  was to be unintelligible for ordinary 
folk. The traditional Ottoman state philosophy demanded that for the sake of the social order 
and harmony the state should keep each man in his appropriate social position.- Each and every 
group should remain in their rightfiil place and thus, to be accorded appropriate treatment by 
the state. It preferred decentralized accommodation in the fece of the great diverrity of the 
periphery. When the loose ties appeared to be working, no further attempt were made for 
further integration.^^
So far we have tried to present a short picture of the emergence, organization and basic 
characteristics of the Ottoman state. In what follows, the same is aimed for the defining 
characteristics of the Ottoman “traditional” society. The implicit^ assumptions of early
İlkay Sunar, “State and Economy in the Ottoman Empire,” in TTie Ottoman Empire and the 
World Economy, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 67. İnalcık, 
O ttom an .\5 \-l
“  Ibid., 66-7.
“  Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics,” in Political 
Participation in Turkey, ed. Engin D. Akarh and Gabriel Ben-Dor (İstanbul:Boğaziçi University 
Publications, 1975), 12. (Originally published in 1973 in Daedalus).
Ibid., 10.
“  We use the term “implicit” because these assumptions are not generally stated explicitly as
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modernization theory,^ -that countries can be divided into traditional and modem societies, 
that transition more or less follows the path that the western societies had followed, and that in 
the end all countries likely to have characteristics of modem western societies- have, by and 
large, been deserted.^ ® It has long been accepted that despite the some common denominators 
societies that are dubbed as traditional tend to display great diversity. Moreover, these distinct 
features of the traditional society are likely to put its imprint on both the form of modernization 
process (or transition period) as well as on the end-product called modernity, if it emerges, 
since it is by no means a foregone conclusion that modernization process inevitably results in 
modernity. For us, therefore, it is important to know about the defining characteristics of the 
Ottoman society. Not only because the strong state we have referred to did not emerge in 
vacuum but rather in complex interaction with the traditional society, \^ ^ e  also shaping it in 
variety of ways, but also because, the peculiar characteristics of the traditional society put its 
stamp on modernization process and modernization process, in turn, affected the state 
tradition. The complex interaction and encounter of these two strains, as it is remarked above, 
significantly affected the fortunes of democracy in Turkey.
Reinhard Bendix, wiio criticized simplistic assumptions of early modernization theory
some critics of the modernization theory claimed it to be. In many cases they constitute unstated (or tacit) 
assumptions rather than clear expositions. For an interesting article in this line, Gabriel A. Almond, “The 
Development of Political Development,” in Understanding Political Development, ed. Nfyron Weiner and 
Samuel P. Huntington (Boston, Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1987).
^  It involved diverse strands that drew inspiration from separate traditions ranging from the 
cultural perspective of Max Weber to evolutionary European sociology, to structural-funcdonahsm. Works 
that are generally regarded as the classical examples of the modernization theory are; Daniel Leraer, The 
Passing o f  Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe HI: Free Press, 1958);
Walt. W.Rustow, The Stages o f  Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, ((Cambridge: C^ambridge 
University Press, 1960); David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961); 
David E. Apter, The Politics o f  Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
^  Reinhard Bendix, “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered.” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History. IX, 3 (1%7). Joseph Gusfield, “Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study 
of Social Change.” American Journal o f  Sociology. 72, (196 7), pp-351-362; Samuel P.Huntington, 
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). These critics did not, on 
the other hand, reject the basic assumptions of the modemizaton theory. What thty did was a correction to 
overtly simplistic and optimistic assumptions of the classical theory. It is for that reason th ^  have been 
called as “modernisation revisionists.” Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, Political Change and 
Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1985), 34.
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for overgeneralizing, and who advanced the view that there is not a single (universal) type of 
traditional society, carefully argued that despite great diversity these societies at their most 
basic level had something in common. According to Bendix, traditional societies are likely to be 
characterized by “lack of differentiation and the existence of high integration within the family 
and community (which) go together with a high degree of fragmentation among them.” *^ 
Therefore, he argued, traditional societies “achieve intense solidarity in relatively small groups 
that tend to be isolated from one another by poor communication and a backward 
technology. These small groups tend to create “for their individual participants an intensity 
of emotional attachment and rejection wdiich modem men find hard to appreciate and which 
they would probably find intolerable.”^^  Moreover, in “each of these solitary groups and in the 
polity as a whole, society tends to be divided sharply between rulers and ruled.”^^
The Ottoman society^  ^ displayed many features that Bendix attributed to traditional 
societies. It also displayed other features that he did not touch. The sharp division between 
rulers and ruled was observed in Ottoman society. Whereas the ruling centér constituted an 
active and somewhat homogenous, closed group, the ruled remained segregated, 
heterogeneous and primordial. The reaya was divided on the basis of religious-ethnic origins 
and occupation. The administrative “Millet” system ensured that major religious communities 
(Greek Orthodox, Armenian-Gregorian, Jews and later Maronite-Bulgarians) in the empire
Bendix, “Tradition,” 319. (His italics)
32
33
34
Ibid., 320. 
Ibid., 320.
Ibid., 321.
An important caveat applies regarding the Ottoman society. Due to the fact that the empire 
covered so large an area populated with various religions, and distinct traditions and that Ottomans had 
shown flexibility to accommodate these differing traditions, there emerged an empire which was far from 
approaching uniformity neither in land regime nor in regulations of trade and conunerce, nor in status of 
various groups vis-à-vis state. As Ortayh noted, for instance, the “tımar” system was applied only in some 
parts of Anatolia and Thrace. İnalcık, too, indicated that the only law that covered the whole of the 
empire and all groups in the empire was criminal law (ceza kanunnameleri), liber Ortayh, Türk İdare 
Tarihi [The Turkish Administrative History] (Ankara: Amme İdaresi Yayınlan, 1978), 97-8; Halil 
İnalcık, “Örfi-Sultani,” 336. Therefore when we refer to the traditional Ottoman society, we talk about 
only very general features of it.
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would regulate judicial matters and tax collection with little outside interference.^^ It was also 
reinforced by ethnic division of labor in the economic sphere, while the Greeks and Jews 
engaged in trade and commerce, for example, the great m^ority of Muslims worked on the 
land as fermers. Each occupational group (not necessarily related to their religious ethnic 
origins) were further accorded diÖferent status determined largely by the taxes they paid such as 
peasants, townspeople and nomads.^’ Further divisions within the periphery derived from the 
existence of various religious sects and orders which found home within the peripheral groups. 
These groups differed from and were opposed to officially recognized version of Islam 
sanctioned by the “ulema.” Each and every group (divided on the basis of religion, occupation 
and settlement patterns) came to co-exist side by side with a high degree of fragmentation 
among them accompanied by high level of solidarity and affectivity within their respective small
38groups.
The Ottoman state’s relations with these groups was different from the pattern that had
been observed in Western Europe. As Reinhard Bendbc indicated one of the chief
characteristics of medieval Europe was that:
certain persons and groups were exempted from direct obedience to the commands issued by, or in 
nameof the ruler... This system ofnegative and positive privileges (which may be called 
‘immunities’ or ‘autonomous jurisdiction’) became the legal foundation of representative 
govemmenL^’
The notion of reciprocal rights and privileges allowed for the corporate bodies (self- 
governing towns, for instance) with autonomous jurisdiction, and paved way for the 
development of a legal system of adjucation to mediate conflicting interests and the 
development of Ständestaat^  The acceptance of both autonomy for various groups and the
36 Dankwart A.Rustow, “Turkey,” 175.
İnalcık, “The nature,” 44.
“  Ahmet Evin, “Communitarian Structures and Social Change,” in M odem  Turkey- Continuity 
and Change ed. Ahmet Evin (Opladen; Leske Verlag und Budrich, 1984), 17-19
39 Reinhard Bendix, “Social Stratification and the Political (Community,” in Embattled Reason: 
Essays on Social Knowledge, ed. Reinhard Bendix (New Yoik: Oxford University Press, 1970), 231-232.
40 Giaffronco Poggi, The Development o f  the M odem State (Stanford, (Talifomia: Stanford
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principle that obligations be based on a contractual basis laid down the foundation on which 
civil society was built.
The centralized Ottoman state, deeply suspicious o f the peripheral elements, did use 
everything in its disposal to ward off such an outcome. Instead of reciprocal rights, privileges 
and autonomous jurisdictions “all parts of the empire as well as the status of subjects and even 
their economic functions were placed directly under the jurisdiction of center, which issued 
laws, edicts and regulations, governing provinces, estates, vocational and professional 
groups.” *^ The Ottomans were reluctant to recognize private property rights that could be 
claimed against the state, as noted above all lands and subjects thought to belonged to the 
Sultan. Quite frequently they resorted “confiscation” as a means to remove those (be it 
merchants or bureaucrats who accumulated wealth) who might challenge its authority. In their 
dismissive attitude against commerce, the Ottomans fevored guild industry at the ©q)ense of 
commerce. They also denied the corporate personality and independent government to towns, 
which played such a crucial role in the emergence of civil society in the Western Europe. The 
notion of protection and obedience, rather than reciprocal rights and privileges, governed the 
relationships between state and its subjects. The Ottoman rulers, in paternalistic fashion par 
excellence, sincerely believed that God had given them the duty to take care of their subjects. 
In feet, the ruler was seen as the shepherd protecting his flock (the reaya) and leading them in 
the righteous path.^  ^ The subjects, in turn, were expected to be obedient and productive. But 
this was not a ‘contract’ in the traditional sense. It was true that Islamic notion of contract 
called “Bay’a” between the muslim subjects and the Caliph must have affected the Ottoman 
rulers particulariy after they assumed the title caliph. But, the concrete mechanisms by which in
University Press, 1978), 33,48.
Ahmet Evin, “Communitarian Structures, Values and Cultural Behaviour in T u ik^,” in 
Turkey and the European Community, ed. Ahmet Evin and Geofifr^ Denton (Leske, Budrich: Opladen, 
1990), 27.
42 Şerif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire.” Comparative Studies
in Society and History. 11, (1%9), 260-2 
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practice a ruler could be forced to obey the rules of contract were never specified. As Bernard 
Lewis wittily put it, good government “was a duty of the ruler, not a right of the subject, 
whose only recourse against bad government was patience, counsel and prayer.”^
This specific conception of relations between the state and its subjects differentiated 
traditional Ottoman society in one respect from traditional society in Europe as characterized 
by Bendix. Bendix have argued that traditional societies are likely to be characterized by sharp 
inequalities in which:
Those of gentle birth have a d i^n^itionate  share of wealth, privileged access to positions of formal
authority, enjoy sociabUity, leisure and culture, whereas the bulk of tte  population lives in the 
drudgery of physical labor and in poverty, without access to literacy, culture or positions of 
influence, and without recognized means of airing their grievartces.''^
In traditional Ottoman society, basically as a consequence of the devşirme system, the 
emergence of the privileged class of rulers (with disproportionate share of wealth, and 
privileged access to positions of formal authority) appears to have been retarded at least until 
the seventeenth century.^ Though one should be careful not to overemphasize the point,^^ the 
situation of subjects also appears to have been much better than subjects in other traditional 
societies. During the heyday of the Empire, the Ottoman rulers well meant the old oriental 
maxim that “a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money 
without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice.”^  The need 
to treat subjects with justice interpreted as giving each person his due, i.e., treating him as his
^  Bernard Lewis, Islam in History -Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East (revised and 
expanded edition) (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), 324.
45 Bendix, “Tradition,” 321-322.
Mardin, “Center”, 11. That does not mean, however, the system as a whole was meritocratic. 
Even at the zenith of its power powerful fiunilies with a history of state tend to dominate decision-making 
positions.
This is the favourite theme of the nationalist historiography. For the one of the most 
sophisticated example of this kind, see, Osman Turan, Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mejkuresi Tarihi, 2 vols 
fThe History of the Idea of the Turkish Domination of the World], ninth edition, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi 
Yayınlan, 19%) (original publication 1%8)
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social position required, seems to be appreciated by Suhans/^ In an effort to secure the weU- 
being of the reaya, at least in the classical period, it was accepted that any subject regardless of 
his social status “could petition the imperial council direcdy, and for important matters the 
reaya would said delegations to Istanbul The roots of the concept of the “father state” 
(devlet baba) can be traced back to that tradition. According to tradition, subjects tended to 
expected fair treatment from the state as children would be expected to be treatad by their 
father. They also tend to expect that the state would take care of their well-being as a father 
would care for his children.
2.2. EFFORTS TOWARDS MODERNIZATION
Before proceeding further into modernization efforts in Ottoman-Turkish polity, we 
should explain what we mean by the term modernization. Following Bendk, we use the term 
modernization to refer to “a type of social change, which originated in the industrial revolution 
of England, 1760-1830, and in the political revolution in France, 1789-1794.”’  ^ The chief 
characteristics of social change which originated from the industrial revolution in England wCTe 
the massive transformation of agriculture accompanied by the decline in the proportion of the 
labor force engaged in agricultural production. This transformation was both a cause and effect 
of the technological developments and further industrial development. The political revolution 
of the French on the other hand had shattered the sharp distinctions between the rulers and the 
ruled and paved way to democratization of society in the sense that rulers were no longer 
drawn from the ranks of privileged of birth, education, or religious authority.
The economic and political breakthrough that occurred in England and France “put 
every country of the world into a position o f ‘backwardness.’” Whether they wanted it or not.
^  As Inalcsk noted Sultan's fennans fiequently repeated that “God had given them the reaya in trusL” 
See İnalcık, Ottoman.67. Koçi Bey, for instance, carefully reminded Sultan (IV Murad) that “If there is 
even a slightest degree of cruelty in the realm of Islam, Padişah is called into question in the day of 
judgement about it.” Koçi Bey Risalesi [The Treatise of Koçi Bey], ed. Zuhuri Danışman (Ankara: Kültür 
ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1985), 69.
50 İnalcık, Ottoman.91.
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all other societies have been forced to respond to ©eternal stimuli (alongside the possible 
intrinsic stimuli) that derived from new ideas and techniques originating in both revolutions. 
‘To catch up’ with modem societies became the central social-political project in the follower 
societies. In late modernizing (or follower) societies, it is usually the state that attempts to play 
the major role in modernization process.*^ It is basically because, external stimuli, in the main, 
forces governments to respond and no other social-political groups are willing or able to play 
such role. It is also because, they try to modernize in as short a time as p o s^ le  by copying the 
available technology, and by trying to avoid the strains of industrialization process as they 
learned from the experience of leading modernizers. Modernization in follower societies is not 
a uniform process. The peculiarities of traditional society, the timing of the modernization 
thmst, leadership and the way the various crises of modernization are dealt with are all likely 
to affect the modernization process.”  Moreover, it does not inevitably resuh in modem society 
or modernity. Earlier analysts implied that once a country started its modernization drive, it 
would end up with modernity, though some crises or even reversals can be faced. It is has now 
become accepted that this is not the case. Experience has shown us that it is only a handful of 
countries that have joined ranks of modernized countries, and that the gap between modem 
developed countries and the rest tend to grow wider each day. That does not mean to say, 
however, that these countries remained traditional. They have accepted many attributes of 
modem society (widespread literacy, modem medicine, communication technology, extension 
of franchise) in isolation from other characteristics of modem society, that is without becoming 
modem.”
Though there is not a single type of modem society, as early modernization theorists 
appears to have believed, one may still speak of defining characteristics of modem society that
52
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had been originated from social-political changes associated with the English and French 
revolutions. According to Bendix, modem societies are likely to be characterized by “stmctural 
differentiation in technology and communications that has led to high level productivity and 
high degree of impersonal independence.” The adjudication of legal disputes, the collection of 
revenue, the control of currency, military recruitment, the postal system, the constmction of 
public fecilities have become the functions of a national government instead of competing 
jurisdictions. And finally the erosion of the old division between the rulers and the ruled are no 
longer clear-cut as fi^chise and formal controls on rulers are widely exercised and status 
distinctions are no longer derived from those of birth.^ * In short, m odan society is likely to 
have high level of socio-economic development as a result of high level of productivity, and a 
national government that are organized on legal-rational principles, and finally some of control 
of ruled over the rulers. After these introductory remarks about modernization, we may now 
proceed to the Ottoman-Turkish case.
The Ottoman classical order entered a long period of decline by the sixteenth century. 
Though a detailed study of the decline of the empire is yet to carried out, scholars generally 
agree that the origins o f the decline of the empire sould be dated back to the late fifteenth 
century. The shift o f international trade routes to the Atlantic Ocean, invasion of the 
Levantine markets of by cheap American silver, the end o f the military expansion into 
Europe, the need to finance large standing army at the expense o f Timarli Sipahi and its 
detrimental effects on land regime, are generally argued to be the chief reasons of the 
decline.*^
The Ottoman statesmen began to search for the causes of decline as the one military 
defeat followed another. Increasingly they turned towards the Western European countries, 
which had now upper hand vis-à-vis the Ottomans. Beginning with Selim DI what came to be 
known as “modernization” have became high on the agenda of the Ottoman state. Referring to 
the fact that Ottomans resorted to reform wiien th ^  were forced to respond to protect
”  Ibid., 322.
^  See, Halil İnalcık, “The nature,” 6.; Sunar, Development. 28-40.
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themselves in a response to external stimuli, it was sometimes called as “defensive” 
modernization. This is somewhat inaccurate, as we noted above, after the modernization in 
England and France, all other late modernizing societies, combined intrinsic changes with 
responses to extrinsic stimuli. The same applies for the term “modernization from above” as it 
is characteristic of the late modernizing societies (or “induced modernization” as opposed to 
“organic” one) that usually the states take leading role.^  ^ Early modernization efforts 
concentrated on reforming the military as it was believed that if reformed along western lines, 
the Ottomans would return to the glorious old days. Both Selim HI (1761-1808) and Mahmud 
n i (1808-1839) based their reform programs chiefly on the establishment of a new army, as 
well as modernizing the state bureaucracy. Their efforts, however, proved to be less than 
successful. Lack of educated personnel and financial means, opposition of anti-reform forces 
led by the ulema, incessant power struggles within the palace bureaucracy, and increasing 
European pressure all appear to have played a role for such an outcome.
The second wave of the reforms known as “Tanzimai”, (literally means reform or 
reorganization) period (1839-1876) tried, once again, to restructure the Ottoman state and 
society. The Tanzimat reforms were largely led by bureaucrats rather than Sultans. One 
significant consequence of the previous reform endeavors was the rise of a new genre of 
bureaucracy (Bab-i Ali or Porte) and the shifting of the balance of power between Sultans and 
bureaucracy in favor of latter. This trend gained pace in the Tanzimat period. As the leading 
agents and (implementers) of the westernization, bureaucrats had strived to consolidate their 
positions vis-à-vis Sultan. Unlike the earlier Kuls they had begun to wield great power.** Reşit 
Paşa and his pupils Ali and Fuat Paşa rather than Sultan Abdülmecit were the leading actors in 
the reform process. True to Ottoman-Turkish state tradition these bureaucrats, “aspired to the
Peter F. Sugar, “Turkey (Economic and Political Modernization),” Political Modernization in 
Japan and Turkey, ed. Dankwart A Rustow and Barbara A  Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1964), 148-9.
Heper, Tradition. 44. liber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En uzun Yüzyılı fThe Longest Century of 
the Empire], third edition (Istanbul; HU, 1995), 77.
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status of state elite”^^  and came to see themselves as responsible for the well-being of the state 
and country. They no longer viewed themselves as the servant of the Sultan but the State.^ 
Influenced by somewhat superficial reading of Western political experience and thought, 
bureaucratization and centralization and were perceived as prescriptions that would save the 
state. It was not only out of their desire for westernization that these policies were adopted. 
Centralization, especially of tax administration, was also thought to help state finances,*^ * while 
bureaucratization and reorganization of existing bureaucracy was thought to help establishment 
of better staffed central government, and limiting the Sultans’ arbitrary powers over 
bureaucracy.
The uppermost aim of the reform policy, therefore, had been directed to the 
“centralization and bureaucratization of the empire. The Imperial Restcript of Gülhane 
(Gülhane Hatt-i Humayunu) (1839) and Reform Edict of 1856 (Islahat Fermanı) were 
promulgated in this period. Both documents promised the establishment of guarantees for life, 
honor and properties, equality before law for Sultan’s subjects, the orderly replacement of tax­
farming system and a system of conscription for the army.^  ^ The reorganization along these 
lines involved: restructuring in the bureaucracy’s internal organizations and the bureaucrats’ 
legal status, the establishment of “modem” schools to train qualified personnel for the state, 
development of consultative assemblies and commissions (Meclis-i Vala-i Ahkam-i Adliye, 
Meclis-I Ali Tanzimat, Şura-yi Devlet), reforms aimed at improving provincial administration
59 Hq)er, Tradition. 64. Also, Halil İnalcık “Sened-i ittifak ve Gülhane Hatt-i Humayunu,”[The 
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(İstanbul: Eren, 1993), 353.
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and the tax system.^ Though considerable fordgn pressure*^  ^ had been involved in the 
promulgation of such reform edicts, that was by no means the sole reason. Due basically to the 
weaknesses of the socio-economic groups that were ready to push for its rights, movements 
towards limited government, rule of law and constitutionalism were all dominated by the 
bureaucrats and associated intelligentsia.
The centralization and bureaucratization continued even when the strong bureaucrats 
of the Tanzimat period had been removed from oflBce by Abdiilhamit II, who single-handedly 
ruled the country for more than thirty years.^ During his reign the modernization of the 
educational institutions gained pace as well as increases in the number of those who were 
enrolled in these schools (including women). The construction of new railways and telegraph 
lines acquired a new momentum.
The reform movement, especially ‘Tanzimat reforms’, had truly been the turning point 
in an effort to transform the Ottoman state towards a rational-legal modem type of state. 
Despite the fact that the state system based on rational-legal principles were not yet totally in 
place and the old stmcture persisted for quite some time, it was a great leap forward in laying 
down the foundations of the modem state. The bureaucrats rather than the Sultan (with the 
exception of Sultan Abdiilhamit II period) tended to become the locus of the state. The 
development of distinctive state norms (so-called adab tradition) into which they had been 
socialized and perceptions of themselves as tme protector of state interests became 
embedded.
Equally significant changes occurred in the traditional social-structure of the Ottoman 
society. Despite the some notable achievements of the reform policies, it was less than
^  For the thorough treatment of Tanzimat reforms, see Carter V.Findley, Bureaucratic Reform 
in the Ottoman Empire. The sublime Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); 
Ortayh, Yüzyıl.·, Roderick Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876, second edition (New 
York: Gordion, 1973).
“  The 1839 reform edict promulgated when the empire needed the European support (or at least 
neutrality) against the Mehmet Ali of Eypt, who ro lle d  against the Ottoman rule. Similarly 1856 reform 
edict was promulgated on the eve of the treaty of Paris (that would meant the acceptance of T urk^ as a 
participant in the concert of Europe) as part of good-willl on the part of Turkey.
^  According to Bernard Lewis, Abdûlhamit n  was “a willing and active modernizer, the true
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successâil in arresting the decline of the empire in terms of land losses and improving the living 
conditions of the m^ority of the population. It is generally accepted that the success in these 
two areas of the reform policy appears to have been impeded by a combination of several 
internal and external factors. Most significant o f these were; the resistance o f vested 
interests (ulema and ayans) against reform, dependence on emerging capitalist market 
relations controlled by West European p o w e rs , th e  multinational structure of the empire 
which made it very vulnerable to the rise nationalism, lack o f trained personnel to 
implement reorganization policy, and unending power struggles within the center which 
brought it to halt and prevented regular action.^*
Far fi-om being improved, the living conditions of the m^ority of the population 
appears to have been worsened. Since the late sbrteenth century, the weakening of the center’s 
authority prepared a fertile ground in which the peasants’ relations with the fief holders 
resembled more and more that of feudal lords’ relations with the serfs as found in Western 
Europe. The tax-ferming system, introduced as a way of increasing the Empire’s cash flow, 
changed the nature of “Tunaf” system on which the traditional Ottoman society was based. It 
helped to create a group of multezims with undesirable consequences for the peasants that 
composed the great majority of the population. Mültezim was a person (of usually military 
origin, that is with a history of service to the state) who paid price in advance for the right to 
use state-owned land. To maximize his benefits, multezims would squeeze the formers, and 
bribe the high officials so as to prevent the strict control of the center which in the past served
heir of Sultan Abdiilaziz and the statesman of the Tanzimat.” Lewis, Emergence. 171.
^  That does not mean, on the other hand, that the Ottoman economy was totally dependent on 
and dominated by Europe in the sense that its economic relations were determined needs of the 
European economies. Never losing its political independence, the Ottoman economy was not dominated 
by the single European power, and the Ottomans even gained room for maneuvre by expoliting riils 
between the various European powers. See, Şevket Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme, 
1820-1913 [Dependency and Growth in the Ottoman Empire, 1820-1913], second edition, (İstanbul; Yurt 
Yayınlan, 1984), 160.
See, fiber Ortaylı, En Uzun Yüzyıl. 179-204 (chapter six, Reformcularm Çıkmazı); İnalcık, 
“Sosyal Tepkiler”; Donald Quataert, “Main Problems of the Economy During the Tanzimat Period,” in 
Workers, Peasants, and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, in Donald Quataert (İstanbul: ISIS, 
1993) (originally published in 1989).
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to protect the peasant majority from ruthless exploitation by fief holders. The weaknesses of 
the central authority also contributed what is known as Celali rd>ellions.^  ^A movement of fief 
holders who lost the right to use their lands, of youngsters wlio could enroll neither in the army 
nor in medreses, of peasants t^ o  left (without permission of the state) their lands, celali 
rd^ellions led to widespread insecurity amongst the population and a dramatic M  in 
agricultural products.’” The peasants in search of security and livelihood were, thus, squeezed 
between the mültezims who were usually in alliance with state ofiBcials’’ and bandits. These 
developments, in turn, resulted in the “clamming-up of rural communities” ”  and the 
development of higher degree of small group solidarity as they tried to protect themselves by 
strengthening primordial loyalties.
With the passage of the time these mültezims came to be recognized as de fecto 
owners of the land they controlled, and constituted a kind of landed dynasty (Ayan- or local 
notables). Though many aspects of the politics of local notables are yet to be researched, 
available research indicates that they did not come to play the role, played by landed gentry 
which have gone through process of “embourgeoisement” in Western Europe. In the first 
place, local notables owed their positions to the state. They acquired state lands for cash 
payments but “made their profits mainly from tax-farming privileges granted them for life 
\^ c h  they sold to sub-farmers ^proved by the state.”’  ^ It was in their interest to tighten up 
their connections with the state. They, therefore, came to play a double role. On the one hand, 
their interest clashed with that of state especially when state oflBcials believed that they 
constituted a threat to higher state interests and tried to reduce their power. But on the other
® The best work on this period is, Mustafa Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası- 
Celali İsyanları [The Struggle of the Turkish People for Peace and Order -Celali Uprisings] (Istanbul; 
Cent, 1995) (originally published in 1%3).
Ibid., 446-454.
It is for this reason that Mardin noted that “ofQcials have become plunderers of their own 
society.” Mardin, “Center,” 14.
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Evin, “(Üonununitarian,” 19. 
Mardin, “Power,” 207.
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hand, they were “agents” of the s ta te ,an d  had acquired all its powers, not so much from 
productive economic activities in competitive market place, but through connections with the 
state. Their power rested not on production for the market place but the exploitation of 
loopholes in a state-dominated economy. They were hardly interested in forming 
horizontal links with the center but rather were involved in a vertical relationship with the 
state on the clientelistic basis to exploit its resources.^^
For a complex interaction of various reasons these landholders did not turn to 
economically productive activities, for instance, commercialized agriculture that have played a 
crucial role in the modernization of Western countries.’® In the first place, despite some 
concentration of land having taken place in some parts of the country, small landholdings were 
still common.”  Large estates existed both in some export oriented areas but they were the 
exception rather than being a norm. And many of them contained unused lands, and frequently 
concentrated on stock-raising that was much more profitable than production.’* The 
perception of trade and commerce being somewhat lowly engagements not suitable for 
muslims was one of the reasons .The  dominance of non-muslim groups in trade and 
commerce constituted another hindrance as these people lacked what we today call the
74 As Karpat noted the title of Ayan was rewarded through a special charter by government. 
Kemal H:Karpat “Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization and the Role of Social Groups in 
Turkish Politics,” in Social Change and Politics in Turkey-A Structural Historical Analysis, ed. Kemal H 
Karpat and contributors (Leiden; Brill, 1973), 37.
75 Heper, Tradition.33.
Şevket Pamuk, 100 Soruda Osmanlı-Tûrkiye İktisadi Tarihi, 1500-1914, [Ottoman-Turkish 
Economic History, 1500-1914 in 100 Question] second ed. (Istanbul; Gerçek, 1990), 141.
77 For the structure of Ottoman viUages and the prevalance of smallholdings, see, Halil İnalcık, 
“Köy, Köylü ve İmparatorluk,”[Village, Peasant and the Empire] Osmanli İmparatorluğu, Toplum ve 
Ekonomi (İstanbul; Eren, 1993) (originally published in 1990).
78 Donald (^ te r t , “Agricultural Trends and Government Policy in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800- 
1914,” in Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914. ed. Donald 
( ^ te r t  (İstanbul; ISIS, 1993), 21-22. (originally published in 1981).
79 For an acute description of this culture see, Sabri F. Ülgener, İktisadi Çözülmenin Ahlak ve 
Zihniyet Dünyası [The Ethical and Moral Values of the Economic Contraction], third ed. (Istanbul; Der, 
1983) (originally published in 1951).
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“enterprising culture” to compete with them. They did knew, for instance, neither the advanced 
techniques of agriculture nor how to maricet their products. They were attracted by the culture 
of the center, and tended to imitate it. Instead of capital accumulation they tend to use newly 
gained wealth in conspicuous consumption. This was basically because in the empire wealth 
became “interchangeable only after passing through filter of status”*® and one way of displaying 
status was to maintain lavish consumption patterns.
Finally we should mention the impact of strong state tradition. True to tradition, those 
occupying efifective decision-making positions (be it civil-military bureaucrats, or Sultan's) were 
reluctant to see the local notables (or any other groups) having autonomy and institutionalized 
privileges and being horizontally integrated into system. It was true that to create an indigenous 
class of commerce and industry, Tanzimat reformers resorted to various mercantilist-like 
policies. It was also true that they tried to remove the insecurity of propaty rights, and gave 
local notables place in administrative councils. However, these policies, it appears, were 
thought to serve to increase state revenues and thus strengthen central authority, rather than 
recognition of these forces as intermediaries between the state and society. For instance, while 
giving place local notables in administrative councils, the state supported small-landholders 
against the threat of their being strong.*' When these forces speared to be getting out of hand, 
bureaucrats easily resorted age-old methods such as confiscation.
In terms of modernization of social structure, therefore, this period was less than 
satisfactory. Despite the reformers’ endeavors, the means of communication and transportation 
within the empire remained unevenly undeveloped. It consisted of ‘segregated’ economic 
entities with only loose connections between them. While some part of the country had been 
incorporated into market relations, the other parts showed characteristics of autocratic self- 
sumaency. Less than successful development of commercialized agriculture, in turn, hindered 
the generation of agricultural surplus value, which formed the backbone of industry in the
Mardin, “Power,” 266.
*' Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisi. 162. 
^  Ortaylı, En Uzun Yüzyıl.IS3.
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Western European countries. The existing small- manufacturing industry was for from ready 
to compete with European goods, which were easily flooded into the country thanks to liberal 
tariff regime. Despite reformers’ attempts to nurture industry, for a variety of reasons (lack of 
capital, enterpreneurship, competition from European goods, reformers reliance on esnafs and 
their resistance), their efibrts remained less than successful.*^ Thus, at the onset of the 
twentieth century, the Empire was predominantly agricultural country. It was estimated that 
more than 75 to 80 per cent of the population*^ lived in villages that were self-contained with a 
high levels of small group solidarity. In cities trade and commerce were dominated by 
minorities while, little small-manufecturing industry had been clustered around the Marmara 
region. Despite some courageous steps having been taken towards the modernization of the 
country, it was far from approaching the state of aflfeirs called “modernity.”
2,3. THE YOUNG TURK PERIOD, 1908-1918
The 1876 Constitution was the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire in the modem 
sense of the term. It was prepared by a leading bureaucrat (Grand Vezir) of the time, Mhhat 
Paşa, and was promulgated by Sultan Abdiilhamit II on 23 December 1876. The constitutional 
movement, like early efiorts towards limited government, was based neither on widespread 
popular support nor an organized political parties but led by reformist bureaucrats and 
intellectuals. Particularly instrumental in that respect had been the Young Ottomans. Since the
“  In an influential analysis, Niyazi Berkes has argued that Tanzimat reformers did not 
understand “the essence and characteristics of European civilization” that they did foil to appreciate 
national-economic basis of it. And consequently they did not see that, apart from some superficial 
imitations of the western civilization, it was the economic-social structure that needed to be changed 
See, Niyazi Berkes, Türk Dû^nûrtde Batı Sorunu [The Problem of the West in Turkish Thought] (Ankara: 
Bilgi, 1975), 194-197. While the inability of the reformers (or Ottoman ststesman in general) to 
understand the socio-economic basis of society is not unknown, it is somewhat inaccurate to argue that 
reformers did not attempt to change the social structure. They did it, though efforts remained 
uncoordinated, piecemal, and ad hoc. Considering the magnitude of the tasks and obstacles involved, (the 
reformers had to fight in too many areas that ranged fiom the reforming state structure, to resisting 
pressures firom European powers, to finance wars, to prevent land losses, to resist anti-reform forces) one 
tends to think that it is somewhat inaccurate to explain failure of reformers with reference to 
understanding of Western civilization. For an argument in this line, see, Ortayh, En Uzun Yüzyıl, 
(esp.chapter six. Reformcuların Çıkmazı).
84 (Juatert, “Agricultural,” 18.
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late 1850s a group of intellectuals, who had been one way or another, been involved with state 
bureaucracy, had begun to raise their voice against the bureaucratic leadership of Tanzimat era. 
In their view Tanzimat reforms, have imitated the West, provided special economic and 
political privileges to minorities and European countries, and that it had led to absolutism of the 
bureaucrats. Though far from achieving ideological uniformity,** they tried to read into Islamic 
principles modem theories of constitutional limited government. The intellectual climate of the 
times, in the making of which the Young Ottomans contributed greatly, must have had an 
effect on Mithat Paşa. Like many of them Mhhat too believed that in order to continue 
modernization and to prevent the break up of the empire the promulgation of a constitution 
that limited the prerogative of sultans and made ministers responsible to a popular assembly 
was necessary.*^ Consequently, the system of government brought by the 1876 constitution 
resembled that of a parliamentary system. But it had greatly strengthened the authority of the 
executive led by the Sultan vis-à-vis parliament. The parliament, chosen indirectly with limited 
franchise, sat for only two sessions, and was dissolved by Sultan Abdiilhamit II in 1878 
remaining closed for thirty years.
Opposition to Abdülhamit’s autocratic rule came, true to Ottoman tradition, not from 
any clearly specified social-political groups but from the ranks of intellectuals and bureaucratic 
elites associated with the state. He was forced to reinstate the 1876 constitution in 1908 when 
the group of people situated in Balkans led by army officers afiBliated with the secret political
** Even a cursory look at Young Ottomans demonstrates that how far from they were far from 
having ideological uniformity. While Şinasi was in favour of wholesale adaption of Western civilization, 
Namık Kemal was agitating for the establishment of a parliament. Ali Suavi, on the other hand, opposed a 
parliamentary system on the ground that it was against the human nature. See, Şerif Mardin, The Genesis 
o f Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1962).
^  Like his precedessors, Mithat Paşa seemed to assumed that as all Western countries of the time 
happened to have some sort of constitutional representative government, westernization meant adopting 
some form of popular participation in government whether one liked it or not. It is sometimes assumed 
that this is an exclusive feature of Turicish modernization. That does not, on the other hand, seem to be 
the case. Shillony, for one, notes that Japanese leaders in the Meiji period were motivated by the same 
considerations. “The Meji rulers wanted their country to be rich, strong and well-regarded. Democracy 
was not among their aims. ...Nevertheless, as all the Western countries of the time happened to have 
some sort of constitutional government and representative institutions, westernization meant adopting 
some forms of popular participation in government, whether the Japanese leaders liked it or not.” See, 
Ben-Ami Shillony, “The Political Tradition of Japan and Its impact on the Development of Japanese 
Democracy,” in Democracy and Modernity, ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (Leiden; Brill, 1992), 107.
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organization, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Ittihat ve Terakki) threatened to rá>el 
against his rule unless he reinstated the 1876 Constitution. Believing that mass-based 
opposition to his mle had arisen Abdiilhamit II decided to return to constitutional rule.*’ What 
was to be known as the Second Constitutional period in Ottoman-Turkish politics had begun.
The CUP was founded in 1889 in Salonika by the military medical c o llie  students, 
who were part of the movement called the Young Turks. Many leaders of the Young Turk 
movements were living in European capitals due to Abdiilhamits’ relentless pressure. In one 
sense, the Young Turics were heirs to the Young Ottomans and significant continuities between 
them can be detected. But there were differences as well. As a whole they were younger, 
graduated from modem schools opened in the Tanzimat and Abdiilhamit period, rather had 
lower middle-class background. Finally, they were much less theoretically articulate in terms of 
the ideologies and worid views they held than the Young Ottomans, and more practically 
oriented.** Like their predecessors. Young Turks, too, q>pears to have assumed through the 
right interventions by the enlightened, problems of Ottoman society could be solved. They 
were, first of all, believers in the power of reason and science. T h ^  believed, in a rather 
romantic and utopian manner, their powers and ability to shape social and political environment 
for the establishment of better social order. Social engineering, according to scientific 
principles, was a necessity and ethically desirable. It then followed that a small group of 
enlightened should have more say in governmental afi^irs than ordinary folk. *^
As a political organization, the CUP’s immediate aim was to end Abdulhamh’s rule and 
to reinstate the constitution. Like the Young Ottomans, they believed that to arrest the decline
Tank Zafer Tunaya, Hürriyetin llanı-İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Hayatına Bakışlar [The 
Declaration of Freedom-Some Observations on the Political life of the Second Constitutional Period] 
(Istanbul; Baha, 1959), 8.
Şerif Mardin, Jön Tûrklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908 [The Political Views of the Young 
Turks, 1895-1908] fifth ed. (Istanbul; İletişim, 1994), 11. (originally published in 1964).
^  Mardin indicated that they likened the relationships between state and statesmen to the 
relationships between doctor and patient Ibid, 19. Also, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition 
(Oxford; (Dxford University Press, 1995), 200-212.
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of the empire it was necessary.^ ® Otherwise, they were a fer cry from having a coherent 
ideology. Instead, the movement involved, at least at the beginning, various groups with 
different aims including the rather liberal Ottomanists, Turidsts and Islamists. What unified 
these diverse strands was not as much the abstract ideals of freedom or constitutional 
government as the priority they assigned to “saving the state.” *^ The inability of the reform 
movement to arrest the break up of the empire and the continuing meddling of European 
powers in internal afl&irs that helped minority nationalisms to rise, made the agenda of saving 
the state the first priority for both those who engaged in intellectual exCTcise and those who 
came to exercise power in that period.
From the beginning of the second constitutional period in 1908 to the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1918, the CUP controlled the destiny of the empire. It was Turkey’s first 
real experience of a multi-party system, as 1909 changes in the constitution reduced the power 
of the sultan and made the system more parliamentary. In the words of one prominent student 
of the period it was a “laboratory of Turkish politics”^  in the sense that it had a huge impact on 
both the ideologies, and political patterns (in terms of party organizations, opposition 
government relations, party-bureaucracy relations) of the following decades. This is so, not 
only because the bulk of the social-political elite of the Republic were involved in the CUP 
activities, but also because the alignment of different social-political forces which took shape in 
this period showed remarkable continuity up until the late forties.
These ten years were decisive for the Empire as the Balkan war reduced the Ottoman 
presence in the Rumelia to a minimum and the decision to enter the first world war (that would 
speU the end of the Ottoman empire) was made in that period. It was a tumultuous period in 
which two disorderly elections were held, eleven cabinets were formed, political assassinations
^  Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks-The Committee o f Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 
1908-1914 (Oxford; Clarendon, 1%9), 16.
’’ One prominent leader of the CUP (Doktor Nazim) reported to have said that he had even not 
seen the 1876 constitution, which they forced Abdülhamit to reinstate. Cited in Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, 
Suyu Arayan Adam [A Man İn Search of an Ideal], (Istanbul; Remzi, 1967), 292.
^  Tank Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye 'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri [Westernization 
Movements in Tuikish Political Life] (Istanbul; Arba, 1996), 98. (original publication 1960)
70
of politicians and journalists took place and extremely harsh government-opposition relations 
observed. Between 1908 and 1913, the CUP did not directly hold power but they tried to wield 
power behind the curtain. Unlike the Young Ottomans they did not feel to competent to rule 
the empire.’  ^ It is perhaps because it was a secret organization with no clearly identifiable 
leader, that they did not know what to do in a response to this unexpected opportunity. With 
the Babiali coup (in 1913) by the CUP, in which war minister Nazim Pasa was killed (along 
with the resignation of Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa) during the cabinet meeting by the group of 
Unionist led by Enver Pasa, the virtually unlimited power period of the CUP had begun.
Although it is difBcuh to unravel exactly from wfiich social and political groups the 
CUP had drawn support, the available research indicates that the CUP was led by young civil- 
military bureaucrats in alliance with local notables and others groups (such as minorities 
fevoring decentralization) who were opposed to Abdülhamit’s rule. Perhaps because it was the 
only oiganization that could be called political in the empire that it had such a heterogeneous 
social base. Rather than following consciously elaborated policies, the CUP supported 
governments had to react to momentous events as they unfolded. The main thrust of those 
policies, however, displayed significant continuity with the Tanzimat, but this time the military 
rather than civilian bureaucrats, clustered around the CUP, was on the driving seat.^ The 
reforms in education continued. Further secularization of the state afiairs (in the sense that the 
religious arguments were taken less and less into consideration in governmental decisions) was 
also one of the hallmarks of the period. The state’s involvement in economic afiairs gained new 
impetus as the CUP oflBcials belatedly came to believe that a muslim-Turkish class of 
merchants would have to be created if the empire was to survive and have a viable economic 
existence.’’ Perhaps the most radical departure of the CUP had been the promotion, albeit in a 
disguised manner, of Tuildsh nationalism. The loss of non-Muslim territories in the Balkans
”  Ahmad, Young Turks. 11.
^  Heper, Tradition.AS.
^  Zafer Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Devletçilik [The Union and Progress and Statism] (İstanbul: 
Tarih Vakfi, 1995).
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had almost ruled out the policy of Ottomanism, a policy envisaging the equality of all Ottoman 
subjects regardless of religious origins. Not only the non-Muslims but also Muslim subjects 
tended to form nationalist organizations as the idea of Turkish nationalism gained new impetus 
through the worics of Russian-muslim emigrants.
Both the patterns of party organization and government-opposition relations observed 
in that period were far away from being conducive to representative government. It has 
constituted mostly a negative tradition, which the Turkish political system found it hard to 
overcome.’  ^ The CUP had emeiged when Adbülhamh II ©tercised relentless pressure on all 
opponents (real or potential) and forced them to go und^ground. Coupled with the Ottoman- 
Turldsh perception of ‘politics’ as a dangerous business that might cost one’s life, the CUP, 
too, accepted a model of organization heavily influenced by Balkan Guerrilla (komhaa) 
organizations. The Masonic lodges and their secretive organizations was another influence, as 
many members of the CUP were also members of the lodges and they used these lodges to 
escape from pressures of the government.^ Its organization, therefore, was based on “ the cell 
system” and was extremely secretive. All prospective members had to sworn in, promising that 
they were willing to work in an extremely secretive environment, ready to implement orders 
without questioning and to sacrifice their life if necessary. The members knew only those who 
were in the same cell but no one else. The non-compliance with the rules of the organization or 
the orders led severe punishment including the death sentence. The secretive organizational 
ethos was supplemented by religious ethos of “Tarikats.” Many scholars of the period^ have 
indicated that prospective members tended to assume that by entering such a supposedly 
secular organization they have entered Tarikat and started to behave as if they were member of
^  As Duverger noted “Just as men bear all their lives the mark of their childhood, so parties are 
profoundly influenced by their origins...” Maurice Ehiverger, Political Parties- The Organization and 
Activity in the M odem State, translated by, Barbara and Robert North (London; Methuen, 1959), XXttl.
^  Sina Akşin, 100 soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki [The Young Turks and the 
Committee of Union and Fhogress in 100 Questions ], (Istanbul; (Jerçek, 1980), 59.
Ibid., 156; Tank Zafer Turtaya, “İkinci Meşratiyetin Siyasal Hayatımızdaki Yeri,”[The Place of 
the Second Constitutional Period in the Turkish Political Life] in 1876-1976 Türk Parlamentoculuğunun 
İlk Yüzyılı, prepared by Siyasi İlimler Türk Demeği (Ankara; Ajans Türk, 1976), 107.
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“Tarikats.”^^  True to Ottoman-Turkish state tradition the CUP members tend to believe that 
they had a sense of mission and unshaken belief in their righteousness. Their “mission” was to 
save the state. According to Tunaya, a typical Unionist (İttihatçı) “regarded himself as someone 
who had a God-given mission.” He believed that if the Ottoman empire was to advance, to 
reform itself it was to be led by the CUP but by no other institution, as it was the only force 
and a g e n t . I t  then followed that they were the only true representatives of state, patriotism, 
and nationalism and all those who criticized or opposed them were committing the “treason.” 
Beginning with such assumptions, it was a short step for the members of the CUP to regard it 
just and legitimate to forcefully remove opponents be them Sadrazams or journalists. For the 
CUP members “nothing was sacred in the pursuit of power and those guilty of dissent must be 
prepared to pay with their lives.”*®’ It was also just and le^timate to do away with l^a l 
niceties when the higher interest of the state was thought to be in danger.
The opposition to the CUP, accordingly, did have its distinctive characteristics, traces 
of which would have been observed in all opposition parties in the Republican period. The legal 
opposition was allowed to exist until 1913, after that date, the CUP became as the only 
organization recognized by law. Many parties had been founded in period following 1908,*®^  
but the main opposition party of the period was the Hürriyet ve İtilaf (Liberty and Entente) 
(LE), which had a short existence - only fourteen month- as it was closed down in 1913. Like 
the CUP it had a very heterogeneous social base. The unifying thread of this heterogeneous 
group was hs’ opposition to the CUP, as it has been in the case of Ahrar Fırkası (Liberal
”  See, in the same line memoirs of the member, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Siyasal Antlar [The 
Political Memoirs], ed. Rauf Muüuay, (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 1976), 50.
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Tunaya “İkinci Meşratiyet,” 107. 
Ahmad, Young Turks. 163.
The CUP supported governments quite often resorted to “the provisional legislations” (kavani- 
ni muvakkate). The idiom that “if there is no law, make one” (yok kanun yap kanun) is attributed to 
Cemal Paşa, one of the prominent members of the CUP. See, Tunaya, “İkinci Meşrutiyet,” 113.
For a detailed knowledge of these parties. Tank Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye 'de Siyasi Partiler, 
İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi-1908-1918, cilt 1, [The Political Parties inTurk^, The Second (Constitutional 
Period, 1908-1918], second ed. (Istanbul; Hürriyet Vakfi, 1988).
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Union), the party’s predecessor. The LE was composed of those who had opposed, one way 
or the another, the CUP. It seemed to attract; bureaucrats who for some reason feh disgust 
against the CUP as its first (after 1908) job was to remove those bureaucrats and to replace 
them with thdr own men; those ambitious politicians or inteUectuals who ^ e d  to make 
advances into the high positions; some local notables who could not get the support of the 
CUP; some part of the religious class; and some groups of ethnic minorities, who feh 
threatened by the CUP’s policies of centralization.“*^ Though the party program involved such 
policies as more autonomy for ethnic groups, decentralization, and a more hl>eral economic 
approach, it was not at all clear that party supporters had internalized such things or 
purposefully chosen the party because of these policies.*®^
From the inception of party*°^politics, relations between the CUP and LE was very 
tense. The imperial-patrimonial Ottoman principles of government had left no room for the 
concept of opposition. Opponents were seen as those people \^dio needed to be removed rather 
than tolerated. Because, if one is in opposition, then one is not loyal since one could be loyal 
only to individual (sultan) and not the concepts of governance. This tradition reproduced by the 
CUP, which appeared to have believed in its sense of mission (of saving the state), and its 
absolute righteousness. When one holds such a firm opinion regarding one’s own beliefs the 
likelihood of its acceptance of the notion of opposition becomes extremely diflScult. Those 
who oppose are seen to possess evil intentions rather than viable alternative to themselves. The 
same attitude is likely to find its echoes within the ranks of the opposition. Product of the 
similar social political environment, the opposition, too, tended to have a similar beliefs, the
The most complete study to date is, Ali Birinci, Hürriyet ve İtila f Fırkası, İkinci Meşrutiyet 
Devrinde İttihat ve Terakkiye Karşı Çıkanlar [The Party of Liberty and Etente, The Opposing Forces to 
the Committee of Union and Progress in the Second Constitutional Period] (Istanbul; Dergah, 1990).
'*” As Sayan noted in the emergence of the party tystem intra-elite conflict rather than materialization 
of conflicts in the political arena had the decisive inqjact See, Sabri S^an, ‘Turkish Party System in 
Transitioa” Government and Opposition. 13, (1978), 40.
There is some controversy whether the CUP can be called as ‘party’ or an ‘association’. The 
dominant view is that even after the 1908, the central committee, which preserved its secretive nature, 
dominated the party group in the assembly. Its claim to be parliamentary party were thus shadowed by the 
central committee. See, Akşin,yön Tûrkler.\5\
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government is seen as having brought the country into the brink of abyss, or more frequently, 
resorting the authoritarian methods.
Coupled with weakness of the political parties’ link with the social groups these 
perceptions of government and/or opposition gave rise to extremely “virulent and mutually 
destructive” form of political struggles.'”* Party struggles tended to be over largely abstract 
subjects'”” unrelated to broader social problems and tensions as well as involving a heavy dose 
of personalistic conflicts."” Public life appeared not as an arena in which solutions to common 
problems are sought but as an arena in which parties endlessly fight with each other. The early 
word to describe party was “firka” \^diich literally meant “division” of “break up” within the 
islamic religious community. “Fırka”, then, came to denote those who supported one religious 
sect against others.'" Party struggles, too, in terms of intensity and the use of violence, tended 
to resemble figfrts between competing religious sects.
The heavy dose of personalistic conflict should be traced back to the imperial- 
patrimonial system of the empire. It had prepared a fertile ground conducive to personalistic
Şerif Mardin, “Opposition and Control in Turkey.” Government and Opposition. 1,3, (1966); 
Frederick W. Frey, “Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey,” in Political Elites in the Middle East, ed. 
George Lenczowski, (Washington D.C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975).
Ergun Ozbudun, “Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations” in Politics in 
Developing Countries- Comparing Experiences with Democracy, second edition, ed. Larry Diamond, 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Juan J.Linz (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 225.
There are reasons to think that this is a feature of countries with the strong state tradition. 
Raymond Aron, for instance, notes the tendency of the French public to discuss such abstract subjects as 
disestablishment, the limits of raison d'etat, lacism rather than concrete ones such as rate of growth, the 
prevention of unemployment, Nato enlargement and like. See, Raymond Aron, Democracy and 
Totalitarianism-A Theory o f  Political Systems (edited with an introduction by Roy Pierce) (Ann Arbour: 
University of Michigan Press, 1990) (originally published in 1%5),141.
Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu’s novel. Hüküm Gecesi, that narrates the period, captures well 
the political struggles of the time. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Hüküm Gecesi [The Night of 
Judgement], second ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 1987) (originally published in 1927).
Tank Zafer Tunaya, Siyasi Müesseseler ve Anayasa Hukuku [Political Institutions and the 
Constitutional Law] second ed. (Istanbul: Filiz, 1%9), 450.
According to Tunaya, “the political life was not dissimilar to the war” (savaş meydanından 
farksızdı) and “it had lost its character of being a political struggle but came to resemble religious wars.” 
Tunaya, îlan.46, 81.
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conflict. Indeed personal rivalry had been central to such systems. As the rulers concentrated 
decision making in their hands, politics tend to become an ©cclusively center-oriented (palace) 
activity having little contact with society. Rulers, too, tend to encourage such personal rivalry 
so as to prevent one fkrtion becoming too powerful.”  ^Because in such a system no one within 
the ruling strata is secure and widespread insecurity tends to produce gossip, intrigues, mutual 
accusations, bickerings, and all sort of personal rivalries. The Tanzimat reforms introduced 
legal-rational norms but the imperial patrimonial traditions continued. As the cmter of gravity 
receded fi-om Sultans to powerful bureaucrats, there occurred a cliques and fections around the 
bureaucrats. Anybody wishing to climb the ladder had to find a protector, someone who was 
powerful, and able to protect, and help him to rise on the administrative ladder. The 
relationship between these two was informal. Having bequeathed such tradition, the Young 
Turks, too, in a very short time, feU in mutual accusations (ranging fiom being a spy, to being 
someone who committed to treason, to having come fi’om ethnic minorities), plots, and 
Actional conflicts."^ Thus, political life dominated by those tradition involved heavy dose of 
personalistic conflict.
While political life progressed along this line, the life of ordinary people did not 
undergo radical transformations. The proclamation of the second constitutional period had 
unreasonably raised expectations.*'* But nothing tangible have come out of it. The stark life of 
ordinary people appears to have remained more or the less same, if not worsened. As one 
member of parliament is reported to have said; “let alone providing everyone with life standards 
like human beings, it is very diflBcult to keep people at their present levels, which is more like
James A.Bill and Robert Springboard, Politics in the Middle East (Little Brown: Sc»tt 
Foresman, 1990), 158-161.
IM Mardin, Jön Türk. 12.
The words “hürriyet and meşrutiyet” appreared to have signified magic solutions to the 
pressing problems. According to Karal, with the proclamation of the constitution people even refused to 
pay for tickets for steamers and trolleys as well as rejecting tax-collector arguing that fieedom has finally 
arrived. See, Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi -İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1908-1918), 
[The Ottoman History-The Second Constitutional Period and the First World War, (1908-1918)] vol 9, 
(Ankara; Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996), 53.
76
that of animals.”“  ^ The loss of the Balkan provinces, the most economically productive part of 
the empire, the influx of the Muslim refugees and the need to finance continuing wars had put 
an enormous burden on state and society. Nevertheless, the modernizing efforts of the CUP 
governments, notably in education continued. One other significant policy of the CUP had 
been the open support of muslim merchants. The rulers of the empire had openly embraced the 
idea that a class of muslim merchants and traders was to be nurtured by the state, though their 
efforts remained less than successful.
2.4.THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE ONE-PARTY PERIOD, 1925-1950
The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 foUowing the break up of the Ottoman 
Empire in the first world war. It was the work of the victorious Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA), which was opened in 1920 and conducted the war of independence, led by 
Mustafa Kemal. After the consolidation of new Republican regime, what became known as 
Alaturk’s revolutions followed.
The main thrust of those revolutions was the further secularization and modernization 
of the country, a process which had been on the agenda of the reformers at least since Mahmud 
the Second. Like his contemporaries in the Young Turk movement educated in modem 
schools of Tanzimat, Mustafa Kemal believed that to save the country further secularization 
and modernization was necessary. ‘ He, however, had dared as far as he could go in this path. 
According to Mustafa Kemal, the reform movement in the Ottoman Empire was piecemeal, 
hesitant, and not far sweeping, ready to give concessions to vested interests. It was based on 
the superficial imitation of western manners and rather prepared to satisfy western powers."*
116 Tunaya, “Ikiiici Meşrutiyet,” 81.
117 Mustafa Kemal, as well as having been involved in the Young Turk movement, was known to 
have had relations with the Committee of Union and Progress. According to Zürcher he was a “prominent 
though not a leading member of the military irmer circle of the CUP.” Erik J. Zürcher, The Unionist 
Factor: The Role o f  the Committee o f  Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926 
(Uiden: BriU, 1984), 66.
118 M ustaâ Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri [The Speeches and Statements of 
Atatürk 1, vol 1 ( Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1%1), 203-206.
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Accordingly it created a dysfimctional duality and prepared its own failure. Drawing his lessons 
he then concluded that the Republican reforms must be prompt, radical, far sweeping, and not 
to give any concessions to reform resisting forces. Here, we see the complex interaction of 
strong state and traditional social structure. The very structure of traditional society is 
perceived to have presented obstacles in the way of reforms. To remove these obstacles, it was 
assumed, the state must respond by being more radical and heavy handed.
Like many of their mentors, the Young Turks, Atatürk and his associates ^p ear to 
have held deeply entrenched belief that the influence of Islam in sodal-poiitical af^irs or more 
accurately its abuse by reactionary forces was one of the most significant causes of the decline 
of the Ottoman Empire, the so-called iron-cast theory of Islam. They did not, however, aim to 
cause religion to vanish but wished to get rid of its primitivism and dogmatism wiiich, in their 
opinion, created obstacles for modernization efforts. Their Islam was to be “a purified and 
reformed Islam which was both modem and Turkish.”*^ The Republican emphasis on 
changing Islamic institutions and stmctures is closely related with the peculiarities of the 
Turkish revolution. As Mardin put it, the Turkish revolution was neither “the instmment of a 
discontented bourgeoisie” nor rode on “a wave o f peasant dissatisfaction with the social 
order” nor targeted “the sweeping away of feudal privileges.”*^* But rather, “it did take as 
a target values o f the Ottoman ancien regime”*^ of which Islam was an indispensable part. 
It particularly attempted to remove the Islamic theological justification of the origins and 
the ends of state power. Consequently the Sultanate, the Caliphate, office of Şeyhülislam, and 
all centers of religious learning and religious brotherhoods were abolished, followed by other
119 Ortaylı, En Uzun Yüzyıl. 26.
Kemal RKaıpat, Turkey's Politics-Transition to a Multi-party Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 60. In the same line Cizre-Sakallıoğlu indicated that Atatürk had favoured an 
understanding that revolved around the idea of “double Islams,” one reactionary and one resonant with 
the civilization. Omit Cizre-Sakalhoğlu, “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in 
Republican Turkey.” International Journal o f Middle East Studies. 28, 2 (19%), 236.
Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution.” International Journal o f 
Middle East Studies. 2, (1971), 202.
122 Ibid., 202.
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reforms aiming to secularize daily life.*^ What was came to known as laidsm^^“* became the 
central flank of Republican agenda.
This brings us to the related aspect of the new Republican outlook, the creation of the 
Turkish Republic as a modem nation-state. Indeed, secularization was an indispensable part of 
the attempts to create a modem nation state. Sovereignty was proclaimed to reside in the 
Turkish nation. This meant spelling the end of the multinational Ottoman Empire and the 
establishment of the Turkish nation-state. This was a gigantic task, not only because Turks had 
been the last to have had nationalistic aspirations within the empire but also because the new 
regime confronted the problem of national integration of non-Turidsh muslim (Kurds, 
Circassians, Arabs, Laz) subjects. The Ottoman Empire was a multinational state where, 
theoretically at least, loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty overrode all otho* loyalties. It was 
necessary to constitute a new identity acceptable to the remaining ethno-religious elements in 
Anatolia.
Mustafa Kemal and his associates were not committed to ethnic-based nationalism (or 
what is sometimes called uncivic eastern nationalism), i.e. defining the nation by ethno-cultural 
traits. Instead they adopted what is known as western civic model that emphasized the political 
equality of citizens at the expense of their ethno-cultural origins. “How happy is the man who 
calls (not who is) himself a Turk” reflected that philosophy. Apart from the non-muslim 
minorities recognized by Lausanne agreement, all the muslim groups were called Turks. Be 
that as it may, as recent research*^ has shown, various nationalisms have tended to combine
Most important among these; outlawing of traditional Ottoman “Fez” in favour of hats (1925), 
adoption of gregorian calendar (1925), adoption of Swiss civil code (1926) and Latin alphabet (1928), the 
deletion of the second article of the 1924 Constitution which stated Islam to be the state religion. See, 
Binnaz Toprak, “The Religious Right,” Turkey in Transition-New Perspectives, ed. Irvin C. Stuck and 
Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1987), 223
The Kemalist conception of laicism involved, not sharp separation of religion and the state 
but the state control of religion through organizational links between religious institutions and the state 
bureaucracy. See, Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden; Brill, 1981), 2.
Anthony D.Smith, National Identity (London; Penguin, 1991), 13. Specifically, 
Sazereesinghh notes how French nationalism, thought to be prime example of western civic nationalism, 
tended towards emphasizing ethno-religious dimension.«; Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in 
M odem France (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1994), 124-151 (especially chapter five, ‘The Two 
Faces of French Nationalism’)
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elements of both. Republican nationalism was not an exception. While it granted equal 
citizenship rights, regardless of ethnic, religious origins, to all those living in Turkey, it also 
involved “an ethno-cultural dimension highlighting the ethnic singularity of Turldshness.”^^ 
The founders of the Republic had been less than sympathetic to the demands raised by various 
ethno-religious groups perceiving them as “irrelevant survivals from the dark ages of Turkey.” 
Their official stand was “to dismiss the checkerboard structure of Anatolia by passing it under 
silence.” This official attitude determined the state’s approach to nationalism and lingersto 
this day. As we shall dwell on it below, this approach led to a policy that tended to deny those, 
A^ dio while enjoying equal citizenship rights do not regard themselves as ethnically Turkish, the 
means to express their professed distinctive origins and identities.
Alongside the project of secularism and the establishment o f the nation-state, the 
Republican regime launched a socio-economic modernization program. Atatürk and his 
associates had well understood that nationalism and secularism, the central flanks of the 
Republican regime, would be incomplete and insecure so long as Turkey remained an 
economically backward country. The new regime, therefore, tried to speed up the economic 
activities in the severely ruined country. The holding of the economic congress, in which 
economic policy choices, open to the new regime were thoroughly discussed, as early as 1923 
attests to that fact.'^ In terms of economic policies, the 1923-1929 period does not signify a 
break from the CUP period. The nurturing of national bourgeoisie, a central aim of the 
National Economy (milli iktisat) policy of the Unionists was continued by Republicans.
Omit Clzie-Sakallioglu, “Historicizing the Present and Problematizing the Future of the 
Kurdish Problem; A critique of the TOBB Report on the Eastern Question.” New Perspectives on Turkey. 
14, (19%), 6.
127 Mardin, “Onter-Periphery,” 25.
In the same line. Sugar, *Turkey,” 164. It is sometimes argued that the preoccupation with 
secularism has come to dominate the republican agenda and led to the sidestepping of economic issues. 
Topiak, for instance, argued that “insistence of changing Islamic institutions and structures prevented the 
modernizing elite of the Kemalist era from turning attention to a broader definition of systemic change.” 
Toprak, Islam. 132. We think that this is view less than justified basically because the leadership cadres 
appeared to have believed secularism is indeed an indispensable part of the efforts to prepare conditions 
for economic development as they believed that economic backwardness of the country was closely related 
with the abuse of Islam in the public domain.
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However, it involved more liberal overtones than Unionists’ -it encouraged foreign capital 
alongade the national one, it favored commercialized agriculture, it had to foUow somewhat 
lesser protectionist policies- basically because several provisions of Lausanne treaty appear to 
have limited the new regime’s room for maneuver. After the great depression of 1929 hit 
Turkey hard the government followed more protectionist and statist policies. Not only did the 
government intervene more and more into economy through extensive financial and foreign 
trade regulations, but also it directly invested in industry such as steel production, chemicals, 
metallurgy, and infi:astructure particularly railways. Alongside its efforts in establishing 
industry, steps were taken both to modernize agriculture and to improve inequalities in in land 
regime.’ ®^
Mustafa Kemal’s way of conducting these modernizing reforms displayed unmistakable 
signs of elitism. True to Ottoman tradition and Young Turk views, he, too, concluded that the 
viable way to accomplish reforms was modernization from above under the leadership of the 
enlightened. In this view, the enlightened elite should lead the apathetic masses in the righteous 
path -to reach a contemporary level of civilization through the guidance of science free from all 
religious-mystical interferences. He argued that the true revolutionaries and populists (halkçı) 
were those who could discover “the real orientations and collective conscience of the 
people.”*^* This, of course, implied that not all ideas or what as sometimes presented as public 
opinion corresponds to the real orientations of the people. Atatiiilc expressed this idea cleariy 
when he said “if we leave the people to themselves, there will be no longer any steps 
forward.” '^  ^ He thought that ^"consulting public opinion really amounted to shaping it.”‘^ ^
129 For a detailed account see. Korkut Boratav, Türkiye’de Devletçilik [Etatism in Turkey ], 
seconded. (Ankara; Savaş, 1982).
130 1For efforts of the republican regime towards the modernization of agriculture, see Dhan Tekeli 
ve Selim îlkin, “Devletçilik Dönemi Tanm Politikalan” [Agricultural Policies in the Statist Period ] in 
Türkiye ’de Tarımsal Yapılar (1923-2000), ed. Şevket Pamuk, Zafer Toprak (Ankara: Yurt, 1988). For an 
assessment of land reform policies, see, Yahya Sezai Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi (1923- 
1950) [An Economic History of the Republican Period, 1923-1950] (Ankara; Yurt, 1982), 343-357.
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Though, he appears to have believed that this guidance was to be a temporary (that is when 
people’s conscience reached a certain level it would no longer be needed), that does not 
diminish its elitist nature as it would still be the elites \^^o would decide A^ dien that stage had 
been reached.
Equipped with such an outlook the Tuiidsh state oflBdals and social-political forces 
associated with it would now assume itself the task of elevating the people to a contemporary 
level of civilization through the Republican People Party (RPP) (founded in 9 September 
1923). Earlier it has been noted that the civil-military bureaucrats in alliance with local notables 
(aga or eşraf) and some religious leaders constituted the core supporters of the CXJP. It is 
generally accepted that the same groups were at the forefront in the war of independence. 
Many members of the Society for the Defense of the National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia 
which would later constitute the core of the Republican People’s Party had in one way or 
another been involved in the CUP. \^^th the proclamation of the republic the same elements 
were at the forefomt to constitute the RPP which was dominated by dvil-militaiy bureaucracy 
in an uneasy alliance with local notables and (at least in the beginning) some religious 
leaders.*^’ While with the passage of the time, the religious leaders left the RPP, the link 
between local notables and party remained strong. Despite the fact that bureaucratic wing in 
the party sometimes clashed with these local notables, and that many local notables found them 
too radical, the RPP leadership could not renounce them since as in the empire, they played a 
useful role in linking the periphery with the center.
Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob M.Landau (London; I.B. Tauris, 1991), 31.
133 Heper, Tradition.S\. (Italics are his).
Ergun Ozbudun, “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime” in Atatürk: Founder o f  a 
M odem State, ed. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun özbudun (London; C.Hurst, 1981), 83.
That does not imply, on the other hand, that the RPP was the same as the CUP in terms of 
ideology. The CUP had involved those who wanted the policy of Ottomanism, and islamism. Besides 
many of these had paid at least a lip service to sultan and Islamic bases of the state, which the RPP harshly 
despised.
'^Ayşe Güneş Ayata, “Class and Clientelism in the Republican People’s Party,” in Turkish State, 
Turkish Society, ed. Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sirman (London; RouUedge, 1990), 164. fF
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The influence of the civil-military bureaucracy, in the sense of being the locus of 
stateness in the one-party regime remained limited during Atatürk’s presidency (1923-1938). 
Atatürk did not mince his words regarding the civil-military bureaucracy based on his personal
137experiences in Ottoman period and remained skeptical of the bureaucrats throughout. 
Despite the occasional disputes between Atatüık and the representatives of civil-military 
bureaucratic tradition including his premier İsmet İnönü, Atatürk seems to have had the last 
word. But the tendencies towards the fusion of party and civil-military bureaucracy that would 
constitute a new state elite with a distinctive ideology called “Atatürkçülük” or “Kemalism” 
had begun in Atatürk’s life time.^ ^* Beginning with the third general congress of the RPP 
(1931), steps were taken towards the realizing that aim.*^^  “Türk Ocaklan” (Turkish Hearts), 
an association to promote Tuikish nationalism founded in 1912, was brought under party 
control in 1927, then the association abolished itself in 1931 and its founder was sent to 
Bucharest as an ambassador. People’s Houses (Halkevleri) and People’s Rooms (Halkodalan) 
were established to promote the values of the Republican regime in towns and-villages. The six 
principles of Kemalism -republicanism, revolutionism, nationalism, secularism, populism, 
statism- were enshrined in the party program (1931) and then the 1924 Constitution (1937). 
Though some leading members of the RPP, notably secretary general Recep Peker, are 
suspected of having had such intentions, these eflforts remained short of creating a party-state, 
modeled on fascist and communist parties of the time. Instead, the state (civil and military 
bureaucracy) tended to dominate the p a r t y . I n  18 June 1936, three days after Recep Peker 
had been removed from his post, it was decided that provincial governors would be the
137 Metin Heper, “Atatürk and Civil Bureaucracy,” in Atatürk and the Modernization o f  Turkey, 
ed. Jacob M. Landau (Boulder; Westview, 1984)
138 According to Hughes, Atatürk himself did not use the term “Kemalism” but as early as 1931, 
history books prepared by ministry of national education written about Kemalism. See, Preston Hughes, 
Atatürkçülük ve Türkiye ’nin Demokratikleşme Süreci [Atatürk and Turkey’s Democratization Process] 
(İstanbul; Milliyet, 1993), 64.
139 For a detailed information. Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin 
Kurulması, 1923-1931 [The Establishment of One-Party System in Turkey, 1923-193 lKAnkara;Yurt, 
1981).
140 Ibid., 322.
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chairmen of the local party organization while the minister of interior was appointed as the 
general secretary of the party.
The Republican leaders neither flirted with the idea of mass transformation through 
mobilization led by political party in line with the strict ideology nor did they ever explicitly 
rqect the ideal of democracy or developed a defense of anti-democratic currents. But, 
particulariy after Atatürk passed away in 1938 the tendency towards interpreting Alatürkism as 
comprehensive “ideology” in the Shilsian sense*“*^ appears to have gained pace, despite the fact 
that Atatürk did not seem to intend such an outcome. During his period, those principles 
came to be interpreted in a flexible way. Rather than drawing policy implications fi’om these 
principles, principles themselves tend to be interpreted in a way that provided justifications for 
policy choices that had been made. The principle of statism, for instance, was capable of several 
interpretations dep^ding on the specific requirements of the period. While Cdal Bayar, (a 
premier between 1937-1939 and a minister of economy between 1932-37) interpreted it as 
giving state help to foster private enterprise, İsmet İnönü favored a more comprehensive view 
that gave the state a powerfiol, and not a temporary, role. With the election of the İsmet İnönü, 
who unlike Atatürk always preferred to woric within the established norms and gave priority to 
bureaucratic regulations, to the presidency the charismatic rule of Atatürk was routinized and
Od)udun, “Nature”, 91. For the argument that Republicans were not ready to embrace the 
basic characteristics of liberal democracy fully either, see, Levent Köker, Modernleşme, Kemalizm and 
Demokrasi [Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy ] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1990).
Edward Shils, “The Concept and Fimction of Ideology,” in International Encylopedia o f 
Social Sciences, vol 7. ed. David L. Sills ( The Macmillan Company, The Free Press: New York, 1%8). 
See, also his comparison of ideological style of politics with a civil one, Edward Shils, “Ideology and 
Civility,” in The Intellectuals and the Power Other Essays (Chicago and London; The University of 
Chicago Press, 1972).
Some students of Turkish politics argued that Atatürir himself did not try to prevent the 
development of Kemalism in his life time and even encouraged i t  See, Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The 
Rebirth o f a Nation (London; Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1964),457; Suna Kili, Kemalim  (Istanbul: 
Robert (College, 1969), 5. We think that this view is less than accurate. The argument that Atatürk did 
encoiuage such a development can not withstand empirical scrunity. What can be said, however, is that 
Atatürk, probably not properly estimating where such actions could lead, have tolerated such attempts in 
his lifetime. That does not mean, however, Atatürk would have supported the dogmatic interpretations of 
his principles which fully emerged after his death. For a similar view, see, Hughes, Atatürkçülük. 68.
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supplemented by bureaucracy.*^ The civil bureaucracy was organized as a career dvil service. 
Special laws and regulations governed its recruitment policies and internal functioning, as well 
as securing protection from the interference of the executive. Bureaucrats as a whole 
constituted a well-cared for group, enjoying relatively high salaries. These developments 
prepared a fertile ground in which the Atatürkist thought, “what must be an example of a 
W eltanschm ungpar excellence, was gradually transformed into an ideology.”*^  ^The fusion of 
civil-military bureaucracy with the RPP*^ gave rise to a powerful state elite, who would make 
a new locus of stateness and carriers of the state tradition. These state elites, who could be 
found in the party, and upper echelons of the civil or military bureaucracy, tended to perceive 
themselves as responsible for elevating the ignorant but capable Turidsh people to the 
contemporary level of civilization, despite the fact that people may not have been interested or 
even opposed to such policy. “For the people, despite the people”, have become thdr motto. 
They saw themselves as promoters, and true defenders of state interests and Atatürk’s 
principles as they understood it. As self-appointed guardians, they assumed themselves entitled 
to take the action whenever they thought Atatürk’s principles had been violated, which at times 
had been detrimental to democratic regime in Turkey.
The Republican modernization project, particularly the implementation of such policies 
of laicism and nationalism soon generated discontent and reaction to the new regime, 
especially among the educated strata. First of all, there were Islamists, whose roots can be 
traced back to Tanzimat period. They argued that the cuirent troubles were the consequence of 
the Westernization efforts of the ruling groups that led to a diminishing of the Islamic rules in 
social and political afiairs. Many of them opposed not the necessity of modernization but the 
way that the project was implemented. They were inclined to see the Republic and its
Dankwan A. Rustow, “Atatürk as Founder of a State.” Daedalus. 97 (1968), 794.
MS Heper, Tradition.il.
146 1' It should not be thought that the RPP dominated the civil-military bureaucracy in the way that 
the conununist parties did, as in former the Soviet Union. A great mobility between bureaucrats and party 
officals had taken place. A bureaucrat could easily become an MP on the RPP ticket, while many MP’s 
resigned to become judges, provincial governors, or directors of state monopolies.
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modernizing policies as Zionist-masonic conspiracy that aimed to deprive Muslim people of 
their true guide- the Islamic law. Some policies of the Republic played into the hands of those 
who argued this line. The principle of laicism, understood by Atatürk and his friends as the 
vanishing of religious influences in social and political afliairs and limiting the effect of religion 
in the realm of private conscience, gave way to an understanding of laicism “that came to 
border on irreligiosity.”*^ ’ The ruling bureaucratic elite adopted some policies*^ that resembled 
the allegedly imitative Tanzimat policies despised by Atatürk himself
Though it was hard to assess the strength of these groups, from time to time they were 
able to secure the support of the Anatolian peasants and small groups o f artisans (esnaf) \^ dıo 
observed that Kemalist policies of modernization had done little to improve material conditions 
of life. Despite considerable advances having taking place on the socio-economic front, it 
remained less than satisfactory. In the period of 1926-1950, the GDP growth was estinrated to 
have been 3.3 per cent alongside the 1.9 per cent population growth. The share of industry in 
the GDP rose to 18.4 in 1946 from 14.4 in 1926, while only a slight decrease-was recorded in 
the agriculture.*^’ The share of landless peasant families was estimated to have risen from 17 
per cent of all Emilies to 20 percent. *** As it speared to one American observer in 1949
Adnan Adivar, “The Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey,” in Near Eastern 
Culture and Society, ed. T. Cuyler Young (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 128. In the same 
line, Kemal RKaipat, “The Republican People’s Party, 1923-1945,” in Political Parties and Democracy 
in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), 58.
There are no detailed studies on that question -which policies of the Republic came to border 
on irreligiosity. Some individual events and policies, many of them short term- are pointed out. For 
instance, in an effort to promote ‘civilized’ Western music ferries crossing Bo^horus played Ravel’s Bolero, 
while traditional Turkish music was forbidden on state radios. But it was equally true that some of these poUcies 
were even qrposed by and eventually abolished by the RPP elite itself For instance, the KtÿrOlû commission’s 
rqx>rt on religious reform that “would have turned the mosques into Christian Churches, complete with benches 
and instrumental music,” was never implemented because of the qiposition it meet Toprak, Islam, 147. 
Similarly, a proposition put forward by some RPP members (and d e fen d  by premier Recq> Pdrer) to change 
the name of “Hactbayram square” into “August Square” was harshly critized and rejected by the Party itself 
Faik Ahmet Barutçu, Siyasi Anılar, 1939-1954 [The Political Memoirs, 1939-1954] (İstanbul:Mtlliyet 1977), 
266.
'^T ezel, CiiOTAi/r/yer. 100, 102.
Ibid., 335.
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“. .40000 villages (in which four fifths of the population lived) have scarcely changed for one 
thousand years.”*** Periiaps, but not solely, because of this, the spread of the new Republican 
secular culture to the mass of people remained less than complete.**  ^It seemed to be confined 
to privileged minorities in big cities, A\diile the m^ority of the population imbued with 
traditional-Islamic values, had not been seriously afiected. The inability of the new regime to 
generate drastic improvements in material conditions of life and to make them internalize new 
secular republican culture made the majority of the population an attractive target for those 
who wanted to mobilize them by using Islamic sentiments against the Republic.**^
On the other hand, there were those wiio felt uneasy as a result of the Republican 
policies in the process of nation-building wWch necessitated inevitable homogenizing. The 
Kurdish speaking population of the Republic (according to 1927 census 9 per cart of the 
population, or roughly 1.2 million)**  ^w ae the most affected and vocal group. Several reasons, 
however, eased the Kurdish opposition to new regime. The tribal structure of the Southern
Max W. Thornburg, Graham Spiy and George Soule, Turkey: An Economic Appraisal (New 
York:The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949), 4. Why the Republican regime was unable to generate 
improvements in the daily life of the majority of the population ? This question requires a separate and 
much larger smdy but it suffices here to note that the new regime chosen to use its already scarce 
resources to consolidate the poUtical-cultural-institutions of new secular, republican state. It also had to 
deal with world recession of post-1929 and second world war period, not particularly conducive 
international environment for prosperity.
Şerif Mardin, “Religion in Modem Turkey.” International Social Science Journal. 29, (1977); 
Şerif Mardin, “The Just and Unjust.” Daedalus. 120, 3 (1991),127. This, of course, raises the question of 
Kemalist model of integration and its impact on the mass of people. What we try to say here is not that the 
Kemalist model of integration was without its shortcomings, but that the regime’s inability to improve 
daily life of its citizens exaceibated already problematic relationships between the regime and citizens. It 
would not be misleading to suggest that if the regime had been more successful in generating 
improvements in ordinary people’s life, various problems of integration would have been less intense.
In discussing the problem of Islamic opposition, one should â li into the trap of assuming that the 
secular Rqxiblican poUdes were implemented in the âce of widespread opposition. This is chiefly because the 
secularizing reforms hardly influenced the life of the peasants who made iqr vast majoriiy of the population. As 
Zürcher nicely put it; “A farmer or shepherd from Anatolia never worn a fez, so he was not especially 
bothered about its abolition. His wife wore no veil anyway, so the fact that its use was discouraged did not 
mean anything to him or her. He could not read or write, so the nature of the script was immaterial to 
h im ... The new family law made polygamy illegal, but those farmers who could afford it would still quite 
often take into the house a second woman...” Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey- A M odem History (London; LB 
Tauris, 1993), 202. In the same line, Karpat, Transition. 53.
154 Cited in Tezel, Cumhuriyet. 88.
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Eastern parts of the Tuiicey where the majority of the Kurdish speaking population lived 
constituted an obstacle for the development of ethnic consciousness of Kurdishness. The 
leaders of these tribes could easily found a place within the RPP and were incorporated into the 
system. Moreover, as noted above, under the republican regime all ethnic groups enjoyed equal 
citizenship rights regardless of their ethnic origins, though they were discouraged not to 
emphasize their distinctive identities. Indeed, most of the Turkey’s Kurdish speaking peasants 
were not even aware that they might had a distinctive ethnical identity, instead they toided to 
embrace primordial and religious identities.
Islamic and Kurdish discontent managed to raise opposition to the new regime, which 
had been repressed only by recourse to extensive force, in its consolidation phase. In some 
cases, opposing movements claimed to fight for both religion and ethnicity (as in Şeyh Sait 
rd)ellion)*”  in other cases these movements were either dominantly religious (Menemen 
events) or ethnic.’** Şerif Mardin had characterized peripheral rdjellion movements in the 
Ottoman empire as ‘flash in the pan.’’*’ In the Republic, too, this feature perpetuated itself 
These peripheral opposition movements were largely spontaneous, and disunited, based on 
exploiting immediate-existing grievances rather than being based on definite principles. They 
appear to have lacked the ‘organizational autonomy’ that might have allowed them to 
consolidate victories and gradually to build on these. Lacking such attributes the republican 
regime was able to contain them.
Apart fi'om these anti-system opposition movements, the new regime tolerated and 
even sometimes encouraged the opposition. This can be explained by reference to the nature of 
the one party rule and their specific understanding of “opposition.” As noted above, despite
155 Toprak, Islam. 69.
We lack detailed, impartial academic treatment of these rdiellions. A study prepared by the 
War History Institution (attached to the general chief of staff office) and entitled as Türkiye 
Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938) is not available to the researchers. A version of it was 
published by less than reliable publication house. Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt /şyan/an,[Kurdish 
Rd)ellions as Documented by the Chief of General Staff Papers] 2 vols, (Istanbul; Kaynak, 1992). 
According to this study, there were 18 rd)ellions between 1924 and 1938, of which only one of them 
(Menemen) have taken place outside the eastern parts of the country.
157 Mardin, “Power”, 269.
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several attempts, the Republican regime found it hard to develop an authoritarian ideology 
aiming to justify permanent one-party rule. Though unpracticed, the democratic system had 
never been explicitly rejected. The Grand National Assembly remained open, &cade décrions 
had been held, and some freedom of discussion and opposition had been allowed. Thdr 
understanding of opposition, however, was somewriat different. Opposition was not to oppose 
(or question) the basic tenets of the Republican polides, it was to stay in the narrowly defined 
parameters of the system. Mustafa Kemal believed “in a democratic pluralist political system 
provided all of the plural elements were republican and modernist progressive.”*^* It was 
expected to oppose not the republican ideals itself but the ways of attaining those ideals. Given 
the Jacobinist-pozitivist background of the Kemalist approach perception of opposition as such 
was hardly surprising. Since sdence was proclaimed to be “the truest guide in life” and since 
there could onlyrie one sdentific truth, the opposition was meant to them opposition to the real 
(true) interests (wishes) of the people. If sdence and reason could find what route a sodety 
should follow and if the enlightened elite who were intent on ^plying those knew them, 
opposition (in the sense of opposing those prindples) was unnecessary and adverse to true 
interest of the people. Opposition would not oppose basic prindples but it would discuss and 
criricize governmental polides in order to arrive at new (and better) ways of realizing those 
prindples. In this view political conflict was seen essentially as a “process of discussion,”**^  as a 
result of which the right polides were assumed to emeige. *“
Such a perception of opposition was reinforced by proclaimed belief in the Turkish
IS8 Kaipat, “The Republican,” 150.
Metin Heper, “AtatürkTe Devlet Düşüncesi,”fThe Concept of a State in Atatürk ] in Çağdaş 
Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk, ed. Ali Gevgilili (İstanbul; Nejat Eczaabaşı Vakfı, 1983), 228.
Note that this Kemalist view of government-opposition relations resembles Islamic Meşveret 
tradition. In the Meşveret tradition, too, the umera and ulema are supposed to debate until they find an 
appropriate solution which enjoys unanimous acceptance. See, for a discussion, Ellis Goldberg, “Private 
Goods, Public Wrongs, and Civil Society in Some Medieval Arab Political Theory and Practice,” in Rules 
and Rights in the Middle East- Democracy, Law and Society, eds. Ellis Goldberg, Reşat Kasaba and Joel 
S. Migdal (Seattle and London; University of Washington Press, 1993), 261-vd. See also recent 
discussion by Jean Leca, “Opposition in the Middle East and North Afiica.” Government and Opposition. 
32, 4,(1997),568fif.
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Gfand National Assembly as the true representative which exercises unlimited sovereignty for 
people’s behalf. Mustafe Kemal had declared that sovereignty belonged, without any limitation, 
to the nation And both the 1921 and the 1924 constitutions stated that the Grand National 
Assembly was “the sole representative of the nation, on whose behalf it exercises the rights of 
sovereignty .” Stated as such, the total sovereignty of the nation represented by the TGNA did 
not bode well for the right of opposition to exist. To oppose the specific decisions of the 
Assembly can easily be labeled as opposition to the dictates of the sovereign people, defense of 
local, particular interest against the higher interests of nation or even treason to the country.
It was clear that this perception of opposition, not as rational expression of opinion and 
iirterest but as a malign force opposing the real interests of the people with divisive motivations 
did not bode well for the development of democracy.*“  Since many opposing movements in 
the early Republic were easily perceived as such and had not been tolerated despite the feet that 
research in retrospect has revealed that they were fer fi’om having such traits. What was called 
the second group (as opposed to the first group which had the m^ority that was to fonn the 
core of RPP) was the first opposition movement. Recent research*“  has shown that the second 
group, fer fi-om being dominated by those opposing the war of independence and defending the 
Caliphate actually involved those who were distressed by Mustafe Kemal’s (wdiat appeared to 
them) authoritarian -centralizing tendencies. Similariy the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) 
was founded by some of the closest fiiends of Mustafe Kemal such as Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuad 
Cebesoy and Refet Bele. Though more religion fiiendly and less centralizing and less radical, 
the PRP was not an organization that questioned the basic tenets of the Republican regime. It
Such a conception of national sovereignty and perception of opposition was not peculiar to 
Turkey alone. It first crystallized in France after the 1789 revolution, and can be observed in other 
countries influenced by French Republican ideas. See, for more information, Ghita lonescu and Isabel de 
Madariaga, Opposition: Past and Present o f  a Political Institution (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1968), 38- 
40.
Indeed, the idea of tolerance of opposition was very slow in coming in western society, which 
now stands as the model of liberal democractic state. See, Robert A Dahl, Polyarchy -Participation and 
Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 45; SQmour Martin Lipset, The First 
New Nation- United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (1963), 39.
Ahmet Demiref Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet- İkinci Grup [The Opposition in the First 
Assembly - The Second Group] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994).
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was rather a movement of prominent national leaders “who felt that the heritage of the 
movement of which they had been such leading figures was being monopolized illegitimately by 
one wing of the original movement..”^^ The PRP survived only seven months. The Seyh Sait 
rebellion in the eastern provinces which seemed to pose a söious threat to regime strengthened 
hand of the hard-liners within the ruling groups. The drastic “Law for the Maintenance of 
Order” was swiftly promulgated. It allowed the vigorous suppression of all opposing forces 
ensuring the closure of PRP in 1925. The Free Party, which was established by a close fiiend 
and associate of Atatürk, by his own encouragement and permission lasted only three months. 
It dissolved itself when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, assuming that it attracted all the discontented 
groups and could pose a threat to Republican order, made his preference clear in fevor of the 
RPP instead of impartiality as was promised inl930. For the next fifteen years (until 1945) 
virtual one-party rule continued with no opposition having formal recognition being permitted 
to exist. The only exception was the independents MP’s within the RPP ^^ dıo had been assigned 
quotas and “charged” to criticize the governmental policies, whose efifect appears to had been, 
on the account of close observers, negligible.*®’
During this period the Republican regime managed to consolidate its basic tenets with 
some success. The complete loyalty of the armed forces and the establishment of the various 
institutions of the modem state (the courts, the police, tax administration) was ensured, 
alongside the new elites that would form the basis of other political parties. The creation of 
new a Turkish identity -or transformation fi'om a multi-national theocratic empire to national 
secularist state- through cultural transformation was weU under way. Ethno-religious 
movements did find it hard to come to surface to pose a threat to regime. On the economic 
fi’ont the shift from a peasant economy to industry and service, despite for from creating
Erik J.Züıcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive 
Republican Party, 1924-1925 (Leiden; Brill, 1991), 111. In the same line, Feroz Ahmad, “The 
Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925,” in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin 
Heper and Jacob Landau (London; LB.Tauris, 1991), 67.
See for Barutçu's comments that members of the independent group had been more in party 
line than ordinary members. Barutçu, Siyasi.12 \.
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revolutionary changes, have made progress 166
2.5. THE FAH.URE OF THE FTOST EXPERIMENT WITH DEMOCRACY, 
1946-1960
Turkey’s transition to democracy in 1946 was realized in this context. It was, again, the 
ruling center, not under irresistible pressures from a social-political groups, that took the 
initiative. As early as 1939 President İsmet İnönü signaled that the time had finally come to 
have another try at multi-party democracy, though he did not allow the establishment of other 
parties until 1945. İnönü’s decision resulted from the carefiil considerations of the various 
factors. First of all, as indicated above, the one-party regime had never developed an ideology 
purporting to justify its permanence. It always retained the ideal of democracy at least in 
discourse. İnönü was reported to have said that “he was not able to look at the walls because 
he was so ashamed of the fact that countries around Turkey had elections and Turkey did 
not”'^  ^ In the same line with Atatürk, İnönü, too, believed that becoming Westernized and 
belonging to contemporary civilization required having a functioning democracy. According to 
İnönü “This new (democratic) way of life would strengthen the Turldsh nation internally and 
gain it the respect of the outside world for being a civilized (medeni) society.”**^* Here we come 
across the favorable effect of the Turkish state tradition on the development of Turkish 
democracy. The state elites, believing in intrinsic values of democracy, and perceiving it as 
something necessary in order to be recognized as a civilized nation, played a crucial role in the 
transition and (later re-transition) to democracy.
166 In the same line see, Karpat, Transition.16.
Cited in Metin Toker, Тек Partiden Çok Partiye, 1944-1950 [The Transition from a Single 
Party to the Multi-party System, 1944-1950] (Istanbul: Bilgi, 1990), 17.
Cited in Kemal H. Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, 
revised and enlarged edition, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (New York: Praeger, 1982), 388. Similarly his defence 
of the decision to have a multi-party regime in the p>arty meetings clearly reveals such an outlook; “Is it 
not strange that when Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and even Arabs and Egyptians were able manage 
democracy, while Turks could not ? Is such a thing possible ? We will certainly do this, too.” Cited in 
Barutçu, Anılar. 286. Note that all the nations mentioned had been under Ottoman domination in the past
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Alongside his valorization of donocracy as an end in itself İnönü defended democracy 
on utilitarian grounds and specifically planned the timing of the transition in a way that would 
best suit the future of the republican regime. He wished to have a democratic regime installed 
in Turkey, because he believed that one-party (or one-man controlled) regimes’ future 
depended on the person at the helm. When that person withdrew, the r^jm e’s fete was bleak 
culminating in usually the collapse of the regime itself He was reported to have said “I can 
continue to spend my life with one-party regime, but I consider what will happen after I have 
passed away.”
Having in mind favorable conception of democraqf İnönü planned the timing of the 
transition very carefully. The defeat of the authoritarian regimes in the Second World War and 
subsequent division of the worid between those which had democracy and which did not, 
forced T urk^ to reconader its place in the emerging world order. This was especially so in the 
fece of Soviet Socialist Republic’s expansionist ideals which targeted (along with other 
countries) Tuikey. Only democratic Turkey, he conceded, could find a -place in newly 
established international organizations of the free worid which would help Tuikey to protect 
herself against Soviet expansion.
Internally, too, transition to a multi-party democracy, İnönü thought, would function as 
a safety valve. He was realistic in this diagnosis. Though Turkey was not directly involved, the 
second worid war left the country in ruins with widespread opposition to the r^jm e. İnönü 
thought that without legitimate outlets opposition might blow away the very essence of the
169 Toker, Tek Parti. 59.
Some analysts suggest that external reasons were the single most important factor in Tuilcey’s 
transition to a multiparty system. Bkz, Nihal Kara-İncioğlu, “Türkiye’de Çok Partili Sisteme Geçiş ve 
Demokrasi Sorunları,” [The Transition to Multi-Party Politics and the Problems of Democracy] in 
Türkiye'de Siyaset- Süreklilik ve Değişim , ed. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sanbay (İstanbul; Der, 
1995); Hakan Yılmaz, “Democratization From Above In Response to the International Context: Turkey, 
1945-1950.” New Perspectives on Turkey. 17 (1997). Having accepted the role of external factors, we 
think that İnönü’s decision cannot be explained without considering the nature of the Kemalist regime 
and his interest-based defence of democracy. Besides, US support was available provided that the country 
in question would not be communist. It may be surmised that the US would preferred a democratic Turkey 
but would not make too much fuss if she remained under one-party rule provided that it was not under 
Soviet influence. For a view that external factors should not be exaggerated see, Karpat, Transition.Hl. 
Also, Bernard Lewis, “Recent Developments in Turkey.” International Affairs. 27, 3, (1951), 322.
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regime. Referring to his decision he was later reported^’’ to have said that if he had had a
different mind, and had made the wrong decision (for not allowing opposition to emerge), the
RPP would have left the power much later. But it certainly would have left power in much
worse circumstances that might have led the RPP’s destiuction.
The picture we present would be incomplete if we ignore İnönü’s assumptions
regarding the opposition. True to tradition he appears to have assumed that the opposition
would not question the basic tenets of the regime and at least in the initial years would not be
able to challenge the RPP rule.*^ He actively encouraged the establishment of an opposition
party by Celal Bayar, who had been the close fiiend and prime minister of Atatürk. Celal Bayar
even presented the Democrat Party program to İnönü and asked for his consent before
applying for official status. İnönü was certain that if the opposition did not behave in this way
he could easily postpone the whole experience. He was reported to have said that:
I would not allow (for the opposition to create an anarchy) this to happen, lam  both 
revolutionaiy and belonged to Kuwa-i Milliye. We have made this state out of 
nothing. We shall not allow some bandits to destroy it  What we are doing is an 
experimenL If we succeed, very good, but if we do not, we shall stop iL In that case we 
will go on as we did so &r only to try it again later.'^ ^
Thus, it is not at all clear whether, if he did not expect the opposition to be manageable, 
he would still allow the emergence of an opposition party.
Nevertheless no one can overlook İnönü’s positive role in installing the multi-party 
regime. He had a good sense of where the world was going and subsequent courage to take 
necessary steps. He handled hard-liners within the party with great success while ensuring that 
the opposition would not be so harsh so as to invite the hatred of hard-liners.*’^
This transition to democracy from above is taken to be the crucial variable that helps to
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See, Metin Heper, İsmet InOna-The Making o f  a Turkish Statesman (Leiden; Brill, 1998), ISO- 
193. The role played by İnönü in the transition process is accepted even his opponents, see, Rifki Salim 
Burçak, Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçiş, 1945-1950 [Transition to Democracy in Turkey, 1945-1950] 
(Ankara; Olgaç, 1979), 130-1.
94
explain Turkey’s troubled democratic development. Dankwart Rustow, for instance, have 
argued that “Turkey paid the price in 1%0 for having received its first democratic regime as 
fi^ ee gift fi'om the hands of a dictator.” It is implied that what is “given” fi’om above can 
easily be taken back. We think that this view is too deterministic. Underiying this thesis is the 
unstated assumption (based on a distorted reading of Western European experience of 
democracy) that democracy is an end-result of bourgeoisie’s (and middle classess) long and 
arduous struggle for power and that transition to democracy was largely conditioned 
(determined) by socio-economic factors. This view and simplistic assumptions that underlied it, 
however, can be criticized on many grounds. Dankwart Rustow and others had called into 
question the “requisites” thesis arguing that “there may be many roads to democracy.”*^'* 
Rustow, particul^y had argued that given the single precondition of national unity, democracy 
might emerge as a by-product. He contrasted many cases of transition to democracy in which 
“democracy was not the original or primary aim” but it was sought as “a means to some other 
end or it came as a fortuitous by product of the struggle.”^^ Recently Guiseppe Di Palma 
dwelled on the same theme asking “wfiy should paths to democracy elsewhere necessarily 
replicate a first path, or foil if unable to?” Similarly Valenzuela pointed out that the origins 
and evolution of democratic institutions and procedures “are determined more by the choices 
made by key elites seeking to maximize their interests within the fiamewoilc of specific 
structural and political parameters than they are by abstract cultural or economic fectors.”
Dankwait A.Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Approach,” in The State 
-Critical Concepts, ed. John A.Hall (London; Routledge, 1994), 362. Originally published in 
Comparative Politics. 2, (1970), 337-363. Taner Timur also implied this in his, Türkiye 'de Çok Partili 
Hayata Geçiş [Transition to Multi-Party Life in Turkey] (Istanbul; İletişim, 1991), 110.
176 Rustow, “Transitions,” 350.
177 Rustow, “Transitions,” 356. John Waterbury goes as far as suggesting that even the national 
unity should not be regarded as precondition. John Wateibury, “Fortuitous By-Products.” Comparative 
Politics. 29, 3, (1997), 383.
178 Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 18.
Arturo Valenzuela, “Chile; Origins and Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy,” in 
Politics in Developing Countries- Comparing Experiences With Democracy, second edition, ed. Larry 
Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Lyime Rieimer; Boulder 1995). See, also, Joseph La 
Palambora, Democracy-Italian Style (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1987), 7.
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Therefore, in the light of recent experience, it can be suggested that just because 
Turkey’s transition to democracy was not led by socio-economical groups, or that socio­
economic or cultural fectors did not seem favorable, did not necessitate that Turkish 
democracy was doomed to fail. Socio-economic or cultural fectors constitute “at most 
constraints to that which is possible under a concrete historical situation but do not determine 
the outcome of such situations.”**“ This having been said, one should not ignore what Otto 
Kirchemiercalled the impact of “confining conditions.”'** A country might have a democracy 
when the socio-economic or cultural conditions were not fevorable as fortuitous products of 
elite struggles who had no intention of promoting democracy but their own interests, but that 
does not mean that the impact of confining conditions is totally removed. The assumption is 
that once established, democratic regime might work out (improve) these confinii^ conditions 
and thus consolidate itself According to Rustow**  ^ the “very operation of these rules (of 
democracy) will enlarge the area of consensus step-by-step as democracy moves down its 
crowded agenda.” Not only this is only an “assumption” not a catainty**^ but also even if it is 
realized it requires, according to Rustow, a long process “one generation is probably the 
minimum period of transition.”**^
Adam Przworski, “Some problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 300.
*“  Rustow, “Transitions,” 363. Similarly, Upset provided further support arguing that “once 
established” a dertMoatic political system “gathers momentum and creates social supports (institutions) to 
ensure its continued existence.” Зеуггюиг Martin Upset, Political Man: The Social Bases o f  Politics, ExpatKkd 
and Updated cd (Ixrndon: Неіпетагш, 1983), 31.
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Rustow, “Transitions,” 359.
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It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Turkey of late forties and fifties in 
terms of both socio-economic and cultural conditions as well as political ideologies and 
cultures of elites did not present a particularly favorable context for democracy to succeed, 
though they were not totally unfevorable either. Firstly, in terms of socio-economic indicators, 
in 1945, roughly 75 per cent of the population lived in villages and engaged in agriculture 
securing more than 46 per cent of the GDP.*** The literacy rate amounted only 30.2 per cent 
in 1945, approximately 70 per cent of the population were being illiterate.**  ^ Though some 
urbanization has taken place, Turicey of the late forties was more of a “peasant society” than an 
urban one. In 1950 only 18.5 per cent of the population lived in places with a population of 
more than 10000.**  ^ In line with low levels of socio-economic development as well as the 
peculiar characteristics of the Ottoman-Turkish state society relations, the institutions of civil 
society were scarce and remained vulnerable to the intrusions of the all-powerful state. In short, 
socio-economic structure of Turkey in late forties displayed many characteristics of traditional 
‘peasant society’ with its less than civic values that would put its imprint on the development of 
Turkish democracy. Our argument is not that in the absence of definite characteristics of the 
state of afi^irs called modernity democracy is impossible. Unlike somewhat more deterministic 
earlier analysis,'** the intellectual climate now became more receptive to possibilist ^proaches 
and it is, by and large, accepted that such countries can still have a democracy, provided that it 
sustains high levels of socio-economic development or that some other factors, such as 
exceptionally ^vorable culture, international conditions or an exceptional elite commitment to 
democracy prevails. But what is clear is that democracy is likely to fece many more difiBculties 
in those countries than others which have advanced on the hard road of modernity
Waller F. Weiker, The Modernization o f  Turkey: From Atatürk to Present Day (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1981), 187.
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Ibid., 154. 
Ibid., 65.
In an insightful analysis of German democracy, Ralf Dahrendorf, for instance, has written 
that “for a liberal democracy to become a reality French and industrial revolutions should become a 
reality.” Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York, London; W.W Norton, 1%7), 
31.
97
characterized by high levels of technology, urbanization, intermediary structures, division of 
labor, and the dominance of impersonal relations and like.
This is because, as many analysts have pointed out, the traditional peasant society was 
characterized by an environment of scarcity due to lack of agricultural technology and 
therefore low productivity. Peasant people are generally poor people who barely make their 
livelihood above the subsistence level. A related feature is that of insecurity. Both a lack of 
surplus and the absence of social security as well as dependence on factors that are beyond 
personal control such as weather, peasants are likely to live in an extreme insecurity. These 
basic characteristics of peasant society are argued to be closely related to the prevalence of 
extensive vertical netwoiks of patron-client relations and low levels of associational 
development combined with a high degree of small group solidarity and low level of political
awareness 189
In Turkey of late the forties and fifties many of these characteristics have been 
observed. Many analysts have pointed out the prevalence of the extensive patron-client 
relations.’^  Ergun O^udun pointed out that various forms of what Lemarchand^^  ^ called 
“traditional political clientelism” could be found in Turkey. According to Ozbudun,*^  ^there had
In an influential book that has been widely used Edward Banfield developed the concept of 
“amoral familism” to characterize peasant attitudes in Montegrano, an agricultural Italian town. Living in 
an environment characterized by poverty and insecurity, as well as lack of what we may call associations 
of civil society, Montegrano’s were defined as amoral familist. The central guiding principle of amoral 
familist, according to Banfield, is the rule that “maximize the material, short run advantage of the nuclear 
family; assume that all others will do the same.” See, Edward C.Banfield, The Moral Basis o f  A 
Backward Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958), 83.
According to Powell, the patron-client tie develops between two unequal parties. It depends on 
reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services and rests heavily on face-to-face contact between the two 
parties. See, John Duncan Powell, “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics.” American Political Science 
Review. LXK, 2, (1970), 412.
Rene Lemarchand, “Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Afiica: Competing 
Solidarities in Nation-Building.” /lOTmcan Political Science Review. 66, 1, (1972).
Ergun Ozbudun, “Turkey: The Politics of Political Clientelism,” in Political Clientelism, 
Patronage and Development, ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand (London: Sage, 1981), 254 
fif. See also, Sabri Sayan, “Political Patronage in Turkey” in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean 
Societies, eds, Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, (London: Duckworth, 1977).
98
been “feudal” political clientelism especially in Eastern parts of the Turkey where inequality in 
land distribution compelled peasants to seek for the support of landowner ağa’s. The 
“mercantile clientelism” refers to relationships between town merchants and their peasant 
customers. Finally, “saintly clientelism” refers to relations between a religious leader and his 
followers. In many cases, a complex mixture of all three forms of clientelism was observed. A 
landowner aga could also be a religious leader, or a town merchant could also be an owner of 
large estate. Many of these patrons, perhaps with the exception of saintly type, all have some 
relationships with the RPP. Indeed many of them were ensured (especially the mercantile type) 
their patron status precisely because of such links with the party. The political significance of 
such phenomenon is such that, as we shall dwell on below, with the transition to a multi-party 
regime, traditional political clientelism tended to give way to extensive party patronage, and the 
phenomen of mobilized voting, which had not bode well for the development of democracy.
The related point about peasant society and its impact on the fortunes of democracy 
concerns with the existence (or absence) of values at mass level that facilitated/or hindered the 
development of democratic governance. What we labeled earlier as “civic values” - such as 
belief in one’s competence, participation in public afiairs, pride in the political system, limited 
partisanship, the propensity to cooperate with others, tolerance of diversity -values that are 
conducive to democratic development are to be found more in socio-economically advanced 
urban societies than backward peasant ones. These values at mass level matter not only because 
elites might be the product of the similar conditions and share similar values but also because 
even if they do not, they still have “a powerful incentive to pay attention to the views of these 
citizens” to get their vote. They are likely to devise policies, behave in such a way that, they 
assume, is likely to gain the formers’ votes and sympathy.
Though we lack a comprehensive empirical study of peasant attitudes in that period, 
empirical kno^\dedge that can be gathered from a variety of studies suggests that in terms of the
143.
Ozbudun, “clientelism,” 254.
Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study o f Political Elites (New Jersey: Prentice Half 1976),
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existence of these civic values, Turkey of the late forties and fifties did not present a particularly 
fevorable picture.
In one of the earlier impressionistic analyses of the Turidsh village, Hasan Tankut (an 
MP and teacher at Language and History, Geography Faculty in Ankara, \^ o  had woilced as 
Kaymakam) provided insightful observations. Tankut noted that Turkish peasants struggled 
even to meet basic daily needs, lived in miserable conditions and were mostly “hungry” for 
ages.*^’ Villages, Tankut argued, were dispersed wide across the country because villagers 
preferred to settle in places where they would be secure fi'om both the state and bandits. He 
noted that widespread insecurity, pessimism about the future, and distrust of others dominated 
the peasants’ world view.*^  ^ Reminiscent of Edward Banfield’s femous concept of “amoral 
familism,” Tankut asserted, peasants tended to be extreme jo is ts , >\Wch constituted a basic 
moral hindrance for “cooperation” and “collective work.”^^ * In the same line, George and 
Barbara Helling'^ ^noted that a sense of insecurity, alongside âtalism, had been widespread 
among the Turkish peasants. Ibrahim Yasa, in his study of relatively developed village of 
Hasanoğlan near Ankara, noted that “In 1944, about 70 per cent of the village families could 
barely earn their daily bread.” He, too, found that fatalism, ignorance and inertia was
OfVl ^ y { \  1
common. In his research Paul Stiriing observed a pervasive distrust that peasants 
displayed towards the government and a lack of belief in their sense of efiBciency. He a i^ ed
Hasan Reşit Tankut, Köylerimiz -Bugün Nasıldır, Dün Nasıldı, Yarın Nasıl Olmalıdır [Our 
Villages- How Are They Today , How Were They in the Past, How They Should be in the 
FutxueK Ankara: Kenan Basımevi, 1939), 5.
Ibid., 29, 37.
Ibid., 42.
198 Ibid., 32.
George and Barbara Helling, Sosyolojik ve îstatistiki Bakımdan Türkiye ’de Köy [A Study of 
the Village From Sociological and Statistical Perspectives in Tuiirey ], trans, by Ahmet E. Uysal (Ankara, 
1956).
^  Ibrahim Yasa, Hasanoğlan- Socioecenomic Structure o f  a Turkish Village (Ankara: Yeni 
Matbaa, 1957), 92, 170, 174.
Paul Stirling, Turkish Village (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 268.
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that peasants tended to see the government as a “legitimate robber^’^ ^ and believed that 
without a contact with the right people it was impossible to get things done, a finding that is 
supported by Özer Ozankaya’s work.^^ This study provided many interesting findings. He 
noted the peasants’ tendency to perceive politics as something that is dangerous and outside 
the area of their competence.“  ^ He also noted that peasants had never been involved in 
organized, collective action, but made their wishes and grievances known through local patrons 
who acted as brokers.“ * Barely satisfying such basic needs as food and shelter, uneducated, 
living in constant insecurity, ignorant of the outside worid, distrustful of others, imbued with 
religiously backed fatalism, Turkish peasants who constituted more than 80 per cent of the 
population could hardly expected to have, it is fair to conclude, dvic values.“ ^
On the other hand, one could also suggest that the picture was not all that bleak. The 
definite characteristics of the Ottoman state philosophy that we have dwelled on, have left its 
imprints on the Turkish mass culture. Turkish peasants were familiar with the idea of state 
representing and serving common good, undemocratic but still bounded by some definite rules. 
In that sense, the idea of limitation of state power, according to some transcendental rules, was
202 Ibid., 267.
özer Ozankaya, Köyde Toplumsal Yapı ve Siyasal Kültür [Social Structure and Politcal 
Culture in ( the Turkish) VillageKAnkara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayuüan, 
1971), 48. Both Stirling's and Ozankaya’s works had been conducted in the sixties. We think that unless 
one assumes that values can radically change in less than two decades these works can be taken to reflect 
the values of Turkish peasants in late forties and fifties.
204 Ibid., 136.
Ibid., 193. See, also acute observations of Turkish teacher of peasant background, Mahmut 
Makal, Bizim Köy [A VilUage in Anatolia], ninth ed. (Ankara: Bizimköy, 1970) (first published in 1950).
^  It goes without saying that this should be related not only with the traditional social structure but 
also its interaction with Ottoman-Turidsh strong state. It can be said, for instance, that their avoidance of 
collective action is related not only with distrust of others and scarcity of resources but also with their suspicion 
that collective action would not impress the authorities and might even led punishment As Skocpol noted, 
states matter not only because of “goal-oriented activités of state officials” but because “their 
organisational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affects political culture, 
encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political action (but not others), and make 
possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others).” Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back 
In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: C^ambridge University Press, 1985), 21.
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not totally alien to them. Imbued with Islamic traditions, they expected the state to be “fair 
and just” to them, despite the fact that they, in most of the times, lacked the means to ensure 
that treatment. But, stiU, the ideal of the benevolent fether state -from \^diich one could expect 
both fair treatment and various goods seemed to have lingered on. The peasant attitudes 
towards government combined elements of “pragmatism, awe, myth and guile.
The peculiar structure of Turkish peasantry also involved some elements that can be 
characterized as conducive to democracy. One such element was “..the absence of landed 
aristocracy and the dispersion of agricultural surplus among millions of middle peasants.. 
Though considerable inequalities in land remained the characteristic feature in the Southern 
Eastern region and in some parts of the Mediterranean,^" small land-holdings were the 
norm.^" Regarding the prevalence of small land-holdings and their positive impact on 
democracy, Keyder suggested an argument that we also find convincing. He argued that
^ A s Lewis remarked, in the empire, when a new sultan was enthroned, he was greeted with 
cries of “Sultan, be not proud ! God is greater than you.” Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy.” 
Journal o f  Democracy. 17,2, (1996), 56.
^  This is akin to Almond and Veiba’s characterization of “competent subjects”. These are 
subjects but they perceive themselves as “able to appeal to a set of tegular and orderly rules in their 
dealings with administrative officials.” It is a proof of the existence of sense of efficacy on the part of the 
subjects. Almond and Verba, Civic, 217.
^  Frank Tachau, Turkey- The Politics o f  Authority, Democracy and Development (New Yoik: 
Praeger, 1984), 121.
Çağlar Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy.” New Left Review. 115,
(1979), 29.
(üavit Orhan Tütengil, 100 Soruda Kırsal Türkiye ’nin Yapısı ve Sorunları [The Structure and 
Problems of Rural Turkey in 100 Questions], expanded third edition, (İstanbul; Gerçek Yayınlan, 1979), 
98. It was also estimated that in 1971, 709 villages belonged to one person, family or kinship group, 
p. 100. Similarly, Tezel estimated that in 1950, 20 per cent of the rural Ëunihes did not own and land. See, 
Tezel, İktisadi.7) 6^.
According to Tütengil, in 1963, those who owned 1-50 decars of land constituted, 68.8 of the 
all agricultural enterprising units and 24.4 per cent of the all cultivated areas. While those who owned 50- 
100 decars of land constituted 18.1 of the all agricultural enterprising units and 23.9 per cent of the all 
cultivated lands. Tütengil, Kırsal.91. Similarly, Tezel indicated that in 1950, 62 per cent of all rural 
families owned some lands, however small they might be. Tezel, İktisadi.376. For a discussion. Çağlar 
Keyder, “Türk Tantmnda Küçük Meta Üretiminin Yerleşmesi, 1946-1960,”[The Consolidation of Small 
Meta Commodity production in Tiukish Agriculture, 1946-1960] in Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar, ed. 
Şevket Pamuk, Zafer Toprak (Ankara: Yurt, 1988).
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aspiring to what Christopher Maq>erson called ‘simple market society’ these small-land holders 
tended not to support radical or violent movements, probably because they fek, that unlike 
landless peasants, they have something lose. It reinforced egalitarian state of mind (which was 
more to do with Islamic-Ottoman principles of government) that we referred above. In the 
similar line, Dahl^ *^  have distinguished traditional peasant society from society of free formers. 
In the former there is a “high propensity for inequality, hierarchy, and political hegemony” since 
the wealth is distributed in an extremely unequal way, while in the latter “more egalitarian and 
democratic” sprit thrives since some equality of in land is obtained. Regarding the impact of 
the absence of landed aristocracy, Keyder probably had in mind Barrington 
Moore’s ’^‘argument that too strong landed aristocracy is not conducive to demcxa’acy since 
they can constitute a ‘reactionary coalition’ (with or without bourgeoiae) led by monarchy 
(and military class) that leads to authoritarian governments against the peasant and woricers.
On the elite level, too, in terms both ideology and political culture there were 
unfovorable elements (for the development of democracy) alongside some fovorable ones. True 
to the legacy of the strong state tradition, the state elites (consisting of military, civilian 
bureaucracy, the RPP and m^ority of Tuikey’s intellectual class) understood democracy not as 
methcxl for aggregation and reconciliation of various interests but as an “end,” something to be 
adopted so as to be regarded as a civilized nation and as a “process of discussion” through 
which “truth” is discovered. They also perceived themselves as true (and ultimate) guardians of 
public (and state) interests coalesced around “Atatiirkian principles,” while tending to see any 
opposition movement not as a benign movement but as traitors opposing the scientifically 
revealed “truths” with evil designs. Corollary to that was their belief that as the ultimate 
guardians of state interests they could even end the democratic system, if they came to the 
conclusion that the Atatiiridan principles were in danger.^'* The trouble was that to decide
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy- Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London; Yale 
University Press, 1971), 53-6.
Barrington Moore., Jr, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and Democracy- Lord and Peasant in 
the Making o f  M odem World (Boston; Beacon Press, 1966), 431.
Remember for instance, tnOnu’s remarks that he would end the experiment with multi-party
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when these principles have been violated was left to state elites’ thanselves.
Apart from a specific understanding of democracy, both state elites and political elites 
shared a roughly similar elite political culture.^ *  ^The founders and prominent members of the 
biggest party of the period, DP, have been socialized into political life in the RPP. It would not 
be an exaggeration to suggest that both (state and political) elites tended to see power in 
absolute terms. This was accompanied by lack of tolerance towards opposition (be it intra­
party or other) justified usually by reference to Atatiiridsm or national will. The tradition of 
ferocious accusation to discredit opponents was another legacy of Ottoman-Turkish polity and 
part of the elite political culture.
But on the other hand, there were other factors in terms of elite ideologies and political 
culture at woik that can be seen as supporting democratic development in Turicey. The state 
elites’ insistence on democracy as political system that Turkey should have, despite the feet 
that they perceived it as something that might allow those who challenged the basis of state 
was one favorable factor. Similarly, political elites formed around the DP, perhaps because they 
had been closely associated with state elites in past, refiained to flirt with overtly anti­
democratic ideologies. And finally, Turkey has a relatively long experience with the ideas of 
rule of law and limitation of state authority, and the practice of political parties and elections 
dating back to 1840’s.^ ”
Thus, despite serious confining conditions, democracy by no means doomed to fail. 
Both the strong state tradition and the features of traditional society undergoing modernization 
generated serious constraints and provided opportunities for the development of the 
democracy. As Diamond, Linz and Lipset put it “no country that has become democratic has
regime if it threatened Republican principles. Toker, Тек Parti. 93-4.
Following Roben Putnam we use elite political culture to refer to “the set of politically 
relevant beliefs, values, and habits of the leaders of political system.” Robert D. Putnam, “Stuifying Elite 
Political Culture: The Case of Ideology.” The American Political Science Review, 65, (1971), 651.
For the significance of longevity of experimentations with democracy for stable development, 
see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave-Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and
Lxtndon: University of Oklohama Press, 1991), 271.
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done so under purely favorable structural conditions.” Whether democracy will survive or 
not depended largely on whether political actors would be able to overcome the impact of 
confining conditions and use opportunities to that end.
Founded in 1946 the Democrat Party was the biggest opposition party of the period. 
Its founders were as much part of the ofiBdal class as their counterparts in the RPP as they had 
spent their entire political lives in the same party. Celal Bayar had been the close fiiend of 
Atatürk and his prime minister. Adnan Menderes was brought in to the RPP by Atatürk 
himself Fuat Köprülü was a distinguished professor of history and former RPP member. 
Similar to other opposition movements fi’om Liberal Union to Progressive Republican Party to 
Free Party, the DP were attracted to those social-political forces which had grievances against 
the party of center, the RPP. In that sense the DP was not organized by the peripheral forces 
themselves, but rather forces of the periphery participated and supported it when it was 
established by those who, while being part of official class, left it largely because of intra-elite 
cleavage.
It was an uneasy coalition of interests united in its opposition to the RPP.^ *  ^ It drew 
support fi-om Islamists v^ dio opposed the perceived ultra-secular policies of the RPP. The neMy 
emerging small-traders and business groups as well as those land-owners (in the Aegean and 
Western Parts of the country), who were suspicious of the statist-bureaucratic intentions of the 
RPP, also appear to have provided support for the DP. Even the younger army officers and 
some intellectuals^ striving for more fi'eedoms are known to have supported the DP. One 
should be carefiil, however, in advancing the argument that in terms of social-bases of support 
the two parties differed radically. The RPP, as the party of the center, continued to attract 
votes from the least modernized, semi-foidal Eastern regions through its long-standing ties
Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour M. Lipset, “Introduction:What Makes For 
Democracy,” in Politics in Developing Countries-Comparing Experiences With Democracy, second ed. 
ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour M. Lipset (Lyrme Rieimer: Boulder, 1995), 53.
Ozbudun, Social. 52; Heper, Tradition. 95; Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in 
Democracy, 1950-75 (London; C.Hurst, 1977), 14.
^  Mehmet Ali Aybar, who was later to become respectable &ce of Turkish socialism, was the DP 
candidate for the Assembly in 1946 elections.
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with the local notables and Agas. The DP, too, managed to gain the support of some local 
notables alongside the professionals and merchants that occupied its middle level leadership 
cadres.^*
The traditional social structure of the country -the ©dstence of traditional clientelism 
and peculiar characteristics of peasant society- can help us to untangle this ^parent anomaly. 
There is an almost unanimous agreement among the students of Turkish politics^ that with 
the transition to multi-party regime, many rural party organizations tend to be based on already 
existing factions (based on kinship, ethno-religious, community oriented differences) and 
clientelistic networks and that the initial party choices were heavily affected by local rivalries 
between these. In the single party-period, state and politics had remained peripheral to the daily 
life of the villagers, the main channel of communication bdng the local notables and other 
Action leaders which “provided a link between the state and the periphery.”^  With the 
transition to a muki-party regime, these local notables continued to perform similar functions 
and provided a main source of support for political parties through leverage they had upon the 
followers. The installation of multi-party regime now meant that “fections could obtain support 
from outside the village or small town by establishing linkages with political parties.”^^ Indeed, 
rivalry between parties had given ample opportunities for competing factions to increase their 
influence. As Stirling put it, the “reigning faction had necessarily already identified itself with 
the existing government, so that the headman and his supporters were automatically RPP.
221 Ozbudun, Social A l.
^  Kaipat, Transition, 412; Paul Stirling, Turkish Village (New Yorit: Viley, 1965), 281-2; 
Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Development of Parties in Turkey,” in Political Parties and Political 
Development, ed. Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Weiner, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 
123; Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Political Change in Rural Turkey: Erdemli (Hague: Mouton, 1966), 151-152; 
Sabri Sayan, “Some Notes on the Beginning.«; of Mass Political Participation in Turkey” in Political 
Participation in Turkey, ed. Engin D. Akarh and Gabriel B. Dor (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University 
Publications, 1975), 124.
“  Ayşe Güneş Ayata, “Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey,” in Democracy, Clientelism 
and Civil Society, ed. Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (Boulder London: Lynne Rieimer: Boulder, 
1994), 51.
224 Sayan, “Mass,” 124.
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Those who opposed them were thus committed to the DP.” ^
This factor helps to explain the speed with which political parties established vertical
linkages with the masses since the leaders of these fections easily controlled the vote of their
clients. It also helps to make sense of the nature of the cross-class support parties obtained
since differences between local factions were not basically derived from class differences but
related to family, kinship or other primordial loyalties. Özer Ozankaya notes the case of a
powerful family leader with linkages to the RPP. With a transition to multi-party regime, this
man had the Democrat party branch established just because he wanted it established by saying
that “bizde de bulunsun” (let’s have one, too). ^  Szyliowicz likewise noted that many large
important femilies “guaranteed their political future by having relatives enroU in both
parties.”^  Karpat similarly provided another example that helps to illuminate the case:
Local groups would get together and, often without prior knoidedge of the party program, would 
establish the a branch and then notify the Democratic Party headquarters of the &ct... Veiy oftenthe 
whole Republican Party organization would go over to the Democratic Party and in some cases, there 
would not be any Republican Party members left to take over. The Rqwblican Party sign on the wall or 
over the door of the party premises would be changed to Democratic Party.
Thus, there did not emerge radical distinctions in the social bases of political parties, all
parties appealing to broadly similar social groups. Yet another consequence of such state of
affeirs has been the centrality of “party patronage”^  to gain votes, \^^ch would have been the
225
226
Stirling, Village. 280.
Ozankaya, Kültür. 77-8. He also notes that with the passage of the time rival Action seized the
control of the DP branch.
227 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, “The Political Dynamics of Rural Turkey.” The Middle East Journal. 
16, 4, (1%2), 434. “In Tarsus,” he indicated, “the chairman of one of the parties had a brother in the 
other. In Mersin, one brother edited one party’s newspaper, his sister the other. In Gaziantep, the CHP 
and DP presidents were second cousins.” Ibid., 434-5.
228 Karpat, Transition, 412.
^  Following Alex Weingrod, we use party patronage to refer to “the ways in which party 
politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support” It means 
distribution of divisible benefits to supporters as opposed to thedistribution of collective benefits or appeal 
to a collective interests. In this conceptualization party-patronage differs fix>m patron-client relations in 
some crucial respects. The patron-client relations arises “within a state structure in which authority is 
dispersed and state activity limited in scope, and in which considerable separation exists between the 
levels of village, city and state”, while party-patronage “is associated with the expanding scope and
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hallmailc of party-competition to day. Many leaders of the existing, tradtional fections, and 
newly emerged ones (businessmen, traders and professionals),^” often competing with each 
other, came to play brokerage roles. They tried to enhance their powers by promising bloc of 
votes to party leaders and promising their clients to deliver what they needed. Political party 
leaders, in turn, were more than happy to use such channels in a desperate search for votes. 
This boded well for the voters. Peasants, which constituted the majority of voters, were 
politically unsophisticated, and had little concern with either party ideologies or programs. 
Party afSliation was “seldom a matter of ideological commitment. What mattered for them,
it appeared, was, first of all the satis&ction of immediate, local, personal needs (buildings of 
roads, mosques, finding employment, securing credit) and then loyalty to his (her) primordial 
group.
This non-ideological and pragmatic nature of party competition does not mean that 
there were no differences between parties. It was true that ideological differences between the 
parties, at least in the beginning, were not as great as some analysts portrayed it. Though it was 
much more sympathetic to the religious sympathies of ordinary people, and “did bring a 
significant degree of relaxation to the understanding and application of secularism” the DP
general proliferation of state activities, and also with the growing integration of village, city and state.” 
See, Alex Weingrod, “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties.” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History. 10, (1%8), 379, 381.
^  For more knowledge about these groups, which were usually be found in the DP rather than 
RPP see, Miibeccel B. Kiray, Ereğli: Ağır Sanayiden önce Bir Sahil Kasabası [Ereğli; A Small Coastal 
Town Before the Advent of Heavy Industry] (Ankara; DPT, 1964); Frank Tachau, “Turkish Provincial 
Party Politics,” in Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis, ed. Kemal H. 
Karpat (Leiden; Brill, 1973); Ayşe Güneş Ayata, CHP (örgüt ve İdeoloji) [The RPP (Organisation and 
Ideology] (Ankara; 1992)
The emergence of political parties and forms of representations that are not exclusively class 
based but dominated by populist and/or clientelist forms is not peculiar to Turkey. Nicos Mouzelis, for 
instance, remarked that when urbanization and industrialization does not proceed far enough (as in 
Southern cone of Latin America and the Balkans), transition to mass politics is likely to be characterized 
by either the predominance of clientelistic or populist movements. Nicos RMouzelis, Politics in the Semi- 
Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America (New 
York; S t Martin’s Press, 1986), 86.
232 Szyliowicz. Erdemli. 151.
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never questioned, let alone repudiate the central flank of Republican regime, secularism.^^ 
Menderes argued that “while being respectful to religious fi'eedom”, his government ‘Vould 
never tolerate reactionary provocations.” In feet, relaxation of jacobinist-secularism did not
begin with the DP. It was the RPP that took the first steps to gamer votes with the transition to 
a multi-party system.^* The RPP government, for instance, introduced religious instmetions 
into primary schools, and established feculty of theology in Istanbul University in 1949.
The DP did not aim to change Turkey’s western oriented foreign policy nor it did 
radically alter the state role in the economy.^^ While accepting harmful effects of the RPFs 
interventionist policies, Menderes stated that his government would try to maximize state-led 
investment.^^ Indeed, as Boratav^* notes the DP’s victory did not significantly change 
economic policies and economy’s general direction since the RPP set out to implement, albeit 
small in scale, economic liberalization measures fi’om 1947 onwards. With the exception of the 
1946 election, the social-background of two party MP’s did not manifest great differences 
either, that difference being reduced in the 1954 and 1957 elections.But,  as Karpat noted, 
some differences between the two parties have resulted fi'om “special historical and political 
circumstances which determined the inception of each party .” The RPP, being the party of state 
and bureaucrats, who believed in the motto of “for the people, despite the people”, were more
233 Toprak, Islam.73.
^  Cited in Faruk Sükan. Başbakan Menderes 'in Meclis Konuşmaları, 1950-60 [The Speeches of 
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in the Assembly, 1950-1960] (Ankara; Kültür, 1991), 13.
Frank Tachau, “The Republican People’s Party, 1945-1980,” in Political Parties and 
Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (London; I.B.Tauris, 1991), 104.
^  Ç^ağlar Keyder was less than justified in arguing that in the DP period “Paternalism, control 
from the centre, and reformism from above were decisively rejected while the market (and capitalism) 
were given free rein.” Çağlar Keyder, The State and Class in Turkey- A Study in Capitalist Development 
(London; Verso, 1987), 124. Similarly, Ahmad also exaggerated when he wrote that Menderes was “the 
chanqrion of the ‘laissez feire’ ecorromy.” Ahmad, Experiment. 67.
237 Sükan, Meclis.6-1
^  Korkut Boratav, Türkiye iktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985 [Etatism in Turkey] (Istanbul; Gerçek, 
1989), 74-6.
^  Frederick W. Frey, Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge; The MIT Press, 1965), 381.
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“romantic and detached from the people.” While the DP, “as a reaction to RPF’ was “more 
realistic and close to the people.” '^*®
The 1950 elections witnessed a historical turning point in Turkish history in that for the 
first time a government was changed through the ordinary people’s vote. The plurality system 
with multi-member constituencies gave the Democrats an overwhelming m^ority in the 
Assembly. The Democrats garnered 53.3 per cent of the vote and 403 seats out of 500. The 
Republicans had 39.9 per cent of the vote, gaining only 69 seats in the Assembly. This 
unbalanced picture had much to do with İnönü’s deciâon not to initiate any change both in the 
constitution and elections laws with a transition to a multi-party regime. He had decided that 
the multi-party experiment might be conducted under the same fiameworic. This, however, 
would prove to be, to say the least, less than wise deciaon. It is argued that certain of its 
electoral victory; İnönü just did not want to be deprived of the great benefits that the election 
system and the constitution provides .But  no to avail, the DP won the décrions and aijoyed 
the quite unlimited powaa that İnönü (according to critics) assumed the RPP would have. A 
simple plurality system exaggerated the DP’s strength while underrepresenting the RPP’s. 
Similarly, the unrestrained nature of legislative power that the 1924 Constitution envisaged 
would have encouraged the DP’s authoritarian actions, leading them to argue that the 
Constitution itsdf authoritarized them.
Though, it is not our subject to discuss the failure of this experiment in detail, the basic 
characteristics of the period of 1950-60 are crudal to understanding the trials and tribulations 
of Turkish democracy as they recur over time. From the very start of the multi-party 
experiment the relations between two major parries was tense (and strained) and remained so 
throughout. At the root of the conflict was the state elites’ suspidon of the DP as a party that
240 Karpat, Transition. 417.
Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Menderes’in Dramı [The Tragedy of Menderes] (İstanbul; Remzi, 
1%9), 152, 346; Nadir Nadi, Perde Aralığından, third ed. (İstanbulrÇağdaş, 1979), 356; Nermin Abadan- 
Unat, Kum Saatini İzlerken [Watching the HourglassKİstanbul: İletişim, 1996), 162. Both writers do not 
provide conclusive evidence that this was really the case. To speak confidently on this matter, more 
detailed research is needed.
110
would undo the Republican reforms. From the inception of party politics conditions that are 
conducive to the emergence of “trust” between party elites had been blocked.^“*^ True to 
Ottoman-Turidsh tradition, the RPP never doubted its self-appointed role to govern (to led) the 
country and the desirability of such a state of afiairs. The majority of the RPP’s top level 
cadres including İnönü had not foreseen that the DP would come to power in such a short 
time, and had been having difficulties swallowing it. In their turn, the DP leaders, who were 
equally surprised by their unexpected victory and exaggerated strength in the assembly, did not
243bother to assuage the fears and anxieties of the state elites in the post-election euphoria. 
They believed that both İnönü and the rank and file members of the RPP had hardly perceived 
them as the legitimate party and were ready to get rid of them, if given an opportunity. They 
did not seek a modus vivendi with the RPP and civil-military bureaucracy despite the feet that 
they needed it for the implementation of their political programs.^^’ Despite their pre-election 
premise of not questioning actions of the single-party period, the DP in power set out to 
employ every means in their disposal against the opposition. Even if they come to power they 
were uncertain about control of bureaucracy which, they assumed, was ready to serve no one 
but the RPP. They, therefore, tried to reshuffle civil bureaucracy as they saw fit, bringing them
242 The significance of tnist between political actors for a democracy to survive can not be 
overstated. As Dahl indicated, for a polyarchy to function, “requires a good deal of trust in one’s 
opponents; they may be opponents, but they are not implacable enemies.” Dahl, Polyarchy. 152.
243 Aydemir. Dram.252.
Celal Bayar (prior to 1950) is reported to have said that “İnönü could have sent two 
Gendermarie to close the party down and in that case nothing would h a i^ n  in the country.” Cited in Tdcer, Tek 
Parti. 94. Similarly, Samet Ağaoğlu, a leading member of the DP, said that majority of the DP su^witers 
iiKİuding himself have never believed in tnönü’s sincerity. Samet Ağaoğlu, Demokrat Partinin Doğuş ve 
Yükseliş Sebebleri: Bir Soru [The Reasons for the Birth and the Rise of the Democrat Party: A (Question] 
(Istanbul: Baha, 1972), 59.
This is easier said than done as the task the DP faced required courageous efforts. As Heper 
put it, “political party elites had to strike a balance between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
democracy and arrive at a consensus on the procedural rules of democracy all by themselves, i.e without 
effective constitutional checks and balances. This they had to achieve, while pursuing a rigorous 
opposition to the bureaucratic military elites and, in the absence of effective linkages to social groups, that 
is without the benefit of moderation of such relationship might have brought about, and while constantly 
being socialized to the idea of the virtues of horizontal democracy only.” Metin Heper, “Introduction,” in 
Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (London: LB. Tauris, 
1991), 5. (his italics)
111
under the control of party oflSdals.^^ The simple feet that the RPP had penetrated the 
bureaucracy rendered matters worse as the DP cadres failed to differentiate their dislike of the 
the RPP and bureaucracy and categorically opposed to both.
In the process, the conflict between the RPP and DP, that had its roots in each party’s 
conception of other, have come to be intertwoven with the personalities of two party leaders 
and have become personalized. In line with Ottoman-Turkish tradition of intra-elite conflict, it 
is what was known as the Paşa (or İnönü) factor that is critical to our understanding the 
reaction of prominent DP leaders. İnönü’s historical personality appears to have led to a feeling 
of inferiority in the DP leaders, particulariy Menderes. For instance, when asked ^^ dıy he had 
not taken the RPP’s view regarding the government’s decision to deploy Turkish soldiers on 
the Korean soil (in 1951), Menderes told (Kasim Gülek) that “if he had asked İnönü on the 
subject, everybody would have said that they were plain inexperienced and had to turn then- 
rivals at the first serious crisis for expert knowledge.Suspecting that he was doing 
everything possible to secure their failure and overthrow they also felt “insecure as long as 
İnönü was active in politics.” '^** If the account of former DP member of parliament and close 
aide of Menderes is to be believed, Menderes thought that “İnönü was a dictator, albeit a 
cowardly one.” Consequently, he estimated that “if you move first, he would be afi-aid of 
you, otherwise he would strike.”^^ ” As the DP minister Mükerrem Sarol once put it bluntly “we 
have nothing to give or take fi-om the RPP; the problem is the İnönü problem. If there were no
For a self-critique that the local organization of the DP directly tried to inluence decisions of 
civilian bureaucracy without appealing to party center and then government. See, Agao|lu, Demokrat.
219-220.
Cited in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaph, Demirkırat: Bir Demokrasinin 
Doğuşu [‘Demirkırat’; The Birth of a Democracy] (İstanbul; Milliyet, 1991), 91.
Ahmad, Experiment.37.
Rıfkı Salim Burçak, Yasstada- öncesi ve Sonrası [Yassıada-Before and AfterKAnkara; Çam
1976), 28.
250 ,Ibid., 28.
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İnönü, there would be nothing between us we could not resolve ”
The conflict between parties that became heavily personalized is not only to do with 
tradition, but also appears to have been fostered by circumstances. To say that intra-elite 
conflict had been an indispensable part of the Ottoman-Turidsh polity, does not explain much. 
For a better and fuller explanation, one should also dwell on which fectors appear to have 
sustained it in the period observed. Looked fi'om this perspective, for the DP leaders the 
preoccupation with İnönü and the RPP appears to have provided an element of unity for an 
otherwise uneasy coalition whose raison d’etre was opposition to the single-party r e g im e . In  
addition, fectors such as widespread illiteracy, the prevalence of clientelistic vertical bonds as 
the dominant linkage between political parties and citizenry, and lack of diflferentiation between 
parties in terms of the social support and programs and ideologies all appear to have prepared 
a fertile ground for the conflicts to become highly personalized. In such an environment, it 
requires a heroic efforts for leaders to base their critics on intelligent discussion of party 
programs and specific policy lines followed. Not only because programs did not differ 
significantly but also the electorate seemed to hardly understand the issues. Instead, parties 
chose the easy way -exaggeration of differences, using fierce accusations to differentiate 
themselves and personalizing of conflicts- while assuming that it would be understood and 
appreciated by the masses.^ *^
The government-opposition relations, accordingly, were fer cry fix)m the liberal 
democratic model envisaged. Having been socialized into a tradition in which the power was 
taken as absolute, and the concept of opposition was perceived as an enigma, the DP leaders, 
too, had diflBcuhies in accepting the opposition. Like state elites before them, they, too,
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In her memoirs, Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, one time activist of the DP, comments on the 
reaction of a group of DP sympathizers from the province of Elmadağ They criticized her and her friend 
for not being harsh enough against the RPP as the Nation Party ofBcials had done. Piraye Bigat 
Cerrahoğlu, Demokrat Parti Masalı fThe Democrat Parti TaleKÎstanbul; Milliyet, 1996).
^  For the DP leaders’ inability to shun habits of one-paity period, see, Ali Fuat Başgil, 27 Mayıs 
İhtilali ve Sebebleri, [The 27 Mty Revolution and Its Causes] translated by M  Ali Sebük, 1 Hakkı Akm
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fevored political ideas in which the concept of opposition can not be easily accommodated.
They fevored what was called the majoritarian democracy in which the wiU of the majority
reigned supreme. The m^oritarian democracy appeared to be well-suited both to Turkish
political traditions and to the short term political considerations of the DP. Atatiiric himself was
a firm believer in the undivided and unlimited sovereignty emerging through the will of the
Grand National Assembly. It was a short step for the DP leaders, as had been for their
counterparts in the RPP, to regard the TGNA’s decisions as “national will.” Though Atatürk
was unclear whether the Assembly would have to be elected competitively or not, the DP
strenuously placed a premium on the competitive election requirement for the TGNA. Hoping
that competitive elections, if regularly held, would place themselves in power more than it
would for the RPP which was supposed to be the party of (powerfiil in effect but minority in
numbers) bureaucratic-elitists, they put enormous premium on the elections and “national will”
wdiich was supposed to emerge as a result.^^
Celal Bayar, for instance, noted that they were the true heirs of Mustafe Kemal who
had stated that sovereignty belonged to the nation without any limitations. In this way, the
DP leaders hoped, they could change the basis of legitimacy (on \\1iich state power is based)
fi-om that of self-proclaimed right of enlightened bureaucratic intelligentsia to the “national
will” supposed to emerge through competitive elections.
Although even in a majoritarian form of democracy right for the opposition to exist is
taken for granted, the DP leaders did not seem able to appreciate that fact. In a very
Rousseaunian manner they assumed that even the function of the opposition is realized in the
TGNA. That is the m^ority will. Menderes stated that:
The 9^ Grand National Assembly that represented the national will is both the guardian of fieedom 
and the inspector (controUer) of the executive on behalf of the natioa These are the best answers to
(Istanbul; Çeltüt 1966), 74.
255 Heper, Tradition. 107.
^  C^lal Bayar, Başvekilim Adnan Menderes [My Premier Adnan Menderes] (Istanbul: 
Tercüman, 1986), 12-3; O lal Bayar, Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek (Atatürk’ün A/etoi/o/q/zsı)[Thinking Like 
AtatOık (The Methodology of Atatürk)], second edition, ed. İsmet Bozdağ (İstanbul; Yaylacık, 1998), 54- 
56 (originally published in 1978)
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those who want to monc^lize the guardianship of freedoms and in^tecdon of the executive and, 
who are in delusion to (or who deludediy) suppose that national inflection is dqiendent solely on their 
existence.
They, too, appear to have favored a rational conception of democracy. Menderes 
expressed his favorite state of afl&irs as “National assembly, national temple, sacred roof and 
inside this temple and under this sacred roof) the discussion and deliberation of national 
interests, and arriving at decisions that are best interest of the nation.” Like thdr 
counterparts they wished to see an opposition which “would do everything possible to ensure 
government’s success.”^^
The RPP in opposition, in turn, seemed to accept the maxim that “the duty of the 
opposition is opposition.”^  Having hardly grown accustomed to the feet that they were now 
in opposition, the RPP presented increasingly harsh opposition to the DP rule. “Like every 
great nation”, İnönü argued in campaign for local elections of 1950, “the Turkish nation can be 
deceived through slander only once.”^* He thought that by choosing the DP people could not 
estimate \Ndiere their true interest lay. He tried to give an impression that they were the real and 
true owner of the government and the country, hence reinforcing the Democrat’s persisting 
fear of being ousted from power by force.
Despite being poisoned by serious problems, the democratic experiment did not run 
into trouble for the next several years. In terms of economic indicators the first DP government 
managed to do quite well. The same, however, can not be said of democratic development. 
The DP leaders were as suspicious of the civil societal (which were not many anyway) groups 
as the RPP had been. Relying on clientelistic relations and party patronage, they did not want 
to replace vertical relationships with horizontal ones. In the absence of mediating structures
Cited in sokan, Menderes. 48 
Ibid., 463.
Ibid., 158.
Kemal RKaipat, “Domestic Politics,” in Turkey, ed. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen: 
Janderhoeck, 1985), 63.
261 Cited in Burçak, Yassiada.51-%.
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between the state and the society, “party patronage” continued to become the main link 
between the people and their g o v e rn m e n tT h e  DP governments used party patronage 
through typical poik-barrel grants in the forms of roads, mosques, and various public works as 
well as through a wide variety of individual inducements from employment to securing 
agricultural credits.^^ Party patronage itself constituted an obstacle to the development of civil 
society by hindering organization and institutionalization,^^a development that did not seem to 
bother DP leaders. Instead of opposing the overpowered state itself as they claimed when in 
opposition, the DP leaders endeavored to employ that state for their own ends. They, in 
Heper’s words, aimed to replace state-centered polity with a party-centered one.“ ’
Alongside the use patronage, the DP leaders showed an inclination towards 
authoritarian practices. From the beginning of the second constitutional period in 1908,
özhudun, “Clientelism,” 260; İlkay Sunar, “Demokrat Parti ve Popülizm,” [The Democrat 
Party and Populism] Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 8 (1983), 2084. To characterize DP’s 
policies, we prefer party patronage rather than populism since over the years populism came to be used in 
a variety of ways and began to denote different things to different people. Even if we define populist 
movements, as Di Telia did, as a “political movement based on mobilized but not yet autonomously 
organized popular sector, led by an elite rooted among the middle and upper echelons of society, and kept 
together by a charismatic, personalized link between leader and led, the result, in turn, of widespread 
social and cultural traits often found in the periphery...” the DP’s populist characteristics are not 
outstanding. Torcuto S. Di Telia, “Populism into the Twenty-first Century.” Government and Opposition. 
22, 46 (19%), 188. As Sunar noted DP’s populism was limited by two factors; that its founders were part 
of the Republican elite who had always been sceptical about mass mobilization and the appreciation on 
the part of the DP leaders that its possible use of mass mobilization would inevitably have to rely on 
Islam, which had been anathema to Turkish state elites, and might cost party a dear. Sunar, “populism” 
2079-2080. It is also to be added that the DP had an relatively advanced institutional-organisational 
structure and all that it entails that made leader-mass relations somewhat institutionalized rather than 
purely charismatic.
263 Sayan, “Patronage,” 129.
^  Sunar, “Populism,” 2084. Recently, however, perceptions of clientelism tends to be much 
more benign. Louis Roniger for instance, writes that even in developed democracies patronage continues 
to be instrumental and may be compatible with non-clientelistic practices. He then argues that once this 
fact overtly recognized, it “may lead to the strengthening of organisations, adding commitment and 
loyalty to occupational qualifications for access to office incumbency.” Louis Roniger, “The Comparative 
Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World,” in 
Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society, ed. Louis Roniger and Ayşe Gûneş-Ayata (Boulder, London; 
Lyime Riermer, 1994),IS. Similarly, Joseph La Palambora argued that “clientelism is an efficient and 
effective way through which the political allegiances, preferences, and demands of citizens are brought to 
weight on public policies -exactly as the sprit, if not the narrower definitions of polyarchy would 
require...” Joseph La Palambora, Italian. 59.
Heper, Tradition. \06. See also, Engin D.Akarh, “State,” 148.
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Turkish political parties had been democratic in opposition and authoritarian in power. The DP 
was not an exception. They were not prepared to expand (as they promised) the basic right and 
liberties which they harshly criticized when in opposition. Let alone expanding them, the DP 
tried to limit existing rights and liberties cleariy violating accepted norms of the liberal 
democracy thus turning the majority of intellectuals and press against itself Under the rhetoric 
of national will, which, according to their view, could accept no limitation whatsoever, they 
opposed to any move designed to curb excesses of power. The establishment of investigatory 
commission (tahkikat komisyonu) in the assembly that would assume quite unlimited pow ers^ 
that, if it is used, would spell the end of liberal democracy, was one spectacular example of the 
DP’s authoritarian actions. Another action of the DP leaders that intensified the polarization 
had been the establishment of “Vatan Cephesi” (Fatherland Front), which consisted of those 
who supported the DP. It was an effort on the part of the DP to broaden the party’s base and 
to show the opposition that masses were on their side.
All these factors were instrumental in bringing down Turicey’s first experiment with 
democracy. The use of extensive party patronage combined with the unplanned, uncoordinated 
economic policy of the DP governments^’ led to serious economic imbalances forcing the 
government to take painful measures. They did little, however, to reduce the DP’s electoral 
appeal, though its vote declined fi'om 56.6 per cent (in 1954) to 47.7 percent in 1957. 
Economic problems, in other words, were not the most important reason for the DP’s 
overthrow. Winning two consecutive election comfortably, the DP leader Menderes’ belief in 
himself as a person specially gifted to lead the countiy in the righteous path as he saw fit
^  The members of the investigatory commission would assume powers of the judiciary, and the 
right to prohibit pidrUcation (and to seize the published ones) of ar^ material deemed to be harmful, and rts 
decisions would be final Cited in Cem Eroğul Demokrat Parti- Tarihi ve İdeolojisi [The Democrat Party- 
History and Ideology XAnkara; İmge, 1990), 156. (first published in 1970). The &ct that it was unconstitutional 
was accqjted even by ^mpathizers of the DP. See, Başgil. 27 Mayıs. 134. Professor Başgil, who had been 
invited to (^ )ankaya to ofier his views on the issue, had fiiiled to convince B ^ar and Menderes that it was 
unconstitrrtional. Ibid., 134-5
For a critical account of econonric policies of DP period, Morris Singer, The Economic 
Advance o f  Turkey, 1938-1950 (Ankara; Titrkish Economic Society, 1977)
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appears to have increased As he believed that what he had done was appreciated by the
electorate he grew more and more authoritarian in power. The speech Menderes gave after the
1954 election victory reflect that mentality:
The elections have clearly revealed how much the citizens like the road I have takea 
So far I have attached value to consultation with you journalists. Metaphorically qjeaking I used to 
seek your advise on whether to use aspirin or qjtalidon as a cure for nerves. Now the pec^le’s lively 
confidence makes it obvious that there is no fiuther need for such consultations. I am going to269have the final word and use aspirin and qttalidon as I please.
As the economic problems come to the sürfece he sought consolation in attacking the 
opposition accusing it of planning to overthrow the government. Consecutive election defeats 
had affected the RPP no less degree. ParaUel to Menderes’ g ro \^ g  confidence and his harsh 
treatment of the opposition, the RPP leaders, too, increased the intensity of their struggle 
against the government. They charged it with aiming to establish an authoritarian government 
and violating Atatiirk’s principles, particularly secularism. They constantly implied that the 
overthrowing of the DP by force was imminent.^ ^® The DP’s policies gained the hostility not 
only of the RPP but also other influential groups whose belief in the regime was so important if 
the regime was to survive.
Particularly significant was the military which, as the chief state elite, believed that they 
were the ultimate protector of the Atatiirk’s principles. It was known that in 1950 some of the 
younger oflHcers supported the DP in the hope that it would help the army to modernize as well
268
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İnönû’s harsh style of opposition was criticized even by anti-DP figures. Yakup Kadri 
Karaosmanoğlu, who had been a close friend of both Mustafe Kemal and İsmet İnönü and an RPP 
member, wrote “Was not İsmet Paşa about to turn the countiy into a battlefield through his struggle 
(against the DP) which he conducted with a boldness and exuberance that he did not display even in his 
youth ? And who could stay out of this muddle ? This muddle has spread to every comer of the countiy.” 
Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Politika’da 45 Yıl [45 Years in Pohtics] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1%8), 208. Similarty, 
Turhan Feyzioglu (Professor who entered the assembly for the RPP in 1957 elections and lived through 
the 12 September breakdown as the leader of RRP) in 1984 remarked that, if he had chance to go back to 
1957-60, he would do everything at his disposal to soften the conflict. Because “in those days the stmggle 
between parties was getting unnnecessarily harsh. Unnecessarily because, there were neither terror not 
other fights based on race and religious sectarian cleavages. But (still) relations between the parties were 
fer too harsh.” Cited in Emin (^laşan. Biz Kirk Kişiyiz Birbirimizi Biliriz [We are so Close to Each Other 
so. We All Know Each Other Well] (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1985), 111.
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as bring a fresh energy to solve pressing problems. These hopes, however, did not materialize. 
The DP leadership committed what was proven to be grievous mistakes in handling relations 
with the military. They assumed that by bringing their own men into the high command, they 
could control the whole army. Parallel to the general decline of the life standards (and prestige) 
of the bureaucracy the armed forces’ economic situation deteriorated b a d l y . T h e  DP’s 
disdain of the bureaucracy was inevitably directed to the army as well. Rumors had it that 
Menderes uttered such words as “He would, if necessary, run the army even with the reserve 
oflBcers.”
Younger oflScers in the army came to believe that the DP government was in breach of 
Atatiirk’s principles (particularly secularism and etatism) which they were entrusted to protect. 
Their coming to such conclusion was, to a great measure, the result of the relentless opposition 
led by İnönü and RPP in association with the bulk of the intelligentsia (professors and the bulk 
of the press). Having been closely associated with the ruling center and its efforts of 
modernization and therefore hardly accustomed to accept the DP’s right to govern, both the 
professors and the great majority of the journalist believed that the DP was blocking and 
reversing the Kemalist modernization efforts. They, thus, easily provided a constant source of 
devastating opposition led by the RPP. Orhan Erkanli, one of the leading member of the 
National Unity Committee that overthrow the government, admitted that the coup was realized 
“as a result of the RPP’s opposition. On the one hand, they enraged the DP, on the other hand, 
they prepared the army and the public opinion with constant opposition.” The RPP had 
accused the government by giving concessions and encouraging the religious reactionism, 
serving the interest of the few exploiters, deviating from Atatürk’s principle of statism, 
damaging the country’s independence by entering close relations with the United States,
George Harris, “The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turitey.” Middle East Journal. 24, 
(1970), 441; Kemal H. Karpat, “The Military and Democracy in Turic^, 1%0-1964: A Sociological 
Analysis of Revolution.” ¿4mer/cort Historical Review, 75, (1970), 1663.
Cited in. Nazlı İlıcak, 27Mayıs Yargılanıyor [The 27 May on Trial] (Istanbul: Kervan, 1975), 
12. See, also Emin Aytekin (p.280) in the same book. Erkanli was one of the fourteen members of the 
NUC who had been expelled from the community, who then, tend to blame the RPP for their expulsion. 
Therefore, one should not take Erkanh’s statement at face value, but it still involves significant amount of 
truth.
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planning dictatorship, dividing the country and etc... In retrospect, it spears that the RPP had 
an enormous influence in shaking belief in the system and generating the feeling that 
“something has to be done” not only in the armed forces but also in the student community 
which through their actions played significant role in the overthrow of the DP.
Against the growing opposition to their rule, the DP leaders’ came up with more 
authoritarian solutions. The closure of the newspapers, the arrest of leading journalists and 
academicians, were the order of the day. True to tradition, the DP leaders appear to have 
believed that compromise (to opposition’s demands) was demeaning and only more force 
could handle opposition. Celal Bayar, for instance, even after 16 years, did not accept that the 
DP’s measures against opposition were too harsh. He argued that “(if they had not taken these 
measures) the social atmosphere would worsen like it did in 1968-9 in eariy 1955, to such an 
extent that street fights, occupations might have turned into bloody fiactride struggle.
Impending economic crisis, heightening polarization, unending party political struggles, 
destructive opposition by the RPP and intellectuals have all been instrumental in bringing the 
down&U of the DP government. Its downfall, however, was by no means a foregone 
conclusion, an inevitable event determined by unfavorable confining conditions.^ ^  ^Particularly, 
political leaders of both parties had several opportunities that might have alleviated the crisis. It 
appears, for instance, that a call for early general election with the date fixed by the Menderes 
government, up until to the last days of the regime, was a real possibility that might have 
alleviated the tension. Since the RPP opposition based its strategy on the claim that the DP had 
no intention of holding elections and therefore leaving power.Similarly Menderes’ or 
Bayar’s resignation probably would have had the same effect as might the declaration that the
Ibid., 634.
Sunar, “Demokrat,” 2086.
^*Ali Rıza C ih ^  İsmet İnönü ’nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları-(l920-1973), İkinci Cilt, 1939- 
1960 [The Speeeches of İsmet İnönü in the TGNA- (1920-1973), vol 2, 1939-1960] (Ankara; TBMM, 
1993), 304. In fiict, İnönü was reported to have said (before 27 May) that if Menderes declared the date in 
which general elections would be held, he would express its support to the Menderes government. Cited in 
Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İhtilalin Mantığı [The Logic of Revolution] (İstanbul; Remzi, 1973), 314.
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activities of the investigatory commission had been ended two-months earlier than planned.^ ^  ^
Or in the RPP’s case a man of İnönü’s caliber and experience who played a historical role in 
installing the multi-party regime must have thought that his inflaming speeches against the 
government might incite an open rebellion within the ranks of the army, which he knew very 
well, against the democratic regime which he had done much to instal and consolidate.
Because İnönü knew that within the army there existed rdjellious groups. Metin Toker, 
who, as his son-in-law was very close to İnönü admits that “although İnönü was not involved 
any military plots to overthrow the government, he was well aware that there existed such 
groups.” According to Toker, “it is a reality that İnönü provided ‘green light’ for 
intervention.”^^ * Toker also added that, if İnönü could fi'eely answer the question whether he 
would prefer intervention or dictatorship of DP, he would clearly say intervention, and 
“officers became aware of that.”^^ Thus, as Hale, who a i^ ed  that whether İnönü knew the 
coup in advance was not clear, accepted “it seems unlikely that he would have wanted to warn 
Menderes in advance.”“ ® Therefore, it is not a gross exaggeration to stato that İnönü still 
pursued an opposition strategy which was “highly corrosive of the democratic process.”“ * He 
had uttered such words in what was to be the final days of the regime; “If you continue on this
In fact, on 25 May 1960 Menderes had announced m Eskişehir that the investigatory 
conunission had completed its activities. But it was too late to stop junior officers. Reported by Ercüment 
Yavuzalp, who was private secretary (özel kalem müdürü) of Menderes, cited in Birand, Dündar, Çaplı, 
Demirkırat. 185. According to Orhan Erkanli, Menderes had told him (in Yassiada) that it was Celal 
Bayar who convinced him that resignation was not necessary and would render matters worse. Regarding 
the declaration of the election date, Menderes was reported to have told Erkanh that they first wanted to 
ensure law and order in the country and then to go to elections as they believed that because of unruly 
behavior of the opposition there was no way of conducting orderly election. Orhan Eikanli, Askeri 
Demokrasi [Military Democracy] (Istanbul; Güneş, 1987), 311-312.
Cited in Birand, Dündar, Ç a^plı, Demirkırat. 161. See also. Metin Toker, Demokrasiden 
Darbeye. 1957-1960 [From Democracy to the Coup d’etat, 1954-1960]. (Istanbul; Bilgi, 1991), 334.
İnönü.
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Ibid., 334.
Ibid.,334. Toker does not tell us how and in which ways they became aware of this stance of
William Hale, Turkish Politics and The Military (London; Routledge, 1994), 112.
Harris, “Causes,” 446.
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road even I will not be able to save you,”^  “(Referring to the overthrow of Sygmann Rhee in 
Korea) The Turidsh nation is no less honorable than the K o r e a n s , “When the conditions are 
fulfilled, (open) rdjellion against government becomes a legitimate right of the people.”^  As 
we learn fi-om memoirs of one of the coup makers, İnönü’s speeches removed one of the most 
significant barriers for the coup, for now it was nearly understood that İnönü (even if not 
openly support it) would not oppose such a movanent.^^ It is not our argument that both 
politicians deliberately set out to wreck the democratic experiment. But by not properly 
estimating where their actions might lead, they were played crucial role in paving way to the 
military coup. Thus, the military intervention, planned and executed by lower ranks officers, 
finally came in 27 May 1960, ending Turkey’s first experiment with the multi-party democracy.
In this ch^ter, we have tried to delineate the larger social-political fiamework of 
Turkish politics. Both the strong state tradition and the traditional social structure undergoing 
modernization and their complex encounter and interactions, we argued, heavily affected the 
fortunes of Turkish democracy by creating constraints and providing opportunities. We then 
tried to present the particular development tr^ectories of both strong state tradition and the 
basic changes in the social structure resulting fi'om the modernization process until the 1960 
breakdown. Our cursory account of first Turkish experiment with democracy suggests how 
complex the interaction of various diverse fectors had been that had led to its breakdown.
^  Cihan, İnönü. 300. İnönü has made this speech on 18 April 1960.
Reported by Allan övmen cited in Birand, Dündar, Çaplı, Demirkırat. 168.
2*4 Cihan, İnönü. 300.
Orhan Erkanlı, Antlar, Sorunlar ve Sorumlular [Memoirs, Problems and Those ho are 
Responsible], (Istanbul; Baha, 1973), 310. In the same line, Heper had written that İnönü’s remark that 
even he would be unable to save the democrats “was bound to encourage the military to intervene (which 
it did in I960).” Heper, “The Strong State and Democracy,” 161. In his subsequent work on İsmet İnönü, 
however, Heper took a different line and argued that İnönü acted harshly towards the opposition because 
he wanted to warn the DP government and thus “wanted to save the multi-party regime he cherished so 
much.” According to Heper, “his remarks were not implicit appeals to non-democratic forces to intervene; 
they were his desperate pleas to the democrats to stop suppressing the opposition and to hold elections.” 
Heper, İnönü. 209. This may be (and seems to be) the case, but it still begs the question of how inönü’s 
remarks might have been interpreted by potential coup-makers and why İnönü, who was so careful with 
the words he used and implications that these words might cause, did not seem to be concerned with the 
possible consequences of his words in that case.
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There were, in the first place, the state elites. Never suspecting their self-^pointed role as 
guardians of public interests, perceiving themselves as entitled to intervene whenever they 
thought the Atatiirkist principles had been violated, they generated considerable tensions for 
new bom democracy. Political elites formed around the DP, socialized in an RPP environment, 
bequeathing Ottoman-Turidsh traditions, on the other hand, did not seek a modus vivendi with 
state elites. Quite the contrary, they tried to sideline them whenever possible. We also argued 
that to better understand that conflict deriving fi^ om state tradition, the social stmcture of 
Turkey also needs to be taken into consideration. Not only because some of the political elites 
are the product of that society but also because both parties were likely to opt for policies that 
they thought would attract votes fi'om that society. We argued that Turicey of late forties and 
fifties demonstrated characteristics of “peasant society” hardly conducive to development of 
“civic values,” a feature that help us to better understand elite behavior. It had for instance put 
its imprint on the way the parties formed linkages with the society, clientelism and party 
patronage being the dominant form. And finally, we indicated the impact of the legal- 
institutional fi'ameworic of both the 1924 Constitution and other related regulations.
This being said, these constraints did not mean that Tuildsh democracy was doomed to 
fail. The party elites had room for maneuver that might have increased the chances of 
democracy. But, as our brief account suggested, political party elites appeared to have been 
unable to overcome the impact of these constraints and paved the way to its breakdown in 
1960.
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CHAPTER III. SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE, POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION AND THE STATE ELITES ‘IN TURMOIL’ : 
POLITICS IN THE LATE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES
The 27 May 1960 military intervention led by lower and junior oflBcers was 
enthusiastically welcomed by the state elites -the RPP, the intellectuals, universities and the 
bulk of the central bureaucracy. Professors’ from both Ankara and Istanbul Universities, who 
were flown to Ankara to advise the ruling National Unity Committee (NUC which was 
composed of 38 staff officers’ led by General Cemal Gürsel) issued a declaration justifying the 
intervention. This declaration, reminiscent of Ottoman fetvas issued by Şejhülislams,’ 
expressed the center’s views regarding the state and government. It stated that the 27 May 
“Revolution” was not an ordinary coup. It was directed against a government ^\hich had 
become “a materialistic force representative of personal influence and ambition,” and therefore 
“ended up by losing all spiritual bonds with the true sources of state power, which reside in the 
army, its court of justice and bar associations, its civil servants desirous of demonstrating 
attachment to their duties, and in its universities...” It accused the government of descending 
“into a position of virtual enmity toward the basic and essential institutions of a true state and 
also towards Atatürk*s reforms..”*
The state elites had hoped that the golden opportunity to install a socio-political order 
that they deemed to be necessary (and good) for the country had finally arrived. The eventful 
decade ahead, however, would demonstrate that Turkey had changed to a great extent. Not 
only would their designs for the country prove to be futile, but the composition of the center 
itself was to undergo momentous changes. What was formeriy referred to as state elites had 
begun to lose their former coherence as the RPP and the bulk of intellectual-bureaucratic elite
' Cited in Kemal H.Karpat, “Political Developments in T uik^, 1950-1970.” Middle Eastern 
Studies. 8,3, (1972), 357. For the full text, see Server Tanilli, Anayasalar ve Siyasal Belgeler 
[Constitutions and other Political Documents] (Istanbul: C^m, 1976), 87-91.
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started to depart from the values that the center held dear. Many members of this alliance 
started to flirt with socialism both at the level of ideas and in practice. Meanwhile, the old DP, 
representing what we called political elites, could not remain unaffected. In the radicalized 
atmosphere of the 1960s its islamist and ultra-nationalist wings established their own parties. 
While the Justice Party, differing in critical aspects from the DP, managed to establish itself as 
the main successor to the DP.
These developments in the political landscape have been associated with social 
structural changes -namely industrialization and urbanization- as a result of the modernization 
process that gained futher pace and changes in strong state tradition. It is argued here that both 
changes in socio-economic structure and strong state tradition have affected previous 
constraints and opportunities for democracy as weU as introducing new constraints and 
opportunities. It was a period of realignment and remaking. It ushered in a new era in wWch 
new forces arose, previous alliances dissolved, and perceptions of various political actors of 
themselves and others underwent critical changes. FoUowing Sunar and Sayan,^  we argue that 
those developments promised both a danger and hope for the stability of democracy, depending 
to a large extent, on choices, actions and responses of the political actors. A new democratic 
center, composed of new RPP and the ex-DP successors the JP, could overcome the impact of 
various confining conditions associated with the strong state tradition and the strains that 
resulted from modernization process. That was the promise. The danger was that failing to do 
this, Turkey might be drawn into political chaos. Unfortunately, the danger was realized. 
Indeed, remaining chapters of this thesis teUs the stoiy of this failure that subsequently paved 
the way for the 12 September 1980 breakdown.
3.1.THE NEW ERA IN THE MAIONG
The ruling NUC had promised a speedy return to civilian rule, with a new 
constitutional order. True to state elites’ perception of democracy as an end in itself that
 ^ İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayan, “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects,” in Transitions 
From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, ed. Guillermo O’Doimell, Philippe C.Schmitter and 
Lawrence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 177.
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should be preserved if the country was to be regarded as civilized nation they honored their 
promise. That was one of the positive impacts of the strong state tradition on the development 
of democraty.^ T h ^  decided to convene the Constituent Assembly (CA) to prepare draft 
constitutions. Composed of two chambers; the NUC and the House of representatives, it was 
“corporate in its composition” including representatives of the judiciary, press, universities, 
youth labor, agriculture and political parties.^ Despite the appearance of embracing all social- 
political groups with a voice, it conspicuously left out the DP and its afSliated organizations, 
over 200 of the 265 members of the assembly belonged to the RPP.’
The CA worked on two constitutional drafts; one prepared by the Onar commission 
(named after Professor and rector of Istanbul University, Siddik Sami Onar) and the other by 
Political Science Faculty of Ankara University. The Onar commission, which “had deep 
reservations about the working of democracy in Turicey,”*  had proposed a constitution which 
aimed to reduce, as much as possible, the elected m^’orities’ influence in governmental aflairs. 
It included the establishment of a powerful upper house which would only partiy be elected 
through elections, the establishment of very powerful Constitutional Court, holding the chief of 
the staff responsible to the president and like. The Ankara proposal, also distrustful of general 
vote, did not go as far. The final draft was a compromise text. It was put to referendum and 
accepted by 61.7 per cent of the vote. The result was, in many ways, disappointing for the 
NUC and speUed troubled a new start for democracy. Not only was participation in the 
referendum quite low, but also in some areas, including big cities such as Izmir (% 50.2), Bursa
 ^It should not be assumed on the other hand that there was no pressure on the military to draw in 
to barracks. The RPP, led by İnönü, played a crucial role for ensuring quick transition to democracy. See, 
Metin Heper, İsmet İnönü- The Making o f  a Turkish Statesmen (Leiden; Brill, 1998), 215-220.
* For more information, see Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961 (Washington: 
Brooking Institution, 1963), 88.
* Ibid., 88. The DP was closed down “Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi” (C^urt of First Instance) in 
29 September I960 for purely technical reasons. It was charged for violating the Law of Associations, for 
not holding national congress since 1955 as party by-laws required it to be hold in every four years.
* For a more detailed knowledge, see Clement H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 113.
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(% 52.8), Samsun (% 57), Zonguldak (% 53.1), more than half of those who participated 
referendum rejected the new constitution.’
The exclusion of ex-DP cadres in the making of constitution, alongside the treatment 
they suffered at the hands of a new administration had sown the seeds of an almost incurable 
resentment on the part of the DP sympathizers towards the constitution.*  There we come 
across the dilemma of post-coup constitution makers, which could be handled only with great 
skills. If they had included ex-DP cadres, they would have seemed to risked to contradict the 
legitimacy of their intervention. If they had not, the new constitution would have faced serious 
problems from its very inception. Turkish constitution-makers, however, did not seem to be 
concerned with such an outcome. They did not even endeavor to ensure, at least, neutrality of 
the DP supporters. As if to condemn the DP forever, the preamble of the constitution stated 
that it was the end-result of the “use of the right to resistance against a political power which 
had lost its legitimacy.”
From the very beginning, this factor negatively affected the new regime’s chances of 
consolidation. The history of democracies, as Linz remaiked, highlights the significance of “the 
inauguration and initial consolidation of the regime for its future capacity to confront a serious 
crisis.” ’ The DP supporters have inclined to see h, not as a compromise constitution in the 
making of which their views were taken into consideration, but as something that had been 
“imposed” on them by political rivals.'® The RPP and other center forces, on the other hand.
 ^For the figures, Welker. Revolution. 165-166.
* Ergun Ozbudun, “Constitution Making and Democratic Consolidation,” in Institutions and 
Democratic Statecraft, ed. Metin Heper, Ali Kazancigil and Bert A. Rockman (Boulder; Westview, 
1997), 231,232.
’ Juan J.Linz, The Breakdown o f  Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration 
(Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 40.
The JP leader Süleyman Demirel, for instance, had noted that the 1%1 constitution started 
with “disunion and hostility” (ikilik ve husumet) from the very begiiming. He continued that “if you begin 
in the preamble to disparage the result of national will, after the parliament and government which had its 
(parliaments’) confidence had been removed by coup, it is not easy to ensure peace and harmony in the 
country.” Süleyman Demirel, Anayasa ve Devlet İdaresi [The Constitution and the Governing of the 
State] (Istanbul; Göktürk, 1977), 25, 28.
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dogmatically (and reflexively) defended the Constitution, not so much because of they believed 
it to be the best constitution for Turkey but because the DP tradition opposed it, and it was 
prepared by themselves. The result was a legitimacy crisis" that impinged upon the regime’s 
chances of consolidation.
It is necessary to pay attention to what sort of political system the 1961 constitution 
devised and how it affected the social-political development of the period. Under the assault of 
the behavioral revolution the study of constitutions as influences on political behavior of actors
were neglected as being simplistic and formalistic. This was especially so in the Anglo-Saxon
1 ^context where the study of constitutional law and political science was sharply separated. 
Influenced by this tradition and as a reaction to the exclusive emphasis put on constitutions, 
scholars tended to neglect the role played by constitutions. But the constitutions are important 
because “political* behavior may take place in a certain form simply because law commands it, 
the law permits h, or the law prohibits other types of behavior.”"  The 1961 constitutional 
order, too, had been essential in understanding not only the politics of new era, but also many 
crises that paved way to the breakdown of democracy in 1980.
In the main, the Constitution reflected the reaction to the severe problems that were 
observed in the 1950-60 period. Indeed, many of the Constitutions’ new regulations were put 
forward by the RPP 1957 election manifesto." The root of the problem, constitution-makers 
assumed, was the prevention of m^orities’ dominance of the governmental apparatus. They
"  Ersin Kalayaoğlu, “1960 Sonrası Türk Siyasal Hayaüna Bir Bakış: Demokrasi, Neo- 
Patrimonyalism ve İstikrar.” (A Look at Post-1960 Turkish Political Life: Democracy, Neo- 
Patrimonialism and Stability] in Tarih ve Demokrasi (Istanbul: Cem, 1992), 94.
Ergim Ozbudun, Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı [The Constitution Making in 
the Process of Transition to Democracy] (Istanbul: Bilgi, 1993), 49.
James P. Me Chegor, “Constitutional Factors in Politics in Post-Communist Central and 
Eastern Europe.” Communist and Post-communist Studies. 29, 2, (1996), 149.
For the text, see Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Döneminde, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler - 
Siyaset Bilimi Açısından Bir İnceleme [The Developments in the Republican People’s Party in the period 
of 1960-1975 from the Political Science point of View] (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1976), 
126-128.
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perceived the DP period as one in which majority dominaned minority. This preference for 
pluralist rather than majoritarian forms of democracy were also suited to the center’s purposes 
of controlling power. Suspecting that general elections in the future might produce the similar 
results, statist-bureaucratic elite wanted to carve out a place for themselves to control the 
elected majorities. According to 1924 Constitution, the TGNA was the sole representative of 
the national will. By contrast, 1961 Constitution (art.4) stated that “the nation shall exercise 
sovereignty through the authorized agencies in accordance with the principles laid down in the 
constitution.” This formula suggested that “the legislature no longer had a monopoly on 
legitimate authority, in the exercise of which other branches and agencies of government also 
had a rightful share.”’’ To this end, the constitution devised a complex system of checks and 
balances; an upper house, independent judiciary and constitutional court. It also granted 
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy to universities and Turkish Radio Televiaon. Moreover, 
it also established a National Security Council (NSC) composed of top level commanders and 
civilian ministers to “advise” the government concerning the matters of national security.
The Constitution also differed in terms of the regulation of civil-political and socio­
economic rights. The 1924 Constitution had, in a very individualistic manner, stated (art.68) 
that “limits to one’s freedom is the freedom of other’s.” As such it provided the assembly an 
exclusive right to define their limits. The 1961 Constitution, on the other hand, did not wish to 
leave it the TGNA It contained a much more detailed bill of rights (consisting of 52 articles) 
indicating under which conditions, if any, they might be suspended.
Rather more to the point (and new) was the extensive regulations of socio-economic 
rights and obligations. Ignoring the country’s economic underdevelopment, the constitution 
makers wished all socio-economic rights to be included in the constitution “in the name of the 
progress.”’^  The Constitution (art.41) stated that Turicey was a social state which was charged 
to provide “a living standard in accordance with human dignity through the regulation of
** Ergun özbudun, “Turkish Constitutional Law,” in Introduction to Turkish Law, ed. Tuğrul 
Ansay and Don Wallace (London: Kluwer, 1987), 29.
Kemal H.Karpat, “Domestic Politics,” in Turkey, ed. Klaus Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen: 
Janderhoeck, 1985), 70.
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economic and social life and in accordance with justice and full employment.” It expected the 
state to provide land for those who either had none or insuflBcient land, to nationalize “where it 
is deemed necessary in the public interest private enterprises which bear the characteristic of 
public service” (art. 59). It recognized the right “to establish trade unions and federations of 
trade unions without having to obtain prior permission” (art.46) as well as, of course, “the right 
to collective bargaining and strike” (art.47) for both employees and employers alike.
The constitution accepted the principle of separation of powers and a parliamentary 
system of government with a bicameral assembly. The president’s powers were largely 
symbolical, while the prime minister was the actual head of the executive. The Judiciary was 
given “almost total independence”'’ so as to make Judges immune from political pressures, 
while the Constitutional court was set up to review the constitutionality of laws. Though not 
constitutionally ordered, the constitution also “opened the way”'* for the introduction of 
proportional representation (PR). PR seemed to be the best way to ensure the representation of 
various political currents in the assembly, and thus to prevent the majority’s dominance.
It is not possible here to provide complete treatment of the Constitution, but on the 
whole, two prominent features of the constitution emerges. It was intended to be a truly 
“liberal” (in American sense) document that both cherished political participation and charged 
the state providing socio-economic welfare services. Both because those who drafted the 
constitution (intelligentsia) wanted the adopt best of every constitution in the world and their 
wishes did not always coincide with those of the army, the constitution involved many 
contradictory dimensions.
On the one hand, it cherished political participation, but on the other hand it desired 
some institutions to be as independently as possible, i.e. to be outside the control of governing 
mryorities. These institutions included Turidsh Radio and Television, National Security
Ibid., 70.
18 Ibid., 69.
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Council, and the Universities. In terms of the limitations of the basic rights and liberties, the 
constitution introduced such vague concepts as “national security, public order, general 
morality.” The 1924 Constitution, on the other hand, had stated that “limits to one’s freedom 
are the freedoms of other’s.” Even a sympathetic observer of the 1961 Constitution“  noted 
that that could allow executive to follow more restrictive policies than the 1924 constitution 
ever did. Last but not least, somewhat contradicting its welfere aims, the constitution also tried 
to tied up the hand of the executive through the second chamber and very strong judiciary 
eager to control every act of it.
Besides, and rather more technical point concerns the role of the constitution for 
aggravating crises -or not providing enough means to solve immobilism.^  ^ Specifically, the 
dissolution of the assembly by the executive, a central feature of the parliamentary system of 
government, was made extremely diflBcult. That severely weakened the hand of the executive. 
The constitution did not envisage the proclamation of a state of emergency (olağanüstü haller) 
for the prevention of social and political emergency cases. It legislated instead, direct martial 
law (sıkıyönetim) as a way of preventing crisis. In the case of an emergency that could not be 
dealt with under the normal democratic procedures, authorities were then left with the stark 
choice of appealing to the military or continuing under democratic procedure.
The constitutional order appears to have afiected post-1960 politics to a significant 
degree. But it is suflBcient to note here that the permissive atmosphere that the constitution 
cherished encouraged widespread political participation of various groups. It also severely 
constrained the elected governments, negatively affecting their ability to move swiftly and 
decisively. Having stated the constitutional orders’ influence on politics of the late sixties and 
seventies, we should also pay attention to changes in traditional social structure undergoing
”  In the same line, believing that “pohtical party rivalry at the village and neighborhod level may 
lead to disruption of basic social units” the political parties law prohibited the set up of a poUücal 
organization below the level of sub-province. Dodd, Politics. 133
^  Bülent Tanör, İki Anayasa, 1961-1982 [The Two Constitutions, 1961-1982] (Istanbul; Beta, 
1986), 89.
Ibid., 92.
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modernization process that had gained further pace.
Since the fifties, the Turidsh socio-economic structure had made considerable progress 
on the hard road of the modernization. Table 1., might provide an indication of the pace of the 
change. Alongside the respectable growth of GM*, significant improvements have been 
observed in the means of transportation and communication as well as the consumption of 
various goods.
Table 1. Growth Indicators, 1948-1968 “
1948 1968 Percent
Increase
Arunral Rale 
of Increase
GNP (TL, 1%1 prices 27.5 76.8 178 5.2
Per C ^ita GNP 1375 2261 64 2.5
Value added in agriculture (TL, 
1961 prices)
12.75 21.6 74 2.8
Agriculture as % GNP 45.4 28.0 - -
Value Added in industry (TL, 1%1 
prices)
3.7 13.7 270 6.8
industry as % of GNP 13.5 17.8 - -
Per Capita Consumption
Paper (kilograins) 2.0 4.7 135 4.9
Textiles (meters) 6.3 19.4 208 6.5
Stell (kilograms) 10.0 39.7 297 8.0
Electricity (KWH) 33.7 163.2 384 9.2
Road Transport
All-weather Roads 
(1000 kms, 1947-67
12 42 250 6.5
Number of motor
vehicles (lOOO’s, 1948- 1967)
19 225 1.084 13.3
Goods (bilhon ton- 
kms./year, 1950-1968
1.0 14.1 1.310 15.4
Travel (bilhon passenger- 
kms/year, 1950-1968
2.6 38.2 1.369 15.6
Installed Generating Capacity (taw., 
1948-1967)
305 2100 589 9.8
Number of Uoensed radios 234 2934 1210 13.3
Commensurate with the decline of the share of the agriculture in the GNP and parallel 
increase in the share of the industry and services a notable shift in the composition of the 
economically active population was also observed.
^  Cited in İlkay Sunar, State and Society in the Politics o f  Turkey’s  Development (Ankara; 
Ankara University Faculty of Political Science, 1974), 93. Sunar derived those figures fi’om, Edwin J. 
(Dohn, Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change (New York: Praeger, 1970), 48-49.
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Table 2. Economically Active Population %, According to Sectors, 1927-197623
SECTORS 1927 1935 1950 1%2 1972 1976
Agriculture 80.9 76.4 77.7 77.1 65.0 59.4
Industry 8.9 11.7 10.3 10.9 14.5 16.6
Services 10.2 11.9 12.0 12.0 12.6 24.0
It can be clearly seen that there was a steady decline in number of those who were 
employed in the agricultural sector from a high point of 80.9 per cent in 1927 to 65.0 per cent 
in 1972. A significant increase was recorded in the number of those who woriced outside the 
agriculture, amounting to more than forty per cent.
A related phenomena of urbanization also gathered momentum. In 1935, only 16.4 per 
cent of the popidation lived in places with more than 10000 population. This figure rose to
25.1 percent in 1960 and 41.7 per cent in 1975. The rate of increase for the urban population 
was 6.4 and 5.1 per cent for the periods of 1950-60 and 1960-70 respectively. While the rural 
population increased only 1.9 and 1.5 per cent in the same period.^ ^
Table 3. Urban and Rural Population in Turkey, 1935-1970^
Years Total Pop. Urban Pop. % Rural Pop. %
1935 16.158.000 2.684.000 16.4 13.473.000 83.4
1940 17.820.000 3.234.000 18.1 14.586.000 81.9
1945 18.790.000 3.441.000 18.3 15.348.000 81.7
1950 20.947.000 3.883.000 18.5 17.063.000 81.5
1955 24.064.000 5.328.000 22.1 18.735.000 77.9
1960 27.754.000 6.967.000 25.1 20.787.000 74.8
1965 31.391.000 9.382.000 29.9 22.008.000 70.1
1970 35.605.000 12.734.000 35.7 22.931.000 64.3
Urbanization in Turkey, on the other hand, was unevea It was the big cities that
^  Yahya Sezai Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950 [An Economic Histoıy 
of the Republican Period, 1923-1950) (Ankara: Yurt Yayınlan, 1982), 101.
Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, The Politics o f  Rapid Urbanization -Government and 
Growth in M odem Turkey (Holmes: Meir, 1985), 29.
^  T.C Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, Türkiye 'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı [50 
Years of Social and Economic Development in Turkey] (Ankara: DİE, 1973), 78.
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continued to attract migrants. The population growth rate of the cities with more than 500000 
people were 7.6, 8.4 and 10.9 per cent for the periods of 1955-60, 1960-65, and 1965-70 
respectively. While it was 4.4, 4.0 and 4.0 per cent for cities with a population of 50000 to 
100000 for the same years.^ What is more and like many other developing countries, 
industrialization had not been commensurate with urbanization. That is to say, migration to the 
cities had taken place not only because the cities offered attractive employment in industry but 
because increasing poverty in rural areas resulting from population increase, mechanization of 
agriculture, and diversion of lands due to inheritance, pushed peasant to search for better life 
opportunities in the cities.^’ The inability of the industry to generate jobs for immigrants led to 
pervasive informal or marginal sector characterized by labor intensive small-scale service 
enterprise with low wages and without any social security. Many migrants who ^ e d  to find 
industrial jobs or employment in public sector worked as porters, shoe-shiners, and peddlers in 
the streets. Not being able to afford the rents in the established quarters of the city, they tended 
to live in the Gecekondu (literally houses “built overnight” on the public, and in exceptional 
cases private, land) or squatter houses.
Table 4. Number of Squatter Houses and Their Population“
Years Number of Squatters Squatter Population Urban pq). Living in 
squatters %
1955 50.000 250.000 4.7
1960 240.000 1.200.000 16.4
1%5 430.000 2.150.000 22.9
1970 600.000 3.000.000 23.6
1980 1.150.000 5.750.000 26.1
Walter F. Weiker, The Modernization o f  Turkey- From Atatürk to the Present Day (New Yoric, 
London; Holmes Meier, 1981), 65.
^  Sunar, Politics. 97; Danielson and Keleş, U r b a n iz a t io n .Karpat, who found that majority of 
the migrants he studied, have pointed economic hardship in the villages as the chief reason, adds that 
the pressure of some landlords and tribal cihefs and the kan davası (vendetta) were other &ctors for 
migration. Kemal H. Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 56, 73.
^  Rnşen Keleş, Kentleşme Politikası [Urbanization PolieyKAnkara; İmge, 1993), 383.
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Table 4., demonstrates sharp increases in the number of squatter residents. While in 
1955 only 4.7 per cent of the urban population lived in squatters, the figure rose to 22.9 per 
cent in 1965 and 26.1 per cent in 1980. It was estimated that in the late seventies that 65 per 
cent of the population of Ankara lived in Gecekondu, while it was 45 per cent and 35 per cent 
for Istanbul and Izmir respectively.^
In short, through the late fifties and sbcties the economic and social structure of Turicey 
underwent considerable changes whose impact would be felt in the years to come. Turkey’s 
increasing drive towards industrialization brought heretofore little-known new cleavages 
(economical in nature) into the fore; conflict between woikers and businessmen (and state since 
most of them were employed in the public sector) and cleavages within the private sector 
between big business and smaller ones. Particular characteristics of the urbanization process 
generated many problems that have political connotations.
It was noted in the previous chapter that “civic values” that are conducive to 
democracy are more likely to be found in socio-economically developed urbanized societies 
than the backward rural ones. The Turkish urbanization process, however, appears to have not 
generated a fertile ground for the emergence of such values, at least in the short term. It tended 
to produce new forms of organization and culture “which were neither fially rural nor urban but 
combination of both. The inability of the private industry to absorb flux of migrants and their 
subsequent turn to the informal sector to make their livelihood was one of the obstacles. Many 
migrants found themselves in an environment of insecurity characteristic of life in villages since 
they could hardly get a regular income, enjoy the feeling of security of having been covered by 
social security net, or be sure that his gecekondu would not be demolished by authorities.^' In
29 Ruşen Keleş, 100 Soruda, Türkiye’de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu, [Urbanization, 
Housing and Gecekondu in Turkey in 100 Questions] second ed. (Istanbul; Gerçek, 1978), 189.
^  Kemal H. Karpat, “The Politics of Transition”, 91.
Miibeccel Belik Kiray, “Az Gelişmiş Ülkelerde Hızla Topraktan Kopma ve Kentle 
Bütünleşememe,”[The Gecekondu: The Fast De-Peasantization and non-integration with the City in 
Underdeveloped Countries] in Toplumbilim Yazıları (Ankara; Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi İdari Bilimler 
Fakültesi Yayınlan, 1981), 347-348. (originally published in 1973); Peter Suzuki, “Peasants Without
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search of economical and psychological security, migrants relied on primordial loyalties to find 
a job, to build their gecekondu, and to survive an alien environment. Heper, for instance, in his 
study of Gültepe and Telsizler squatter areas in İstanbul, found that migrants heavily relied on 
their kin and hemşeris (people fi'om their home town) wlio had already settled in the city, to 
survive.^  ^ Alan Dubetsky in his study of fectory organization in Güzelbahçe and Aktepe in 
Istanbul observed that the majority of woricers especially in small fectories that used low levels 
of technology tended to recruit workers fi’om a specified area of the country, usually fi'om that 
of the owner. The new squatters, thus, were populated by individuals coming fi'om the same 
village or district and forming clan and reproducing communitaiian-mahalle syndrome in the 
midst of the city.
It was true that the migrants’ dependence on kin, ethno-religious groups or hemşeris, 
and their continuing relations with villages, provided sort of an adjustment mechanism through 
which newcomers to city learned to cope with city life.^  ^ But, on the other hand, this factor 
appears to have constituted a hindrance for the development of such “civic values” usually 
associated with urbanization, as individualism, tolerance, sense of efiBcacy, trust and ability to 
work with others who does not happen to be in his primordial small group.^’ Individualism,
Plows: Some Anatolians in Istanbul.” Rural Sociology. 31, 4 (1966), 432.
Metin Heper, Türkiye'de Kent Göçmeni ve Bürokratik örgütler [Urban-Migrants and 
Bureaucratic Organizations in TurkeyKİstanbul: Üçdal, 1983), 59.
Alan Dubetsky, “Kinship, Primordial Ties, and Factory Organization in Turkey; An 
Anthropological View.” IntemationalJoumal o f  Middle East Studies. 7 (1976), 437.
^Kiray, “Bütünleşememe.” 348; Suzuki. “Peasants,” 432; Ned Levine, “Old Culture-New 
Culture; A Study of Migrants in Ankara.” Social Forces. 51 (1973), 360 flF.
Ahmet Ö. Evin, “Communitarian Structures and Social Change.” In M odem Turkey - 
Continuity and Change, ed. Ahmet 0 . Evin (Opladen, Leske Verlag und Budrich, 1984), 19-23. Heper, 
similarly noted that the migrants found it very difiScult to come together with others (with whom they do 
not share primordial loyalties) for common aims. Ibid., 66. Regarding their sense of efficacy, Heper found 
that nearly 9 out of 10 squatters believed that they can not do anything against the decision (by 
authorities) which is likely to harm their interests. Ibid., 100. This having been said, it should not be 
assumed that old urbanities do very well on these counts. This does not seem to be the case. What can be 
said with confidence, however, is that old urbanities are better than the migrants. See, for an interesting 
article that asserts that not only for squatters but also for the long time residents of the city the family and 
kinship ties continue to play significant roles, Alan Duben, “The Significance of Family and Kinship in 
Urban Turkey,” in Sex, Roles, Family & Community in Turkey, ed. Çiğdem Kağıtçtbaşt (Bloorrüngton;
136
tolerance, and sense of efficacy on the part of the individual can hardly be expected to flourish, 
if a person can barely sustain his life without help of his small group. In that case, a person 
faces the staric choice of either quitting his community or accepting norms and values of these 
groups wdiich hardly fosters individualism and tolerance of diversity.^  ^ Similarly, wdiile small 
group solidarity is likely to promote trust of those you know, it is also likely to foster distrust 
of those you do not know.^  ^ In fact, Bradbum argued that basically because life of an 
ordinary Turk turned around family and kinship groups, Turks had a difficulty to come 
together, with those outside this circle, to pursue common goals.^*
The migrants’ relations with political parties, not surprisingly, were largely based on 
vertical relationships of patronage, as it was in the village. To secure public employment, to 
secure legal guarantees for squatter houses, to get various public services they had to turn to 
political parties that had the power to realize these. Though it seemed to contribute to the sense 
of efficiency in the squatters and facilitated their integration into urban society, the relations 
resembled those of clientelist-dependency relations rather than horizontal ones.- Political parties 
were seen as patrons that had the power to supply what they wanted only if they voted for 
them. Squatters, then, perceived right to vote “as an ideal avenue for transforming the 
communal opinion into a political will and as an instrument for participating in politics to secure 
benefits.” ’^ Like the villagers who cared mostly (if not only) about the satisfaction of
Indiana University Press, 1982). Also, Dubetsky, “factory,” 441.
^  It should, in no way, be assumed that there is a direct relations between urbanization and the 
emergence of toleration, individualism and sense of efficacy. The emergence of civic values can be said to 
have been related with, at least, the socio-economic factors, experiences with political authority and the 
impact of traditional values, particularly reUgion (or more accurately particular understanding of 
religion). For an insightful attempt on how particular understanding of Islam (but not the Islam as such) 
came to promote hitalism, unquestioned obedience to authority in Ottoman-Tirrldsh context, see, Sabri F. 
Ülgener, Zihniyet ve Din fThe Mentality and Religion] (Istanbul; Der, 1981)
Margaret Levi, “Social and Unsocial Capital; A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making 
Democracy Work.” Politics & Society. 24, 1 (1996), 51.
38 Norman M. Bradbum, “Interpersonal Relations within Formal Organizations in T urk^.”
Journal o f Social Issues. 19 (1%3), 63.
Karpat, “The Politics of Transition,” %. Kaipat also noted the existence of large percentage of 
migrants who voted for the RPP in the village swithced for their votes to the JP and TLP in the city. Ibid.,
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immediate local needs, squatters, too, seemed to little concerned with national issues, abstract 
principles, or honesty of leadership but immediate issues of ensuring the survival of squatter, 
and improving the local infrastructure (sewerage, roads, schools).
The relationships between the rise of radical movements and urbanization process were 
another factor that brought inhabitants of the gecekondu to the center of discussion. Many 
analysts predicted that constituting the new proletariat of the cities, migrants would provide a 
constant source of support for radical movements. This assumption did not hold in Turk^, at 
least in the short-run. The eariy settlers of squatter houses seemed to be happy with their life in 
the city and did not want to return to vülages.“*® Since, however difBcult, city life created a 
sense of relative (relative to village life) betterment. Many did vote for the JP because the party, 
as the party of power, skillfully used its patronage powers. Though th ^  had not been fully 
integrated into city life, traditional frmUy and local ties and the prevailing leadership patterns 
appeared to have prevented a sense of alienation. Many researchers, on the other hand, 
cautioned that with the second generation (and unless the sense of economic betterment 
continued) it might begin to change. This indeed, as we shall see, was what seemed to happen 
in the late seventies.
3.2. POLITICS IN THE NEW ERA
In the first election of the post-1%1 political order, five parties contested. The 
elections demonstrated that those parties competing for the former DP votes still had a 
considerable following. The RPP, which had a misfortune of being equated with the military 
rule and its several misnomers, was able to gain only 36.7 per cent of the vote while the newly 
established Justice Party (JP) got 34.8 per cent. The RPP managed to win 173 of the 450 seats 
in the lower house and 36 in the senate, while the JP secured 158 seats in the lower house and 
70 in the senate.
1 1 6 .
40 Keleş, Kentle^e.32', Karpat, Gecekondu. 140. Heper, Göçmen. 56-7
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The 1961 elections were the beginning of the process of both the disintegration and 
change of outlook in what we called the state elites. In the first place, the army high command 
clearly saw that the radical oflBcers, who were inclined to believe that socio-economic reforms 
had to be enacted under the prolonged military rule, might seriously damage both the internal 
hierarchy and tradition of non-intervention into daily political life. Their coming to such a 
conclusion was the beginning of a process of the bulk of intelligentsia’s alienation fi'om the 
military. The shedding of radicalism, within the army, have also prepared the ground in which 
the convergence, albeit very tentative, between the JP and the army would later take place on 
the basis of anti-communism and anti-separatism. To better understand how the military’s 
outlook changed, it is necessary to review main events briefly.
After the announcement of the election results, some disgruntled oflScers (including 
seven generals and four admirals) decided to intervene in the political process. They âgned 
^\ftat was known as the 21 October protocol. The protocol was a “manifesto of a coup 
otherwise unprepared.”^' It included the banning of all political parties and the dissolvement of 
both the NUC and election results. Facing such demands the NUC leadership tried to satisfy 
both the disgruntled oflBcers and its pre-election promise that results would be respected 
regardless of the conclusions. Through their endeavors, t\ftat was known as Çankaya protocol 
was finally signed by party leaders on 24 October. The protocol stated that the RPP leader 
İsmet İnönü would become prime minister and that the parties would support Cemal Gürsd’s 
(head of the NUC) election as president. There would, at the same time, be no attempt for the 
amnesty of convicted ex-DP members. Thus, the first coalition government, (one writer called 
it as “shotgun wedding”^^ ) was formed under the leadership of İnönü.
The transition to civilian politics at a formal level was thus completed. But disgruntled 
radical officers did not stop there. Colonel Talat Aydemir and his fiiends and students at 
Harbiye attempted a military coup in February 1962.^  ^ Thanks to İnönü and military high
William Hale, Turkish Politics and The Military Qjon6oTL\ Routledge, 1994), 146.
42 Ibid., 147.
For the details. Ibid., I56-I60; see also less than academic treatment by Erdoğan örtülü. Üç
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commands’ balanced and careful attitude, the coup was put down. İnönü had persuaded 
Aydemir that, if they surrender, th ^  would be no trials. Though İnönü fulfilled his promise. 
Aydemir was unrepentant. He attempted another coup in May 1963, which also âiled. This 
time, both the politicians and army high command were prepared to make him pay for what he 
had attempted to do. Aydemir and his collaborator Fethi Gürcan were tried and sentenced to 
death.^ Soon they were executed.
This was an important event in that the armed forces high command had shown 
determination not to tolerate such actions. If they had taken a diflfCTent course of action, 
Tuikey might have slid into the position of the many Latin American and Afiican praetorian 
states, in which the spiral of coups and counter-coups followed each other endlessly. Be that as 
it may, the struggle between high command and junior level radicalism would continue and 
culminate only after the 12 March militaiy intervention. The Aydemir case had shown that 
senior oflHcers had a first round, and for the time being an accommodation between armed 
forces and civilian government was finally began to evolve.
Why did the army high command not tolerate junior level radicalism ? Several factors 
can be suggested. The Aydemir case had shown that as well threatening their own position, 
tolerance of junior level radicalism risked the division of army, as the Turkish air force jets 
came close to bombing the Harbiye in the second coup attempt to put down the rebellion. 
Secondly, post-election developments threatened neither the 27 May “Revolution” nor their 
own position. Though unsatisfied by the election results, the army high command managed to 
get Cemal Gürsel elected President and İsmet İnönü Prime Minister. Besides, there was the 
National Security Council where they could easily transmit their views to civilian governments.
İhtilalin Hikayesi [The Stoiy of Three RevolutionsKAnkara: Ayyildiz, 1966).
** For details, Walter F. Weiker, “The Aydemir Case and Tuikey’s Political Dilemma.” Middle 
Eastern Affairs. 14(1%3).
As Hughes noted Aydemir case was also important for showing that the “Atatüıldsm” can be 
interpreted in a way that provides no place for liberal democratic order and can bu used as screen for 
personalistics aims. Aydemir had claimed that he was the true representative of Atatiiik’s ideas. Preston 
Hughes, Atatürkçülük ve Türkiye ’nin Demokratikleşme Süreci, [The Atatürkism and Turkey’s 
Democratization Process ] trans. Rabia Süer (Istanbul: Müliyet, 1993), 100.
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They had also ensured that the legitimacy of the 27 May intervention would not be questioned. 
In addition, during the military inteiregnum they provided for themselves and army as a whole 
“by significantly raising oflScers salaries and establishing auxiliary benefits, including housing, 
commissaries and other prerequisites.”^
A series of unstable coalition governments foUowed until the 1965 elections. The main 
issues affecting the coalitions were the amnesty of ex-DP oflBcers and the struggle between the 
JP and New Turicey Party for the old DP’s votes. Meanwhile Turidsh politics was becoming 
mily radicalized in the sense that social and political problems of the country began to be 
discussed in the light of radical paradigms, discussions being dominated by socialist ideas. 
Socialism which had, as an idea and practice, been an anathema for the pre-1960 period came 
to life fully in the post-1960 period. As a leading figure in the Turkish Socialist movement 
Behice Boran put it “it is only after the 27 May 1960 that socialism as an political idea and 
movement seized the opportunity to make itself fek legally. As a result of “an almost 
complete freedom of expression,” *^ that permissive atmosphere of post-19frl political order 
provided, many second rate socialist literature books translated, as well as propagandist books 
by Turkish authors,'”  which would contribute the rise of student radicalism. In a desperate 
search for solutions to pressing problems, academics, journalists, students, were all involved in 
hotly contested debates concerning the socio-economic structure of the country and how to 
overcome the problem of underdevelopment -of planning, of land reform, and of the role of
46 Weiker, Revolution. 103.
Behice Boran, Türkiye.60. Similarly, for Ahmet Samim, 1961 signalled, “Brave New 
Beginning,” Ahmet Samim, “The Left,” in Turkey in Transition, ed. Irwin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. 
Tonak (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1987), 155.
^  Çağlar Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,” in Turkey in Transition, ed. 
Irwin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 52.
Among others see, Hilmi özgen, Türk Sosyalizminin İlkeleri [The Principles of Turidsh 
SocialismXAnkara: Mars, 1%2); Cemil Sait Barlas, Sosyalistlik Yollan ve Türkiye Gerçeklikleri [The 
Ways of Socialism and the Realities of Turkey] (Istanbul, 1%2); Ali Faik Cihan, Sosyalist Türkiye [The 
Socialist TuıkeyKİstanbul: Toplum, 1965); Behice Boran, Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları [Turkey and the 
Problems of SocialismXlstanbul; Gün, 1%8); (^tin  Altan, Onlar Uyanırken- Türk Sosyalistlerinin El 
Kitabı [While They Awaken-The Turkish Socialists’ Handbook Xlstanbul; Ararat, 1%7).
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the private sector. The solutions they proposed were in fevor of state-dominated economic and 
political order that did not always bode well with liberal democratic ideals. The YÖN 
declaration, signed by prominent figures of intellectual life and many bureaucrats, wliich 
favored a statist economic development, is a good indicator of the extent to which the 
intellectual stage had been dominated by socialist and socialist inspired ideas. Alongside this 
radicalization, an increase, which can be interpreted as sign of desire for further political 
participation, was also observed the number of voluntary associations.
Table 5. Growth of Voluntary Associations’”
1950 Num. Percent 1960 Num. Percent 1968 Num. Percent
ECONOMIC
Employer assa - - 23 .1 190 .5
Agriculture assa 49 2.3 272 1.6 683 1.9
Labor Umons 91 4.2 408 2.4 995 2.6
Professional assa 53 2.4 189 1.1 259 .7
White Collar assa 166 7.6 665 3.9 2355 6.2
Artisans (esnaf) 253 11.7 2745 15.9 3670 9.7
Subtotal 612 28.2 4302 25.0 8152 21.3
CULTURAL
Social Welfare 208 9.6 635 3.7 1520 4.0
and charity
Sports 699 32.2 3376 19.6 5334 14.1
ReUgious-
mosque buiilding and 
preservation
142 6.5 4821 28.0 8419 22.3
Other reUgious 12 .6 283 1.6 2311 6.1
Culture 285 13.1 2511 14.5 6327 16.7
Beatification 102 4.7 853 5.0 4644 12.3
Subtotal 1448 66.7 12479 72.4 28555 75.5
OTHER
Foreigners and 
minorities
75 3.5 218 1.3 290 .8
Miscellaneous 36 1.7 230 1.4 809 2.1
TOTAL 2171 17229 37806
As the table shows beginning fi"om 1950 there was a steady increase in the number of 
voluntary associations fi'om 2171 in 1950 to 17229 in 1960 and to 37806 in 1968. Though it 
does not seem that 1960 was the turning point for the proliferation of voluntary associations as
Weiker, Modernization. ! T h e s e  figures derived fi'om Ahmet N. Yûcekök’s study of 
associations in Turkey is by no means non-contestable and must be looked at with care. But as a whole it 
gives a broad picture of the growth of voluntary associations. Ahmet Naki Yücekök, Türkiye ‘de Demek 
Gelişmeleri [The Development of Associations in Turicey ] (Ankara: AÜ SBF, 1972).
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many analysts implied, it is a fact that the post-1960 period was conducive to the proliferation 
of class-based associations, particularly labor unions and professional associations.** This is so 
despite the fact that table shows that the share of economic associations compared to the total 
number of associations declined from 28.2 in 1950 to 25.0 in 1960 and to 21.3 in 1968 due to 
phenomenal increases in the number of religious -mosque building and preservation- 
associations from 6.5 percent in 1950 to 28.0 percent in 1960 and to 22.3 in 1%8.
We shall later turn to the impact of this radicalization and increased assodational 
activity on both the student movement and on the emergence of ultra-nationalist movements, 
but these factors affected major parties no lesser degree. Responding to a rising wave of 
ideological ddjates the RPP adopted a “left of center” (ortanm solu) policy introduced in the 
eve of 1%5 election by İsmet İnönü himself*^ It was the beginning of a process of the RPP’s 
defection from the values that the army (the main partner in the center) held dear. The RPP 
leadership hoped that with left of center policy it would ensure the support of workers, 
intelligentsia and students.** Otherwise, İsmet İnönü, a veteran politician, did not seem to 
seriously entertain the idea that the RPP would be modeled on West European social democrat 
and-or socialist parties. For İnönü, left of center policy referred “to the RPP’s principles and 
party programs and its place on the right-left continuum. In no way is left of center policy 
outside the RPP’s six arrows. It can not be interpreted in a way that changes the effect of those 
principles. It can not be implemented as a new idea. The RPP is not a socialist party.”*'* But no 
to avail, as we shall dwell on below, left of center movement within the party would soon be 
channeled away from the direction that İnönü and his team wished, culminating in the victory
Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 163-164.
Kili, Halk Partisi. 211.
George S. Harris, “The Left in Turkey.” Problems o f  Communism. 29,4, 29.
^  Necip Mirkelamoğlu, İnönü Ecevit’i Anlatıyor [İnönü Talks about Eœvit] (İstanbul: Kerven, 1975), 
80. He also argued that “the left of center policy emerged when I used the term for clearer expression of the 
RPP’s principles. There is nothing in this policy which contradicts, or can not be explained, by the RPP’s 
basic principles.” Ibid., 119.
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of Bülent Ecevit whose interpretation of “left of center” policy was much close to various 
shades of left than İnönü.
İnönü’s this move, however, did not secure enough votes for the RPP to come to 
power. The 1965 election was undoubtedly, a victory for the JP. It had garnered away 52.' per 
cent of the vote (and 240 seats out o f450 in the lower assembly) while the RPP got only 28.7 
per cent of the vote (and 134 seats out o f450). Thus, only five years after the 27 May military 
intervention, another party claiming, however cautiously, to represent old DP constituency had 
come to power through the elections. Having said that one should not percave the JP as the 
exact replica of the old DP. In the changing social-political structure of Turicey what we have 
called political elites underwent momentous changes (both in their composition and ideology), 
too.
Ironically, the JP (founded in 11 February 1961) was led by General Ragip Gümüşpala, 
who had been chief of stafif after the 27 May coup, but then retired as part of the 
“rejuvenation” of the armed forces by the NUC. Expectedly, the party leadership was careful to 
downplay their aflSnities with the former DP. According to Ahmad “initially the JP enjoyed the 
full confidence of the military.” ”  At least their own men were leading the party. As time went 
on, however, rank and file membership and local organizations had begun to show a rather 
hostile attitude towards the military and 27 May intervention, which led to harsh threats from 
the leadership of the NUC. General Cemal Gürsel, for instance, once spoke in the constituent 
assembly arguing that “there are those who wish to revive the ex-DP with its old dangerous 
habits. They do not appreciate that they are playing with fire.”^^  It was even attacked several 
times by a group of youngsters in the name of protecting the 27 May “Revolution.”
With the unexpected death of General Gümüşpala in 1964, the party elected a new 
chairman Süleyman Demirel, who secured a resounding victory over his main rival Sadettin
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Bilgiç, who was believed to be a candidate of ex-DP hard-liners. Süleyman Demirel was a new 
man in Turkish politics. Bom in 1924 in a village in the province of İsparta, he was of peasant 
origin, who then rose to top through his abilities. He was capable technocrat who became the 
General Director of State Water Undertakings at the age of 32 in the DP period. He was 
known as “the King of Dams.” Though not as charismatic as Menderes, his peasant 
background (which he quite skillfiilly used to portray himself as the people’s man) combined 
with his proven administrative technocratic capabilities made him a symbol of “modernity and 
national authenticity.”*^  He was a leader with whom the ambitious rural migrant could identify 
himself as a symbol of self-made man,** and “the first entreprenair to lead a Turidsh 
government.”*’
The JP under Demirel’s leadership managed to assuage army’s fears about revival of 
old DP and thus achieved a modus vivendi with the armed forces at least in the short run.^ At 
times Demirel did not hesitate to pay tribute to the 27 May intervention and constitution that it 
brought.^' At other times, he spoke of the need to forget past controversies and to look ahead; 
“27 May Revolution (ihtilal) is a reality. Nations should look to, not their past, but the future. 
Let us leave aside setting the accounts of 27 May. Let us discuss now how to cure existing 
wounds. We should search for securing ‘unity and togetherness’ in the country in the shortest 
possible time.”^^  In power, Demirel always tried to assuage the fears of the army commanders
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İsmet Giriüi, “Turkey Since the 1%5 Elections.” Middle East Journal. 23, (1%9), 359 (pp-
60 Karpat, “Developments,” 363. Michael, P. Hyland, “Crisis at the Polls: Turkey’s 1%9
Elections."” Middle East Journal. 24, (1970), 5.
61 For instance, when reading his governments policies in the assembly ( in 1%5) Demirel spoke 
as following; “Before proceeding further into our government’s policies, I should make it clear that it is 
our unfailing objective to implement the (1961) Constitution with its words and spirit, which rest on the 
27 May revolution, and approved by national will.” Cited in Dağlı, Nurdan, Belma Aktüık. Hükümetler ve 
Programlan U, 1960-1980,2. Cilt [(jovemments and Their Programs II, 1960-1980, vol 2] (Ankara: TBMM, 
1988), 92.
62 Cited in Hulusi Turgut, Demirel’in Dünyası [The World of Demirel], vol 1 (İstanbul: ABC,
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regarding his party’s intentions. He provided virtual autonomy for the armed forces in their 
internal relations. He also tried to keep quiet about their intrusion into the civilian politics. The 
election of Chief of Staff Cevdet Sunay to the Presidency in 1966 was also part of this 
strategy.^^ In taking such course of action, Demirel appears to have learnt from vdiat he 
thought to be Menderes’ mistakes.^ The feet that he rejuvenated a movement whose leader 
had been hanged only four years earlier made him very cautious.^ ^ He was reported to have 
said that “(in Tuildsh history) forty-three Sadrazams had been executed alongside six Padişah” 
and was “ready to face this feet with dignity (vakar)” adding that “dignity does not mean 
voluntary acceptance” (vakar memnuniyet demek değildir).^ He also said that the specter of 
three hanged politicians were always in his mind.^ ^
In terms of the classification proposed by Duverger,* * the JP, like its predecessor, had 
more in common with “cadre” rather than “mass membership” parties.^ ^ It was also an
1992), 252.
“  For a detailed treatment of the JP’s relations with the army, Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, AP-Ordu 
İlişkileri, Bir İkilemin Anatomisi fThe JP-Army Relationships, An Anatomy of a Dilemma] (İstanbul: 
İletişim, 1993).
^  For an interesting article that elite political learning is key the success of the democracy, see 
Nancy Bermeo, “Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship.” Comparative Politics. 24,3 (1992), 276.
** A close aide, who worked both under Menderes and Demirel compared them; “Adnan Bey was 
a person who quickly got angry and flared up but afterwards tried to placate those. Demirel, by contrast, 
is a person who does not express his true feelings, does not react quickly, and does not say anything before 
its time is up. He is a man who does not decide quickly but, like a chess player take steps after careful 
considerations. In short he is careful, plarmed person. He is a mathematician, who does not leave 
anything to chance, who takes decisions late, but his decisions are grounded.” İhsan Sabri (j^ğlayangil. 
Anılarım [My Memoirs] (İstanbul; Güneş, 1990), 91.
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^  In the cadre model parties rely on small groups of activists and maintain only loose 
membership. Their activités are limited in scope and largely devoted to electoral mobilization. In the mass 
party model, however, parties rely on due paying members and maintain strong gross roots organisations. 
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“indirect” rather than a “direct” party in the sense that it was not established by, nor maintained 
formal links with trade or business unions or other associations. Its organizational structure, 
accordingly, showed characteristics of indirect, cadre parties. Not aiming to attract the votes of 
one segment of the society, nor the mobilization of the electorate, it did not heavily rely on the 
number and active participation of members who paid dues. It was in the election periods, if at 
all, that ordinary party members became active. Their activity, however, did not mean that they 
could exert significant pressure on leadership cadres. The power of the central organs-vis-a-vis 
local organizations was remarkable and dissidents found it difiScult to resist the party center’s 
demands. It then became a foregone conclusion that the small and very limited number of top 
cadres and political leader formulated policies, prepared the programs, determined party 
strategies and maintained strict party discipline.™ Indeed, especially after 1970 (when the rival 
fection left the party) the domination of its leader Süleyman Demirel became complete.^' Its 
links with social groups, consequently, remained weak and based on vertical relationships of 
clientelism and patronage. The party, it seemed, was interested more in exploiting advantages 
of being in power through party patronage than planned-intelligent articulation/aggregation of 
various diverse interests and formulation of concise, well-thought out policies for the country’s 
problems.™
Arsev Bektaş, Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980) [The Leadership 
Oligarchy in the Process of Democraüzation, the RPP and the JP, 1%1-1980] (Istanbul; Bağlam, 1993), 
137.
We do not have a comprehensive study (that takes into consideration cultural, institutional and 
economical factors) of why is the case. For an attempt that emphasized institutional aspects of the 
problem, see, Bektaş, Liderler.
” Bektaş, Liderler. 162. One JP MP was reported to have said “Süleyman Demirel never accepted 
that there could be rivals for his leadership position. It is out of question that he wanted to train a second, 
third or fourth man. He always wanted to be at the top alone.” Cited in Ibid., 166. See, also memoirs by 
ex-JP dissidents, who criticized him for lack of intra-party democracy. Mehmet Turgut, Siyasetten 
Portreler [Portraits From PoliticsKİstanbul; Boğaziçi, 1991); Kamran İnan, Siyasetin İçinden [inside 
Politics], third ed. (İstanbul; Milliyet, 1995).
This feature, too, is not unique to Tuik^, but was observed in the majority of developing 
countries as well as in some developed countries. See, Vicky Randall, “Conclusion,” in Political Parties 
in Third World, ed. Vicky Randall (London; Sage, 1988), 185 flf.
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Like its predecessor DP, the IP’s ideology, too, did not oppose the basic tenets of 
secular republican ideas, despite the fact it was frequently presented and perceived as such. 
Demirel claimed that Atatürk had stated two basic principles. That “sovereignty belonged to 
the nation without any limitations” and that “The Turkish nation shall reach a contemporary 
level of civilization.” The Justice Party, according to Demirel, was the result of the first 
principle as it made this principle its motto. We have seen in the second chapter that Celal 
Bayar, too, had argued along similar lines. The second principle, Demirel continued, was 
embedded in the DP-JP tradition since they all made socio-economic development their 
priority. In other words, the ideal of “Great Turkey, (whose distinguishing mark is economic 
development) was nothing but what Atatürk had in mind when he spoke of reaching the 
contemporary level of civilization.”^  Economic development, Demirel believed, was only one 
facet of the contemporary level of civilization. To value an individual for being an individual 
and to give it a voice in social and political life was an equally important aspect of Western 
civilization. In his words, “our understanding, which values people highly, is nothing but what 
Atatürk had in mind when he spoke of Western Civilization.”’  ^ He added that “the real 
Atatürkism is the acceptance of Western life and governing styles.”’*
In arguing this line Demirel was not on insecure grounds, unless we regard Atatürkism 
as an ideology in the Shilsian sense. As we indicated in the second chapter. Celal Bayar had 
argued along the same lines. The basic difference between Atatürk and the DP-JP tradition on 
the issue of sovereignty was that the latter placed great stress upon competitive elections 
through which the nation expressed its preferences, thus exercising sovereignty, while Atatürk 
did not in his lifetime. But, it is hard to claim that Atatürk did wish not to have competitive 
elections all the way along. On the second principle, too, the JP leaders were justified for
Süleyman Demirel, Oniki Mart ve Sonrast-îkinci Kitap [12 March and Its Aftermath-The 
Second Book KAnkara: Ayyildiz, 1972), 50. Demiiel would add the third principle of Atatürk that is the “use 
of reason” in achieving the first two goals, see, Süleyman Demirel, 1971 Buhranı ve Aydınlığa Doğru [The 1971 
Crisis and the Way Out] (Ankara; Doğuş, 1973), 67.
74 Süleyman Demirel, Büyük Türkiye [Great Turkey] (İstanbul; Dergah, 1977), 75. 
Demirel, Buhran. 352.
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having such an interpretation since Atatürk did not advocate command economy and since he 
wanted Turkey to take its place in the western club of nations.
Though, it was frequently accused of tolerating (encouraging) religious reactionism, 
the JP leaders were careful to emphasize the party’s secular nature. In the first place, Demirel 
made clear his opposition to some policies of the one-party period. He argued that Turkey did 
not experience a genuine free atmosphere regarding freedom of religion and conscience (din ve 
vicdan hürriyeti). In his view, “freedom of religion and conscience (in Turkey) oscillated from 
one extreme to other - from suppression to exploitation of religious feelings-.”’® Criticizing 
some ultra-secularists, he complained that there had been many people who thought that 
Turkey would fell into the hands of reactionaries “even by mentioning the word of Allah.””  
Having said that, Demirel had much common with the traditional. Republican approach to the 
Islam. He was content with the view that the state should control religious education, which 
would obviously have contradicted with the principle of laicism in the traditional sense. He 
argued that “it is clear (under Republican principles) that, if left unchecked, rdigious life could 
risk the principle of laicism.”’* Because, otherwise religious education would be provided by 
those who had no intention of exploiting religious sentiments for political ends. He reiterated 
the view that like army and schools, mosques too should not be involved in politics, while 
there should be respect for religious beliefs and conducts of the citizen. That meant, as Cizre- 
Sakalhoğlu put it, excluding “İslam from the public sphere by declaring it irrelevant for political 
and economic development.” Therefore, the claim that the JP was aimed at encouraging anti­
secular opposition to the Republic is less than convincing, despite the feet that it attracted (and
Demirel, Büyük. 106.
’’ Ibid., 107. Also, Demirel, Anayasa. 36-8. Here Demirel spoke of the need to remove article 
163 of the Turkish Criminal Law, which prohibited the propaganda and establishment of a religious state. 
According to critics, this article has been used to hinder even non-political activités (pertaining to 
worship) of the muslim population.
78 Ibid., 104.
Omit Cizre-Sakalhoglu, “Religion-State Interaction in Republican Turkey.” International 
Journal o f Middle East Studies. 28. (1996), 240.
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provided for a place) those who seemed to oppose the secular Republic “  Indeed, it is probably 
the case that this soft attitude towards religion provided a firmer guarantee of stability for 
secularism in the long nm.
On economic and social matters the JP was what Otto Kircheimer called a catch all­
party.** The JP leaders were aware that in order to win as many votes as possible the party 
must “represent different and sometimes contradictory interests and aggregate them into policy 
packages acceptable to as many groups as possible.”*^  The party refused to commit itself 
either ideologically to any “isms” or defended specifically interest of one group. As Demirel put 
it “(the JP) are not dependent on any class. We are the nation with its peasants, formers, 
workers, artisans and merchants. As the JP we shall defend the rights of all these classes.” ^
In another place he argued that the path they had chosen;
is neither capitalist nor socialist It is a model ofgiowth (within the limits of the Turkish constitution) 
that is based on mixed economy and that accepts private pn^rty  and private enterprise while 
accqrdng the redistribution of national wealth according to a plan geared to the nations’ needs. It is a 
iTKxIel of growth that was directed nations needs and reahties. Why should we a doctrine ?*''
The Party, then, preferred a “mixed economy” in which the state would be active in
It is known that the JP leadership sought the support of some Tarikats and Islamic movements. 
Responding to that, tarikats and Islamic movements (some of whose opposition to secular republic is also 
open to debate) openly supported the JP. Indeed, the chief representative of the “Siileymana” movement, 
Kemal Kaçar, son-in-law of movements’ founder Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, was a member of parliament 
with the Justice Party ticket until the 1980. An influential Islamist poet-writer Necip Fazıl beatifully 
explained why they supported Demirci, which revealed that far from being seen as their own men he was 
best among those available for their ends; “(We like him) Not because he made believers happy through 
any concrete action, but because he made infidels burst through his inaction. Not because he is the 
person we are waiting for, but because he is not the person we are afraid of, and he does not hurt or 
disturb, the climate which would allow the person we eagerly wait to come.” Cited in Abdullah Uraz, 
Baba [The FatherKAnkara: Eka, 1992), 174.
Otto Kircheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems,” in Political 
Parties and Political Development, ed. Joseph La Palambora and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1%5).
Avner Levi, “The Justice Party, 1%1-1980,” in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, ed. 
Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 140.
^  Ahmad, Experiment.23%.
Demirel, Büyük. 191. Note how closely Demirel’s speeches resemble the Republican principle 
of halkçılık whose motto was “we are a nation with no class distinctions.”
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those areas which were not undertaken by the private sector and which could only be 
performed by the state. It put great stress upon public investments as a means for the creation 
of “Great Turkey.” Demirel argued that in Turkey the state will have to invest in infrastructure 
(meaning roads, ports, airports, railways) upon which industry could be built.**
Like many catch-all parties, Demirel, too, advocated a social welfere state. *^  He argued 
that in addition to “classical state functions, the contemporary state is charged socio-economic 
tasks and responsibilities.”*’ He defrned the social welfare state as “a state which has important 
roles to play in economic and social development, a state \^ c h  has a r^^Jatory, directive, 
service and helping tasks so as to arrive at welf^e and a peace society.” ** According to 
Demirel, the social welfare state requires the state; to provide equal opportunities for 
everybody, to provide minimum life standards for every citizen, and to secure just income 
distribution. *^  He defended social welfere state not only because it was a proven vote-catcher 
electorally but also because he wanted to protect his party against the leftist charge that it was 
serving solely to upper classess.’® In so doing, he was also influenced by the traditional 
Ottoman-Turkish conception of the fether state. His peasant background made him sensible to 
the sufferings of the masses expressed in his speech “poverty is the biggest cruelty. 
According to Demirel, “to deal with poverty, desperation, and misery is in the nature of the 
state. One of the most significant tasks of the modem state is this.” ^  Besides, Demirel
85 Ibid.,263.
According to Karpat, “Demirel’s views are probably closer to a moderate form of social 
democracy than genuine capitalism.” Kemal H. Karpat, Social and Political Thought in the Middle East, 
revised and enlarged edition, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (New Yoric: Praeger, 1982), 396
Süleyman Demirel, 1973 'e Bakarken fThe Glance at the year 1973 ] (Ankara; n .d ), 107.
Demirel, Büyük 24-5.
“'Ibid.
He argued that ”by defending the welfare of the masses I forestalled the charge that can be used 
against us.” Cited in Turgut, Demirel.324.
Nimet Arzik, Demirel’in İçi Dıçı [Demirel in His all Aspect] (İstanbulıMilliyet, 1985), 49.
^  Ibid. 49. When asked what the one policy area was, of which he felt most proud, Demirel
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expected the social state to soften class struggles, thus help achieve social peace and harmony. 
In those democratic countries which accepted the existence of the private sector, Demirel 
argued, “there is a need for state intervention, first to increase the national product and second 
to secure peace and welfere for the working masses, which necessitates regulatory and 
conciliatory state intervention.” But Demirel, somewhat contradicting himself emphasized 
that the social welfere state required the “reduction of various restrictions regarding individual 
freedoms and economic activities.” ^  What he meant by this, we think, is that he was criticizing 
those who tended to see the ideal of mixed economy as the imposition of a strict plan. As 
Demirel put it “the plan is not something that is sharp and inflexible, a jacket to be worn as it is 
cut out. We do not share the view that use the plan for irresponsibility, inaction or the ©reuse 
of turning one’s back to the people’s real needs.”
When we turn our attention to how these ideas were translated into policy practices, 
we observe a close relation between these ideas and the economic policies of the JP that are 
based heavily on party patronage. Like its predecessor, the JP quite skilliully used patronage to 
ensure support. While rural party machine characteristics were dominant in the DP, the JP, in 
accordance with increasing urbanization, tended to have urban party machine^ characteristics. 
Available research’’ indicates that the JP directed its efforts toward securing the support of 
migrants through patronage. It did took the forms of securing employment in public sector.
pointed out his party’s decision to provide a minimum income for those who were older than 65 years of 
age. Ibid., 47.
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tolerating- legalizing and the building of gecekondu’s or demolishing them by strict 
implementation of law, allocating municipal services on the basis of party loyalties and like.^ 
The IP’s pragmatic ideology and cross-class support it secured can, thus, be better understood 
if we take into consideration party patronage. For instance, the JP was less than enthusiastic 
regarding planning not so much because of their belief in the intrinsic values of the market and 
inherent weaknesses of state intervention, but because it was likely to limit their prerogatives 
for patronage.
Relations with the armed forces was one era in which the JP differed sharply from the 
DP. We have noted above that the JP had shown the utmost care so as to present an image 
acceptable to the army. But it is also necessary to review changes in the army’s outlook 
regarding the JP. The period of 1961-1971 was the period of struggle within the army, struggle 
between those who subscribed the Jacobinist interpretations of AtaturJdsm (ranging from 
desire for personalized dictatorship to heavily controlled economy and society) and those who, 
while staying in the same paradigm, did not subscribe such views. The radicalized atmosphere 
of post-1961 put the danger of “socialism-communism” on the agenda of the army, as a 
problem that needed urgent attention since senior commanders suspected that communists 
were trying to infiltrate the ranks of the armed forces. The army’s opposition to leftist- 
communist movements was one policy area that the army and the JP at least seemed to share. 
When President Cevdet Sunay declared that the constitution was closed to socialism, the JP 
applauded it. It also supported the chief of general staff Cental Tural, who issued a circular 
recommending the book, entitled “Methods for Struggling With Communism” to be read by 
the armed forces. Convergence on anti-communism was not, however, enough to dispel the 
army’s doubts regarding the JP. The struggle within the army (between the moderates and 
radicals yearning for reformist government) was yet unfinished. The amnesty issue (of the ex- 
DP members) refused to go away. But still, it appears that the army’s view of the JP was much
^  Alongside this rather traditional forms of patronage, commensurate with industrialization and new 
import substitution strategy, there appears to have developed new forms of patronage where businessmen used 
pohtical contacts to secure benefits. It is true that that form was not new, but because of the increase in the 
niunber of businessmen with industrialization, it became more wide^read.
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more fevorable than the DP’s had ever been throughout its life except the few years in the early 
fifties.
The proportional system of representation and the permissive atmosphere of the 1961 
constitutional order accompanied by the changes in social structure affected not only the m^or 
parties but paved the way to the emergence of both socialist-inspired movements and also 
ultra-nationalist and fiindamentalist religious parties. Amongst those newly established parties, 
the Turkish Workers Party, (established in 13 FdDiuary 1961) was the first legal socialist party. 
Earlier (10 August 1960) General Cemal Giirsel, the leader of the NUC, had declared that 
providing it did not have “ill-intentions” he would permit the establishment of a socialist 
party.^ Established by the trade unionists, the party did not have much appeal at the beginning. 
It is only v^ dien the respected former academic Mehmet Ali Aybar became the leader of the 
party, that it began to attract wider audience.
It is hard to read too much into its proclaimed program as legal constraints must have 
severely limited its founders regarding their real intentions. But it is posable to say that TWP 
did not advocate the dictatorship of the proletariat while “it was socialist and pro-Soviet in a 
peace movement feshion.”'“® As Lipovsky remariced in the beginning neither the party charter 
nor program mentioned the word “socialist”, an anathema word for many in Turkey.'”* The 
party made “the fiill implementation of the constitution”'”^  its motto. This allowed them to 
advocate socialist ideas while staying in the homework of the constitution. The party leadership 
defended a third way, not as distinct from both capitalism and socialism but as a “transitional 
period” from capitalism to socialism.'”^  While what the third way necessitated remained 
ambiguous, it would not be misleading to say that its most concrete policy offering was the
99 Ahmad, Experiment.22\.
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nationalization of various industries and control of the private sector through “obligatory” 
plans, and state-led industrialization. Though small in its organization and support at the level 
of v o t e r s , i t  was disproportionately influential in spreading socialist ideas within the 
intelligentsia and student community. It would not be wrong to suggest that, for the first time, 
the TGNA witnessed the emergence of an openly ideological (bordering on an anti-system 
proportions) party.
The Nationalist Action Party, headed by Alparslan Tiirke§, Turkey’s first legal ultra­
nationalist party, emerged in post-1961 era. Bom in Cypms, Tiirke§ was the strong man of the 
27 May intervention. Not only he had been involved in the preparations for the intervention 
coup but also he assumed a prominent role in the post-coup administration. He was known to 
have favored prolonged military rule so as to complete socio-economic reform. But no to avail, 
his views was apparently rejected by the other leaders of the NUC. Tiirke§ and other 13 
members of the NUC were given jobs abroad on November 1960. This group was fer fi'om 
united in their aims and did not speak with one voice. When they returned to the country, many 
of them found a place in different political parties. Tiirke§ entered into Republican Peasant 
Nation Party (RPNP). In 1965 he seized the control ofRPNP, getting himself elected as leader.
The new RPNP ideology was developed through the works of Turkey (which would 
change its name Nationalist Action Party -NAP- in 1969) and other party ideologues. As 
Karpat perceptively noted nationalist resurgence was to be related with the opposition to leftist 
social currents.’*’* It was “defensive and conservative in character’ prone to perceive social 
ideas as being “communistic and subversive” and suggesting instead a return to traditional 
virtues found in history.'“  The NAP opposed both capitalism and socialism as foreign 
ideologies. Instead it proposed “a third way” whose basic principle was to be “everything is for
At its peak (at the 1%5 general elections), the party managed to gamer 3 % of the vote (about 
276.000) getting 15 MP’s eleaed to the assembly. Afterwards it came nowhere closer to that point.
Kemal H.Karpat, “Ideology in Turkey after the Revolution of 1960 -Nationalism and 
Socialism,” in Social Change and Politics in Turkey - A Structural Historical Analysis (Leiden; Brill, 
1973), 335.
106 Ibid., 335.
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the Turkish nation, toward the Turk and according to the Turk.”*”^  In an effort to combine best 
of both worlds, Türkeş offered his theory called “dokuz ışık” (nine lights).**^ * These nine lights 
which were supposed to guide the nationalist movement were; nationalism (milliyetçilik), 
idealism (ülkücülük), moralism (ahlakçılık), scientism (ilimcilik), socialism (toplumculuk), 
peasantism (köycülük), freedom and individualism (hürriyetçilik ve şahsiyetçilik), 
developmentalism and populism (gelişmecilik ve halkçılık), industrialism and technologism 
(endüstricilik ve teknikçilik). Though rejecting racism (based on Turkish race) at a formal level 
(party programs and electoral manifestos), the NAP leaders and afiBliated publications did use 
racist themes quite frequently.’*’’ Realizing that the Turkish electorate was more receptive to 
religious sentiments than ideology, it also tried to ^peal to Islamic sentiments in order to 
enhance its electoral fortunes.’”  The NAP also established (or seized the control of) many 
afiSliated youth organizations and occupational interest groups such as Ülkücü Gençlik Demeği 
(Idealist Youth Association-IYA), Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation 
of Nationalist Trade Unions-CNTU), Ülkücü Polisler Birliği or Polis Birliği (idealist Police 
Union-IPU). As we shall see in the next chapters, the party had a disproportionate (regarding 
its electoral strength) effect in the Turkish politics. Its affiliated organizations were quite 
prepared to engage in illegal acts against the left but also they were quite successful in 
penetrating supposedly impartial state institutions through their membership in National Front 
(1975-1977) governments.
Apart from socialist and ultra-nationalists, Islamists, also took their place in Turkey’s
Cited Mehmet Ali Ağaoğullan, “The Ultranationalist Right,” in Turkey in Transition, ed. 
Invm C.Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 194. Note the 
resemblance with the Italian fascist Gentile’s dictum that “Eveiything for the state; nothing against the 
state; nothing outside the state.”
Alparslan Türkeş, 9 Işık ve Türkiye [The Nine Lights and Turkey] (Ankara: Emel, 1979). For 
a sophisticated discussion of the ideology of the NAP and its relations with the political traditions of 
Kemalism, see. Omit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, “The Ideology and Poliücs of the Nationalist Action Party of 
Turicey.” C.EM.O.T.1. 13, (1992).
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Ağaoğullan, “ultranaüonalist,” 197. 
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, “Nationalist Action,” 147-8.
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increasingly ideological political landscape of the late sixties. The National Order Party (NOP) 
was founded in January 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, a professor of engineering and the head 
of the Turkish Union of Chambers (TUC). Though it was shut down by the constitutional 
court in May 1971, it reappeared (as National Salvation Party) in October 1972. Like all parties 
from TWP to NAP, the party had two discourses, one for oflBcial and one for daily use. 
Assessed by its party program, the party put the emphasis on moral development, which was 
understood as respect for human rights and freedoms, values and history of Turkish society and 
private property. It supported secularism and the freedom of religion and conscience. It also 
put great stress on the establishment of national heavy industry, and the elimination of 
inequalities. The party opposed what it called capitalist big business and opposed Turkey’s 
relations with the then European Economic Association (EEC), instead supporting planned 
development informed by “Milli Gbru§”(National View). It severely criticized Turkey’s 
Westernization policies and offered to return to authentic (Turkish-Islamic) values and 
traditions. Apart from official documents, the party ideology was rather more clearly expressed 
by its leaders and ideologues. A study of these discourses presented an the image of the party 
which tended to use stem anti-Republican (alongside anti-western and anti-semitic) rhetoric 
that bordered on anti-system proportions."’ It was also observed that, in line with Turkish 
political traditions, the party’s demands for freedoms were only for those who thought 
similarly."^ Like the NAP it truly began to play a role after the 1973 elections in which it 
became third biggest party in the parliament.
Even though, like the JP and the RPP, these political parties’ links with the social 
groups remained weak and they too, to a much lesser extent, tended to have cross-class 
support, the impact of changes in social structure had put its imprint on these parties. The way 
in which the emergence of these parties was closely related to changes in social stmcture can 
be seen, when we look at wkich segments of the society these parties have drawn support
See, for such an analysis, Tinker Alkan, “The National Salvation Party in Turkey,” in Islam 
and Politics in the Middle East, ed. Metin Heper and Israeli Raphael (London; Groom Helm, 1984), 91.
Ali Yaşar Sanbay, Türkiye’de Modernleşme Din ve Parti Politikası -MSP Отек Olayı 
[Modernization, Religion and Party Politics in Tuikey -The NSP Case] (Istanbul; Alan, 1985), 210.
157
from. The TWP drew its support mainly from socialist leaning intelligentsia and some of the 
newly emerged working class as well as and some migrants living in Gecekondu’s, segments of 
society that are product of Turkey’s industrialization-urbanization process. The NAP and the 
NSP, despite their somewhat divergent bases of support, seemed to have attracted those small 
businessmen and artisans or, more broadly, those who have threatened by the emergence of 
industrialization and big business which have tended to support the JP. It was also the case that 
both these parties disproportionately draw support from less-developed parts of the country.“  ^
It goes without saying that changes in social structure were not the only factor in such a 
multiplication of parties. The political fectors -state elites’ receptivenes to socialism, the 
permissive atmosphere of the 1961 constitutiorr, the reinvigoration of ultra-nationalism as 
reaction to socialism, the decision of the JP leaders’ not to tolerate Islamist erctremists in their 
own ranks -all played decisive roles. It was rather the complex encounter and irrteraction of all 
these factors that'determined the parameters of politics in that period.
33. THE 12 MARCH INTERLUDE
To repeat, the post-1961 p>eriod ushered in a new era in Turkish politics. Changes both 
in the composition of the state elites in interaction with the modernization process that gained 
pace as well as the impact of the 1%1 constitutional order have all contributed their imprint. In 
this new era new social-political forces tended to flourish, the previous alliances began to 
dissolve, perceptions of various political actors of themselves and others underwent critical 
changes. It was a period of remaking and realignment of various socio-political forces. The 
RPP, the staunchest ally of the military, and the chief state elite, were beginning to move 
towards the left, whilst the army began to appreciate how dangerous junior level radicalism 
might be. The army also seriously worried about a perceived advance of socialist ideas in its 
previous allies; intellectuals-academics, students, and the RPP. Whilst its anti-communism 
alienated this community, it also created a basis of convergence with the JP. Meanwhile the JP,
113 Ibid., 104.
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the main successor of the old DP, also underwent a period of renovation. It was much more 
careful with its relations with the military. It was much less associated (in the eyes of the army 
high command) with anti-secularism, economic mismanagement and dependence on foreign 
power as the DP once had been. In addition to these changes in the previous parties and 
political actors, the post-1961 political order, in which politicization and radicalism dominated 
the intellectual climate, also paved the way for the emergence of both socialist-inspired 
movements and parties alongside the ultra-nationalist and islamist ones.
In the face of these changes, the crucial question was whether the Turkish political 
system, already crippled by the serious constraints deriving from its state tradition and 
traditional social structure undergoing modernization, would be able to adjust itself to these 
changes which themselves provided new constraints and offered opportunities, and maintain 
the democratic system of government."“* The answer would turn out to be no as the country 
approached the 12 March military intervention to which we now turn. This intervention is 
significant because the military’s justifications for the intervention is similar to its justifications 
for the 12 September intervention. In that sense, the 12 September intervention was the result 
of similar patterns that led to military intervention in 1971, but this time “on a much larger and 
more alarming scale.”'"
The 1965 elections provided a clear majority for the JP. Demirel soon formed a 
government. During his first government, the Turkish economy was in the midst of what 
economists called “an easy phase” of import substitution. Tired of political instability, 
business community and international economic agencies welcomed the government. Boosted 
by such confidence, the Turkish economy achieved a respectable rate of growth, low inflation
ismet Giritli had similarly noted that “ ...Turkey is headed for a time of trouble in which its 
political authorities are going to have to cope with an uiueasonable revolution of rising material 
expectations on the part of the majority, an equally unreasonable revolution of utopian-spritual 
expectations on the part of the a significant majority, along with a general breakdown of individual and 
social discipline.” Giritli, “Turkey,” 363.
Ergun Ozbudun, “Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations,” in Politics in 
Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences With Democracy, sec.ed. ed. Larry Diamond, Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Juan J.Linz (Boulder, London: Lyrme Rieimer, 1995), 236.
1)6 Çağlar Keyder, “democracy”, 48.
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and unemployment. While considerable economic advances took place, the country’s political 
life was far from stable. Ideological polarization within the political actors grew by each passing 
day. Thanks to the system of proportional representation, the TWP managed to gain 15 seats in 
the TGNA with 3 percent of the vote. They were quite vocal and instrumental in heightening 
the tension in the country. With their increasingly anti-communist stance, the Justice Party 
MP’s particularly were not prepared to tolerate socialist ideas at the National Assembly 
level."’ Apart from the TWP, the left of center movement in the RPP gained momentum 
towards the left. Party’s Secretary General Bülent Ecevit emerged as the leader of the 
movement. Bülent Ecevit’s pamphlet entitled “The Left of Center” contained ideas which 
were, in many ways, an anathema to İnönü and old vanguard of the party. Impressed by the 
TWP’s electoral advance and the students’ and intellectuals’ alienation from the RPP, Ecevit 
appears to have thought that the RPP could come to power only if it appealed to workers, 
peasants and socialist inspired intellectuals. Though the struggle between Ecevit and the old 
guard would continue until the 1973 party congress in which Ecevit won the party leadership, 
his distinct interpretation of the left of center movement presented an image of a party that is 
tom by internal conflicts.
Meanwhile prevalent politicization was spreading into the universities. Encouraged by 
the fact that they had played a critical role in throwing out the DP government, students wished 
to remain always on center stage."* Indeed there existed a tradition of student involvement in 
state affairs. The distinguished place the Ulema had had in the Ottoman Empire provided a 
rather somewhat privileged place for both educational institutions and their students. Already in 
the late 18th and 19th centuries riots and demonstrations by the Medrese students (softas) had 
thrown the country into the ch aos .Wi th  the establishment of the Republic, students’ self-
In his memoirs. Çetin Altan, was an MP from the TWP, exemplifies the prevailing 
athmosphere of the TGNA. Çetin Altan, Ben Milletvekili İken [When I was a Member of Parliament] 
(Ankara; Bilgi, 1971).
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styled role perception was reinforced. Kemal Atatürk had called on Turkish Youth to watch 
over the secular Republic and the independence of Turkey. What Landau^^ called 
“nationalistic education” through which students were immersed in Atatüric’s dictum, had 
sharpened their tendency to participate in political afl&irs. Student action in the sixties, 
however, was different from fifties and before. First of all, there were an increase in the number 
of students enrolled for education.
Table 6. Number of University Students, Selected Years'^ *
Years Numbers
1960-61 65.297
l%2-63 70.649
1964-65 84.335
1966^7 108.637
1968-69 140.000
l%9-70 147.175
1970-71 169.793
As observed from the table, student numbers increased by nearly twofold in a decade. 
Meanwhile, educational facilities (which were hardly satisftictory in the fifties anyway) could 
not keep up with increasing demands, afiecting the quality of education negatively. Students 
were quick to seize the issue of low quality of education as an opportunity to protest. The 
quality of education was not the only reason. Many youngsters from smaller towns and cities 
who came to study in Ankara and Istanbul experienced cultural dislocation, alongside the 
growing concerns about their future.'^ All these fectors significantly contributed to the volatile 
atmosphere in the universities attracted youngsters to various ideologies offering magic 
solutions.
International Relations. (1964), 83.
Jacob M.Landau, Radical Politics in Modem Turkey (Leiden; Brill, 1974), 30.
T.C Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Ensütüsü, Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 
50 Yılı [50 Years of Social and Economic Development in Turicey] (Ankara; DİE, 1973), 466. Figure 
includes students both in universiues and other insütutions of higher learning.
Sabri Sayan and Bruce Hoffmann, “Urbanization and Insurgency; The Turkish Case, 1976- 
1980.” v4 Rand Note, N 3228-USDP, (no date), 8.
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Prior to the 1960’s, apart from scathy references to Atatürk and laicism, ideology was 
largely absent. It was widely believed that once the DP government was overthrown, all of 
sudden, eveiything would change for the better. As one student leader remarked in his memoirs 
they were supporting the DP (in pre-1960 era) without any logically sustained arguments. It 
was more like supporting a “football club.”*  ^ Post-1961 student movements, on the other 
hand, were much more ideological and militant. Abadan notes that the nature of statements 
issued by student organizations radically changed after the 27 May 1960 intervention. 
Prior to 27 May these statements “were more of an indicative nature, carrying only the 
only purpose to inform public opinion.” After that date, however, statements were “much 
more dynamic, requesting quick action, containing warnings and some times even 
threats.”’^ * Parallel to the general popularity of socialism in the intellectual community, an 
increasing number of students appeared to have been attracted certain socialist ideals, however 
superficial their understanding of socialism might be.^^ Not only because there was now a 
stock of ideological material available to them, but also because the political climate both inside 
and abroad was in fevor of such militanisation (on the line with leftist tendencies) of the 
movement. Apart from the Johnson letter, which angered the Turkish public as weU as the 
students, American invasion of Vietnam in 1965 further fueled student radicalism. Besides, 
there were available idols whom could be imitated by excited youngsters. Che Guevara 
exemplified the romantic guerrilla movement in Bolivia in 1967, and, of course, 1968 student 
movements across the world. As Samim observed, students in Istanbul “began to occupy their 
campuses as soon as word reached them of the Sorbonne takeover.”
Harun Karadeniz, Olaylı Yıllar ve Gençlik [The Turhulenl years and the Youth], eight ed. 
(İstanbul; Belge, 1995), 11. (first published in 1971)
124 Abadan, “Youth”, 90.
125 Ibid.
özer Ozankaya, Üniversite öğrencilerinin Siyasal Yönelimleri [The Political Tendencies of 
University Students ] (Ankara; Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınlan, 1966), 35.
127 ,Samim, “left”, 157.
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Despite the parallels with the students movements in Europe and America, the Turidsh 
student movements displayed unique features of its own. While (compared to its Turkish 
counterparts) well-to-do students in the West reacted against the social and political order 
arguing that it created alienation and “The One-dimensional Man” Herbert Marcuse portrayed, 
Turkish students were rather more interested in “national independence,” “economic 
development,” and stringent “anti-Americanism.” Whilst their counterparts questioned 
(rejected) values of their own society, Turkish students appears to have been highly affected by 
the values of traditional Turkish society. For instance, their anti-Americanism was bred as 
much from concern with national independence as from American soldiers’ behavior in Turkey 
rather than a sophisticated critique of American way of life and values that underlied it.
This student activism were soon to lead to fateful consequences for political instability. 
It had began with sincere protests and boycotts confined the campuses. Later on, it involved 
student-police clashes, and damages to property. The most publidzed student actions of the 
period were; student-police clashes in which one student were killed in July 1968; the burning 
down of US Ambassador’s car in Middle East Technical University in January 1969. More 
significantly, leftist militant radicalism soon generated a reaction from ultra-nationalist youth 
groups (most of them affiliated with the NAP) who were quite prepared to use violent means 
under the banner of anti-communism. What was known as “Bloody Sunday” (16 January 
1969) (in which right-wing student groups attacked left-wing students who were protesting the 
American 6. Fleet’s visit to Turkey) was the first of the its kind in which two students were 
killed, and 114 injured. And finally, this student movement nurtured its own guerrillas, who, 
unlike earlier student leaders, believed that only way to change the regime was through the 
armed struggle. The continous charge'”  that the JP was blocking reforms that the constitution
Karadeniz’s memoirs is telling in this respect; “(In 1968 June ) We were afraid of going out. 
But there was a hotel near to our student hostel where American soldiers, accompanied by Tuiidsh girls, 
could easily enter. This was repeated many times and students witnessed it. Meanwhile the police (who 
quietly watched when American soldiers took Turkish girls to the hotel) were arresting student friends of 
us who have done nothing. These were terrible events to drive mad even those youngsters who had no 
ideological leanings.” Karadeniz, Gençlik. 109.
The YÖN movement and associated writers have argued that democracy as it was practicised 
in Tuikey, would bring only reactionary conservative forces to power. And that because of this, Turkey
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envisaged and that there did not seem to be a socialist party coming to power through elections 
were significant factors in pushing adventurist students to the illegal organizations that aimed 
for armed struggle. Usually violent clashes between conflicting student groups involved the 
danger of spreading out into other segments of the society. It created an image of a 
government which was unable to deal with increasing chaos in the universities.
The worker movements were not immune to (or spared fi'om) increasing mobilization 
and politicization. The founding of Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Organization 
(CRWU) as a split fi’om pragmatist Confederation of Turkish Workers Union (CTWU) in 
1967, was an indicator of the degree to which workers movement had been politicized. As 
stated in the program the chief aim of the CRWU was to defend the woricers rights. It would 
do so through its endeavor towards the attainment of “revolutionary essence” (which would 
ensure radical transformations as envisaged in the constitution) by the Turkish working class.
As to the increasing mobilization of the workers, table 7. shows that beginning fi’om 1963, 
when the right to strike was permitted by law, the number of unionized woilcers, number of 
strikes and workdays lost in these strikes increased considerably.
would enjoy neither economic growth nor socio-economic equality. Turkish democracy, according to their 
view, was a “pretty or Philippines” democracy. See, özdemir. Yön.
See, for a detailed treatment, Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, “Labour and State in Turkey: 1960- 
m O .” Middle Eastern Studies. 28, 4 (1992), 717, 721.
Cited in Kemal Sülker, 100 Soruda, Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri [Woricer Movements in 
Turkey in 100 (^estions] (Istanbul; (jerçek, 1976), 147.
Indirstrial irruest usually accompranied by violent clashes between workers and security forces 
in which injirries and even death have taken place. See, Kemal Sülker, “(üumhırriyet Dönemi İşçi 
Hareketleri,”[Worker Movements in the Republican Period] Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 
cilt 7, (İstanbul; İletişim, 1983), 1846-7.
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Table 7. Trade Union Activity133
Years Number of
muons
Number of 
members
Number of 
agreement
Number of 
strikes
Number of 
workers in 
strike
Workdays
lost
1948 73 52.000
1950 88 76.000
1955 363 190.000
1960 432 283.000
1%3 565 2%.000 96 1.514 19.739
1%5 668 360.000 871 46 6.593 336.836
1970 717 2.088.000 1.516 111 25.%3 260.338
Thus, the late sixties witnessed a heavily politicized country in which strikes by the 
workers, marches and boycotts by the students, and violent clashes between rival political 
factions became widespread. In the fece of such social-political unruliness, the JP government 
appeared to be ineflfective. Though the JP was, again, the clear winner of the 1969 election, 
doubts began to occur regarding its ability to govern the increasingly politicized country. It 
may seem paradoxical that the ability of a government, that garnered away 46.5 per cent of the 
vote and 256 seats of out 450 in the lower assembly in the elections that held a couple of 
months earlier, to govern came to be questioned. This paradox is closely related to Turkey’s 
being a state society. In state societies the votes might not always count as powerfully as in 
stateless societies.
In the first place, Demirel’s position in his own party began to be seriously questioned. 
Powerful factions within the JP had again surfeced and Demirel could not contain dissidents in 
the pa r t y .On ly  four months (11 February 1970) after his election triumph Demirel was
Weiker, Modemization.iS. As Weiker himself indicated, there are, unfortunately, many 
widely varying figures on these items. Mehmet Şehmus Güzel, for instance, provides two different 
accounts. One these, prepared by ministry of labor, estimates the number of strikes at 72 and workdays 
lost in 1970 as 220.189. While the other prepared by International Labor Organisation estimates the 
number of strikes as 112 and workdays lost as 241.200 for same year. See, Mehmet Şehmus Güzel, 
“Cumhuriyet Türkiye’sinde İşçi Hareketleri” [Workers Movements in the Republican TuikeyjCumhuriyet 
Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol 7 (Istanbul; İletişim: 1983), 1860
134 The principal charges that dissident directed against Detnirel were; that the JP had become 
the party dominated by his clique, that he was involved in corrupt practices involving his relatives. It was 
known that ex-President Celal Bavar was supporting the dissidents. Many suspected that he opposed
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forced to resign because the dissidents voted against the party in the assembly. Finally, those 
dissidents numbering total 27 announced the formation of Democratic Party led by Ferruh 
Bozbeyli.
Parallel to Demirel’s loss of strength, violence and chaos in the streets was on the rise. 
Towards the end of the 1970 “universities were paralyzed by student agitation and violence and 
the fectories by woricer militancy and strikes.” The kidnapping of four US airmen stationed 
in Turkey by the outlawed Turkish People’s Liberation Army (TPLA) was only one of the 
more spectacular terrorist attacks. The 15-16 June worker demonstrations in Istanbul and 
Kocaeli was more serious and alarming. Protesting against the governments’ amendments that 
would make the CRWU largely ineffective, workers almost spontaneously staged massive 
demonstration. in which one policeman and one worker were killed. The government 
proclaimed martial law for three months tacitly confessing its inability to ensure law and order. 
In the words of a senior commander who would later sign the 12 March memorandum, the 15- 
16 June movement was “first of its kind, a movement (regardless of whether its causes are just 
or not) of these organizations whose strength was mistakenly underestimated, which turned out 
to be an act of aggression (reminiscent of military move) by 50000 people directed towards 
life, property and armed forces.”*^^
In the face of escalating conflicts in the country, Demirel blamed the 1961 Constitution. 
He argued that it did not equip the state to deal with those who abuse freedoms. He even went 
as far as saying that it was very difficult to govern a country with this constitution without 
appreciating the fact that this also undermined his claim to legitimacy derived from the 
same constitution.'^’ According to Demirel, it was “a fact that the 1961 Constitution values
E>emirel because he had shown no intention of the leaving party leadership to ex-DP cadres as they 
expected.
Ahmad, Experiment.201.
Muhsin Batur, Antlar ve Görüşler- Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası [Memoirs and Views-What 
Really Happened Behind the Curtain Diuing Three Time Periods ](tstanbul: Milliyet, 1985), 196.
For a view that prior to 1966 coup. President Goulart’s similar claims undermined his claim 
to legitimacy see, Alfred Stepan, “Political leadership and the breakdown of democracy,” in The 
Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes- Latin America (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University
166
non-infringement of the essence of rights (hakkm özü) than the destruction of the state. It is not 
easy to prevent street violence while staying within the limits put forward by the 
constitution.”*^* As noted above, from the very beginning the JP had shown a rather hostile 
attitude towards the constitution. In the eve of the 1969 elections, the JP election manifesto 
urged changes in the constitution. The main thrust of this change was to be the strengthening of 
the executive. According to Demirel “the 1961 Constitution is promulgated to ensure that 
the executive would not execute... The constitution does not provide authority to 
government whilst it charged it with many duties.” Among its proposals for constitutional 
change, the JP offered; strengthening of the executive by giving it right to issue governmental 
decrees, removal of several constitutional barriers that would make parliament work faster, 
rearrangement of the issue of autonomy for universities, and curtailing the independence of the 
judiciary by giving more say to the executive in the appointment of the judges.
Although the JP leaders had a point in criticizing some aspects of the 1961 constitution, 
the argument that public disorders would not be contained within the democratic system is 
cleariy an exaggeration. It was true that the judiciary (both Constitutional court and Conseil 
d’etat) were eager to overturn the governments’ decisions as they were entitled 
constitutionally. Also, the enactment of new laws had been made difficult by the constitution. It 
was also true that the constitution had strengthened trade unions and workers rights’ and made 
it difficult for the government to reshuffle the civil servants. It also had granted autonomy to
Press. 1978), 128.
' “ Demirel. 12 Mart .1.
139 Demirel. BflvûA:. 123-127.
140 Demirel maintained this position through late seventies as well. In addition to above 
mennoned points, he proposed; the introduction of referandum; giving the president right to proclaim 
state of emergency; giving the executive right to proclaim state of emergency instead of direcüy calling 
maitial law; making it easier for the executive to call for new elections and the like. See, Süleyman 
DemireL Anayasa ve Devlet İdaresi [The Constitution and the Governing of the State] (Istanbul; Göktürk, 
1977) 54-61. Celal Bayar, similarly, would criticize the constitution and blame it for being one of the 
chief causes of the anarchy in the late seventies. Celal Bayar, Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek (Atatürk’ün 
Metodolojisi) [Thinking Like Atatürk (The Methodology of Atatürk], second edition, ed. İsmet Bozdağ 
(Istanbul: Tekin, 1998), 142-150.
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universities. But these in no way meant that it did not enable governments to deal with 
increasing chaos in the streets. The constitution itself allowed for declaration of martial law in 
which various rights and liberties could severely be curtailed. Besides, the notorious articles of 
Turkish penal code of 141-142 prohibiting communist propaganda and activities were in 
eflfect. Certainly, the constitution did not constitute great obstacle for the efforts to prevent the 
abuse of various rights and liberties without violating the essence of these rights. Therefore it 
is more accurate to conclude that Demirel’s criticism was more to do with the DP-JP traditions 
understanding of majoritarian democracy and national will as well as his party’s initial enmity to 
the 1961 the constitution.
Put in other words, Demirel’s problem (in the fece of increasing criticism and military 
unruliness) was more to do with his weakening grip on power which, in the main, was not 
related with the constitution, but the social-political climate in the making of which he played a 
part. Having in mind, the belief that Menderes’ allegedly harsh attitude towards public 
demonstrations prepared his tragic end, Demirel has shown some hesitance- in dealing with 
student unrest.'“*' In 1968 he said “roads are not going to be worn out by demonstrating” and 
that “everybody has to accept the use of freedoms that the constitution brought and should 
look after his own business.” '^  ^When the military high command urged him to recourse to 
harsher measures in the National Security Council Demirel was reported to have said that “the 
causes of 1960 revolution (ihtilal) were the press, TRT, and the universities. If we take the 
harsh measures, it can be used against us to justify another coup. Because those measures can 
not be reconciled with democracy.”
In feet, Demirel faced a dilemma. If he used harsh measures to deal with unrest, a less 
than sympathetic intelligentsia would blame him for authoritarianism. If he did not, he would be
For a study that places emphasis on the JP leaders’ supposedly soft attitude as the chief cause 
of chaos in the streets, see. Metin Toker, Sağda ve Solda Vuruşanlar -Türkiye'deki İki Yönlü İhtilal 
Ortamının Anatomisi [An Anatomy of the Environment of Revolution: Fighters on both the Left and the 
RightXAnkara: Akis, 1971), 172 ff.
Cited in Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, v4P.64.
Cited in Batur, Anılar. 183.
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characterized as ineflfective. This bring us to a important issue that is, his relations with the 
country’s leading elites. In the first place the bulk of public opinion makers, namely 
intellectuals, journalists,''*^ were of the opinion that as well as (knowingly or not) protecting 
ultra-islamists reactionaries, Demirel was also the representative of landed and big business 
interests and therefore unfit for the realization of the reforms that the constitution was 
supposed to have envisaged. Whatever his government achieved tended to be downplayed by 
this intelligentsia, who speared to have assumed that he could hardly do right. *‘*^
This view find echoes both within the civil bureaucracy and the army. Though 
opposition to communism and Kurdish separatism had provided some convergence between 
the army and the JP, historical animosities were far fi’om exhausted. For instance, in the 
National Security Council meeting in 28 Aralık 1970, commander of land forces Faruk Gürler 
openly opposed the proclamation of martial law because “h would give the impression that the 
armed forces are in the command of the government.”*'*'^  This is indeed what it should be. The
Some journalists’ opposition to Demirel derived purely fix>m personal reasons. Haldun Simavi, 
owner of the biggest (in terms of circulation) newspaper of the day. Günaydın, had taken an overtly hostile 
attitude toward Demirel. The apparent reason was that Demirel had refused to see the representative of his 
newspaper (who wished to declare his sorrow) after the appearence of some news (which was subsequently 
proven to be wrong) that Demirel’s wife Nazmiye Demirel has been involved in a murder. For a view that 
the harsh opposition that Günaydın presented to Demirel (which had been instrumental in bringing the JP 
government down) was a lot to do with the personal feeling of revenge fell by Haldun Simavi, see Necati 
Zincirkiran (direaor of publication and editor of Günaydın newspaper) who characterized that event in 
his book as “An event that led Turkey to 12 March pronounciamento” (Türkiye’yi 12 Mart Muhtırasına 
Sürükleyen Olay). Necati Zincirkiran, Hürriyet ve Simavi İmparatorluğu [Hürriyet and the Sitnavi 
Empire] (İstanbul; Sabah Yazı Dizileri, 1994), 129. According to Orhan Erkanlı, a member of NUC that 
overthrown the DP government, “it was the press that overhrew Detnirel. They had done so not on the 
grounds of serving the nation or some other noble aims but for purely sentimental and personal reasons.’’ 
Orhan Eikanli, Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular [Memoirs, problems and Those who are Responsible], third 
ed, (Istanbul; Baha, 1973), 55.
Demiiel complained that “I am not of the opinion that we could nurture the intelligentsia of 
democracy. We have been unsuccessftil in explaining democracy and Republic. And that has been an 
important point in the crisis.” Demirel, Buhran. 67. He also added that his peasant background was one of 
the important factors that lay at the root of elite hostility to him. He said that “ ...and finally I come fiom 
İsparta. I am a peasant. It is not possible to say that our elite stomached that.” Cited in Turgut. 
Demirel.323.
Batur. Anilar.23S: Arcayürek also confirms such an attitude on the part of Gürler. Cüneyt 
Arcayürek, Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor, 5, Demirel Dönemi 12 Mart Darbesi [Cüneyt Arcayürek 
Explains 5-The Demirel Period, 12 March Coup d’etat ] (Ankara; Bilgi, 1985), 279.
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civil bureaucracy, carriers of a state tradition and a powerful state elite tended to see the JP 
with a condescending attitude as the representatives of partial interests opposing true public 
interests as represented by themselves. They continued to practicize what Heper called 
“negative politics” in which parliament and bureaucracy became hostile powers.*^’ Of course, 
these animosities were mutual. Though the JP’s attitude towards the army was radically 
different from that of the DP, the same thing can hardly be said for the civil bureaucracy. The 
JP in power tried to sideline the civil bureaucracy as much as possible. If the modus vivendi 
could not be realized between these two, the JP appears to have carried as much responsibility 
as the civil bureaucracy did.
True to Ottoman-Turldsh political traditions, the relations between the JP government 
and the opposition parties was tense. As well as the continous charge that the JP was violating 
Atatiirk’s principles, and blocking the socio-economic reforms that the constitution envisaged, 
even the RPP came close to applauding youth violence (which threatened democratic stability) 
if only because it weakened Demirel government. The accusation that the JP was a reactionary 
party bent on undoing Atatiirk’s achievements and his principles was the standard criticism of 
the RPP politicians. In addition they supported several actions bordering on illegality, if only 
because they had the potential of weakening of government. For instance, sp>eaking for the 
RPP Nihat Erim remarked that they saw nothing wrong in the youth’s actions of boycotts and 
campus occupations. According to Erim “we must congratulate, not condemn, those 
youngsters who had brought into the attention of public opinion (with bright methods) serious 
reforms in the area of education is needed.” '^  Similarly, the RPP secretary general Bülent 
Ecevit*^  ^defended the peasant’s occupations of land in some parts of the country. He argued
Metin Heper, “Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernizing Context; The Turkish Case.” 
Journal o f South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. 1.1. (1977).
ArcayOrek. 12 Mart.23İ. Ironically, Nihat Erim would later led to military backed interim 
government to deal with terrorism after 12 March. His government would preside over the execution of 
three students for violating the constitution. Demirel later called this as “ilahi adalet” (Sacred Justice) 
Süleyman Demirel, Yeni Bir Sosyal Mukaveleye Doğru [Towards a New Social Contract] Ankara, 1974), 
28.
149 Ulus, Fd)ruary 13, 1969.
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that:
People who have lost the hope that the government and the state would implement the land reform the 
constitution envisaged, even ordered, have taken the initiative. This movement can not be prevented by 
Gendarmeries, technological discoveries, or new laws. There is a constitution above all laws. But 
above the constitution are the laws of nature. Those who p red a ted  advantages of hving like a human, 
would know how to acquire that right'^
As Demirel also complained, the RPP leaders alongside the other leading elites’ 
could not differentiate hostility to the IP’s policies from hostility to democratic regime.*^* 
They hardly considered the possibility their harsh criticism could damage not only the party in 
power but the democratic system itself. Meanwhile the JP spokesman’s implied that the RPP 
was behind the anarchy and chaos in the country. According to Demirel “the slogans of left 
of center and this order must change, have been the source from which the anarchy has been 
fed.” As in before 1960, an outsider observing government-opposition relationships might 
have been excused for assuming that the two parties were radically different (in terms of 
ideology, in terms of social bases of support, in terms of occupational background of deputies) 
so as to exclude any possibility of dialogue. That was cleariy not the case. Neither were class 
parties nor did they appeal to one segment of voters alone. Though the 1969 elections 
demonstrated a shift in the regional bases of strength -the JP losing support in more modem 
regions while the JPP doing the opposite- it was still far from the case that the JP had become 
the party of less modem regions while the RPP commanded an outstanding lead in modem 
regions.'”  Nor it was possible to find radical differences in the occupational background of 
deputies of both parties as table shows.
150 Ecevit would later (in 1976) claim that with these words he meant to warn the government 
against possible social imrest if measures were not taken. Bülent Ecevit, Ecevit'in Agiklamalan 
[Statements of Ecevit] (Ankara, 1977), 16.
I SI
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Demirel. J2 Mart.51.
Demirel. Mukavele.26.
Ergun <3zbudun. Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 117, 180.
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Table 8. Social Backgrounds of Two Major Party Deputies, 1965-1969 154
Occupations % RPP JP
1%5 OfiBcial 23 22
Professional 52 46
Economic 31 34
1969 Official 30 36
Professional 51 46
Economic 21 33
It was true that ideologically there were some differences the between parties on some 
issues such as the role of parliament, judiciary, laicism, freedom of thought and economic 
planning. But these were not enough to account for harsh relationships between the 
government and opposition. We suggest that this state of afiairs can not be explained without 
taking into account Turkish political traditions and culture. From the second constitutional 
period onwards it was a tradition to accuse (usually without any substance) your political 
opponent for violating what you assume to be unchangeable principles of the state. Its roots 
should be sought in the political traditions of Ottoman Empire, and particularly the institutions 
of “Siyaseten Katl.”*”  The fact that Sultan’s could take life of any of the state servants on the 
basis of higher interests of the state and religion, which had been fused, created an atmosphere 
where accusations, slanders, gossips became the primary means through which disguised 
power struggles within the ruling elite were conducted.'*^ In such an environment, the easiest
154 Adopted from, Weiker, Modernization. 23
Ahmet Mumcu. Osman It İmparatorluğunda Siyaseten Katl [‘Siyaseten Katl’ in the Ottoman 
Empire] (Ankara; Birey ve Toplum, 1987).
The literature might provide reader an idea of how ‘politics’ was conducted inside palace. 
Yahya Kemal’s collection of short stories “Siyasi Hikayeler” (Political Stories) is an example. In one of 
these, entitled “Raif Efendinin Katli” (The Murder of Raif Efendi), Yahya Kemal tells the story of Raif 
Efendi, who had been retired from the palace service and chosen to live quiet life outskirts of Istanbul. 
One day, Raif Efendi suddenly is taken to the ‘Kapı Arası' the place in which those who had been fined 
capital punishment were kept. Everbody wonders why he had been taken there facing the death. Ataullah 
Efendi, another influential man belonging the ulema who had also been retired after performing several 
important services in the palace, tells why. According to Ataullah Efendi, years ago Raif Efendi was 
approached by a man. Ah Bey, who had the wrath of Sultan Mahmud II and had been exiled. Ah Bey 
had, in the fury of being exiled person, told many displeasant things regarding Sultan Mahmud II and its 
close circle to Raif Efendi. Some hme later Ah Bey have regained the Sultan Mahmud’s confidence and
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way to deal with an opponent was to blame him for violating the higher interests of the state. If 
you managed to convince the holder of state power that your opponent constituted harm to 
higher interests of the state, Sultan could take his life.‘*^  With the advance of Tanzimat 
reforms, the ruling bureaucratic cadres secured themselves legal guarantees, but the notion of 
higher interests of the state and the tradition of accusing opponents for violating higher 
interests of the state seemed to have lingered on. Though, the understanding of what the state 
interests were remained dependent on those who happened to have been, for that moment, the 
locus of state.
In the second constitutional period, due to its transitional nature, there was some 
ambiguity regarding what constituted the state interests, and who were to assume the role of 
chief state elite. This indeed provided the most powerful organization of the period the CUP, 
room for maneuver so as to define what the state interests were. The CUP and its military 
leaders, perceiving themselves as the only representative of Turkish nationalism and the only 
force to save the unity of the empire, tended to accuse opponents, who were not strictiy 
speaking Turkish nationalists, of treason. In the republican period, this tradition appears to 
have been reproduced. As we noted in the previous chapter, after Atatiirk’s death, his 
principles began to be taken as ideology in the Shilsian sense and came to be regarded as 
embodying state interests, while the military (as the chief state elite) perceived itself as the 
protector of such principles and guardian of state interests.
have come to influential positions, but could not get rid of the doubt that what happens if Raif Efendi tells 
anybody what he had told to him about Sultan Mahmud II. He founds the way out by securing the murder 
of Raif Efendi convincing the Sultan that he constituted harm to higher interests of the state. In all these 
stories, centrality of spying and clandestine activities for state officials, the virtues of keeping quiet and 
for not being too prominent, alongside the insecurity and fear felt by those who had, in some way, 
involved in politics in the palace, is narrated in a style peculiar to Yahya Kemal. Yahya Kemal, Siyasi 
Hikayeler [The Political StoriesJ, third edition, (İstanbul;özal matbaası, 1995). For an interesting 
assesment of the on the same book, see, Murat Beige, “Yahya Kemal ve OsmanlI’da Siyasi Gelenek” 
[Yahya Kemal and The Political Tradition in the Ottomans] Toplum ve Bilim, 28, (1985).
Mumcu provides striking examples of such cases. Sultan Mehmet II, once commanded the 
execution of one his former vezir as his rivals, fearing he would become vezir again, circulated rumours 
that the vezir was wearing white clothes when he was expected to be in mourning due to the death of one 
of Sultan’s sons. Ibid. 66. In another case, Sultan Ahmed I, once commanded the execution of his vezir-i 
azam Derviş Paşa, because his opponents convinced the sultan that he was digging a tuimel to reach the 
palace to topple him. Mumcu, Kati. 83.
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With a transition to a multi-party system, the political party struggles in Turkey seemed 
to turn around, chiefly, mutual allegations (of being corrupt, dictator, communist, a traitor, a 
reactionary, being a reactionaiy, not a being a real Turk etc.) between government and 
opposition. The most serious charge being the charges and counter-charges of whether the 
government or opposition violated the Atatiiridan principles (which came to be understood as 
embodying the unchangeable state interests) or not. Though there were many differences, and 
it would be a gross simplification, one can nevertheless still liken political party struggles in 
Turkey (as least until early seventies) to reminiscent of a state servant(s) who complained to 
Sultan that his rival(s) violated the state interests (or Sharia). Like these state servants in the 
empire the political parties in Turkey tended to claim, usually to provoke the military, that the 
other party(ies) was infiingjng the vital interests of the state or Atatiirkism.*** It is again for this 
reason that all but openly illegal anti-system political movements in Turicey needed to provide 
credentials that they were the ‘true Atatiirkists.’ In the Ottoman empire, too, all movements 
fi"om ultra-westemists to ultra-islamists all claimed that they were trying to ensure 
unchangeable true interests of the state, sharia (an interpretation of what it requires depended 
on those whom hold the power)‘^ ’prevails. Though much more detailed studies remain to be 
done on these points to speak more confidently, it is interesting to note that even if the 
substance and ideological bases of the political cleavages changed, the style, work habits, 
assumptions and other cultural pattems-traditions of the Ottoman elite politics continued to 
affect the republican elites which claimed to represent a sharp break fi’om the Ottoman past.'^ ®
Similarly Hqjer, after noting that “political parties in Turkey developed as a means of elite 
conflict” added that “always at issue was the bureaucratized version of Atatüıidst thought.” Heper, 
Tradition. 99.
It is enlightening to note that the CUP which overthrew Abdiilhamit II had accused him of 
“removing some of the materials from the sacred books and ordering the burning of the some of them.” 
Many members of the CUP, which had a secular orientation, had later accused Abdülhamid II for being 
pan-islamists. See, Mete Tunçay, “Siyasi Tarih,”[Political History] Türkiye Tarihi, 1908-1980, vol 4. 
(İstanbul; Cem, 1992), 32.
For a provocative article that attempts to show how the pre-revolution traditional Russian 
peasant culture (such as sense of commonality, working habits and leadership cult) have affected the 
Soviet elite, see, Stephen R. Biuant, “The Influence of Russian Tradition on the Political Style of the
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In fact, noting the Turkish elite’s deep suspicions about Demirel, Sherwood had 
commented (in 1967) that “it is yet to be demonstrated that the JP can rule Turkey successfully 
with the overwhelming majority of the Turkish elite in defiant opposition.”*^* Sherwood was 
proven right that facing a majority of elite opposition the Demirel government appeared to be 
powerless and unable to rule the country. We have no social-scientific means to assess whether 
he was objectively so powerless, but even if we had the means to assess that it is irrelevant 
here. The important thing (for the regime stability) is, the beliefs of the critical elites regarding 
the regime, and the majority of Turkish elites’ seemed to believe that the democratic regime 
was in crisis.
The military intervention of 12 March was conducted in this atmosphere. In chapter 
one, we noted that the military’s “size, autonomy, professional doctrine, and role conception 
detemrane its threshold for intervention, but do not constitute an independent cause of 
breakdown.”**^  The 12 March intervention was the one of the rare cases of military 
interventions in which the military’s professional doctrine and role conception, rather than 
strictly societal-political variables, came close to be the most significant variable. Despite 
student and workers unrest, the death toll arising fi-om such actions was far fi-om reaching 
threatening proportions."^^ The economy, though experiencing hardships, was fer fi'om 
imminent collapse, and only one and a half years ago 46.5 % electorate had registered its 
preference for the JP.
Despite all this, as indicated above, the military and the country’s elite, had semed to 
lose their belief (which was very low fi'om the beginning) in the Demirel government’s ability
Soviet Elite.” Political Science Quarterly. 102, 2, (1987).
161 Sherwood, “Justice.” 64.
Lany Diamond, Juan J.Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, “An Introduction; What Makes for 
Democracy,” in Politics in Developing Countries-Comparing Experiences With Democracy, second ed. 
ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Lyime Rietmer; Boulder, 1995), 47.
Demirel, too, expressed a similar opinion. According to him “there was nothing out of control 
before 12 March. All in all, only six people have been killed in violent clashes. Apart from 15-16 June 
events, there was nothing forcing the declaration of martial law. We had managed through this difficult 
period without recourse to martial law.” Cited in Turgut, Demirel.25%.
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and right to rule. The intervention finally occurred on 12 March 1971. 12 March military 
intervention by “pronounciamento” is certainly one of the most complicated (in the sense that it 
was diflBcult to unravel) intervention in Turkish political history.*^ Not only because there are 
many conflicting explanations of which of the various factors compelled the military to act, but 
also because exactly whom was behind the military move was not clear. Memorandum 
issued by the militaiy high command stated that “parliament and the government have driven 
the country into anarchy, fi-atricidal strife and social economic unrest.” It also accused them of 
not “carrying out the reforms which were envisaged in the constitution.” It demanded the 
setting up of “powerfiil and credible government, which will end the present anarchic situation, 
will take up the reforms envisaged in the constitution, in the sprit of Atatiirkisni, and will 
implement reformist laws.” William Hale perceptively notes the three elements that came 
together to produce the 12 March memorandum. The first was the belief on the part of the 
senior commanders that Demirel had lost grip on power and had been unable to deal with 
mounting public disorder. The second was some commanders’ coming to the conclusion that 
social unrest can not be prevented by force alone, it also required some socio-economic 
reforms, which the Demirel government was not particularly keen to implement. And thirdly, 
there were radical oflScers with connections in the press and academia, who concluded that no 
real progress can be expected within the liberal democratic order because the one-man one- 
vote principle were bound to produce what for them conservative governments.
According to the dominant viewthat relies heavily on the accounts of senior 
commanders who carried out the operation, it was a move designed to forestall far more 
extreme damaging intervention by the radical forces. Some junior oflScers who were retired 
after the intervention, on the other hand, claimed that planning for a radical military regime was
Ahmad, Experiment.105, Hale, Military.lSS.
Keyder provides an example of sociological reductionism arguing that “the development that 
had led to the removal of the JP and the establishment of a government not based on popular support was 
the division within the ranks of the bourgeoisie.” Keyder “democracy,” 51.
Hale, Military. 187.
Landau, Radical.AA·, Ahmad, Experiment.205.
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done at the behest of their superiors and only at the last minute had they been abandoned by 
their superiors.
What can be got from the memoirs of those who had been involved in the military 
intervention suggests a somewhat more complicated picture. There is little doubt that the chief 
of Genera] Staff Memduh Tağmaç worried about street politics and the spread of radical 
socialist-oriented ideas within the army. In a much quoted phrase he was reported to have said 
“social awakening exceeded the level of economic development.” But he was not particulariy 
keen to use military pressure to implement what others argued as socio-economic reforms that 
the constitution was supposed to have ordered. Regarding the problems of disorder, he was 
reported to have said that the problem “must be dealt with force otherwise another possible 
coup, which would resemble not 27 May but the 1917 Russian revolution, might come.” He 
appears to have thought that it was the constitution with its ultra-liberal provisions which 
needed to be changed. According to Muhsin Batur, he has shown some reluctance in involving 
the military in day-to-day politics, but as he informed President Cevdet Sunay “he could not 
control his subordinates.” It appears that the commander of the air forces Muhsin Batur and 
land forces Faruk Gürler were in fevor of military involvement to prevent anarchy and 
implement constitutional reforms. What is less clear, however, is the degree and closeness of 
their relations with the junior level radical officers who wanted to establish long term military 
rule in the name of Kemalism. According to General Gürkan who was one of the most 
prominent of those radical officers, Gürier and particularly Batur were well aware of their 
plans, and they were supposed to lead the new military government, but changed their mind in 
the last minute. When these junior level officers met with Gürler and Batur to get the order for 
military takeover on March 9, Gürler did not dare to lead them as “he was still undecided and
168
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Celil Giirican, 12 Mart 'a Beş Kala [On the Eve of 12 March] (Ankara: Tekin, 1986), 34, 252. 
Cited in Batur. Anılar. 182.
Cited in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent (^pli, 12 Mart- İhtilalin Pençesindeki 
Demokrasi [12 March-A Democracy in the Paw of Revolution] (Ankara: İmge, 1994), 181.
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was not sure his control of the land forces.”*’*
Similarly, and for the same reason (i.e. it was not clear whether all of the air forces that 
he commanded would support such move) Batur*’’ too, was not prepared to lead the 
intervention. The meeting ended with the decision that all preparations should be stopped until 
another meeting which would be held in 10 March but this time with the Tağmaç. It appears 
that Gürler and Batur had some relations with junior level radicals but were not as close as 
these juniors claimed.*’  ^ In the meeting, the military high command, perh^s sensing that after 
all these preparations, and rumors, some sort of military action was required, decide to issue a 
memorandum.” '* When their sincere worries about “something to be done,”*’  ^ combined with 
the desire to give a message to junior oflBcers that “something is done” appears to have 
provided main incentive for the intervention.
This last minute memorandum was a not well-planned and well thought out text but a 
compromise one. It threatened the takeover of government (if its demands were not fulfilled) 
but it lacked precise plans to stand up this threat. Like the 27 May intervention before it, it was 
not clear who was in charge. But soon, developments showed that Tağmaç and Sunay were in 
control. On 13 March five general (including Celil Gürkan), one admiral and thirty-five
171
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Batur, Antlar. 238.
Ibid.. 238.
In our interview, Kenan Evren (who worked with Faruk Gürler and who respected and liked 
him as his commander) told me that he had some materials regarding Gürler’s involvement with radical 
officers which he characterized as “ugly.” When I ask what was it, whether he could wish to make it 
public, he said to me that he had given it to the Presidency of War History (Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı), 
which is not, with few exceptions, open to reserachers. Kenan Evren, Interview by the author. Marmaris, 
March 31, 1998.
According to Batur, in 11 March meeting, he told Memduh Tağmaç that “There was some 
preparaüons. We stopped these. But we can not continue like this. We have to take steps towards some 
sort of action.” Cited in Birand, ENindar, Çaplı, 12 Mart. 203.
Kenan Evren, who also particiapted in 10 March meeting with Tağmaç, noted that many high 
level commanders were deeply concerned with country's situation. Evren reported that some commanders 
had said that “our lungs had too much freedom so that it burst it (our lungs) which was not familiar with 
such things.” Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren 'in Anıları, [The Memoirs of Kenan Evren], vol 1, (Istanbul: 
MUliyet, 1990), 152.
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colonels were retired.*’  ^ In 19 March Nihat Erim, who resigned from the RPP and thus made 
an “independent MP” overnight, was appointed to form a new cabinet, a decision that even 
Muhsin Batur, one of the signatories of the memorandum, learnt from the press. As he later 
confessed they (Gürler and himself) lost control of the developments soon after the 
presentation of memorandum because th ^  did not abolish political parties and assemblies.*’’
Initially bulk of the press,*’* intelligentsia,*’  ^ student and teachers associations all 
supported the military’s memorandum and the JP governments’ resignation. “Vigorous forces” 
(zinde kuvvetler), they believed, had finally taken over the reins of the government thus far 
dominated by conservative-reactionary forces and would now implement the socio-economic 
reforms that were allegedly ordered by the Constitution. Their hopes, however, were soon to 
turn sour. It was true that there was radical groups within the military wishing for a long-term 
authoritarian government to enact reforms envisaged in the constitution, but the military’s 
(more accurately, senior commanders’ who now held the control) foremost aim was to end 
what appeared to them public disorders.
Instead of directly taking over the administration the military commanders’ had set up a 
reformist non-partisan government in the assembly. The unwillingness of General Tağmaç to 
assume governmental responsibilities, and the lack of unity within the high command regarding 
the aims of intervention appears to be dominant reason for such outcome. Professor Nihat 
Erim was charged to form a government (known as the brain cabinet) in order to end chaos in
176 .’ The high command defended its action on the grounds that these officers constituted a danger 
to army unity. Many suspected, on the other hand, that they had been retired to support the claim that 
intervention was to forestall a left-wing intervention.
177 Batur, Anılar. 309.
Nadir Nadi, owner and editor of Cumhuriyet newspaper recalled that after hearing the 12 
March memorandum “they had been rejoiced like children.” Nadir Nadi, Olur Şey Değil [It is incredible ] 
(Istanbul: Çağdaş, 1981), 173.
Professor (of Law at Istanbul University) Hifn Veldet Velidedeoğlu have remarked (on 17 
March) that “the sprit of Atatürk have just taken action to prevent the collapse of the modem Turkish 
republic and the sinking of the Turkish nation into the darkness just when the country was at the brink of 
the abyss, as he had done in the independence war.” Hifa Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Türkiye 'de Üç Devir 
[Three Periods in Turkey] cilt 1 (Istanbul; Sinan 1972), 422.
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the streets and to enact socio-economic reforms. Despite the militaiy pressure, his was a 
government dependent on the JP support in the assembly. Thus the JP was, through the 
ingenious use political maneuvers able to block the agenda of the Erim government.
It was on the question of law and order that the Erim government had the full support 
of JP and the military. Continuing terrorist activities forced Erim government to proclaim a 
martial law on 17 April 1971 in eleven provinces. The proclamation of martial law had given 
virtually a free-hand to military commanders, who then proceeded with a policy of severe 
punishment of leftist terrorist and intellectuals suspected of sympathizing them.
The 12 March intervention also hastened the leadership struggle within the RPP. The 
struggle was between those favoring “left of center” policies as elaborated by Ecevit and those 
who stuck to the rather more traditional RPP line represented by İsmet İnönü. In the first 
reaction to military’s memorandum, İsmet İnönü, this time representing the equally Atatüridst 
legacy of army’s non-involvement in daily politics, harshly criticized the commanders’ move.^ ** 
But later he somewhat softened this attitude. The chief of staff Memduh Tağmaç had sent him 
a message (with Sadi Koçaş, a retired military men and an RPP, MP) that if they had not 
moved left-wingers would have taken the lead, and asked for a support.**  ^ As a Statesmen 
concerned before all else security of the Republican state, he took the more conciliatory 
attitude.’*^  In doing so, he appears to have thought that to keep to parliament open such an 
attitude was necessary. It was more so especially since he was told that the intervention was
See the assesment of the period by Prime minister Nihat Erim himself, Nihat Erim, “The 
Turkish Experience in the Light of Recent Developments.” Middle East Journal. 26, (1972). (pp.245- 
252)
“If high-ranking military commanders” ai^ gued İnönü, “are to decide when a government is to be 
changed and what the short and long term tasks of newly formed governments are, and particularly if they put 
forward suggestions and insist on their implementation as unavoidable measures, then we caruiot imagine that 
parliamentary life can be feasible.” Cited in Ahmad, Experiment.290.
Koçaş cited in Birand, Elündar, ([)apb, 12 Mart.216. İnönü also had asked Fuat Doğu the head 
of the National Intelligence Agency to brief him on the intervention and recevied the sintilar answer. 
Tanju Crirzoğlu, Kırık Politika- Anılarla Kamil Kırıkoğlu [Politics of Disappointment- Kamil Kınkoğlu 
Through Memoirs] (İstanbul: Güneş, 1987), 22
183 Metin Heper, İsmet İnönü- The Making o f  a Turkish Statesman (Leiden; Brill, 1998), 234.
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conducted to forestall a radical coup by junior ofBcers and the RPP men had been appointed as 
prime minister. As soon as Nihat Erim was appointed as prime minister (on 19 March) and it 
became clear that İnönü would support him Ecevit resigned (on 21 March) from his post as 
secretary general. With his resignation Ecevit set out to prepare for a final bid, which would 
eventually come in 1972 when he defeated İnönü and became the leader of the RPP.
To sum up, after 1960 Turkish politics had entered a new era. The “participatoiy” 
structure of the 1961 Constitution and the socio-economic changes as a result of the 
quickening of the modernization process were the crucial fectors affecting the politics in the 
new period. In this era new social-political forces tended to flourish, previous alliances began to 
dissolve, perceptions of various political actors of themselves and others underwent critical 
changes. It was a period of remaking and realignment of various socio-political forces. The 
RPP, the staunchest ally of the military, the chief state elite, were beginning to move towards 
the left, whilst the army began to appreciate how dangerous junior level radicalism might be. 
The army also seriously worried about perceived advance of socialist ideas in its previous allies 
intellectuals-academics, students, and the RPP. Whilst its anti-communism alienated this 
community, it also created a basis of convergence with the JP. Meanwhile the JP, the main 
successor of the old DP, also underwent a period of renovation. It was much more careful in its 
relations with the military. It was much less associated with anti-secularism, economic 
mismanagement and dependence on foreign power than the DP once had been. In addition to 
these changes in the previous parties and political actors, the post-1961 political order, in which 
politicization and radicalism dominated the intellectual climate, also paved the way to the 
emergence of both socialist-inspired movements and parties alongside the ultra-nationalist and 
islamist-religious ones.
These changes, as we noted in the beginning of this chapter, introduced both new 
constraints and opportunities alongside the existing ones. It would not be an exaggeration to 
argue that the 12 March military intervention occurred because Turkish political party elites’ 
were unable to overcome these constraints. The intervention, expectedly, was a far cry from 
bringing a solutions. In the first place, it was naivete (to say the least) to expect the intervention
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to correct the several imbalances that the democracy feced. The military interventions were 
more likely to create as many problems as they solved for the democracy. The 12 March 
intervention was hardly an exception. Socio-economic reforms (such as land reform) that 
were allegedly envisaged by the constitution could not be enacted. It was true that public 
disorders (namely student radicalism and strikes by workers) were suppressed. But it was 
achieved only by recourse to martial law for the time being. There were amendments to the 
1961 Constitution. The basic tendencies of those changes were towards the strengthening of 
state authority in relation to basic rights and liberties, the strengthening of military authority vis- 
à-vis civilians, the weakening of judicial control over elected governments, the strengthening of 
the executive vis-à-vis legislature.*** Although those changes had been in the direction that had 
been advocated by the JP and Demirel, it did not suflBce to make them cease their criticism of 
the 1961 Constitution.
Whatever its successes and fidlures it might be, the 12 March intervention and events in 
the military inteaegnum surely affected perceptions of several political actors themselves and 
their perceptions of others. These changes was important in understanding developments 
leading to breakdown of democracy in 12 September 1980. The military high command had 
now well-understood junior level involvement in politics was to be avoided. Because it might 
seriously damage the internal unity of the army. A process which began with the Aydemir case 
in 1963 was now complete. Afterwards, if the military had to intervene again, it would do so 
through the high command.
With that came the end of the alliance between the army and the left leaning 
intelligentsia and students. The severe treatment that students and the bulk of the intelligentsia 
suffered in this the period spelled the end of the alliance, between the military and this group. **^  
It appeared that, the military had found radicalism of the students and intelligentsia just too
Hale, Military. 209.
Tanör,/Inwaso. 54-60.
A stark account of this treatment can be found in İlhan Selçuk, Ziverbey Köşkü [Ziverbey 
MansionKistanbul: Çağdaş, 1987).
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much. It has been noted earlier how the military gradually came to see leftist activities and 
allegations that some officers collaborated with it. The high command could not help but be 
concerned since it threatened both the unity of the army and the country’s independence (in the 
commanders’ eye socialism meant Soviet control) and its place in the Western bloc. The 
military’s change of attitude towards this group can be observed from the changes that the high 
command made in the books that had been taught at Military schools. The 1971 edition of the 
book, was entitled Türk Devrim Tarihi (The History of Turidsh Revolution) while 1973 edition 
was entitled Türk İnkılap Tarihi. The exact rendering of these into English difficult. But 
while the word “inkılap” to denote “revolution” came to be preferred by more right-leaning 
interpreters of Atatürk revolutions, the word “devrim” was the option of more left-leaning 
interpreters of it It was also the case that in the 1973 edition of the book, the characterization 
of the DP as “düşük” (or fallen) had been replaced by “eski” (or old DP).'**
Yet another example of the army’s changed attitude is the case of the arrests of 
Professors Bahri Savcı and Mümtaz Soysal (of Political Science Faculty of Ankara University) 
for subversive activities. These two professors had been involved in the preparation of the 1961 
constitution by the invitation of the military. Professor Sava even had declared that the 
military’s move was “democratic” on the 13 March.'*’ Even more interesting was the arrest of 
the Professor Bülent Nuri Esen (Law Faculty of Ankara University) who, just a couple hours 
before his arrest, had been eating with prime minister Nihat Erim, who had also been a 
professor in the same faculty. After the crackdown on the leftist activities no one would dare 
to advance the view that a progressive order or the constitutional reforms would be enacted by 
“vigorous forces.”'”  The academic -turned journalist Uğur Mumcu, who had close relations
These book are. T.C Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, Türk Devrim Tarihi [The History 
of Turkish Revolution] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1971); T.C (jenelkurmay Harp Tarihi 
Başkanlığı, Türk İnkılap Tarihi [The History of Turkish ‘inkılap’] (Ankara: (jenelkurmay Basımevi, 
1973).
Genelkurmay, Inkılap.\91\ Genelkurmay, Devrim.191.
Ahmad, Experiment.320.
Igor P.Lipovsky, The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980 (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 166.
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with some radical oflBcers, made this point clear. When asked whether they supported the 
military intervention to implement Atatiirldst reforms prior to the 12 March intervention. 
Mumcu’’’ answered, “At that time, I was thinking of a revolutionary leap forward based on the 
clamping of all civil-military forces. But the 12 March experience had shown us that this road 
was blocked.”” ^
The military also appears to have appreciated that unless it was seen as completely 
necessary by critical actors and was weU-prepared, the military’s direct involvement in politics 
damaged both internal discipline and their prestige.”  ^ As the 12 March military intervention 
foiled in most of its professed aims except the suppression of terrorism for a time being. 
Perhaps the most face-losing (for the military) event of the post-1971 era was the presidential 
elections. The military foiled to get the chief staff Faruk Gürler, elected as president in 1973 .”  ^
Facing resistance of civilian politicians the military had to accept a compromise candidate ex­
admiral Fahri Korutürk. It appeared that united civilians scored a significant victory against 
generals. The Economist, for instance, had remariced that “it may even prove a milestone in 
contemporary Turkish history.”” * In reflection it became clear that the bulk of the army was 
not united in its support for Faruk Gürler. Despite the army managed to get another ex-military
Yankt. January' 27- February 2, 1975. For a similar assessment. Ismail Cem, Tarih Açısından- 
12 Mart, [The 12 March From the point of view of the History ] vol 2 (Istanbul; Cem, 1977), 282.
'^^Semih Vaner’s comment even after 16 years reflects the impact of 12 March on the 
intelligentsia’s perception of the military. According to Vaner, “by compromising itself gravely in the 
maintenance of order, including its most scandalous aspects, it (military) had irrevocably tarred its 
progressive image.” Semih Vaner, “The Army,” in Turkey in Transition, ed. Irwin C. Shick and Ertuğrul 
A. Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 256.
In the pre&ce of the 1971 book, (referred above, ftxitnote 187) it was argued that history of Turkish 
revolutions should be known very well because, as like in the past, in the future, too, “commanders might be 
forced to take the fote of the nation into their hands, rescuing it finm the situation into which it had folien.” This 
sentence, reflecting the military post-1971 unwillingness not to involve itself in day-to -day politics, similarly 
does not appear in the 1973 editioa
For the details. Hale, Military. 203-208; Roger P.Nye, “Civil-Military Confinntation in 
Tiukey: The 1973 Presidential Electioxts.” IntemationalJoumal o f  Middle East Studies. 8, (1977).
195 The Economist, March 24, 1973. “Rebuff for the Generals.'
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men elected for the presidency, it was nevertheless, perceived as loss of face for the military.
Similarly, relations with the RPP, which had entered a precarious course of events ever 
since it adopted the “left of centeri’ policy, finally culminated in Ecevit’s election to the party 
chairmanship. Ecevit was determined to restructure the RPP along what he called the 
democratic leftist line, appealing to workers, peasants, students and middle classes. With 
Ecevit’s victory, in the army’s eyes, the RPP was no longer the party associated with the 
traditional state philosophy as they interpreted it. Ecevit’s anti-12 March posture and his failure 
to provide support for General Gürler have all affected the military’s disenhancement fi'om the
RPP. 197
Parallel to its anti-communism and anti-separatism, the convergence between the 
military and the JP was now clearer than ever, as the military (in broad agreement with the JP’s 
diagnosis of Turkey’s law and order problems) pushed for the constitutional changes the JP 
had campaigned for. Though overthrown by the military, the JP did not assume a hostile 
attitude toward the military and supported interim governments. Demirel was pleased to see 
that the military proceeded a policy of crushing subversive leftist activities which he would 
willingly subscribe but could not do under normal democratic procedures.*^ The feet that 
many martial law commanders subsequently joined the JP also supports the view that the 
relations between the army and the JP were further softened.*^ It was not, however, the case
Kenan Evren, for instance notes that with the Gürler event “the prestíge of the armed forces 
have been damaged to a considerable extent.” Evren, Anılar. \59.
The Economist observed that “Mr Ecevit is now as much disliked by the generals as the 
Justice Party’s Mr Demirel is.” The Economist, March 24, 1973. For a similar assessment, Engin D. 
Akarli, “The State as Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey,” in Political 
Participation in Turkey, ed. Engin D. Akarh and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul; Boğaziçi University, 1976), 153.
As Muhsin Batur lamented ’1he JP has managed to attain many of its demands that it even did not 
dream of and now waiting for its future days in power.” Cited in Cizre-Sakalhoğlu, AP. 114.
Some of these commanders were; Omal Süer, the former martial law commander of Izmir. 
Kemalettin Gökakın, the former general secretary of National Security Council, and the former military 
judge Ali Elverdi, who was a prosecutor in Dev-Genç trial that led to the execution of three members of 
organization.
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that mutual historical animosities were all forgotten, rather, as Akarh^ ®^  perceptively pointed 
out, it was the case that the army now tried to put itself at an equal distance from all parties.
^  Akarh, “state,” 154.
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CHAPTER IV: FRAGMENTATION, POLARIZATION, PARTY 
PATRONAGE AND POLITICIZATION: POLITICS IN THE POST- 
1973 PERIOD
In the previous chapter, we advanced the view that the 12 March military intervention 
could be seen as the result of the inability of the Turkish party elites to overcome various 
constraints -derived from the turbulent years of sixties- imposed upon already existing 
confining conditions. It was also noted that the 12 March military intervention could not solve 
many problems it aimed to tackle, and Turkish democracy entered the post-1973 era with the 
similar problems. The question (that we raised regarding the post-1961 period) that whether 
Turkish democracy would be able to adjust to the changing social-political conditions, imposed 
upon already existing constraints and opportunities, thus reasserted itself in the post-1973 era. 
In what follows we shall try to delineate how in the fece of new opportunities and constraints - 
changes within the RPP, and the increasing fragmentation of the party system, the experience 
of the 12 March intervention which affected perceptions of various political actors, the 
continuing migration to cities, an economy that was completing an easy phase of import- 
substitution strategy- the political party elites behaved and how their behavior seemed to affect 
the stability of democratic regime.
It is the basic argument of this chapter that, far from advancing in the way of finding 
solutions, post-1973 governments (that of the RPP-NSP coalition and Demirel’s National 
Front coalitions) further aggravated the situation. Apart from the only seven-month long RPP- 
NSP coalition, the National Front (NF) governments particularly, played a crucial role in the 
further escalation of many problems and subsequent degeneration of the democratic regime and 
thus constituted cornerstone of the 12 September military intervention. The remarkable 
features of this period were the increasing polarization of party elites (which was increasingly 
were transmitted to the masses) and the politicization of the bureaucracy accompanied by
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extreme party patronage.
4.1.THE EMERGENCE OF BÜLENT ECEVİT AND THE NEW RPP
The leadership change in the RPP signified end of an old era as Bülent Ecevit took over 
leadership fi'om veteran politician and hero of the independence war, İsmet İnönü. This was 
not a simple change in leadership. Bülent Ecevit wanted to restructure the RPP what he called 
along democratic leftist lines. It is, therefore, necessary to pay attention to the new RPP 
ideology and its chief propagator Bülent Ecevit. Unlike Süleyman DemireL, Ecevit had a 
distinguished background in the sense that his femily belonged to the cultural elite of the new 
Republic. His fether was a Professor (in Medical School) at Ankara University and a member 
of parliament on tüe RPP ticket, while his mother was an accomplished painter. Bom in 1925, 
he attended the prestigious American Robert College, where he had been introduced to Anglo- 
Saxon culture. His early interests had been focused on poetry, literature, journalism and 
translation. After graduation, he attended Law School but left his education uncompleted. KBs 
first job was in the oflScial press agency of the government. Then he was sent to England to 
work at the Turkish embassy as a press attache. After four years (1946-1950) in England he 
returned to Turkey and began to write articles (on literature and foreign aflfairs) for the RPP 
newspaper “Ulus.” He was eleaed to the TGNA in 1957 on the RPP ticket, and was minister 
of labor between 1962-1965. Having a deep attachment towards underprivileged,' he played an 
important role in legislating workers right to organize and strike during his tenure as labor 
minister.^
Ecevit had wholeheartedly supported İnönü when he declared that the party was on the 
left of the center in 1965. Though his conception of left of center policy differed fi'om that of
' He was reported to have criticized his friends at Robert College, who were attending dancing 
parties where girls and boys come together. In the school newspaper he argued that “every party a 
youngster attends increases the distance between himself and peasant- as he became more and more 
demoted.” Cited in Kayhan Sağlamer, Ecevit Olayı- Bir Başbakan ’m Doğuşu [The Ecevit Phenomenon, 
The Rise of a Prime Minister] vol 1, (İstanbul; Tekin, 1974), 43.
 ^ Sabri Sayan, “Bülent Ecevit,” in Political Leaders o f  the Contemporary Middle East and 
North Africa, ed. Bernard Reich (Westport, Coimecticut; Greenwood Press, 1990), 161.
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İnönü, Ecevit stayed loyal to him as the struggle (between those who reject the left of center 
and those who did not) within the party continued. Indeed, it was reported that Ecevit would 
not allow anybody to criticize İnönü in his presence.  ^ With İnönü’s support, he became 
secretary general of the RPP in 1966. Ecevit wrote three books between 1968 and 1970, where 
he explained what the party’s new ideology should be. With his high oratical skills and youthfiil 
image he soon came to be identified as the leader of the left-wing of the party as secretary 
general.
Ecevit’s radical rhetoric occasionally brought him into clashes with İnönü. When İnönü 
declared that the RPP was not a socialist party, Ecevit responded that left of center policy 
should not be interpreted as rigid and close (i.e.whose limits were defined by party leadership) 
doctrine. He added that the RPP was always open to change implying İnönü’s conception was 
not the only interpretation.'' But İnönü did not unseat him when surely he could have done so. 
He appears to have thought that this would contradict the party’s new image and cost votes in 
the elections. He must have supposed that he could unseat him anytime he wished, as he had 
done other challengers. The clash between these two came in the aftermath of the 12 March 
military intervention. Ecevit resigned when İnönü decided to support the Erim government and 
began to prepare for a final bid against İnönü. Ecevit’s reaction to the 12 March intervention 
might provide some clues regarding his leadership style and qualities as leader. It is therefore 
necessary to pay close attention to it.
Proponents of Ecevit were quick to claim that he was a principled democrat who 
resigned from his position to protest the anti-democratic removal of elected government.*  That 
did not, however, appear to have been the case. He resigned on 21 March 1971, that is nine 
days after the intervention and only two days after Nihat Erim (a determined critic of Ecevit)
 ^Sağlamer, £cm7.240.
 ^ Feroz Ahmad and Bedia T. Ahmad, Türkiye'de Çok Partilili Siyasal Hayatın Açıklamalı 
Kronolojisi, ¡945-1971 [An Annoted Chronology of Multi-Party Politics in Turkey, 1945- 
1971KAnkara;Bilgi, 1976), 356.
* This view is not only held by proponents but by others as well, see for instance, Ahmet İnsel, 
‘Türkiye’nin Kronik Rejim Bunalımı Üzerine,” [On the Chronic Regime Crisis of Turkey] in Türkiye 
Toplumunun Bunalımı (Istanbul; îleüşim, 1990), 129.
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became a prime minister. Besides, his characterization of the 12 March intervention was not the 
reaction of a principled democrat who opposed military intervention regardless of its aims or its 
consequences, but rather as someone who took stance whether the intervention in question 
served specific policies or not.* In a strange way, he argued that “those provisions of the 
military’s memorandum regarding government was not a ‘coup d'etat,’ but only those 
provisions of memorandum, perhaps and hopefully, unwillingly subscribed by the military 
commanders, regarding his party was a coup d’etat.” This was because, he argued “it was the 
government that had tried to lengthen its period in power by getting support fi'om the army.” 
“Once any government found itself in that situation,” he continued, “it is only to be expected 
that commanders could rightly say to it that they no longer protected it.”’ Therefore, he 
concluded that the 12 March intervention which was supposed to be above the party could not 
even be impartial regarding factions in the RPP. It was conducted, Ecevit asserted, against the 
march of left of center policy in the RPP. This was an obviously distorted view of the 12 March 
intervention, which was despised even by his sympathizers.*
®As was his reaction to 27 May military intervention. His comment on 27 May in Ulus new-spaper 
is also revealing: “Your dark days are over. Good morning Turkish nation. When the Turkish people 
woke up yesterday morning, they embraced the light of freedom alongside the sunshine. It was the 
Turkish army that brought this light as great news through its quiet struggles in the darkness of the night, 
and presented it with rise of sunshine (to the Turkish nation) as a present that she deserved. Thank you 
Turkish Army, Good Morning Turkish Nation.” Cited in Sağlamer, Ecevit.56.
’ Cited in Suna Kili. ¡960-1975 Döneminde, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler [The 
Developments in the Republican People’s Party in the Period of 1%0-1975 from the Politcal Science point 
of View ] (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınlan 1976), 277. In February 8, 1972 Ecevit also argued 
that “my opposition to the formation of (Erim) government should not even be interpreted as opposition 
to 12 March intervention. In contrast. I was in favour of the establishment of a government in line with 
what the 12 March commanders wished. They had wished the formation, within the rules of democracy, 
of a persuasive government that would work in above-party sprit. I am of the opinion that it is not correct 
(proper) to appoint a person, who was a member of an opposition party, even the leader of one faction in 
that party, as head of government supposed be above party.” Cited in Kemal Satır, CHP’de Bunalım [The 
Crisis in the RPP] (Ankara: Nüve, 1972), 25.
 ^ Abdi ipekçi was reported to have said that it was a “nonsense.” Cited in Tufan Türenç and 
Erhan Akyildiz, Gazeteci [The JournalistKistanbuI: Milliyet, 1987), 301. Similarly Çetin Altan was 
reported to have commented that “If a person says that the Turkish army, under American influence, 
have planned coup d’etat to prevent my coming into power, his nerves must have been quite disturbed.” 
Cited in Sağlamer, Ecevit. 244.
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It appears, then that Ecevit well-appreciated that the struggle was nearing to an end 
and he could capitalize on the situation by resigning at that moment. His handling of resignation 
affairs also revealed his rather emotional approach to politics. When asked why he had not let 
İnönü know about his resignation before making it to public, Ecevit answered that he did not 
go to İnönü because he could have persuaded him not to resign.^  This suggests either that he 
was not totally confident of his own case, or he was so committed to him that he just felt it 
impossible to speak with İnönü face-to-face.
The stniggle ended when Ecevit replaced İnönü as the third president of the RPP after 
Atatürk and İnönü. It appears that İnönü (who was 88 years of age at that time) 
underestimated Ecevit’s strength and assumed that he could easily ward off the challenge as he 
had done so many previously. Ecevit, on the other hand, had built up his clientele within the 
party hierarchy, and public opinion was strongly on his own side. İnönü accepted defeat with 
dignity but resigned when the new RPP leadership decided to withdrew its ministers fi'om the 
interim government. In his resignation letter he stated that the RPP’s policy have taken a 
direction which was harmfial to the interests of the country when the sensitive conditions of the 
12 March still prevailed. The main thrust of İnönü’s critique was that Ecevit had allowed to 
the various shades of the left to infiltrate the party. He was also concerned with Ecevit’s 
leadership qualities to lead what was to him the biggest party of Turkey. He seemed to regard 
him as unrealistic, adventurist, lacking a sense of responsibility, and with low administrative 
capacity.He answered those who mentioned Ecevit’s achievements by saying that “an 
adventure might be successful, but it does not change the fact that it is still an adventure. 
If the adventure continues afterwards, this is an even bigger mistake.”*’ Ecevit’s popularity
’ Ibid.,284.
10 Necip Mirkelamoğlu, İnönü, Ecevit’i Anlatıyor [İnönü talks about Ecevit] (İstanbul; Kervan
1975).
" Ibid.,194. It was even reported that İnönü asked to Kamil Kınkoğlu (who was a general 
secretary of the RPP and seemed to be suppoiting Ecevit’s bid for leadership) whether he did not know 
“the fact that Ecevit can not even watch over couple of gooses.” Cited in Tanju Cdızoğlu, Kırık Politika- 
Anilarla Kami! Kınkoğlu [Politics of Disappointment- Kamil Kınkoğlu Through Memoirs] (Istanbul; 
Güneş, 1987), 152.
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had reached such a nadir that few endeavored to understand what this old and experienced 
statesman was saying.
With Ecevit’s election as the leader, the intra-party organizational changes towards 
more social democratic patterns developments were expected to take place as Ecevit also 
promised to increase intra-party democracy. The RPP, which was based on an alliance of local 
notables with civil-military bureaucracy throughout its life, showed the characteristics of an 
indirect, cadre party. Its links with social groups, like that of the JP, remained weak and based 
largely on clientelism and patronage.’^  Having such charismatic and historical personalities as 
Atatürk and İnönü as leaders the concept and the tradition of intra-party democracy did not 
have deep roots. Ecevit’s efforts in affecting the organizational structure of the RPP in that 
respect remained less than complete. Not only because legal constraints prevented the party 
having formal links with, say, trade unions, but also because it was very difficult to change 
party direction in such a short time in the fece of the overwhelming opposition of the vested 
interests,leaving aside the question whether Ecevit really wanted it to be so.’* Despite some 
steps have been taken to increase both intra-party democracy and efforts towards turning the 
party toward mass membership parties, the RPP still continued to display cadre party 
characteristics and a lack of intra-party democracy.’* While, as existing available research 
suggests, more class-based participation has been observed, it did not replace the older forms 
of participation based on clientelistic relations, rather both forms continued to exist side by
Arsev Bektaş, Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980) fThe 
Leadership Oligarchy in the Process of Democratization, the RPP and the JP (1961-1980)] (İstanbul; 
Bağlam, 1993), 112.
See, Ayşe Güneş Ayata, CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji) [The RPP (Organisation and Ideology)] 
translated by, Bellas Tarhan, Nüvit Tarhan (Ankara; Gündoğan, 1992).
As Bektaş noted there did not seem to be any significant increase in the number of those 
peasants, workers, or artisans in the central executive organs of the party even after the 1972. Ibid., 105. 
She also noted how Ecevit’s efforts to curb irrégularités observed in recording of the members, which have 
hindered intra-party democracy, faced resistance by the vested interests.
Indeed, the intra-party factions has firequendy criticized Ecevit for autocratic tendencies.
Bektaş. Liderler.\'i\.
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side. 17
Ecevit’s political views, which provided a new direction to the RPP’s new left of center 
policy, are scattered in his books and speeches. Expressed in an eloquent, poetic and 
sentimental language, they involve many contradictory themes concerning society and politics. 
In many ways they carry utopian connotations, which does not bode well with political realism. 
According to Ecevit, the underlying philosophy for the left of center policy was the opposition 
to the existing order because it was unjust in that it did not provide what we may call “equality 
of opportunities” for everyone. The opening sentences of his book entitled “The Left of 
Center”'* read as:
There is a level a human being can attain if his (her) personality are freed from material inhibitions, if 
he (she) can get the education deserved If a political order does not allow everytxxb' to reach that stage, 
it is contraiy to humanity. If it allows some to reach that level while hindering others it is contrary to 
both humanity and justice.
For Ecevit, the left center policy first of all aimed at equality of opportunity so as to 
enable the underprivileged to develop their talents. Aspiring to have “all good things together” 
Ecevit characterized it in the following manner. It was “humanist” (insancı), because “it gave 
individuals highest importance.” It was “populist”(haIkçı) because “it strived for the removal of 
every kind of inequality and exploitation so as to melt class differences away.” It stood for 
“social justice and security” and was “progressive, revolutionary and reformist” because it 
purported to “change social structure at the highest possible speed.” It was “etatist” because it 
“views state as something that serves people not the vice versa.” Its statism does not aim for 
removal of fi^ eedom of private enterprise but direct it for the public good. It was “for a planned 
economy” because only through rational regulations could its aims be attained. It was for 
“liberty” because it rejects the limitations of individual freedoms for the sake of future 
generations. And finally it was ‘Tor social democracy” because they appreciate that unless
17 Ayata, CHP.
Bülent Ecevit, Ortanın Solu [The Left of Center], seventh ed. (Istanbul; Tekin, 1975) (Original 
publication, 1968), 11. Elsewhere Ecevit similarly argued that “the ideal (ülkü) of the RPP was to 
establish a dynamic and creative social order in which no one can oppress or exploit others, and where 
human personality can develop free from every kind of social obstacles.” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 
Demokratik Sol Düşünce Forumu [The Forum of Democratic Leftist ThoughtK Ankara; Kalite, 1974), 7.
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economic and social limitations are removed, democracy would not function in favor of 
people.” '^
According to Ecevit, “left of center” policy was in complete harmony with the 1961 
Constitution and principles of Atatüric. Like the TWP and many intellectuals, Ecevit argued 
that the 1961 Constitution had envisaged a particular social and political order and left of 
center movement aimed at realizing that order. Accordingly, the popular slogan, and the title of 
the book Ecevit wrote, “This Order Must Change” does not envisage changes in the existing 
1961 constitution, but establishment of the new social-political order that was allegedly 
envisaged by that constitution. In another book, he even went as fer as suggesting that the 
constitution had “ordered” such reforms. Therefore it was a “constitutional movement.” 
Ecevit’s this claim, too, can not stand up to close scrutiny. Although the constitution 
charged the state to provide social welfare for everybody, it also provided a room for 
different interpretation by stating that “the state performs its socio-economic 
responsibilities given by this constitution -to the extent that its economic development and 
financial resources allow.”(article 53)
Ecevit claimed that it was not only totally constitutional but also in line with Atatiirk’s 
principles. Like many political movements, Ecevit, too, wished to have the additional 
legitimacy that being an Atatürkist was supposed to provide. In a way Atatürkism (whose 
interpretation greatly varied) seemed to have been perceived as a state philosophy that no one 
could afford to ignore. According to Ecevit, Atatürk was a “revolutionary” (devrimci) and
”  Ecevit. So/.24-26. Even a cursoiy look can reveal questions that are hard to answer regarding 
the realizations of these policy aims. For instance, how can a movement, aiming to change social 
structure at the highest possible speed, be also reformist at the same time ? How can a movement while 
giving highest importance to individuals be also strive for the removal of every kind of inequalities and 
melting away of class distinctions ?
20 Bülent Ecevit, Bu Düzen Değişmelidir [This Order Must Change] (Istanbul; Tekin, 1968).
Bülent Ecevit, Atatürk ve Devrimcilik [Atatürk and Revolutiorüsm], second ed. (Istanbul; 
Tekin, 1973) (Original publication in 1970), 103.
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revolutionism was indeed one of his six principles. But Ecevit^noted that “in the language of 
Republic, revolution (devrim) used not in the sense of “ihtilal” but “inkilab” it is antonymous of 
reformism (evrim).”^  According to Ecevit founders of the RPP has made an “ihtilal” only once 
in 1919. It, therefore, is not committed to the violent overthrow of the existing order.
For Ecevit, Atatürk’s revolutionism involved two aspects. One was its concrete 
dimension, revolutions that were realized in his life time. The other was its abstract 
dimensions, that is his “permanent revolutionism.”^  It was only when these two came together 
that one could be a “real Atatiirkist” and “real Atatiirkist revolutionary.” *^^ To protect concrete 
revolutions, Ecevit continued, one must be a permanent revolutionary.^’ According to Ecevit, 
the left of center movement was to continue where Atatürk left off. It was to be revolutionary 
in this special sense.
In Ecevit’s interpretation, Atatürk’s revolutions were “superstructural revolutions” 
(üstyapı devrimleri), they were “affected superstructure, that is to say, political, administrative 
and legal institutions, organizations.”’* But the real revolutions Ecevit added were “base 
revolutions” (altyapı devrimleri). What he understood by base revolutions is not at all clear. On
~  EceviX.Duzen. ITi.
^  In Ecevit’s interperation. being an “inkılapçı” means Üie rejection of the violent overthrow of 
existing order. But, it also opposes reformism, that is gradual improvements in the existing order. So, 
according to Ecevit, “inkılapçılık” is something which opposes both the overthrow of existing order and 
its reform through gradualism. This usage of “inkılapçılık” seemed to be accepted by academics as well. 
Kemal Karpat, for instance, have preferred similar use of “inkılapçılık” to refer to both reformism and 
re\'olutionism. Kemal H.Karpat. Turkey's Politics- Transition to a Multi-party System (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1959), vii. It is possibly because of the Republican elite’s distaste with hesitant 
reformism of the Tanzimat period, the term “reformculuk” came to be understood as a term that has to be 
avoided.
Ecevil.Dùzen.222.
^  Note that “permanent revolutionism” is a concept developed by Russian revolutionary marxist 
Leon Trotsky (1879-1940). Citing many examples like these, many critics charged that Ecevit is prone to 
have been impressed by the last book he read, or country he had just visited. See, Metin Toker of Hürriyet, 
Hürriyet, May 29, 1977, “Benim Oyum” [My Vote].
“  Ecevit. Atatürk.\%.
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Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 62.
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the one hand, it was said to involve a revolution “that aimed to re-order relations of 
productions and envisages changes in the possession of economic power. On the other hand, 
his concrete proposals were nothing of the sort, concerning only land reform and social 
security. Ecevit indicated four areas which were yet to be realized despite the constitutions’ 
clear instructions. These were land reform, steering of the private sector in line with public 
interest, the right to live in an humanly way (insanca yaşama hakla), and the right to social 
security.
He did not hold Atatürk responsible for not realizing “base revolutions” however. 
According to Ecevit, social and political conditions of the time -widespread poverty and 
illiteracy in the Ottoman Empire, lack of real knowledge regarding revolutions, oppositions of 
privileged classes- had prevented him from doing so.^' Be that as it may, Ecevit believed, 
Atatürk had shown the direction that future generations should follow, that is “base 
revolutions.” Besides, by realizing superstructura! revolutions Atatüric had paved the way 
towards real base revolutions since without first the latter can not be realized.^ ·^
While it is not at all clear how far Atatürk himself would subscribe to what Ecevit 
called base revolutions, Ecevit was more in line with Atatürk’s “populism” (Halkçılık) with its 
somewhat idealized picture of people and the riietoric of “going to the people,” and melting 
away the class differences.^  ^But it should also be noted that Ecevit rejected the old formula of
29
30
Ibid.. 61.
Ecevit, Düzen .19-%'i.
Eoevit, Atatürk A3.
32 Ibid., 36, 63.
There are many examples of Ecevit’s idealized picture of people. “Protests do not necessarily 
show that people are against the revolutions (of Atatürk). ...For such an outcome, the intelligentsia must 
be held responsible. The task of vanguards is not done through wrihng or speaking but by going into 
people’s daily life so as to present examples to show (the correct) the way.” Ecevit, Atatürk, 79. “None of 
the professors can thoroughly know the socio-economic problems that concern poor people of Turkey as 
much as people in Pülümür mountains or landless peasants in Torbalı can.” Ibid. 123. “The RPP should 
go to the people. It should be able to create an image of people that is more suitable to its real idenüty.” 
Ecevit, Sol. 99. For more information about the idea of populism in Turkey, see İlhan Tekeli and Gencay 
Şayian, “Türkiye’de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi.” [The Evolution of ‘Halkçılık’ Ideology in Turicey]
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“for people, despite the people” a motto of Jacobinist interpretations of Atatiirkism:
We are a party which strives for reforms and revolutions to the extent that the peqtle themselves are 
convinced the necessity of these. We take care of their wishes and 1оЫс for their s u |^ r t  Theiefore, we 
are ready to wait for this to happen even if this required remaining in qjposition for a long time.
He seemed to appreciate that unless the RPP wiped away its elitist image, it would not 
able to attract much support and come to power. He criticized Turidsh intellectuals for being 
closed to the people and having a condescending attitude towards them.^ * He even preferred 
the term “agreeing with the people” (halkla anlaşma) to ‘Celling the people” (halka anlatma) for 
the latter’ elitists connotations.^ * Nevertheless, the very elitism of Ecevit (who was bom and 
nurtured in an RPP environment) surfaced in many places. For instance, in his book The Left of 
Center he still could wrote of “people serving the s t a t e . I n  other place, he spoke of 
“democracy of the state” (devletin demokrasisi).^ *
Ecevit fi'equently resorted to vulgar mandst slogans such as “revolutionism”, the 
distinction between base revolutions and superstructural revolutions, or “land for tiller, water 
for user.” In a much abused passage he even compared his revolutionism with that of Fidel 
Castro and Ernesto Che Guievera;
Castro and Che Guievera &oed closed doors. So did Ho Chi Minh. So did Mao Çe Tung. To qjen these 
doors, whose key was not possessed b>' the revolutionaries, they had to use force to break the doors. But
Toplum Bilim. 6-7, (1978).
34 Ecevit, Dûzen.llA.
He even said that intellecttials in small towns in Anatolia were living as if they were in colony 
having no relations with the local people whatsoever. Ecevit, Atatürk. 80.
36 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. Demokratik Sol.5.
In explaining why democracy was well-suited to the Turkish people, he argued that only with 
democracy ‘"could one have (create) a conception of state that people could feel their own and thus serve 
willingly.” (ancak demokrasiyle halkın benim devletim diyebileceği bir devlet imajı, kendinden sayarak ve 
gönlünden gelerek hizmet edeceği bir devlet kavraim yaratılabilirdi.) Ecevit, Sol.49. In another place, 
Ecevit argued that “ (Turkish) people can not do without a state, but they can not unwillingly serve the 
state either” (Bu halk devletsiz yapamaz. Ama devlete gönülsüz de hizmet edemez). Ibid., 49.
^  “Since our State is a social state, democracy of this state should naturally be, and will be, social 
democracy.” (Devletimiz sosyal devlet olduğuna göre, bu devletin demokrasisi de sosyal demokrasi 
olacaktır, öyle olmahdır). Ecevit, Sol.Sİ.
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in our countiy the doors are not closed T h^  can be qjened if we turn dooiicnob.^ ®
But what he has offered was nothing of sort. Despite not infrequent denunciations of 
the private sector as exploiters, Ecevit did not categorically oppose private enterprise. He 
noted that due to the possibility of reaping extreme profits in some areas, or what economists 
would call “rent-seeking,” private enterprise in Turkey did not turn to productive industries. He 
promised to end this and to channel private enterprise into productive activities that would help 
to foster the economic development of Turkey.'*® At a more abstract level, Ecevit argued that 
“without a right to property and enterprise there can not be a democracy” *^ because when the 
state controls the whole of the economy there can be no counter power, a situation likely to 
lead to democracy’s death.'*  ^However, he did not see democracy as the imperfect means to 
protect individual rights (including property) as classical liberals would. Quite the contrary, he 
believed that unrestrained freedom of enterprise and property was not compatible with 
democracy either. The left of center attitude was committed to democracy “not because of 
freedom of enterprise and right to property” but quite the contrary “it respected them to sustain 
democracy.”^  In other words, the market economy was “a necessary evil.” *^ Ecevit envisaged 
what is commonly called middle way in state-market relations in which the state would play a 
role (however not clearly defined) supposed to serve public good alongside the private 
sector.^ He found, for instance, the statism of the YÖN movement just too much and signed
39 Ecevit, Atatürk. 105.
^  Bülent Ecevit, Başbakan Ecevit 7e Sohbet [Conversation with Premier Ecevit](Ankara; Ajans 
Türk, 1974), 41-44.
Ecevit So/ 43.
42 Ibid., 44.
Ibid., 44.
44 Ibid, 115.
Clement H. Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey (London; Eothen, 1979), 115.
^  In an attempt to lure the private sector, the RPP program dated 1976, stated that “a private 
sector that works within the framework that the RPP offered ensures the society’s confidence as well as its 
own security in the most efective way on the hard road of transition to industrial society.” Cumhuriyet
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the YON declaration with reservations.'*’ How fer and through which channels the state would 
be involved in the economy were ambiguous. The RPP theoreticians put forward such 
concepts as “Halk Sektörü” (Peoples’s Sector) and “Köy-Kent” (Rural-City)'** but these did 
not appear to be well-thought out realistic proposals. Similarly, Ecevit did not oppose foreign 
investors provided that “they did not take more than they bring.” '*^ But he did not specify how 
his party would ensure that did not happen.
Ecevit was unrepentant in his defense of democracy as he understood it. Arguing that 
“every administrative system from workplace to university must be democratic, (because) if it 
(democracy) begins and ends with the ballot box, it does not satisfy needs of today’s man”*® he 
favored what is commonly called participatoiy democracy. He frequently stressed that left of 
center policy would function as a bulwark against both ultra-left and right.** The RPP’s 
commitment to democracy, Ecevit argued, determined how fer it could move towards the left. 
That is to say, the RPP would move to the left to the extent that that could be reconciled by its
Halk Partisi, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı ve Seçimlerin Teknik 
Hazırlıkları ile İlgili Bilgiler [The Program of the Republican People’s Party and Information Regarding 
Technical Aspects of the Elections] (Ankara: Ajans Türk, 1976). 155.
Sağlamer, £cev;7.147.
The Rural-City project aimed at setting up a new center (chosen with the help of the people) 
with infrastructural faciliues such as roads, electricity, schools, hospitals, and agricultural know-how, 
which would attract several villages around it. As well as preventing migration to the cities they would 
function as the core of future cities. Bülent Ecevit, Sohbet. 36. People’s Sector (Halk Sektörü) is based on 
the idea that savings of small shareholders, trade unions, various co-operaüves, pious foundations and 
migrant workers abroad, should be used in establishing economically productive businesses. They would 
be supported by the state, their management would closely be supervised by its shareholders to a greater 
extent than is possible in pri\ate sector enterprises. Ibid., 24, see also, for more information see, Ali Nejat 
ölçen. Halk Sektörü [People’s Sector ] (Ankara: Ayyrldrz, 1974).
49 Ecevit, Düzen. 160.
Bülent Ecevit, Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar [Basic CTrncepts and Problems 
in the Democratic Left] (Ankara:Ajans Türk, 1975), 31.
Ecevit, Sol. 117. As time went on, Ecevit’s efforts to distance his party fitjm Marxist-socialist 
ideas were considerably increased. In 1975, for instance, Ecevit argued that they preferred to use the term 
“democratic left” rather than “social democracy” to characterize the RPP’s new direction simply because 
the latter term derived brom Marxism, and they wanted to forestall charges that the party was influenced 
by Marxism. Ecevit, Temel Kavramlar. 52.
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commitment to democracy and freedom.*  ^His commitment to democracy was to do as much 
with the standard view (held by the Turkish state elite) that Atatiirkism required the 
establishment of democracy as was his belief in intrinsic values of democracy. Like İsmet 
İnönü, he accepted that Atatürids revolutions aimed at “familiarizing the Turkish nation with 
freedom, to open up mind of Turks to free thought, and to prepare Turkish society for 
democracy.”*^  Therefore, Ecevit believed there was no contradiction between Atatmk’s 
revolutions and democracy and criticized those intellectuals striving for the realization of 
Atatürk’s revolutions through an authoritarian regime led by the military.
Why Ecevit (and other prominent RPP ideologues) employed such radical rhetoric, 
despite close scrutiny reveals that the content of their expressed beliefs -involving many 
contradictory themes and arbitrary use of concepts*^- appeared to be somet^liat different.*** 
One can suggest that one of the factors could be their desire to attract those (students, 
intellectuals, urbanized workers) who were influenced by prevalent socialist climate of the time. 
They seemed to assume that, if they could present their less than radical ideas in the form of 
simple, sentimental and radical language, they could attract this group. This was especially so, 
since they could justify the use of such language through the reference to Atatürk, as the 
various groups including TWP on the left had done before them. The other factor might be the 
RPP leaderships’ indifference with what his words might mean to others, and how others could
52
53
54
Ecevit. Sol.32.
Ecevit, Atatürk.51.
Ibid.,51, 59.
Ecevit, for instance, once stated that the “concept of father state (devlet baba) is replaced by 
concept of children state (evlat devlet).” He seemed to imply that the new concept of the state that the 
RPP espoused would require the state to behave like a hard-woridng, good-mannered children as “hayırlı 
evlat” would. Ecevit, Temel Kavramlar. 30.
^  Even secret CIA report (dated 1974) concluded that “Ecevit is a moderate socialist with an 
apparently firm and sincere commitment to the principles of democracy, social justice and peaceliil 
change. A major factor in his strong attachment to socalism is his belief that its adoption is essenüal to 
protect democracy in Turicey and ward off communism.” These reports are claimed to have been seized by 
Iranian authorities in the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. Documents From the US Espionage Den-US 
Intervention in the Islamic Countries, Turkey (The Center For the Publication of the US Espionage Den’s 
Documents, Tehran, no date), 24.
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use these words.
The opponents of the RPP, on the other hand, were quick to seize an opportunity to 
portray it as more left-leaning than it really was. In fact as early as 1965, when İnönü 
introduced the term left of center, the JP leaders had responded by saying that “left of center is 
the road to Moscow” (ortanın solu Moskovanm yolu). Demirel as a stringent anti-communist 
whose belief that Turkey’s troubles were caused by international communism was reinforced 
by the events of the 1969-73, used the RPP’s radical rhetoric to portray himself as the only 
man to stop the RPP whose coming power might open way to the communism. Due, in part, 
fragmented party system, both parties and leaders benefited in presenting the other as more 
extreme than they actually were. The tradition of mutual allegations continued but this time 
their contents were somewhat different. In the sixties and early seventies, parties accused each 
other of being “reactionary,” “violating Atatürk’s principles,” or “aiming to destroy 
democracy.” With the advent of new RPP leadership, these allegations tended to be replaced in 
part by being rightist- fascist or leftists-communist. Therefore the use of radical rhetoric by the 
prominent members of the RPP seems to have been one of the chief factors for increasing 
polarization. It is true that the Turkish party system (politics) has never been free from 
polarizing tendencies, but it became more pronounced through the 1973 elections and 
afterwards.
4.2. THE 1973 ELECTIONS: TOWARDS FRAGMENTATION AND
IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION
The 1973 elections were contested in a highly electrified atmosphere. The new RPP 
leadership made “the change of existing order” its motto, alongside the prevention of the threat 
fascism supposed to be nurtured by the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and tolerated by the JP. 
In line with Bülent Ecevit’s views outlined above, the RPP’s election manifesto, called “Ak 
Günlere” (To Bright Days) promised all good things together, restoration of democracy, low
201
inflation, high growth and social justice.”  The program promised a democracy in which people 
actively participated in public aflFairs. To this end it promised to remove all limitations, many of 
them brought to life during the 12 March period, upon the “freedom of thought,” *^ to remove 
various limitations that hindered the trade union’s and associations,’ civil servants and the 
universities’ involvement in political life.”  In a sentence that reveals party’s conception of law, 
it promised “not to implement the constitutional requirement that the state security courts be 
established unless extraordinary circumstances require.”^  Concerning economic policy the 
manifesto presented only general statements setting the party’s policy orientation rather than a 
detailed program of a what possible RPP government would do. It stated that there was no 
contradiction between rapid growth and social justice on the one hand, and industrialization 
and agriculture on the other.*' Aiming to remove the “differences between village and city” it 
offered the implementation of rural-city projects.*^ It also promised a “land reform” that aimed 
not to end private property but to enable the landless peasant to have land of his own. Lands to 
be distributed should come from large estates as well as from unused but arable public lands.*^
It favored a mixed economy in which private sector, public sector and people’s sector, 
“consisting of co-operatives and other public enterprises” would co-exist.*^ Big capital (or 
monopoly capital) and foreign investment is tolerated but would be subjected to clearly 
specified limits. The manifesto also promised to secure “social justice within the private sector”
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi- Ak Günlere [The 
Republican People’s Party, 1973 Election Manifesto- To Bright Days] (Ankara: Ajans Türk, 1973)
“ Ibid, 178.
”  Ibid., 189.
“ Ibid., 189.
*' Ibid.,90.
“  Ibid.,41.
"  Ibid., 35-36.
Ibid.,84, 31.
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by supporting small and medium sized firms as well as Anatolian industrialists.®  ^ In foreign 
policy, it did not propose anything profoundly different fi'om traditional Turidsh foreign policy. 
It promised “to stay in common defense organizations that Turkey participated in” but also 
stated that “it would not be contented with it.”®® It was fiirther stated that the encouragement 
of the indigenous defense industry and the strict controls of NATO bases in Turkey were to be 
given priority. While supporting détente between blocs and great powers, it highlighted 
Turkey’s need to advance economic and political relations with the non-aligned countries as 
well as all her neighbors.®’
The IP’s election manifesto, on the other hand, was relatively short (91 pages in 
comparison to RPP’s 229 pages) and consisted of a restatement of the party’s traditional 
policy line; mbced economy with social welfare provisions, emphasis on national will and the 
critique of som6 provisions of the (changed) 1961 constitution, 'wdiich were thought to be in 
conflict with that ideal. If the election manifesto differed from previous ones in one respect it 
was in its emphasis on anti-communism. It mentioned the existence of the communist threat 
with an international backing directed to Turkey’s political integrity and blamed it as the chief 
cause for the political instability that the country experienced for two decades.®* It argued the 
events of the last two years had shown that violent events were not directed to the JP 
governments, as claimed by some RPP leaders, but to the integrity of the Turkey’s democratic 
regime.®  ^ It promised that the JP would take every conceivable measure to “fight with 
communism, which was the biggest enemy of the Turkish nation and l&therland, and all other 
extreme currents.”™ The anti-communist rhetoric became more and more pronounced in the JP
65
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Ibid., 81-85.
Ibid., 217.
Ibid., 219-220.
68 Adalet Partisi, Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi -1973 [The Justice Party Election
Manifesto- 1973] (Ankara, 1973), 7.
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leaders election speeches. They tended to accuse the RPP of defending and nurturing 
commmunists through their defense of unlimited freedom of thought and through inflaming 
speeches. Their mutual allegations tended to raise the tension that sometimes led to violent 
clashes between party supporters.^’ Apart from the polarization on issues, the fact that the 
elections were perceived as severe test of the leaders themselves made them very rigid and 
worried. The JP leader, Süleyman Demirel, was anxious to prove that despite the intervention, 
he was still acceptable (to the army) as a premier. He also faced the task of uniting the right as 
three parties emerged for the former JP votes. The RPP leadership was equally concerned 
about whether their new policies would be approved by the electorate. Though the danger of 
terrorism seemed to be fading away, many believed that with a return to civilian regime it might 
resume.
Table 9: The 1973 General Election Results^
Political Parties Votes % Seats(in the lower assembly)
RPP 33.3 185
JP 29.8 149
DP 11.9 45
NSP 11.8 48
RRP 5.3 13
NSP 3.4 3
TLP 1.1 1
Independents 2.8 6
As table shows, the 1973 elections did not give any party mandate to govern alone. 
Contrary to expectations, the RPP became the first party with 33.3 per cent of the vote, whilst 
the JP garnered away 29.8 per cent of the vote, gaining 186 and 149 seats respectively in the 
lower assembly. It was the first time since the 1946 elections that the RPP finished first. The 
RPP’s success was interpreted as an indication of the approval that the electorate had given
The angry crowd had attacked the RPP leader Bülent Ecevit m pre-election meeting in İsparta, 
hometown of Süleyman Demirel, which left more than 20 people wounded. Ecevit had blamed Şevket 
Demirel (Demirel's brother and the leader of JP organization in İsparta) for instigating the attacks. 
Hürriyet, September 29, 1973.
Metin Heper, A Historical Dictionary o f Turkey (Metuchen, N.J; Scarerow Press, 1994), 55.
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towards Ecevit and his left of center policy. Analysis of the RPP votes had supported this 
interpretation. It has been shown that workers, inhabitants of the Gecekondu’s and those living 
in urban areas increasingly voted for the RPP, a trend already observed in 1969 elections but 
becoming more pronounced in 1973 .^  ^ Parallel to the rise in its votes in urban areas the RPP 
lost support in the less developed South East, as the big land-owners and Aghas tend to move 
away from the RPP basically due to its left of center policy.
The fact that the JP saw its share of vote decline in those areas that the RPP increased 
its vote suggests that an number of former JP supporters switched their support towards the 
RPP, but in itself it does not explain the JP’s loss of its former position as the dominant party of 
Turkey. Surely, the National Salvation Party (NSP) led by Necmettin Erbakan and Democratic 
Party of Ferruh Bozbeyli, which had a 11.8 and 11.9 per cent of the vote respectively, appears 
to have appealed some segments of former JP supporters.’“* Despite these changes, it is hard to 
claim that social background characteristics of the RPP and JP deputies did significantly differ 
from each other, as table 10. demonstrates.
Ergun özbudun, “ 1973 Türk Seçimleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme,” [An Inquiry on the 1973 
Turkish General Elections] Bülent Nuri Esen 'e Armağan (Ankara; Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi 
Yayınlan, 1977), 277, 290; Ergun özbudun and Frank Tachau, “Social Change and Electoral 
Behaviour in Turkey: Toward a ‘Critical realignment’ T  International Journal o f Middle East Studies. 6 
(1975).
As özbudım and Tachau noted, it was the Democratic Party to which former JP supporters 
appears to have defected while the NSP have drawn support from a various sources, özbudun and Tachau, 
“Critical,” 475.
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Table 10. Social Backgrounds of Two Major Party Deputies, 1973 (%)0/.'»75
Ocxaipations RPP JP
Official 26 24
Government 10 12
Military
Education 13
Professional 49 39
Law 33 24
Medicine
Engineering
Economic 16 30
Agriculture 10
Tiade.ind. banking 11 20
Other
Religion 0.5
One sigriificant difference observed was that the RPP members tended to be younger, 
and somewhat better educated than other parties, and more heavily made up of professionals, 
especially lawyers and teachers.’* The distribution of former military oflBcers among the parties 
provides further evidence of the military’s post-1973 disengagement from the RPP and 
rapprochement to the JP. A total of 17 former military oflScers, 8 (% 5.4 of JP membership) 
were afSliated with the JP compared 6 with the RPP (%3.2 of RPP membership).”
In terms of the categories formulated by Giovanni Sartori,’* the 1973 elections marked 
the beginning of the trend away from predominant party system towards the moderate multi­
party system.”  Sartori characterized the moderate multi-party system as a party system with
Adopted from Weikcr. Modernization, 22,23.
Frank Tachau, “Social Backgrounds of Turiush Parliamentarians,” in Commoners, Climbers 
and Notables, A Sample o f Studies on Social Ranking in the Middle East, ed. C. Van Nieuwenhmjze 
(Uiden: E.J.Brill, 1977), 310.
77 Ibid., 308.
™ Giovanni Sartori. Parties and Party Systems-A Framework for Analysis, vol 2. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976).
’’ Sabri Sayan, “Turkish Party System in Transition.” Government and Opposition. 13, (1978), 
48; Ergun özbudun, “The Turkish Party System; Institutionalization, Polarization and Fragmentation.” 
Middle Eastern Studies. 17, (1981), 232. Üstün Ergüder, “Changing Patterns of Electoral Behaviour in
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more than 3-5 parties in which no one party is able to form a government unless it is supported 
by one or more parties, whose distinctive feature is the absence of anti-system parties and 
moderate form of politics. Up until the 1973 election the combined votes of the two major
parties never amounted less than 71.5 Even this was obtained in peculiar circumstances of 1961 
elections in which there was a fierce competition for old DP votes.** But now it was only 63.1 
percent. Moreover, the DP-JP tradition seemed to have lost the dominant position (in terms of 
votes secured) it once had.
This fragmentation of the party system was accompanied by ideological polarization*^ 
between party elites. Despite the moderate multi-party system the elements of moderate 
politics were lacking.*  ^ The major party elites tended to polarize on the right-left (or as they 
called it fescist-communist) divide. There was nothing new in the Turidsh party elite’s 
disposition towards polarization but the issues on which parties polarized changed from a 
progressive-reactionary to left-right (or fascist-communist) divide. But more significantly, three 
explicitly ideological and semi-loyal parties (NSP, NAP and TWP) have been able to command
16.3 per cent of the vote and 52 seats in the lower assembly.*  ^ This fiagmentation and
Turke>.” Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi. 8-9 (1980-1981), 47. 
Saitori. P a rtie s .m -m .
% 93.2 (in 1950), 91.4 (in 1954), 87.9 (in 1957), 71.5 (in 1961), 81.6 (in 1965), 73.9 (in
1969).
^  The term “polarization” is hard to define. According to Dahl, it involves three difierent 
notions: the idea of a dimension of bipolarity, dualism, the extent to wliich a population is divided into 
two categories; the idea of dimension of distance between the largest categories; the idea of various 
charaaeristic on which polarity or dualism might exist. Robert A. Dahl, “Some Explanations,” in 
Political Oppositions in Western Europe, ed. Robert A. Dahl (New Haven and London; Yale University 
Press, 1966), 381. Giovanni Sartori appears to have equated polarization with a situation in which 
“spectrum of political opinion is highly polarized” and where “lateral poles are literally two poles apart, 
and the distance between them covers a maximum spread of opinion.” Sartori. Parries. 135. In line with 
these definitions we use the term “polarization” to depict a situation in which political opinions (held 
whether by elites or masses) literally is bipolar and there is a maximum distance between these poles.
83 Sayan, “Party system,” 49.
^  Whether the Turkish party system at this period can be characterized as polarized pluralism, is 
debatable, despite ideological polarization at the leadership level. Tme, there were five to six parties with 
coalition potential, the opposition showed some characteristics of bilateral opposition, and there was 
centrifugal drive, all symptoms of polarized pluralism as espoused by Sartori. But, on the other hand, the
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polarization of the party system posed new challenges to Turkish democracy as it necessitated 
the formation of coalitions. The country had to pass through the experience during the 
transition period of 1961-65. But many did not find it satisfectory not only because it was a 
coalition that came to life only with the militarys’ backing but also because governing with the 
coalitions requires values such as compromise, bargaining, shared decision-making, which are 
not highly valued in the Turkish political traditions and culture. It all seemed to depend on 
party elites ability to come up with viable coalition government that would set out to tackle 
Tuiicey’s problems.
There were some talks in the business community supported by President Fahri 
Korutürk regarding the necessity of the RPP-JP grand coalition so as to make a swift transition 
to civilian democracy. Political party leaders did not entertain such a possibility. Demirel, who 
inteqjreted election defeat as the electorates’ misunderstanding regarding their endeavor to 
keep parliament open, made it clear after election results that “nation has given them the duty 
for opposition.”*’ He had consistently rejected the grand coalition with the RPP since 1969 and 
never thought of the JP participating in a coalition under Ecevit’s premiership. On the contrary, 
far fi"om forming a coalition with the RPP, Demirel tried to limit the RPP’s chances of forming 
coalition with the NSP or DP by increasing ideological polarization.*^ The RPP leadership was 
no less repentant. Only one day after the election Bülent Ecevit declared that he was committed 
to reform the existing order and was not prepared to make concessions to form a coalition 
government. He appears to have thought that the premiership was in his own grasp and did not 
want to miss opportunity.
When it became clear that the two major parties would not collaborate, minor parties 
particularly NSP, came to play a prominent role totally out of proportion their electoral *
metrical center of the system was not occupied by a center party, there was no clear anti-system party and 
that with the 1977 elections the number of parties that have an a coalition potential declined to four, while 
the combined votes of two major parties arisen to 78.3 %.
8S October 23, 1973.
** Sabri Sayan, Parlamenter Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri [Coalition Governments in 
Parliamentary Democracies] (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınlan, 1980), 186.
208
strength. The NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan did his best to secure the most advantegous 
coalition bargain. One day he visited Demirel, the next day Ecevit, then Demirel again. This 
endless bickering continued until February, that is nearly three months after the elections when 
the RPP-NSP coalition was ratified by President Fahri Korutiirk.
The coalition seemed to be the bizarre combination that could be formed when we 
considered the ideologies and world-views of coalition parties. The NSP questioned very 
concept of laicism which constituted the central flank of the Republican regime of which the 
RPP had been one of its prime defender so far. Those wbo defended the coalition pointed out 
similarities between parties, i.e. that both of them opposed big business with multinational 
connections, that both favored state-backed industrialization, that both of them defended more 
independent (read western-sceptical) foreign policy, and that both had fevored social welfere 
regulations.*’ Notably, it was suggested (by the pro-RPP supporters) that both the RPP and 
NSP appealed to same electorate; the underprivileged, the diflference was that the NSP 
supporters sought solutions in the metaphysic, while the RPP supporters did it in economic and 
social sciences. They also pointed out that the coalition might help to bridge the gap or 
traditional cultural cleavage between laicist and pro-Islamists that generated considerable 
problems for Turkish democracy. Bülent Ecevit, for instance, argued that the “historical 
mistake” was now being corrected.**
However, as even pro-Ecevit scholars*’ accepted that political calculations and 
advantages of being in power counted more than anything else. For Erbakan it was a question
See, for instance. Muzaffer Sencer “Koalisyonun öğeleri,” fThe Elements of the Coalition] 
Cumhuriyet, January 22, 1974.
“  According to Ecevit, Turkish intellectuals have falsely assumed that religion constituted one of 
the most intractable force in opposition to progressive socio-cultural reform. They asssumed it to be so, 
because the vested interests of the status quo that resisted socio-cultural reforms have so far been able to 
disguise it by reference to religion. That was a historical mistake as it was not those ptople who had a 
sincere belief in religion that stood in the way of reforms, but those who used religion to oppose reforms. 
Ecevit. Sohbet. 95. He also argued that the coalition was significant in that it showed that loyalty to 
democratic left does not contradict with loyalty to traditional customs or religion. Cumhuriyet, February 
12, 1974.
89 Ahmad, Experiment.334.
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of survival since the predecessor to NSP (the National Order Party) had been closed down by 
the constitutional court. He appears to have thought that a coalition with the RPP would surely 
enhance its image, which would help to prevent any future possible closure of his party. 
Besides, he also thought that the advantages of being in power would greatly enhance the 
party’s patronage capabilities and thus help the party to consolidate its power base. Ecevit was 
equally concerned to get into power. Being a prime minister, he thought, would help to 
assuage the fears regarding the RPP’s new “left of center” policy and his ability to govern.^ *
The coalition lasted only for seven months. What Ecevit called a coalition to correct 
the “historic mistake” at the end turned out to be a dismal failure for his party. It soon became 
clear to RPP leaders that the NSP was not interested in fulfilling what was in the coalition 
protocol, but rather furthering their own agenda in total disregard for it. ThQf brought their 
own men into the ministries under their jurisdiction, without any respect to legal regulations 
and used the ministries they had as they saw fit. It became clear that they were using resources 
they controlled for patronage purposes. Necmettin Erbakan, as vice-premier, made many 
public speeches that many despised as cases of irresponsible leadership. On one day, he would 
speak of making one hundred thousand tanks, the next day he would declare that oil-rich Arab 
countries would provide che^ oil to Turkey because he reminded them of Islamic 
brotherhood.’^
^  Türker Alkan, “The National Salvation Party in Turicof,” in Islam & Politics in the Modem 
Middle East, ed. Metin Heper and Israel Raphael (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 83. See also one 
of the party MP’s speech that the coalition with the RPP enhanced the party’s legitimacy. Cited in Ali 
Yaşar Sanbay, Türkiye’de Modernleşme Din ve Parti Politikası -MSP ömekolayı [Modernization, 
Religion and Party Politics in Tuikey -The NSP Case] (Istanbul; Alan, 1985), 188.
Some journalists’ warnings went unnoticed. Metin Toker of Milliyet had argued that “This 
coalition can not be formed, even if it is formed can not survive long in the Turkey of 1973. From the very 
first day it will split up. It is a pity that the favourable winds (for Turkey) will be left une)q)loited. Those 
who live long enough are going to see it.” Milliyet, November 4, 1973. “Köhne Bir Kilidin Pash Anahtan 
İle” [With the Rusty Key of Obsolete Padlock]
^  Korkut özal, who was then minister of agriculture in the RPP-NSP coalition, remarked how 
Ecevit cancelled cabinet meeting after waiting for Eibakan to come for 45 minutes, despite the fact that he 
twice went to Eibakan’s room to tell him cabinet was waiting. Cited in Nail Güreli, Gerçek Tanık- Korkut 
özal anlatıyor [The Real Witness- Koricut özal Speaks] (İstanbul; Milhyet, 1994), 79.
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One notable work of the coalition that surely would have a lasting effect on democracy 
was the amnesty, in the honor of the fifth year of the republic, granted to those convicted of 
political crimes, as well as ordinary convicts. Critics have pointed out that those who had been 
released (for having been convicted for political crimes) would now be encouraged to continue 
their activities that have led the country into political chaos.^  ^ Even Ecevit himself had to 
accept that alongside the rightist militants, there might be leftist militants who had been freed 
by the general amnesty. But he put the blame on the assembly and the constitutional court for 
altering the original draft that upset the balance.^ The amnesty issue was also important in 
deciding the coalitions’ future. Despite initial agreement, the twenty NSP deputies voted for 
exclusion of those convicted from the notorious Penal Code articles 141 and 142 prohibiting 
the establishment (and according to some, propaganda) of the communist organizations. The 
bül finally passed as the constitutional court (acting upon the appeal of the RPP) decided that 
exclusion of those articles was unconstitutional.^^ It was the last straw that helped Ecevit to 
make his mind to dissolve the coalition.
The coalition might have lasted longer than it had, if only Ecevit had not believed that 
early elections might give him a landslide victory. The Turkish army’s successful intervention in 
Cyprus’* turned Ecevit into a national hero almost overnight.’’ He was hailed as a second 
Atatürk, the man who rescued Turkish Cypriots from extermination, and showed to the world.
”  The army especially seemed to have grave reservations about that release, and their confidence in 
Ecevit fiirther declined as they believed that many of those fieed fiom prisons would be likely to engage in 
terrorist activities. But since their last intervention in politics resulted in disarray they could not exert pressure 
on this particular issue and preferred to stay silent It nevertheless reinforced their perception of civilians, that is 
distorting what they had achieved for political purposes. General Evren told me that with that amnesty 
‘terrorists, who had been even more sharpened, have been fieed.” Kenan Evrert Interview by the Author, 
Marmaris, March 31,1998. (Henceforth interview).
Bülent Ecevit, Ecevit'in Açıklamaları [Statements of Ecevit](Ankara, 1977), 10
^  It was repotted that nearly four thousand prisoners who had been convicted of these articles 
have been freed by the constitutional court decision. Cumhuriyet, January 1,1975.
^  Turkey used her right to intervene as guarantor power when the ruling Greek junta backed 
colonel Nikos Sampson attempted to eradicate Turkish population forcefully from the island.
^  Some writers even compared him with Atatürk, Safe M. Yurdanur, Dün Atatürk Bugün Ecevit 
[Yesterday Atatürk, Today Ecevit] (Istanbul; Göl, 1975)
211
once again, what Turks could achieve. The RPP leadership estimated that if th ^  could take the 
country to the polls, they would win a landslide victory. Ecevit, then, created an opportunity to 
resign and used it, though the reason for resignation stated was to prevent the NSP’s 
endeavors to seize the state.^ * However, he miscalculated the feet that the other parties in 
parliament would not agree to hold an early general election, which they were likely to lose. 
After it became clear that two major parties would not be able to form a government. President 
Korutiirk entrusted the task of forming a government to senator Sadi Irmak. The Irmak 
government failed a vote of confidence, but continued (until the new government formed) as 
caretaker government. Thus, T urk^ entered the longest governmental crisis in its history 
which would last more than two hundred days.
During this period, painstaking bargainings between parties took place. The JP 
leadership seemed to follow a two-tiered strategy. It aimed the prevention of possible RPP 
government and the seduction of enough Demokratik Party MP’s to resign from their parties 
and thus to form a National Front government with NAP and NSP. The portrayal of the RPP 
as more left leaning than it was and blaming it for student violence in the universities was well 
suited to first strategy. The RPP leadership, on the other, did its best to persuade the other 
parties for an early general election. While the political scene was dominated by endless 
maneuverings, clashes between rival students groups, that had a potential to spread into larger 
segments of the population, tended to reemerge. The instability at the governmental level was 
beginning to have an effect on the social level as the caretaker Irmak government could do little 
to deal with the crowded agenda. The reactions of the major party elites to these events were 
telling in that they provided clues the direction of their attitude that they would show to 
increasing terrorism later. For instance, when TTUSA (a union of left-leaning teachers) 
meetings had been disturbed by unknown attackers, Demirel reacted that “it was the RPP that 
instigated attacks so as to say (to nation) that either we come to power or we would not allow
According to Ferda G ül^ (minister of transport in the RPP-NSP government) “Ecevit wanted 
it to be seen by everbody that we had nothing common with our partner. He seemed to aiming to create 
several reasons that would make it easier (for public opinion to accept) if the RPP left the partnership.” 
Ferda Güley, Kendini Yaşamak [Living Oneself] (İstanbul; Cem, 1990), 541.
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this country to live in peace.” Ecevit on the other hand responded that “those who are a ftaid 
of possible RPP government were behind the attacks.”
The fact that the country had those days passed without any overt involvement of the 
military in politics was a positive sign of democracy’s resilience, as perceptively noted by Abdi 
İpekçi of Milliyet.’®* But, it was more to do with the military’s unwillingnes to engage in 
politics, rather than deeply entrenched belief in the virtues of democratic regime on the part of 
the citizenry at large and other critical groups. Indeed, it can be argued that endless discussions, 
turnarounds, broken promises, blufis that politicians were engaged in, during the post election 
period was highly corrosive of the belief in the democratic regime. Lacking a tradition arriving 
at a compromise through the multiple confrontation of various groups, Turidsh political culture 
does not look at favorably notions of “bargaining” that was the hallmark of the period. It 
tended to emphasize instead co-operation, harmony and unanimity.’®^ We have noted in the 
previous chapter that the bulk of Turkish elite’s (in the military and press) had a “rational 
conception of democracy” that is there is always one correct (rational) polity, which can be 
discovered through honest discussion, but not by bargaining and compromise. Bargaining was 
likely to be seen as means through which politicians pursued their narrow interest at the 
expense of public. And in Turkish case, endless bargainings reached a stage that even a 
consolidated democracy, that looks favorably on the notion of bargaining, can hardly accept as 
normal.
^  Yankı, (Istanbul weekly) 24 February- 2 March 1975.
Ibid.
Milliyet, 1 January 1975. Yankı has made it as cover subject asking “Why Turkey still endure 
T  Yankı, 24-30 March 1975, “Türkiye Neden Ayakta ?”[Why Turkey still endure ?]
These political traditions is not peculiar to Turkey. Both Ralf Dahrendorf and Myron Weiner 
notes prevalance of such values in German and Indian society. See, Ralf DahrendorL “Conflict and 
Liberty: Some Remarks on the Social Structure of German Politics.” British Journal o f  Sociology. XIV, 
(1%3), 197-211; Myron Weiner, “India: Two Political Cultures,” in Political Culture and Political 
Development, ed. Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 235.
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4^.THE NATIONAL FRONT GOVERNMENTS: POLITICIZATION AND 
POLARIZATION
The crisis ended when Demirel was appointed to head first the National Front (NF) 
government. It composed of the NSP, NAP and Republican Reliance Party (RRP), and nine 
deputies who had resigned fi'om Demokratik Party as a result of Demirel’s relentless efforts. 
The distribution of cabinet posts demonstrated again how important small parties had been in 
Turkey’s fi^gmented party system. The NSP held eight portfolios out of forty-eight seats, the 
RRP had four out of thirteen while NAP got two out of three seats. The JP, on the other hand, 
held eighteen portfolios out of one hundred forty eight seats. In the vote of confidence, the NF 
coalition garnered away 222 votes while 218 voted against it.
To better understand the NF period, it is necessary to take into account the views of 
those who composed it. According to Demirel, the rationale behind the formation of the NF 
governments was, “to unite the nationalist against the leftists and communists.” He argued 
that politics in Turkey was now divided into two; the leftist camp composed of RPP and other 
smaller socialist parties and rightist camp which included JP, NSP, NAP, RRP, and DP. 
Therefore, Demirel continued, it was necessary for right-wing parties to constitute a National 
Front to stop the march of socialism in the country. He was not the only man to argue in this 
line. The idea of National Front against the left was first suggested after the 1973 elections by
The establishment of the first NF government was interpreted as a proof of Demirel’s 
resilience and his considerable political skills. For that reason. Yankı has chosen Demirel man of the year. 
1975. Yankı, 29 December-4 Januaiy, 1976.
According to the 1961 constitution, just a simple majority is enough to secure vote of 
confidence, while the qualified majority of 226 is required to oust government in power through vote of no 
confidence.
Aware of the bad publicity and connotations asociated with the word “front” Demirel and 
other leaders of the coalition were careful not to call it as National Front, but were anxious to emphasize 
that it was a “cumhuriyet hükümeti” or “coalition of nationalist parties” at most. Celal Bayar, on the other 
hand, did not refiain to use the term National Front against the danger of communism. Celal Bayar, 
Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek (Atatürk’ün Metodolojisi) fThinking Like Atatüik (The Methodology of 
Atatürk)], second edition, ed. İsmet Bozdağ (İstanbul; Tekin, 1998), 138. (first published in 1978).
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Celai Bayar and Ferruh Bozbeyli.**  ^The sharp rise in the RPP’s votes and the fear of Ecevit, 
whose radical rhetoric frightened influential right-wing circles in the country, and intellectual 
dominance of socialist ideas, motivated them to seek a united coalition against it.‘“’
It was not altogether clear whether Demirel genuinely believed in the communist threat 
or used it as pretext to obtain the support of minor right-wing parties so as to persuade them to 
participate in a coalition. It appears that both played a role. When Demirel’s views since 
1965 are examined there was a marked trend towards stringent anti-communism. Demirel 
appears to have believed that there was a threat of communism backed by several states and 
international organizations. Against the argument that the electoral strength of the socialist 
parties was negligible, he pointed out that the communists nowhere seized power through 
election, and that they would not seize it in Turkey either. According to Demirel, the 
communist conspiracy was behind the many problems that Turkey had to tackle. Alongside his 
belief in communist danger, the opposition to communism was weU suited to Demirel’s aim of 
attaining power. For Demirel, it was important to demonstrate that after 12 March he was 
again capable of governing the country. He had to dispel doubts raised in many circles that the 
army would not allow him to become prime minister. Many also believed that Demirel feared 
the parliamentary investigations in the assembly (regarding Demirel femily’s business 
connections, particularly his nephew Yahya Demirel) might result him being tried in the 
Supreme Court (Yiice Divan). Critics charged that Demirel craved attaining power because 
only if he came to power, could he prevent such an outcome as decisions of these commissions 
heavily afiected by political considerations rather than impartial criterias. To come to power, to
In fact, the so-called “Patriotic Front” (Vatan Cephesi) of the DP period can be seen as the 
foreruner of the idea of National Front.
Muharrem Ergin, one of the ideologues of the influential Aydınlar Ocağı had been constantly 
arguing for a nationalist front against the “storm of socialism.” See for a collection of his writings. 
Muharrem Ergin, Milliyetçiler, Korkmayınız, Birleşiniz [Nationalists, Do not be Afraid, Unite] (Ankara; 
Ayyildiz, 1976).
The allegations of being communist or nurturing them did not begin with Demirel, however. 
In line with the tradition of mutual allegations, many had blamed the DP founders for being communist in 
the late forties. Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, Demokrat Parti Masalı [The Democrat Party TaleKİstanbul: 
Milliyet, 1996), 17.
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prevent the RPP forming a coalition, Demirel, then, tended to exaggerate the “threat of 
communism.” He presented his case as if the communists would take over the government, 
if he did not form the NF coalition."®
The NSP was rather more interested in the benefits of being in office. Arguments that 
compelled the NSP coalition with Ecevit applied equally to NF governments. That is, being in 
power ensured an aura of legitimacy and helped to consolidate its power base through the 
enhanced opportunities for patronage. The NAP, which made the struggle against communism 
its motto, were more than happy to join such a coalition. In addition, they, too, were moved by 
the advantages of being in power.*" As such the coalition was based on shaky foundations. 
Rather than uniting in the implementation of anything like a coalition protocol, each partner, 
particularly the NAP and the NSP followed their own strategies, which was to prove highly 
detrimental for democratic stability.
The most pronounced aspect of the NF governments was the extreme politicization of 
bureaucracy and an extensive party patronage. We use the term politicization to mean “the 
influence of party politics penetrating into public administration and pushing the special 
interests of political parties into the foreground at the expense of the realization of a unified 
national policy.”"^ It refers to a state of afiairs in which the political party or (parties in
According to Nadir Nadi, communism has became the biggest support of Demirel who has 
lost support both inside and outside the country. It is through the use of the fear of communism, Nadi 
argued, Demirel had been trying to cover his own defects. See, Nadir Nadi, Cumhuriyet, August 3, 1976. 
“En Büyük Desteği,” [His Greatest Suppport]. Even stringent anti-communist. Professor Aydın Yalçın 
criticized Demirel’s this attitude of exaggerating the communist threat to Turkey. Aydın Yalçın, Türk 
Komünizmi Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler [Some Observations on Turkish Communism] (Ankara: Ayyildiz, 
1976), 134.
Otherwise, Demirel’s views on coalition governments (probably derived from the 1961-1965 
experience) was overtly negative. Prior to the 1%9 elections, he argued that “coalition governments can 
do nothing but to get along somehow (idare-i maslahat etmek). They mean frequent governmental crisis 
and engagement to small parties’ programs rather than your own.” Cited in Abdi İpekçi, Liderler Diyor 
Ki -Röportajlar [The Leaders are Speaking - Reports] (İstanbul: Ant Yayınlan, 1969), 50.
Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, “The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party.” 
C.E.M.O.T.I, 13 (1992), 156-8.
V. Merikoski, “The Politicization of Public Administration.” International Review o f  
Administrative Science. 3, (1973), 211. Merikoski differentiate two separate but interrelated aspects of the
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power) tend to dominate and control bureaucracy and subject all decisions to the political 
preferences of the governing party (or parties). Subjecting the high level bureaucrats to party 
preferences is not a phenomenon unique to Turkey and, unless taken to the extremes, it is not 
seen as strictly detrimental to democratic stability. It is not easy to determine how the 
relationships between high level appointed officials and elected ones are to be arranged. 
On the one hand, it seems well-justified for a new government to appoint to bureaucratic 
positions those with whom it considers would cooperate best. Indeed, democratic ideals 
require that subordination (within well-defined rules) of appointed officials to the elected 
ones. Since they, not the bureaucrats, are elected by people and are called to account in 
every election period. On the other hand, a powerful, independent and non-politicized 
bureaucracy, which is not totally dependent on political authority, is indispensable for the 
sound implementation of policies.
How a balance ought to be struck between two principles is determined by such 
factors as country’s history, culture, institutional structure in each case. Ferrel Heady 
noted two distinct tradition."^ What he called “classic” administrative systems referred to 
existence of strong bureaucratic organization with a sense of esprit de corps, which is 
inclined to assume that what political parties stand for is not necessarily identical to the 
public interest. The French and German bureaucracies approximate this type. Here 
politicization at the higher echelons of the bureaucratic machine is resisted. “Civic 
Culture” administrative systems, on the other hand, prefer a bureaucracy which serves the 
political party in power. They do not have a conception of public interest independent of 
the political party in power. The United States and English bureaucracies approximate this 
type. In these countries, particularly in United States, elected politicians have an 
unmatched leverage over the bureaucracy.
Turkey, which has shown characteristics of “classic” administrative system, came to
politicization. One concerns with the political appointments, the other political activities of civil servants. 
In this study our focus is on the first aspect.
Fenel Heady, Public Administration -A Comparative Perspective (New York: Marcel and 
Dekker, 1984), 179.
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experience an extreme spoil system. During the NF governments, politicization of bureaucracy 
have reached a level heretofore unseen in the history of Turkish democracy. Each ministry was 
put under the complete jurisdiction of one party and each party (which controlled that ministry) 
reshuffled it in a way it saw fit fi'om the rank of undersecretary to junior servants. To have the 
sympathy of one party or parties in power, not the merit or achievement, was the criteria, 
according to which bureaucratic positions were filled. When as soon as the new minister 
appointed, (s)he tended to change his private secretariat, then deputy minister then general 
directors, directors of department and even directors of sections.'*^ We do not have any hard 
data basically because of difiBculties inherent in the nature of the subject-matter and evidence 
remain largely impressionistic"^ but even rough estimates demonstrate the magnitude of the 
degree of politicization. Figures that Professor Sait Güran provided, for instance, might give an 
idea how the post-1975 governments (of which one of them was the NF governments) played 
with the bureaucracy. According to Güran, between 1962 and 1980 provincial governors 
(Vali) were changed 518 times. The average number of changes per year was 29 and average 
service duration was two an half years. Until the establishment of the first NF government, 
(that is in first thirteen years) the number of changes amounted to 284 and the average number 
of changes per year was 22 and average service duration was 3.1 years. Between 1975 and 
1980 (beginning of the first NF government to July 1980), however, the number of changes 
amounted to 234. That meant 47 changes a year and duration of service of 17 months only. ‘
Alongside the politicization, each party tried to use state power and resources to
Cahit Tutum. “Yönetimin Siyasallaşması ve Partizanlık.” [Politicization of Administration 
and Partisanship]/t/nme İdaresi Dergisi. 9, 4 (1976), 19.
For other examples. Sait Güran, Memur Hukukunda Kayırma ve Liyakat Sistemleri [Spoil 
and Merit Systems in the Laws that Regulate Civil ServantsKİstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1980), 285- 
290 and Tutum, “Partizanlık," 18-19.
Güran, Memur.291. The phenomenal increases in the number of civil servants in the seventies 
can be interpreted as further evidence of poliücization as parties tried to recruit as many civil servants as 
possible from their supporters. While in 1970 number of civil servants was 655.737, it has risen to 
962.537 in 1976 and 1.174.710 in 1977-8. While the population also went up finm 35.232.000 in 1970 to 
42.078.000 in 1977-8, the number of civil servants almost doubled in less than nine years. Ibid., 6.
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further, not the coalitions, their own interests for patronage*'^  purposes. To choose a place 
where public investment would be directed was determined largely by whether the investment 
in question would increase the chances of reelection of party in power. Local mayors, 
belonging to opposition parties could not get the revenues that the central government were 
legally to provide."* The changes in the position of Director General of a State Economic 
Enterprises is one indication of how the plundering of public resources reached high 
proportions. Believing that State Economic Enterprises provides them unbridled power to 
satisfy partisans, each party made it sure that their men administrated the SEE’s. Between 
1962-1974 the average number of years for duration of service (for a director of SEE) was 3.5 
years, the corresponding figure for the 1974-1980 period was, on the other hand, 1.7 years. 
The patronage and politicization, that had been observed in this period disturbed even 
otherwise loyal supporters of the coalition. Nazlı Dicak, for instance, complained of extreme 
partisanship;
It is possible to understand a government that appoints higher civil servants with care and 
selectivity so as to implement its program successfully. But it is a great mistake to apply this rule 
to workers (to work in the factory) or students (to study in the schools). And this is against our 
understanding of nationalism. (Besides) this also means the violation of the oath that has been 
made. And because of these it is both undignified and unconstitutional.
It was particularly minor coalition partners, the NSP and NAP, rather than the JP that
went as far as they could go in this game of politicization and patronage. Despite its misgivings
about bureaucracy, the D P-P tradition had never attempted to scatter about civil bureaucracy
as did the those two parties."’ They were essentially moderate catch-all parties which could
117 The term patronage refers to 'Ihe ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special 
âvours in exchange for electoral suppoit” Alex Weingrod, “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties.” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History. 10, (1968), 379.
” * Protesting the NF government’s partisanship, mayor of Ankara (chosen at the RPP ticket) even 
went hunger strike. Hürriyet, July 31.1976.
Güran, A/em«r. 290.
Tercüman, November 16, 1976. “Milliyetçi Cephe Koalisyonu” ffhe National Front
Coalition].
Erhan Bener, Bürokratlar-2 [Bureaucrats-2] (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1978), 184, 196.
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not afford to be too hostile to any significant group in society. Besides, even if they appointed 
their own men into bureaucratic positions, they at least showed some concern that they were 
able men. Basically in order to keep things going, as low quality appointments would likely 
have damaged chances of reelection through the low quality of services they would have 
provide. The minor parties, on the other hand, concerned solely with whether the appointee in 
question was one of their own men or not. From their point of view of themselves, this was a 
rationalistic option. Being a party which had little hope of gaining votes fi'om moderates (and 
which was supported in the main by hard core believers) they had little incentive to show care 
about the quality of those appointed. Besides, these party leaders appear to have thought that 
they might not have another opportunity to participate in government, therefore it was in their 
best interests to maximize the advantages of being in power without any concern for legal, 
traditional or ethical rules.
To better understand why NF governments tended towards politicization and party 
patronage it is necessary to pay attention to both the impact of the strong st^e tradition and 
the social-structure of the country that undergoes rapid modernization.*^ Civil bureaucracy in 
Turkey displayed unique tendencies which distinguished it fi'om French and German 
bureaucracies, countries which also had a state tradition. In the latter cases, despite having the 
notion of public interest, which is not always same as those of politicians in power, 
bureaucracies have came to accept that their definition of public interest is not the sole 
definition of it, that is, they do not have a monopoly on “truth.” The strong “Esprit de Corps” 
tradition is balanced by the tradition of “service to the state, whatever masters the state may
These two factors having been singled out, the legal-institutional framework that regulated 
Turkish civil bureaucracy also appears to have contributed the prevalance of extensive politicization of 
bureaucracy. The lack of centrally organized examinations to recruit civil servants is argued to be one of 
the reasons. Since each public organisation tends to recruit civil servants in the way it sees fit, this led to 
gross differences in terms of the quality of civil servants. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that 
any civil servant could easily be moved through different institutions. Thus enabling one, who happened 
to have somehow become a civil servant, to be moved into other institutions which showed concern with 
the quality of appointees. See, Güran, Memur. 273 ff. See also, Cahit Tutum, “Türic Personel Sisteminin 
Sorunlanna Genel Bir Yaklaşım.” [An Essay on the Problems of the Turkish Personnel System] Amme 
İdaresi Dergisi. 13(1980), 102-3.
220
have.” Thus modus vivendi emerged as “the bureaucratic elite does not lay claim to 
becoming the political elite as well.”*^^
In Turkey, on the other hand, bureaucracy strictly adhere to what Heper called 
“bureaucratic empire tradition.” Composing (with the military) the significant part of the 
what we called state elites, bureaucrats, too, assumed that there is only one correct policy in 
each case. They, also, appear to have lacked the notion that public interest would best be 
served through the conciliation of various interests. Instead, they maintained that it would 
emerge through discussion by intelligent people. Public interest, they assumed, is best 
represented and protected by bureaucrats who are fi'ee fi'om pressures of electoral 
competition.
This tradition appears to have given way to oppositional mentality (or state of mind) in 
the peripheral forces. Thus, “having always been pushed around the Turkish periphery they 
could not develop a public interest and emerge as ‘civil-society-as public.’”*^ Not only because 
lack of economic resources independent fi-om the state hindered the formation of various 
groups that might constitute the core of the civil society but also the over-zealous state state 
looked to such groups with suspicion. The state easily resorted to their suppression when 
officials began to think that it might constitute harm to state interests. When the potential civil 
societal groups are treated in such manner, the emergence of “public realm” and related 
concepts of ‘responsibility’ and indeed ‘civility’ in the public sphere becomes exceedingly
Heady, Administration. 202.
124 Ibid., 202.
Metin Heper, “The Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change; The Turkish 
Bureaucracy and a ‘Historical Bureaucratic Empire’ Tradition.” International Journal o f  Middle East 
Studies. 7, (1976).
Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (London; Eothen Press, 1985), 104. Heper draws 
upon Gianflonco Poggi’s phrase bourgeoisie-as-public in coining the term civil society-as public. 
Gianflonco Poggi, The Development o f  the Modem State (London; Hutchinson, 1978), 83.
We use public realm, after Poggi, to refer to a realm “formed by individual members of the 
civil society transcending their private concerns, elaborating a ‘public opinion’ on matters of state and 
bringing it to bear on the activities of state organs.” Poggi, State. 82.
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difficult. Since civil society is nothing but “citizens acting collectively in a public sphere."^^  ^
“The civility that makes democratic politics possible,” as Michael Walzer argued “can only be 
learned in the associational networks of civil society.”’^
With this attitude towards the political system in general, and the state in particular, it 
can be expected that when they (forces of periphery) had an opportunity, they would exploit 
state institutions to the fullest possible extent, breaking legal rules let alone ethical and 
traditional rules as the NF governments did.*^ ® Since it is an alien (but not in the sense of 
colonial powers) force that mistreated them for so long, there should be no limits to what can 
be obtained from it .^ ‘^ This is more so since that kind of opportunity might never came again, 
as what the state gave them could easily be taken back. The idiom that “the property of state is 
like a sea, he who does not exploit it is a pig” (devlet malı deniz yemeyen domuz) reflects this 
mentality.
Accompanied by this peripheral mentality one can also suggest additional elements
Lany Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation.” Journal o f  
Democracy, 5, 3 (1994), 5. (his italics)
Michael Walzer, “Civility and Civic Virtue in Contemporary America,” in Citizenship- 
Critical Concepts, vol 2, ed. Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1994), 104. (Origitial 
publication 1974), 1
Metin Heper, “Recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist Polity?.” 
IntemationalJoumal o f  Turkish Studies. 1,(1979-1980), 104.
This state of affairs is not urtique to Turkey, but was also observed in societies that have 
experienced with centralized, over-zealous state. In 1965. Alfred Grosser have noted similar tendency 
among Frenchmen who tended to see the centralized French state as “an enemy from which you must 
seize whatever advantages you can.” Peter Ekeh noted existence of two different ethics for Nigerians. One 
for public realm and one for private realm. According to Ekeh, while in the western societies what is 
considered morally wrong in private realm is also considered morally wrong in the public realm, 
Nigerians associating public realm with memories of the colonial administration does not think in this 
way. Thus, several actions (all forms of nepotism, for instance) that would disturb them in the private 
realm does not ethically disturb them if it is conducted in public realm. See, Alfred Grosser, “France; 
Nothing but Opposition,” in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, ed. Robert A. Dahl (New 
Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1966), 293; Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in 
Africa: A Theoretical Statement.” Comparative Studies in Society and History. 17, (1975).
It is also significant to note that the word “devlet mah” (property of state) suggests that people 
tend not to perceive state as something that exists to serve them and that have no other aim or property of 
its own but quite the reverse.
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that appear to have motivated the NAP and NSP for politicization and extensive 
patronage. Though we do not have hard evidence to sustain this claim, it would not be 
exaggeration to argue that NSP, for instance, tended to perceive the Republican Turkish 
state and its bureaucracy as something that imposed an irreligious secular framework and 
tried to eliminate Islam from Turkish society. As such its distrust and hostility to the 
Turkish state seemed to be doubled. The NAP, on the other hand, advanced a view that 
since very basis of Turkish nationalism and state was facing the threat of communism, 
anything deemed to have been of use against this struggle were to be regarded as 
legitimate. The widespread slogan of “everything is for the fatherland” denotes this state 
of mind. When the fatherland is seen to be in danger, principles like rule of law and other 
legal niceties were to be discarded since without a fatherland no rule of law is possible.
It would, however, be insufBcient to relate the NF governments’ tendency toward 
politicization and patronage solely to the state tradition and subsequent particular state-society 
relations. If that had been so, we would not have observed such phenomenon in countries 
which do not possess such state tradition, which obviously is not the case. Like many societies 
in modernization process, undergoing rapid socio-economic change, the social structure of 
Turkey provided a fertile ground that increased political parties’ predisposition towards 
politicization and patronage. The inability of the private industry to absorb migrant workers, the 
central governments’ less than successful efforts to ensure decent life for the migrants who had 
to Uve in squatter houses, have all led these people to turn their fiice to political parties for 
help.'^ ^ Political parties, in a desperate search for votes, find it hard to resist these pressures as
133 For the discussion of the NAP’s conception of democracy, see, Cizre-Sakallio|lu, Nationalist 
Action. 151-153.
134 Kemal Kaipat, for instance, found that the people in the squatter houses “regarded voting as the 
vital, if not the unique means, which allowed them to bargain with political parties and with the city as well as 
the national authorities.” Kemal RKarpat, “The Politics of Transition: Polihâl Altitudes and Party Affiliation in 
the Turidsh Gecdcondu,” in Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems, ed. 
Engin D. Akarii and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istarfoul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), 103. Similarly Sayan 
noted importaiKe of patronage “as a means for strengthening one’s status or for achieving particularistic goals is 
clearly recognized by most citizens. Establishing prqier cormections with the right people, therefore, assumes 
priority in all types of social relations.” Sabri Sayan, “Political Patronage in Turk^,” in Patrons and Clients in 
Mediterranean Societies, ed Ernest Gellner and John Wateibury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 104.
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their success is very closely related to their ability to secure specific benefits for their 
supporters.
In addition, the organization of the parties as well as initial conditions in which 
successors of these parties emerged were such that it made prevention of patronage diflBcult. 
Turkish parties, as noted, had hardly emerged as the representatives of social groups, 
articulating/aggregating their interests and carrying them into the public arena, but they 
emerged largely as a result of an intra-elite conflict. T h ^  were not so much parties which 
articulated /aggregated and tried to reconcile various interests than parties which were more 
interested in distributing public resources along party patronage. Thus, as Turan Güneş (an 
academic and the RPP MP) insightfuUy observed, Turkish parties did not ideolo^cally greatly 
diflfer fi-om each other nor did try to appeal to only one segment of the society. Their local 
organizations wşre dominated by powerful local faction leaders (be it trader or big farmer) who 
needed party support to maintain their privileged position. The party groups needed to respond 
to particularistic demands of the local organizations because they had a say in who should be 
nominated for the elections in the years to come.*^ ® Similarly, Martin Shefter (who criticized 
those who put a premium on the sociological theories of patronage which emphasized 
characteristics of society in transition) observed whether a party would lean towards patronage 
is heavily affected by calculations of the party elites as to whether the party would gain more 
than it would lose if it intervened the administrative process on a partisan basis. This in turn 
depended on the relative strength of party elite who had a stake in maintenance of the 
patronage system, on the one hand, and the strength of the bureaucratic elites who had an 
interest in maintaining a more universalistic administrative system, on the other; and whether
For a study that relates what we called here politicization and patronage to the phenomenon 
of administrative difiusion (that express itself with increases in; taxes and public spending, number of 
civil servants, new public agencies, regulations) as a result of increased social mobilization. See, Cemil 
Oktay, “Türkiye’de Yönetsel Yayılma Olgusu ve Doğurduğu Sonuçlar,” [The Phenomenon of 
Administrative Difiusion and Its Consequences in Turkey] Türkiye 'de Siyaset- Süreklilik ve Değişim, ed. 
Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sanbay (İstanbul: Der 1995). (first published in 1984).
Turan Güneş, “Partizanlığa (^ lare Bulabilecek Miyiz 7”[Shall We be able to Find Solution to 
Partisanship] Türk Demokrasisinin Analizi, ed. Hurşit Güneş, (Ankara: Ümit, 1996), 195. (first published 
in 1961)
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parties were internally created or externally mobilized ones.^ ^’ In Turkey many of these 
conditions were obtained. The DP and JP were internally created and did not stay in opposition 
for a long time and thus were not compelled to seek other means (recruting due-paying 
members, to form organic relations with economic interest groups) of acquiring a following. In 
addition, the peculiar state-society relations favoured patronage the best way to gain votes 
from the inception of party politics. It was true that a bureaucracy had consolidated itself prior 
to the emergence of mass participation, but this bureaucracy, especially its civilian part, could 
not successfully resist the party elites’ quest for patronage.*^*
Politicization and partisanship was not the only frcet of the NF governments. Due to a 
lack of agreement on critical issues, each coalition partner had its own way in governmental 
affain» to a degree that common governmental policy just could not emerge. For instance, it 
took fifty-three days to elect the head of TGNA because partners in the coalition just could not 
agree on who should be elected. The coalition partners heavily criticized each other and tended 
to take the share of success on them selves.T he NSP was the most vocal in its criticism of 
the JP and NAP. An outside observer might have been excused for assuming that some of 
these parties were in opposition criticizing government. In one instance, Necmettin Erbakan 
blamed the JP for subverting the NF government. He claimed that in the incoming elections 
(1975 partial senate and lower assembly by-elections) the JP faced heavy defeat by the NSP. 
When reminded of the feet that they were in coalition with the JP, Erbakan remarked that 
“fiiendship is one thing, the commerce is another” and that “there can not be any gain from 
unification with the colorless JP.”‘^  In other instance, Fehmi Cumalioglu, vice -chairman of
Martin Shefter, “Party and Patronage: Germany, England and Italy,” in The State-Critical 
Concepts, vol III, ed. John A  Hall (London; Routledge, 1994), 111. (first published in Politics and Society 
in 1977).
One of the reasons why was this so related with internal orgarusation of Turkish bureaucracy. 
As Dodd noted in Turkey “each ministry is virtually autonomous in its persoimel arrangements” so when 
a party control ministry, it could easily resuffle its bureaucracy, filling it with their own men who would 
not resist partisan demands. Dodd, Crisis. 47.
139
140
Güreli, Korkut ózal. 100. 
Hürriyet, August 11, 1975.
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the NSP, argued that the JP “belongs to a tradition that based on exploitative, rentist, 
materialist western mind Alparslan Türkeş, similarly argued that the “development plans 
that the RPP and the JP subscribed to amount to nothing but the deception of the nation.”*“*^
Their criticism of each other were not confined to pre-election campaigns. After the 
1975 senate and lower assembly by-elections in which the JP came first, Erbakan blamed the 
JP as if they were not in the same coalition, the “JP has gained but it did so through the 
use of money and inflated promises, but its balloon will soon be deflate.” The general 
secretary of the NAP once urged the resignation of minister of education (from JP) for 
annulling the entrance examination of the Teacher Schools controlled by the NAP.'“*^ 
Coalition partners even accused each other of nurturing anarchy. Şevket Kazan, a prominent 
member of the NSP argued that “today the JP is nurturing the anarchy.”'^ * Similarly, Fehmi 
Cumaholu of the NSP argued that “nowadays naked force are coming from both sides. We 
warn our partners in the coalition to take care of the situation.”*^
Demirel, on the other hand, complained that “we are successful, to the extent that the 
car with four different tires can go.”‘^  ^ It seemed that the dominant reason that keep coalition 
together was the self-interest of the parties (of being in power) and prevention of possible RPP 
government. At the cost of preventing RPP government, the JP leadership seem to prefer a 
policy that involved a coalition with those who had no intention other than of advancing their 
own interests, a coalition that did nothing but get along with somehow. Despite all the unco-
HOrriyel, August 22. 1975. 
Hürriyet. October 1, 1975. 
Hürriyet, October 14. 1975.
Yankı, November. 15-21, 1976. The annulment of the results came after the allegations that 
candidates were asked to answer such questions as the doctrine of nine lights, the birth date of Alparslan 
Tüıkeş, the names of first and second viwes of Türkeş and like. Yankı, 10-16 January, 1977.
145 Hürriyet, March 23, 1976.
Hürriyet, January 30, 1976.
Hürriyet, September 17, 1975.
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ordination, blackmail, politicization, and patronage, Demirel was able to argue that;
I do not complain about our coalition partners. This coalition has a meaning that transcends the 
governmental stability. For that reason the left attenqrts to do everything in its di^xrsal to end it Those 
parties that formed the coalition well-ai^reciate that if the coalition ends, it is not only the government 
but the National Front that would also end. In that case the left would control the poUtical qrace. It is 
not easy (for coahtion partners) to shoulder that
Knowing that Demirel preferred a strategy of keeping the RPP out of power at any 
cost, the two minor parties went as far as they could go in their exploitation of advantages of 
being in office. When asked what he thought about the possibility of the JP taking the NSP to 
the constitutional court where a decision to close it down could be taken, Fehmi Cumabobglu 
said that ‘These days are over. No one party is crazy enough to dare to spoil the coalition. The 
JP are envious of our heavy industrialization effort.”'^ ’
Extreme partisanship, politicization and lack of coordination went hand in hand with 
the ideological polarization. It was already noted how the new RPP under the leadership of 
Bülent Ecevit and his harsh rhetoric has contributed to the emeigence of ideological 
polarization. Instead of taking a more responsible stand, Süleyman Demirel added fuel to the 
flames. To remember, the basic rationale Demirel used for the formation of the NF was to unite 
nationalists against the threat of communism. That aim made it susceptible to polarization. As 
Abdi İpekçi of Milliyet perceptively noted;
This coalition, which was formed in the spirit of uniting one thing to oppose another, and which 
made the war against communism its primary aim, can not mollify (polarization), but it carries 
the risk of encouraging further polarization. To declare a war under the banner of ‘war against 
communism’ on those who does not think similarly, can only consolidate this danger. It can also 
start the beginning of a process that may spell the end of multi-party democracy and therefore the 
country can be dragged on to bloody fascism. ‘
Abdi ipekçi was justified in his worries, “to unite nationalists against leftists” might 
have been a good idea to bring into line those reluctant Demokratik Party MP’s, but it did not 
bode well for the stability of democracy. The country was on the way to being divided literally
Yankı, October, 13-19, 1975.
Hürriyet, September 1, 1976.
Milliyet, April 3, 1975. “Sonradan Giderilemeyecek Hatalan önlemek için” [To Prevent 
Mistakes that can not be Corrected Later].
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into the two poles (left-right) and the distance between these poles tended to grow with each
passing day. Demirel hardly seemed to notice differences between various shades of the left
spectrum. He constantly argued that “those leftists can not be nationalists. Leftism means
internationalism. There can be no agreement (or compatibility) between nationalists and leftists.
The politics in Turkey is now practiced on these terms; leftism and nationalism.”*^* In this
view, the majority of the RPP supporters with moderate tendencies were held to be identical
with the supporters of legal and illegal socialists, which was clearly not the case.**  ^Similarly, by
putting himself in the same category with Alparslan Türkeş since they were all nationalists
(whose policies many JP supporters would also object to), Demirel played into the hands of
those who tended to portray the JP as an extreme right-wing party.
Ecevit responded this stance of Demirel in a way that furthered polarization as he had
his own strategy that required a heightening of tension. As Dodd noted polarization on the part
of the RPP arose from their conviction that the JP was soft on the NAP and allowed them to
infiltrate institutions of the state. *^  ^ From the very first day, Ecevit blamed the NF coalition
arguing that it "Svill threaten not only the democratic regime, but national unity and the
principles of the Republic.”**“’ That was because Demirel;
collaborated with the enemies of the democratic regime. Those who planned and instigated political 
attacks are now about to take power. A man who is so presumptuous that he does not refrain declaring 
that the nation has given him title 'Başbuğ’ in the assembly, who is so disreq>ectfril to the rule of law 
that he authorized what he called 'commandos’ to help securiw forces, who was expelled from the 
country for trying to set up dictatorship, now is the vice premier. * *
151 Hürriyet, June 9, 1977. Also, Hürriyet, May 21, 1977.
As Metin Toker of Hürriyet noted “The claim that there can not be any left-wing but the 
ultra-left brings Eiemirel to same parallel with the communists, and Demirel is not even aware of that 
fact.” Hürriyet, Oaober 5, 1975. “Niçin, Kime T  [Why, to Whom ?]. It was also criticized by influential 
conservative literary critic, Mehmet Kaplan, whose book entitled “The Dream of Great Turkey,” is 
thought to aspire Demirel’s own book entitled as Great Turkey. Mehmet Kaplan, Büyük Türkiye Rüyası 
[The Dream of Great Turkey] third ed. (Istanbul; Dergah, 1992), 201. (first published in 1969)
153 Dodd, Crisis.36.
Hürriyet, April 9, 1975.
'^^Hürriyet, April 12, 1975.
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According to Ecevit, Demirci was not able to say that “he was not going to cooperate 
(elini uzatmak) with Idealists Youth Associations (lYA) whose hands were bloody” and could 
not condemn it as he himself condemned the ultra left Revolutionary Youth five years ago. “It 
is just because of that,” according to Ecevit, “Demirel could not govern this country, could not 
bring peace and order as one could cooperate either with themselves (the RPP) or 
murderers.”'** Ecevit continued his harsh attacks during the whole period of government. He 
blamed the government for instigating attacks upon the opposition, to protect what he believed 
to be fascists. He argued that “the government has authorized those attackers to help security 
forces. Therefore, it is not necessary to search for who are behind the attacks.”'*’ In Ecevit’s 
view, the parties in coalition “were trying to establish bloody SS forces fiom the grave.”*** 
They (through their actions) led to “youngsters’ deaths.”'*’ Knowingly or not he tried to give 
an image that everybody was in danger of being attacked by forces that got support fi'om the 
government. When Türkeş sent a card to celebrate a religious holiday which read that “Shoot 
anyone who backtumed from Dava” Ecevit harshly reacted that “all our lives are dependent on 
bandits. I am expecting Turkish justice to collar those who provoke murders.”'*" In one 
instance, after the RPP convoy had been attacked in Gerede, Ecevit accused the government, 
“the government has ignored to take necessary precaution even when it was suspected that the 
attacks might have taken place. I do not think that they will catch any of them. Because, 
criminals and murderers are in govemmenC'^^^
In another case, when the RPP convoy had again been attacked in Elazığ, he became 
furious. He told that attackers were “the agents of bandits in Ankara” and blamed Demirel:
Bülent Ecevit. Millet Meclis Tutanak Dergisi, [The Veibatim Reports of the TGNA] Birleşim 
57, Otunun 2, 16.2.1976.
Hürriyet, April 26, 1975.
Hürriyet, June 9, 1975.
'^Hürriyet, January 11, 1976.
'^Hürriyet, October 10, 1975.
Hürriyet, June 24, 1975. (my italics)
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The chief re^nsibility for this events âlls on Etemirel. He is a person who could collaborate even with 
Satan to become prime minister. Artihcial shows of sorrow can deceive nobody. Those who robbed the 
state for years are now collaborating with âscists, murderers and those obsessed with divine love 
(meczup). Even those bandits, who have taken to the hills, are less harmful than them.'
This was not an exceptional accusation uttered in a moment of anger. Ecevit 
continuously dwelled on the same theme going as fer as suggesting that Demirel was the head 
of bandits (eşkıyanın başı):
Those who execute conspiracies and provocations from abroad or firom behind curtains, see Demirel as 
their biggest assistant PoUtical murderers are getting support fiom the government Demirel is not only 
the head of government but the head of bandits because he protects them.'^
It goes without saying that these kind of accusation did not bode well for democratic
stability. If what Ecevit said about government had been said by ordinary citizen he would have
been taken to the court for attacking the moral personality of the government.'^ Not only did
these allegations impede the possibility of rational dialogue between the parties, they also
generated a picture of a country which does nothing to solve tremendous problems, but is
embedded in political infighting’s that heightens tensions in the country and. contributes the
chaos in the streets.
The RPP leaderships’ this attitude seemed to have rested on both political calculations 
and their conceptions regarding the NAP and the JP. To unite those leftist leanings, to exploit 
socialist potential fully, they tended to exaggerate the danger of “fascist takeover.” Once the 
point was made the logical conclusion was that as the biggest party of the left the RPP was the 
only power to stop the march of “right and fascism” to protect the democracy. It made sense, 
for those on the left who did not think to vote for the RPP, to make them vote for the RPP
162 Hürriyet, September 7, 1975.
Hürriyet, March 22, 1976. The other examples can be given: “Demirel and the JP is 
responsible for the events of the last one and a half years. If he can not prevent some actions of his 
coalition partners, he is so weak that he can not be a prime minister, if he is not that weak, he has as 
much fault as they have.” Hürriyet, June 7, 1976; “The youth would get peace when the head of this 
government takes his bloody hands out of universities.” Hürriyet, November 22, 1976.
Similarly, Kemal Karpat commented on Ecevit’s behaviour in opposition: “Bent on acquiring 
power at all costs, Ecevit embarked upon a war with the government in power, using what later proved to 
be his preferred tactics: passionate denunciations and appeals to class hatred and sweeping promises 
elaborated by sentimental visions of social justice and ñesdom.” Kemal H. Karpat, “Domestic Politics,” 
Turkey, ed. Klaus Detlev Grothusen (Gdttingen: Janderhoeck, 1985), 74.
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since any small swing in favor of the RPP would make a big difference while other socialist 
parties came nowhere close to affecting the political balance of power in the assembly.This 
was indeed what the JP leadership had done to unify what they called nationalists (or rightist) 
against the leftists by emphasizing communist threat.
Whether Ecevit sincerely believed the NAP was a fascist party*^ which was powerful 
enough to take the reins of government is open to debate. In retrospect, his view of NAP as a 
party that could seize the reins of government seems exaggerated,*'^ ’ but there are also hints 
that his view of the NAP also involved a sincere belief regarding the party potential and did not 
result from solely political calculations. Ecevit seemed to believe that the NAP aimed at
Yalçın Küçük, writing from ultra-left perspective noted this tendency on the part of the 
Ecevit. He had argued that "leftists in Turkey pretend not to see the &ct that the RPP needs the NAP to 
control leftist movements.” Cited in Yalçın Küçük, Türkiye Üzerine Tezler -5, 1830-1980 [Theses on 
Turkey-5, 1830-1980] (Istanbul; Tekin, 1988), 642. Also, Doğan Avaoğlu, Devrim ve 'Demokrasi 
Üzerine [On Revolution and ‘Demokrasi’] (İstanbul;Tekin, 1997), 13. (frrst published in 1980)
Whether the NAP could be characterized a fascist party depends on what is understood by the 
term foscism, which Ecevit declined to explain. If fascism is defined according to social backgrounds of its 
supporters as a middle class movement of those who felt alienated (with a sense of rootlessnes) in a 
modernizing society, and those who challenge the basic assumptions of enlightenment with a passionate 
desire to return pastoric romantic age, the NAP is not a fascist party. Though, it certainly expressed a 
reaction to socio-cultural changes of late fifties and sixties, it did not advocate the return to lost golden 
pastoric age except that some in the movement tend to interpret “Nizam-i Alem” as such. But rather it 
aimed that those changes (modernization-industrialization) should be more in line with traditional 
Turkish culture and symbols. Therefore, it can not be said to be anti-enlighteiunent (or anti-modem) as 
they made the Turkey’s economic development their motto. Mustafa Çalık, МНР Hareketi- Kaynakları ve 
Gelişimi, 1965-1980 [The NAP Movement -Its Resources, and Development] (Ankara: (üedit, 1996), 202. 
Besides the NAP appears to have ignored social radicalism and mobilizational aspect of other fascist 
movements. But if fascism is defined through some political characteristics such as ultra-nationalism 
bordering on racism, the mystification of state, leadership cult, stringent anti-communism then the NAP 
ideology involves some elements that have affiruties with fascism. Unlike other fascist parties, the NAP 
leaders rejected the charge of fascism. Alparslan Türkeş for instance, argued that “fascism aims at the 
establishment of a totalitarian political in a pluralist society. And it represents limitless and arbitrary 
bratal state. In that sense, there is no difference between communism and fascism.” Alparslan Türkeş, 12 
Eylül Adaleti- Savunma [12 September Justice -Defence] (Istanbul; Hamle, 1994), 54. Elsewhere, Türkeş 
have based his opposition to fascism and Nazism on somewhat different argument and argued that 
‘Turkish nationalists regard it as dishonorable (şerefsizlik) to follow (acccept) leaders, ideologies and 
programs of other nations.” Yankı, 10-16 October, 1977.
It might seem as exaggeration but Ecevit was not the only person to think in this line. Even 
Kenan Evren believed that the NAP could seize, not the state, but the JP as it seized for Republican 
Peasant Nation Party in 1965. He told me that he knew Türkeş’ personality well because they were class­
mates in Harbiye. According to Evren, the fad  the NAP increased its share of vote in the 1977 election 
was a proof that it had begun to get the votes of JP supporters. Interview.
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purposefully incite violence so as to make an authoritarian regime acceptable for the big 
business and other influential elites. Once established, Ecevit seemed to assume, the NAP could 
influence and/or control that authoritarian regime which would undo the gains of the 
democratic struggles of underprivileged as well as preventing their further awakening.**^ * What 
is crystal clear, however, is that Ecevit seems to have supposed that the portrayal of the NAP 
as such would help his party in the elections. The fact that Ecevit spoke as if there had not 
been any substantial leftist terrorist groups and that only if government-supported 
(tolerated) fascist forces were to be suppressed would the problem of terrorism easily be 
eliminated give further credence to this interpretation, since such critiques might cost him 
votes. Besides, accusing opponents with the harshest possible terms without paying 
much attention to its possible consequences for political stability was perfectly in accord with 
Ottoman-Turidsh political traditions and constituted a limitation that Ecevit found hard to 
overcome.
The JP leadership was no less repentant in his attitude toward the RPP and Ecevit. 
Demirel accused Ecevit and the RPP of providing a support for anarchy (read communism). 
According to Demirel, the RPP’s left of center policy, particularly the direction it took after 
Ecevit seized the control of the party, stimulated the ultra-left in Turkey. The RPP carried their 
slogans into center of the political arena. It gave its support when they acted (be it university 
students, or peasaiTts and workers who violated the law) and provided amnesty to those who 
were convicted. According to Demirel, “Ecevit has became the instigator of anarchy as he 
wants to make the security forces ineffective by accusing them.”' ’® Responding to Ecevit’s
See, also Attila tlhan's evaluations in the same line, Attila İlhan “Tüıkeşin Çaldığı Kapı” 
[The Door Knocked on by Tûrkeş] in Hangi Sağ (Istanbul; Bilgi, 1980) 206-208. Similarly, Cizre- 
Sakallıoğlu wrote that political terrorism and sectarian violence became the route to power for the NAP. 
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, “Nationalist Action,” 150.
Earlier, however, Ecevit had criticized those leftist groups which wanted to create an anarchy 
so as to bring a dictatorial regime, which in turn, would sharpen class contradictions and therefore would 
quicken the eventual overthrow of the capitalist regime. Bülent Ecevit, Atatürk 106. He seemed to hold 
this belief throughout the seventies. But he seemed to assume that the threat of fascism was much more 
urgent (immediate) than the threat of communism.
170 Hürriyet, May 1, 1975.
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harsh critiques, Demirel went as far as suggesting that “today the only reason for the
persistence of uneasiness in the streets, workplaces and Universities is the RPP.”*’* According
to Demirel, the RPP did this, “just to make everybody to say that Turkey can not be governed
by this government.”’^  When a man attacked Demirel and broke his nose, one cabinet minster
remariced without proper inquiry “this person was morally committed to the RPP” (manen
CHP1İ). Süleyman Demirel even uttered such words which might be interpreted as
encouragement for attacks on the RPP. He said that “without settling accounts with the RPP,
this nation can not find peace and harmony.”” ^
In this process and in line with Turidsh political traditions, mutual allegations tended to
be personalized. Demirel once argued that Ecevit was “an imitator of Castro, a liar that used
the slogan of ‘Bright Days’, and ‘a political swindler” (Castro taklitçisi, akgünler yalanası,
siyaset cambazı).” '* He even susperted Ecevit’s mental health:
Ecevit confuses qjposition with rdjellioa The RPP continue to slander. No body can find strange our 
characterization of him as mad. Because he is man who could said that the pariiament was ten years 
behind the nation, that government was a bandit, that the district governor was thief that the premier 
was a grocer.
These mutual allegations between leaders appeared to be the chief reason for inaeasing 
polarization in the country, which tended to have an effect at mass level as was refleaed in 
violent attacks on party buildings and party meetings.”  ^While political party elites played 
a crucial role in that respea, it is less than accurate to argue that polarization among the
171
172
Hürriyet, November 8, 1975.
Yankı, 20-26 December. 1976.
Hürriyet, February 1. 1977. E)emirel had even said that “if they had collaborated to form a 
government with Ecevit, it would have meant the collaboration with Satan.” Süleyman Demirel, CHP 'nin 
Şerrinden Yılmayacağız fThe Evil Actions of the RPP will not Intimidate Us ] (Ankara; Doğuş, 1975), 11.
174
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Hürriyet, September 15, 1975. 
Hürriyet, October 5, 1975.
As Sani pointed out, elite behaviour in political arena tend to have a much greater impact on 
the mass level in terms of intensification or reduction of cleavages. Giacomo Sani, “Mass (Constraints 
on Political Realignments: Perceptions of Anti-system Parties in Italy.” British Journal o f Political 
Science. 6, (1976), 9.
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electorate “is not a consequence of cultural trait but the result of a conscious choice by the 
leadership of political parties. Such a view tends to obscure the socio-cultural structure of 
the country (constraining conditions, so to speak). It is true that political party elites added fiiel 
to the flames but that does not change the fact that there was a fertile ground which propelled 
political elites to behave in such a way. Put in other way, ideological polarization may not 
originate fi'om the electorate, but once originated, the electorate did not seem to object to it or 
show its dissatisfaction. Even if electorate did not approve, it did not pressurize the elites for 
policy change. As Linz noted, “it is not always clear if undesirable leaders have ‘corrupted’ the 
electorate, they often do, or if the voters for a variety of motives condone actions detrimental 
to the quality of democracy, not minding who would represent and govern them.”*’* It may be 
surmised that political party elites tended to use such a language assuming that it would gain 
them more votes.*’’ As we discussed in the second chapter, in terms of the existence of dvic 
values, the Turidsh sodety does not fare particularly well. The small group solidarity and in­
group out-group orientation, and lack of tolerance, that we dwelled on above-appears to have 
prepared a fertile ground that disposed Turks towards polarization. Besides, historical 
cleavages based on ethno-religious divisions -Alevi vs Sünni, Turk vs Kurd, seemed to fecilitate 
such polarization at elite level. As Sayan for instance, noted “pro- or anti-leftist postures 
appeared to be strongly influenced by religious (laidst versus pro-Islam), secterian (Alevi
liter Turan, “The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkej,” in Modem Turkey -Continuity 
and Change, ed. Ahmet Evin (Opladen:Leske Verlag und Budrich, 1984), 99. Ergiider similarly remarked 
that “ideological polarization does not originate from the electorate.” Üstün Ergüder, “Changing Panems 
of Electoral Behaviour in Turkey.” Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi. 8-9 (1980-1981), 69.
Juan J. Linz, “Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy,” in Democracy's 
Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Camridge University Press, 1997), 422.
*’  ^ La Palambota, for instance, notes that Italian politicians tend to use ferocious language to 
make people think that they are really worth their pay implying that citizens expects such things from 
politicians. Joseph La Palambora, Democracy-Italian Style (New Haven and London; Yale University 
Press, 1987), 266. Though we lack an empirical data to show that is the case, an impressionistic 
observation of Turkish political scene might led one to consider same is valid for Tuikish case, as we 
discuss it in the chapter seven.
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versus Sünni) and intra-communal fectional cleavages.”’*®
In this electrified atmosphere the voice of those who urged for restraint and prudence 
went unnoticed. President Fahri Korutüric warned that “the political parties’ accusations of 
each other to a degree that implies even treason to country, and finally appearance of 
supporting violence, is brusting the prestige of the democratic system.” An outside observer 
of Turidsh politics might have been excused for assuming that both parties’ (the JP and the 
RPP) visions of Turkey were so dissimilar, that their support was diflferentiated on sharp (and 
rigid) social and political cleavages and that the occupational background of their MP’s was so 
different But as indicated above this was not the case.’*^  The JP was basically a catch-all party 
that favored a modem capitalist economy with moderate state intervention. It did not question 
the basic the basic tenets of the Republic, namely principles of laicism and nationalism. Its 
social support was not heavily derived fi’om one section of society at the expense of others. 
Quite the opposite, it drew support fi'om nearly all strata of society (to a varying extent, of 
course) fi'om big industrialists, to a shanty-town migrants and peasants. Similarly, as noted 
above, the RPP was not a socialist party, it did not aim at the establishment of a socialist state 
in Turkey, despite some members’ mild rhetoric. What it fevored was basically moderate 
capitalism in which the underprivileged one would be cared for through social security 
measures. True, there were some disagreements regarding the perception of the threat of 
communism and how limitations to basic rights and liberties were to be handled, but these 
differences can hardly account for the harsh stmggle between the parties.
If that is so, why were government-opposition relations so harsh and why was
Sayan, “Party system," 51. 
Hürriyet, April 24. 1975.
Dodd, Development. 116; Dodd, Crisis.3i', Weiker, Modernization.150. A frank recognition of 
this fact by party members appear to have taken place only after when they have come together as the 
military rounded them up at Zincirbozan military camp. As İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (an MP firom JP) 
argued At Zinciibozan we came to appreciate that (through seminars in which everbody participated) 
“There was no difference between the JP and the RPP regarding diagnosis and prescriptions of Turkey. Of 
course there was some degree of divergence regarding the prescriptions but th ^  were not something that 
could not surpassed.” İhsan Sabri (^ğlayangil, .4n//anm [My Memoirs] (İstanbul; Güneş, 1990), 252.
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ideological polarization so high ? In the first place, the effect of the party system should be 
indicated. It has been noted above, after Sayan, that the Turkish party system approximated a 
moderate pluralism format while lacking elements of moderate politics.**  ^In a moderate multi­
party system in which two major marties dominated the political scene, each of the two parties 
is likely to strive to retain support of the extremist on its flank. This was especially so since 
minor parties were eager to absorb these extremist votes. The two major parties came to 
believe that only small margins of the vote might secure them clear a majority in the assembly, 
therefore they could not afford to the alienate extremists on both sides. Thus in the process, 
the RPP and the JP were made to “appear” more extreme than th ^  really were. Instead of 
fostering moderate tendencies both parties feelt urge to move further extremes, that fueled 
further polarization.
The impact of the party system, does not, however, appear to have been the only 
explanatory variable. The Ottoman-Turkish political traditions (of intra-elite conflict and 
patterns opposition) needs to be taken into the consideration. As we noted in the previous 
chapter, accusing opponents with the harshest of terms -usually for violating unchangeable 
state interests- had become one of the favorite method in power struggles both in the empire 
and in the multi-party period. Thus, the political party struggles in modem Turkey turned 
around the charges and counter-charges of whether the govemment-or opposition were 
violating unchangeable state principles (called Ataturkism) or not. Both the 1960 and 1971
Ergun Ozbudun similarly noted that the Turkish Party Sytem had shown characteristics of 
polarized pluralism in essentially limited pluralism format. Ergun Ozbudun, “The Tuikish Party System: 
Institutionalization. Polarization and Fragmentation.” Middle Eastern Studies. 17, (1981). 230.
It is sometimes assumed that the centrifugal competition is a feature of only “polarized 
pluralist systems.” This view, based on the assumption that two-party systems tend to produce centripetal 
drive, however, is mistaken. Robert Dahl noted that when opinion is polarized in bimodal pattern, 
moderate and two-party systems would encourage antogonism and severe conflict as the parties would 
tend to retain the support of extremists on their flanks. Dahl, Opposition.376. For the similar conclusion 
see, Sartori, Parties.\92.
185 Dodd, Crisis.47.
liter Turan, “Stages of Political Development in Turidsh Republic,” in Perspectives on 
Turkish Democracy, ed. Ergun özbudun (Ankara:Savaş, 1988), 88.
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military interventions were made against a government which, allegedly, violated these 
principles.
Though in the post-1973 era Atatiirldsm was not the main axis around which political 
struggles were conducted as the new RPP changed its policy of accusing the DP-JP tradition 
in order to provoke the army since their attitude vis-à-vis army underwent important changes, 
the tradition of accusing your opponent with what you consider to be most despised terms 
appears to have continued. These terms were being fascists or communist. In this language 
“Fascists” (devised particularly to attract post-1960 intellectuals and youth) seemed to cover all 
evils together, that is, exploiters, racists, ultra-nationalist, religious reactionaries. The 
accusation of being communist, on the other hand, was well suited to attract the abhoirence of 
the traditional societal groups and their behavioral codes. It seemed to mean, first of all, being 
against religion and the traditional normative communitarian behavioral code to which an 
ordinary Turk adhered.**’
One important factor that seemed to reinforced such traditions is related to peculiar 
organizational-ideological characteristics of Turkish political parties. As noted, Turkish 
political parties were not greatly differentiated in terms of policies, or the social support they 
secured. Due basically to the center’s weight in the economy, all political parties seemed to 
share the view that the distribution of public resources (or party patronage) was essential for 
success. Consequently, both major parties were less parties of interest articulation and 
reconciliation as well as formulators of clear-concise policies than parties which accepted the 
assumption that resources ‘were there to be distributed’ without detailed concise policies
Şerif Mardin have noted that in Ottoman-Tuikish society, being anti-religion has been 
perceived as the the most severe form of radicalism. Şerif Mardin, “Siyasal Sözlüğümüzün özellikleri-2; 
Faşizm,” [The Features of Our Political Lexicon-2 : Fascism] in Siyaset ve Sosyal Bilimler, (İstanbul; 
İletişim, 1994), 170 (originally published in 1962). In a more recent study on the NAP, (j^ik found that 
for NAP supporters being communist meant being anti-religious or atheist, and rejection of such concepts 
as honor, dignity, (irz ve namus) family, morality, respect for elders and discipline. Ç)alık, Hareket.155- 
156. Likewise, Haluk Kırcı, the NAP militant who committed various illegal acts, wrote that communism 
had meant to him as atheism and rejection of traditional values of honor and dignity. Kırcı tells us that 
“he was planning to kill his sisters in the case of communist take over of the reins of government then to 
take the hills.” Haluk Kırcı, Zamanı Süzerken (Hatıralar) [Looking at Past (Memoirs)Xistaobul; Burak, 
1998), 43, 68.
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pertaining to the production of it. Perhaps because of this lack of differentiation they tended to 
appeal to mutual allegations (of being communists, fascists, reactionary, coirupt, liar and like) 
so as to conceal the feet that they are all similar to each other.'** Therefore, it is fair to 
conclude that the polarization in this period was as much to do with Turkish political traditions 
of intra-elite conflict as it was related to logic of the party system and the peculiar 
organizational-ideological structure of parties itself It was also related with social-cultural 
features of the Turkish society.
As the 1977 general elections approached the NF governments came to be despised by 
critical groups. The military, as guardian of the Republican ideal of secularism, was uneasy with 
the feet that the islamist NSP was in power and advancing its own agenda. Increasing 
politicization of bureaucracy and partisanship as well as an increase in terrorism appears to 
have disturbed the military.'*^ Though the chief of general staff did not express it publicly, the 
president Fahri Korutürk, who had played role of transmission belt between military and 
civilians can be thought of representing the military’s views as well. And Korutürk had been 
quite critical of the NF government fi'om their inception.
The bulk of the press (the majority of which was not sympathetic to the JP and/or 
Süleyman Demirel) equally disturbed by the behavior of the minor partners in the government. 
Erbakan’s frivolous behavior in governmental affairs, the NAP’s threatening posture and 
partisanship all affected their perception of government. Their sympathies lay with Ecevit. 
Though fearful of Ecevit’s radical riietoric, the business community, too, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the government. Similarly, there are hints that the Western community.
'** Though, we do not have hard data to sustain such conclusion, one can also surmise that party 
elites behaved in this way assuming that it would be appreciated by the electorate. Not many, for instance, 
would have understood the sophisücated critique of the new RPP line even if the JP leaders’ had 
undertook such an enterprise. Instead, an easy was found through allegaüons that the electorate 
understood.
Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren 'in Anilan,\The Memoirs of Kenan Evren] vol 1, (Istanbul; 
Milliyet, 1990), 180.
He, once, argued that “no body should act in the way that might create hostility between 
crescent and cross (hilal ve haç). No body has a right to present the image of pan-Turkism or pan- 
Islamism.” Hürriyet, May 28, 1976.
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particulariy the United States also was warm towards an alternative government without 
Erbakan. They just had too much of Erbakan, who was uncompromising on the Cyprus
issue. 191
The election campaign was conducted in a very electrified atmosphere. The pressing 
issues around which election campaigns were conducted were the escalation of terrorism and 
economic problems. The RPP leadership emphasized the lack of security of life and blamed the 
government for tolerating and supporting fescists NAP militants. The elections, the general 
secretary of the party argued, “was not about a choice between the JP and the RPP, but a 
choice between those who oppose fescism and fescists. It would be a referendum against 
fascism.”’^  Having the sympathy of influential segments of society, Ecevit’s election trips 
attracted very large crowds. “Ecevit, our hope” was the slogan many chanted. For many, 
Ecevit seemed to be hero who had been denied power by ingenious political manaiverings. He 
was presented as a real alternative to the much despised NF government. EXiring these 
elections trips, various attacks on the crowds and Ecevit took place. The attacks and leaders’ 
responses to it showed, once again, the degree of polarization in Turkish politics. After an 
attack on his party meeting in Niksar, Ecevit responded that “it was a plot designed by the JP 
and NAP.”*’  ^ The general secretary of the RPP went as far as suggesting that a minister in 
charge of youth affairs was the man behind the attacks. The general secretary of the JP, in 
turn, blamed Ecevit for events in Niksar arguing that “Ecevit continue his instigation campaign 
throughout the country.”'^  Ecevit’s response was harsher; “I am not going to run away from 
elections... Demirel is saying that I have taken shelter in the state. Of course, I would do that as
The Economist, for instance, remarked that “Turkey’s allies in NATO need a Turkish 
govenunent willing and strong enough to stop just sitting on its bayonets in Cyprus; to reach an 
agreement with Greece over the Agean; and to decide what sort of relationship it wants with NATO and 
EEC. Both major parties need to be short of extremist coalition parties if they are to get to grips with 
Turkey’s problems.” The Economist, June 4, 1977. “West’s Far East”
192 Yankı, 16-22 May. 1977.
Hürriyet, Aprü 27, 1977. 
”” Hürriyet, April 29, 1977.
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long as I could find a state. I have not taken shelter in bandits as he has done.”^^*
When in 1 May demonstrations 34 people were killed as an unidentified attacker fired 
on the crowd, Ecevit went out of his way to openly accuse the government of murder. He 
argued that “The leader of bandits and criminals is Demirel. He is also the head of liars, a man 
who could still continue to blame others even when he had citizens killed.” Ecevit argued 
that the JP supported NAP militants who were behind the attacks to intimidate people to 
ensure that they did not go to the polls which would demonstrate overwhelming support for 
theRPP.*^ ·'
While raising the tension, Ecevit ruled out the idea (suggested by the illegal Turkish 
Communist Party and its sympathizers) that the RPP should constitute a new National 
Democratic Front (UDC in Turkish acrynoms) against the National Front that would involve 
all “progressive parties” as well as trade unions and other civil societal organizations against 
fascism. He had argued that it would be a contradiction if the RPP led such a movement as it 
was opposed to the very idea of “Fronts.” Besides, he argued, it would have been harmful to 
the RPP as its direction clearly difiered fi"om that of the alleged members of such fi-ont. 
Instead, he expected these groups to proclaim their support for the RPP as it was only group to 
have a realistic chance to come to power. Ecevit argued that the RPP could not come to 
power by trying to appeal to extreme marginal groups since it might alienate moderates and 
cost the party power.
195 Hürriyet, May 1, 1977.
Hürriyet, May 9, 1977. Even pro-Ecevit journalist Abdi İpekçi criticized Ecevit for 
heightening the tension; “It is right and even duty for Ecevit to attack and condenui the govermnent. But 
the style he used, can stir (or bring into action) not only crowds in the meeting area but even those who 
read these in armchairs at home.” Milliyet, April 10, 1977. “(jergjnlik ve Ecevit” [Tension and Ecevit]
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1977 Genel Seçimi Radyo Konuşmaları [Radio Speeches in the 1977 
(jeneral Elections] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1977), 6.
Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union (CRWU) had declared its support for the 
RPP. Ecevit expected the TWP to do same. Reported in Orhan Duru, Ecevit’in Çilesi [The Agony of
Ecevit] (Istanbul: Afa, 1995), 24.
Bülent Ecevit, Açıklamalar. 72.
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In the making of this electrified atmosphere, Süleyman Demirel and other prominent JP 
leaders played a role no lesser degree. Demirel reiterated his view that in the elections “the 
choice was between nationalists and leftists.”^  According to Demirel, nationalism wfiich was 
unifying, integrating and constructive force, was the essence of Republicanism, while ‘leftism’ 
(solculuk) was present neither in the genesis of the Republic, nor within the homework of the 
1961 constitution. No one, he argued, could claim that in the final analysis leftism did not rest 
on Marx.^ °‘ “Leftism as understood in Turkey,” he asserted, “is nothing but paving the way to 
communism.”^^ He blamed the RPP saying that it had encouraged (yataklığını yapmak) those 
who disturbed the country’s peace.^^ “There was peace in country when there was no leftism” 
he claimed, “it was with the RPP’s decision to embrace the left that peace began to be 
disturbed.”^  The RPP had done this so through its opposition to what they called “existing 
order.” The feet that the RPP labeled the existing order as “to be collapsed” (yıkılası), 
according to the JP leader, encouraged anarchy and disorder. It was also the case, as general 
secretary of the party, Nahit Menteşe argued, that the RPP was encouraging militants in the 
streets because it was trying to trade on and to exploit chaos in the streets.^ The crisis of 
confidence between two party elites reached such a degree that to call it schizophrenic can
200 Hürriyet, May 21. 1977.
Adalet Partisi. ¡977 Genel Seçimi- Radyo Konu^aları [Radio Speeches in the 1977 General 
Elections] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1977). 5.
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Ibid.. 6.
Hürriyet. Mav 24. 1977.
Adalet Partisi. Radyo.S
^  Ibid., 60. Likewise, Celal Bayar argued that the “fight arise from the fact that there are parties 
which protect the existing order and parties which try to change it.” Celal Bayar, Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek 
(Atatürk’ün Metodolojisi) fThinking Like Atatürk (The Methodology of Atatürk)], second edition, ed. 
İsmet Bozdağ (İstanbul: Tekin, 1998) (first published in 1978). İn an effort to discredit what they called 
leftists, the JP did not hesitate to appeal to distorted religious arguments. A member of the JP general 
administrative council (Genel İdare Kurulu), for instance, argued that Koran had defined that leftists were 
those who deny God and the principles of Koran, while rigthist were those who believes in God and 
Koran. Accordingly, he continued, “no muslim can claim that he is leftist. Because one can not be muslim 
and leftist at the same time.” Adalet Partisi, Radyo. 28.
206 Ibid., 41.
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hardly be regarded as an exaggeration. For instance, when the JP decided to start the 
election campaign later than expected, Ecevit was reported to have suspected that the JP 
was trying to start the election campaign only after they made the RPP unable to hold 
meetings.”“ ’
The elections did not give any party the mandate to govern alone, though the RPP 
secured the plurality of votes with 41.4 per cent as table 11 showed.
Table 11. The 1977 General Election Results“ *
Political Parties Votes % Seats Gower assembly)
RPP 41.4 213
P 36.9 189
NSP 8.6 24
NAP 6.4
RRP 1.9
DP 1.9
Independents 2.5
One significant feature of the elections was that the combined votes of the two major 
parties increased fi’om 63.1 per cent to 78.3 per cent. The RPP votes went up to an impressive 
8 per cent. The expansion of the party’s electoral base in urban areas, a trend gained pace since 
the eariy seventies, accelerated. Somewhat surprisingly in the fece of massive opposition 
against the NF governments, the IP’s success was equally impressive. It was able to increase its 
votes nearly seven percent fi'om the 1973 elections. It was not that Demirel’s strategy of 
rallying the anti-left vote in his party had proved successful as the NAP also nearly doubled its 
vote. It was rather the case that Demirel had managed to virtually finish (prior to elections he 
secured Celal Bayar’s support) the Demokratik Party, which lost almost 10 per cent of its vote.
207 Cited in Duni, Ecevit.33.
^  Regarding the election results, the NSP objected that some double-voting took place. In &ct, 
the number those who were eligible for vote rose to 21.207.33 (in 1977) from 16.798.164 (in 1973), an 
increase of nearly five millions. İhsan Ezherli, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (1920-1986) [Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (1920-1986)] (Ankara; TBMM, 1986), 87. When we consider the population increase 
in the same period, it is not easy to explain this unexpected increase. It may be the case that in 1973, some 
of those who were eligible for voting, might not registered for the election but registered for the 1977 
elections. No official inquiry had been conducted on the issue.
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One interesting result of the elections was that voters punished the NSP, as it was the only 
coalition partner whose vote declined. The social backgrounds of deputies did not display any 
distinct pattern from that of 1973 that are worth noting.
The rise in the combined votes of the two major parties and the parallel decline of NSP 
and Demokratik Party votes made the Turkish party system “less of a multi-party system”^  
and reversed the trend towards a multi-party system to two party system. But this, in no way, 
diminished the significance of minor parties. As Erbakan explained “the key (the emblem of the 
NSP) has become smaller but its force (and value) increased.” ’^® He knew well that in the face 
of uncompromising attitudes between two parties its 24 MP’s would play a role totally out of 
proportion to its electoral strength.
He was not mistaken. Misinformed that his party had gained enough seats to form a 
government alone, Ecevit declared that “our nation has beaten the reigning fesdsm with its 
votes” and that “they were ready to form a coalition with any party but the JP and the 
NAP.”^" In fact, Ecevit had sharply ruled out a grand coalition between the JP and the 
RPP during the election campaign. He had argued that “after all this, and unless the JP 
administration is not purified of the bloody hands that killed youngsters, the coalition 
between the JP and the RPP is an illusion. If we form a coalition with the JP, we betray 
our commitment to ourselves, the people, democracy and the state.” ‘^^
By ruling out the JP-RPP cooperation, Ecevit opened the way for a coalition with 
Erbakan as if the country and himself had no experience of NSP in power. Ecevit hoped that 
anti-NF sentiment would ensure some JP MP’s to vote for the RPP or to abstain in the vote of 
confidence. He has reported to have said:
I am not going to see them. I do not think that the JP and NAP’s views on democracy differs much. But
I also know that rank and file members (taban) of both parties is not like that. I believe that the MP’s
^  Sayan,”Party System,” 53. In fact this trend has begun in the 1975 partial senate and lower 
assembly by-elections. The RPP had polled 44 percent, while the JP garnered away 41 per cent of the vote.
June 16, 1977.
Cumhuriyet, June 9, 1977.
212 Hürriyet, May 8, 1977.
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would be under pressure fiom their wife’s and children who would pressure them for the security of life
. 213and property.
The mood in the country was in favor of Ecevit government. Prior to the elections, the 
great majority of the press had openly thrown their weight behind the RPP.^ *'* The trade unions 
-both left-wing CRWU and moderate Confederation of Turkish Workers Union (CTWU) 
supported Ecevit. Vehbi Koç, the head of Turkey’s biggest holding company declared that it 
would be beneficial for Turkey, if the RPP were to form the government, as did both the 
presidents of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Associations (TIBA) and Istanbirl 
Chambers of Commerce (ICC). Many businessmen were reported to have remarked that the 
business community’s support for the RPP government derived from Ecevit’s personal 
qualities as well as the hope that (unlike the NF government’s uncoordinated, ad hoc approach 
to the economy) he would subscribe to planned development strategy and would be able to 
control radical elements within the trade union movement.^ ** Otherwise, they had not become 
die-hard fans of the RPP’s new line. As The Economist put it, although businessmen “distrust 
his (Ecevit’s) trendy radicalism they prefer it to the paralysis under Mr Demirel’s previous NF 
coalition.”
Demirel, on the other hand, did everything he could to prevent the RPP government 
getting a vote of confidence. He had ruled out co-operation with the RPP during the election 
campaign. After the elections his stance became more rigid. Some exuberances (in which
Cited in Cüneyt Arcayürek, Demokrasinin Sonbaharı- Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor 7, [Cüneyt 
Arcayürek Explains-7, The Autumn of Democracy] (İstanbul: Bilgi, 1985), 93.
Both Milliyet and Cumhuriyet newspapers, and weekly magazine Yankı, have ali openly 
supported the RPP, while Hürriyet and Günaydın made clear their distaste with any possible govenunent 
that would involve Erbakan and Türkeş. After the elections, even Nazlı Ilıcak argued that the RPP should 
form the government. According to Ilıcak, “the NF government could not solve the problem of anarchy 
and inflation due basically to internal contradictions. The RPP, seeing eveiy measure that was designed to 
fight with anarchy as something that would make it difiicult for it to come to power, has prevented them. 
If the RPP now forms the government its attitude would change.” Tercüman, June 13, 1977. “CHP mi 
yoksa AP mi ?” [The RPP or the JP ?]
Sec, Buğra, Devlet. 204. Also, Henri J. Baricey, The State and the Industrialization Crisis 
(Boulder: Westview, 1990), 162-163.
The Economist, June 18, 1977, “Give Him a Chance -or a Rope.”
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Demirel’s wife was reported to have been teased) by the RPP sympathizers, who 
mistakenly assumed that the RPP had a majority to form a government, was pointed out as 
being a significant factor in Demirel stiff stance against the Ecevit government. This can be 
seen an exaggeration since animosities between the parties were not unknown. But it is an 
important example of how party politics had been personalized (party politics confused 
with personalities and vice-versa). Prior to the elections Demirel had declared that the 
struggle was between leftists and nationalists. After the elections he repeated the same 
argument. As if there was no difference between the JP the NSP and NAP, and as if these 
parties participated as united front in the elections, he argued that “the nation has not given the 
left the power” and the government parties (that had stayed in power for 26,5 months) had 
polled % 52 of the vote and increased the number of MP’s to 232 fi'om 213.” To prevent 
the possibility of the NSP’s collaboration with the RPP, he argued that “whoever gives the 
power to the left that the nation has not given to it is under great sin in both worids.”^^ *
The JP leaders’ argument did not convince even his otherwise loyal supporters. Nazh 
fiicak of Tercüman pointed out that electorate did not vote for the NF governments, but 
individual parties which constituted it. According to Ilıcak, if these parties had made it clear 
that after the elections they were going to cooperate, this might have been the case. But 
they did not. The right-wing electorate indicated their preference for not a coalition (NF) 
but a party.^ *’
Demirel had the experience of the first NF government, as he himself criticized it most 
severe terms. Prior to elections, the JP spokesmen in line with their strategy of capturing 
the pre-1973 JP vote, had all claimed that any vote that went to the NSP would have gone 
the RPP. These three parties, particularly the JP and NSP, all accused each other in most
Suleyman Demirel, Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi [The Verbatim Report of the TGNA], 
Birleşim 24, Otunun 3, 30.7.1977.
Hürriyet, June 13, 1977. Note that to forestall the possibility of the NSP joining the RPP led 
government he appealed to religious sentiments.
Tercüman, 8 July, 1977. “Milliyetçi Partiler Koalisyonu...” fThe Coalition of Nationalist
Parties...]
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severe terms in the election campaign,^ but still the cost of Ecevit’s premiership seemed to 
him so high that he ignored them. This case showed once again that the struggle for political 
power dominated Turkish politics to such degree that no principle, no promises, no previous 
experiences counted much.
Not surprisingly, the RPP government foiled to ensure a vote of confidence. I t  
obtained 217 votes (9 short of the required 226) against the NT’s 229 vote. Ecevit, once again, 
miscalculated the hard focts of Turkish party politics. He had declared that “he had a trust in 
the MP’s sense of personal responsibility.”^  In fact, Turkish party discipline was so tight that, 
unless resigned, MP’s could hardly vote against his party’s wishes. Besides if Ecevit had not 
been so harsh towards the JP, this might still have happened. As many critics noted, it was 
less than sincere act on the part of the Ecevit, to refuse even to see JP leader accusing him 
for being fascist on the one hand and to rely on the JP MP’s for the vote of confidence on 
the other.
Failing to ensure a vote of confidence and focing severe opposition in his own party for 
missing the power when it was so close,^ Ecevit offered a coalition to the JP under a naîtrai 
prime minister. It was all too clear that Demirel would not accept this offer which was
^  Necmettin Erbakan, for instance, argued that “we are not the traffic police of the bourgeoisie 
as the JP has been.” Hürriyet, April 26, 1977. He made fun of the news that Demirel had hit the table with 
his fist (masaya yumruğunu vurmak) when speaking with the then US president Jimmy Carter. Erbakan 
mockeringly responded that “my God what a fimny thing ! who you are to hit your fist to table in the 
presence of Carter. You did go there just to turn a somersault with your round body.” Hürriyet, May 12, 
1977. Süleyman Demirel. for instance, argued that “National View (milli görüş) is nothing but sophistry” 
and that “The NSP, which is far cry from seriousness, should not be given shelter as an anomaly in 
Turkish politics...” Hürriyet, May 18, and 19 1977, respectively. When reminded of these speeches, 
Demirel responded that “if what has been said during the election campaign were regarded as the cause 
of blood-feud, no govermnent could be established in Turkey.” Süleyman Detnirel, Millet Meclisi 
Tutanakları p ire Verbatim Reports of the TGNA] Birleşim 24, Oturum 3, 30.7.1977.
The two revealing instances observed during the critical days of the vote of confidence might 
give an idea of how polarization at the mass level reached such a terrifying stage. In the first, a JP 
sympathizer was reported to have sent a letter to JP leadership wishing it to be read in the Demirel’s 
presence in JP group meetings. The letter threateningly condemned those who might have been thinking 
of resigning fiom the party. In the second instance, an RPP sympathizer, a clerk in the bank, corrunitted 
suicide when the RPP could not get vote of confidence. Yankı, 4-10 July, 1977.
222
223
Hürriyet, June 16, 1977.
See, The Economist, July 9, 1977 “The Rise and Swift Fall of Bülent Ecevit.”
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obviously a last ditch attempt to share a power and to silence those who argued for coalition. 
The RPP leader seemed to have forgotten that only a month ago he had ruled out the 
possibility of a coalition with the JP accusing them of being fescist (and or helping them). 
“Purporting to be deeply insulted by this charge,”^ “* Demirel rejected the RPP’s last minute 
oflfer and set out to form second National Front government this time leaving the RRP out. 
This he did, despite the 26-month experience of the first NF government, and virtual 
opposition of critical groups in the country. The composition of cabinet posts was “an 
arithmetical nonsense.”^* The NSP held 8 portfolios (out of 29 MP’s), Türkeş held 5 (out of 
16 MP’s), while the JP held 16 (out of 189).
Demirel defended his action on the grounds that he wanted nobody to say that they 
were preventing the establishment of a government while they were also not forming it 
themselves.^ He argued that eight million people had voted against the left and his party could 
not stay indifferent to it. The real reason, it seemed, was the fear of an RPP government, and its 
possible consequences. In that case, his leadership in his own party would be questioned. 
Knowing that if given another opportunity Ecevit would form a coalition with the NSP, 
Demirel himself did not want to miss the opportunity.^’ It shows how an obsession with 
power made Demirel opt for options which were, it seemed to many, doomed to foil.
From the very start, the NF governments continued where they had left off They could 
not agree on who should be the president of the assembly as coalition partners began to tear 
each other apart. For instance, the NSP refused to authorize a visit by Foreign Minister İhsan 
Sabri Çağlayangil to Egypt because of what he had said there. In the incoming local elections 
(of 11 December) coalition parties blamed each other. Many JP MP’s, especially those who
The Economist, July 16, 1977 “A Glut of Leaders.”
^  The Economist, July 30, 1977 “Compromise Writ Large.’^
226 Cited in Arcayürek, Sonbahar.260.
In the words of The Economist, Demirel was “not the man to hand it over to Mr. Ecevit or 
anyone” when the premiership was “again within his grasp.” The Economist, July 16, 1977 “A Glut of 
Leaders.”
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were expecting ministerial positions but could not get them, fiercely criticized the government 
during their party’s tenure in government.^* Besides, the government continued to attract a 
plethora of criticism fi-om all quarters of the society. The mainstream press opposed it fi’om the 
beginning anyway. The TIBA added to its fi e^quent declarations a new one indicating its desire 
for dialogue between two parties.
In the face of such widespread discontent the second NF government lasted for just 
over than five months. During the final months of 1977 a total of twelve JP MP’s, indicating 
their discontent with the government, resigned fi'om their party, leaving NF governments short 
of a governing majority,. Finally, the government fell when the RPP put forward an 
interpellation. The government failed to obtain a vote of confidence (as those MP’s who 
resigned voted against it) and Demirel resigned on 31 December 1977.
4.4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NATIONAL FRONT GOVERNMENTS
The NF period had been detrimental to the stability of democratic régime in several 
crucial respects. First, the civilian bureaucracy including the police became politicized leaving 
the bureaucratic structure in tatters. As a result of NF governments policies of patronage and 
politicization, the administration seemed “as if it has been divided into ‘worlds’ closed to one 
another.”^  Since the quality of those appointees was hardly taken into consideration, the 
quality of outputs was negatively affected. Thus, the performance of the administration (which 
had never been free fi'om problems as fer as citizens concerned) were severely jeopardized. 
This appears to have undermined efficacy and effectiveness, and as a result, the legitimacy of 
the democratic regime.
^  The head of JP İzmir province accused the NAP arguing that “this coalition must be brokea 
The NAP is defending fascism. There is no difference between Hitler and Tüıkeş.” Hürriyet, October 4, 
1977. Another MP (Zeyyat Mandalinci of Muğla) argued that the JP should enter into dialogue with the 
RPP as the Turkish state is undergoing its most severe crisis in its long history. Hürriyet, October 13, 
1977.
^  Cahit Tutum, “Politicization of Administration and Partisanship.” Turkish Public 
Administration Annual. 4, (1977). 228.
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Especially detrimental for democracy has been the politicization of the security 
forces.“ ” The belief in the virtues of democracy is, in part, dependent upon the fact that the 
state authorities apply laws equally. That is, state oflBcials stay neutral to any citizens and shall 
themselves be bound by the rule of law. If the belief that parliament, the president or prime 
minister, police, politicians, or judiciary deals with some violent political acts, because of the 
sympathy that they felt for those who committed them, the legitimacy of the democratic regime 
is much weakened.“ * In that case, both various elites and the citizenry at large are likely to feel 
uncertain regarding their own personal safety, as well as concluding that the liberal democratic 
regime has failed in its primary task, that is security of life and property. They are, therefore, 
likely to take the law into their own hands (if they can) or more commonly defer to their 
allegiances to stronger authority.“ ^
In this respect, the NF governments did much which undermined belief in the 
democratic regime. The underlying rationale for the NF governments, as put by Demirel, was 
to unite nationalists against the danger of communism. Making this as its raison d’etre the NF 
coalition made itself susceptible to a charge that it would treat rightist leniently. They would do 
so, critics charged, through the politicization of the security forces by filling the positions with 
the sympathizers of the NAP. There are evidences that this had indeed been the case. The 
Minister of Interior of the second NF government. Korkut Özal remarked that he had 
personally observed how the police took sides with rightists and both attacked together left- 
wing students at the private high college of Yükseliş and could not do much to prevent it.“  ^
Even the stringent anti-communist Aydın Yalçm could wrote that “there is a common belief
230 Dodd, Crisis. 19.
Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown o f  Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibrium 
(London and Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 61.
Linz noted that “one-sidedness in excusing or condemning such acts is both an indicator and 
a cause of loss of legitimacy of participants in the political system.” Ibid., 61. He also remariced that the 
prevalence of such belief was instramental in the loss of legitimacy of, most notably, the Weimar Republic 
and Italy. Ibid., 116.
Güreli, Korkut özal. 45-6.
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that the police are behaving partially, that some criminals are not, knowingly, caught by the 
poUce.”'^ '*
The other charge involved the role of the NAP militants in fighting with the a llied  
communists who had the support of their parties which were in government. Alparslan Türiceş, 
the leader of the NAP made the struggle against communism its basic aim giving scant (if any) 
respect to rules of democratic regime. Ecevit might have been exaggerating the danger of 
fescist takeover of government, but there is plenty of evidence that the self-appointed NAP 
militants perceived themselves as helping the security forces against communism. Indeed, 
Türkeş made the struggle against communism the raison d’etre of his party. So long as it 
remained within the legal fiameworic, there was nothing wrong with it. But the actions of many 
NAP members clearly bordered on illegality. Though the prominent NAP members rejected 
these charges, a close reading of several materials reveals that they did not care much about 
legality in their struggle against communism. In his book entitled “Türkiye’nin Meseleleri” 
(Problems of Turkey) Türiceş wrote that “we, as a party, will crush communism and other 
conspirators. Not only them, but we also punish those who are in power and do not take 
necessary measures and those traitors who are in complicity with them.” On the back cover 
of that book it was read that “in this struggle if I fell down, you raise the flag and go fiirther 
than I went. If I turn away fi'om my struggle (Dava), shcx)t me! Shoot anyone who participated 
the struggle but then turned back.” Indeed, Türkeş openly accepted that his party’s members 
were helping security forces where they proved to be inadequate. In his defense (at the 
military court after the military intervention) too, Alparslan Türkeş conceded that “without 
doubt, those who participated in real struggles were forced to go illegal but that was because
234 Aydın Yalçın. Türk Komünizmi. 137.
Alparslan Türkeş, Türkive ‘nin Meseleleri [The Problems of Turkey], fourth ed. (İstanbul. 
Kuüuğ, 1975), 175.
^  He argued that the struggle of the nationalist Turkish youth against foreign ideologies “which 
are the vanguard of imperialism, is above every kind of appreciation. It is because of their selfless 
struggles that Turkey has been rescued from the brink of abyss.” Alparslan Türkeş, Temel Görüşler (The 
Basic Views] (İstanbul; Dergah, 1975), 142.
250
State power was weakened to such degree that it was non-existent.” He even went as far as 
telling judges that “if we had not been there, it was possible that the intervention of the Turkish 
Armed Forces would have been too late, and you gentlemen, would not have had us in this 
court to try with your current uniforms and ranks under this flag.”^*
In the face of the NAP’s this posture, Demirel seemed to tolerated it. He was the man 
who believed Turkey’s law and order problems were caused by an international communist 
conspiracy and that those with rightist sympathies played no role in it.^^ He was the man also 
who stated the raison d’etre of the NF governments was the “unite the nationalists against 
communists.” All of these reinforced the belief that the NAP militants used illegal methods and 
the JP tolerated it, and that the NF governments treated those terrorist on the right with 
lenience. Yankı, for instance remarked that “even the JP prominents are confessing that why 
Demirel has given two portfolios to the NAP which had only two ministers: That is because, 
th ^  confess, the commandos of Türkeş is going to stop leftist youth in the street.” '^*® Even 
stringent anti-communist Aydın Yalçın accused the JP of tolerating the-NAP’s various 
actions.
Though some ministers made it clear to Demirel that the NAP was involved in some actions 
bordering on illegaliw. But the JP leader Demirel thought ‘They are our children. Even if they 
committed some excesses, it is not important. Because they are nationalists and anti-communist. 
The NAP is, appro.ximately. in our side. Besides, they are the only political institution that does 
not create any problem for us. Therefore, at this moment it is not politically coirea to have a 
conflict with them.' They therefore passed over our warnings and connived at their efibrts to 
seize important state apparatuses like the communists.
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Alparslan Türkeş, 12 Eylül Adaleti. 112.
Ibid, 15.
Demirel argued that “Before and after the 12 March we continue to claim that what lay behind 
the anarchy was the communist conspiracy which aimed to overthrow the Republic. We claimed that those 
anarchists were the communists. Time has proved right our view that anarchy has little to do with socio­
economic problems.” Cited in Riiki Salim Burçak, Türkiye 'de Askeri Müdahalelerin Düşündürdükleri 
[Some Thoughts Stimulated by Tuikish Military Interventions] (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi, 1988), 9.
240 Yanla, January 12-18, 1976. “Anarşi ve İktidar (gicişmeleri” [Anarchy and Power Struggles]
Yeni Forum, September 1, 1980. “Şiddet Olaylannda Doğru Teşhis” [A Correct Diagnosis in 
Violence]. Similarly Harris argued that “with cabinets depending on support from the NAP, it was clearly 
difficult for security forces to act decisively against the commandos.” George S Harris, Turkey Coping 
With Crisis (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 145.
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We can not know precisely how important the NF governments’ attitude was 
regarding the rise of terrorism. But we do certainly know that the number of those who died or 
injured from politically motivated attacks rose sharply from 27 in 1974 to 37 (in 1974), to 108 
in 1976 and 319 in 1977.^ '*^
It is clear that the NF governments’ failed to arrest increase the number of those who 
lost lives from terrorist attacks. The NF governments’ diagnosis and ways of dealing with the 
problem of terrorism appears to have played a significant role in this increase. As great majority 
in the left believed that the NF governments treated rightists leniently. What really matters in 
such situations is not what really had happened but what the actors believed to have happened. 
Ecevit and the prominent RPP leaders’ views reaching such conclusions have been stated 
above. The leaders of the legal socialist parties have aired the same view.^ ^^  When the party 
leaders professed such convictions, it was all to be expected that youngsters too easily fell prey 
to this idea. For instance, Mesut Akin, (The head of Revolutionary Youth Union of Istanbul) 
declared that “the security forces of the state are helping those fescists militants of Idea Clubs 
when they attack youngsters and workers. Instead of helping the state’s security forces, these 
idea clubs and other fescists institutions are attacking youth (with state forces).”^^ When such 
belief becomes prevalent, it is only a matter of time that they, too, will tend to take the 
implementation of law (or rather lawnessess) in their own hands, or defer to stronger 
authority.^ “**
Keleş, Onsal, Kent.35. These numbers (derived from Tercüman newspaper) as admitted by 
authors as well, by no means non-contestable. Ehie to defrnitonal problems and lack of reliable statistics 
there are differing figures on that point. According to Dodd, the numbers were 33, 90, and 260 for the 
years 1975, 1976, and 1977 respectively. While Mackenzie gives the figure of 231 for 1977. Clement H. 
Dodd, The Crisis o f  the Turkish Democracy, second edition, (London: Eothen, 1990), 142; Keimeth 
Mackenzie, Turkey in Transition (Ankara, 1981), 6.
243 Cumhuriyet, November 19-22, 1975.
Hürriyet, Hürriyet Yıllığı 1977 [Hürriyet Aimual, 1977] (İstanbul, 1977), 290. Similarly, Sami 
Şener, the general secreatary of national Turidsh student union of Islamic youth argued that “to make 
events more bloody under the banner of helping the state security forces is, in a way, to help anarchy. We 
always defended that when violence occurred, it is in police’s responsibility to deal with it.” Ibid., 288.
As Linz noted, “the tolerance of a democratic regime for the creation of paramilitary
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It may also be surmised that general politicization and lack of coordination paralyzed 
the state’s administrative ability to implement its coercive functions, namely to catch and punish 
those who violated law. The prevention of terrorism requires able and eflScient security forces 
with necessary equipment. Appointments with partisan and political considerations must surely 
have reduced the quality and morale of the security forces. Since they were promoted or 
demoted on the basis political preferences, there was no need for hard work to bring those 
illegals into the justice. The politicization of the security forces alongside the problem of under­
equipment of the security forces to deal with increasing terrorism would show its full impact in 
coming years, since the weaknesses of the state vis-à-vis violent actions tend to further 
encourage violence.
On the economic front, the uncoordinated, piecemeal, and patronage directed policies 
of the NF governments had done much to the emergence of the economic crisis whose effects 
would be felt in 1978 up until IQSO.^ “*’ In terms of basic economic indicators, the Turkish 
economy was in a healthy situation -or what was in the midst of early phase of import- 
substitution strategy- in the early 1970s. This was basically due to 1970 stabilization measures 
(implemented by the JP government) and worker remittances from the Europe. Worker 
remittances were enough to balance the entire trade deficit in 1971-1973 period, giving even a 
current account surplus in 1973. Exports also inaeased sharply; 15 per cent in 1971, 31 per 
cent in 1972, 49 per cent in 1973, while the GDP growth had been 7.3, 9.6, 5.1 per cent 
respectively in these years. Therefore, Turicey did not initially need external financing to
organizations by disloyal oppositions creates a most serious threat to its existence.” Linz, Breakdown. 59.
246 Keleş, Ünsal, Kent. 9. 109.
As indicated above, it should not be forgotten that neither party patronage nor economic 
populism begin with the NF governments. What can be said, at most, is that the NF governments went as 
far as they could on both fronts. For the discussion of populist economic policies in the period of 1962- 
1976. see. Korkut Boratav, “Türkiye’de Popülizm: 1962-1976 Dönemi Üzerine Notlar,” [Populism in 
Turkey: Some Notes on 1%2-1976 Period] in İktisat ve Siyaset Üzerine Aykırı Yazılar (İstanbul: BDS, 
1989).
248 Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey (London: Verso, 1987), 185.
T.C Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1990 [Statistical
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support its import-substitution strategy and resulting deficit
Troubles began when the world oil crisis (as a result of the 1973 Middle East war) hit 
all of the world.^ *' It not only caused an increase in Turkey’s imports (both petrolaim and 
other imported goods) bills fi"om two billion dollars in 1973 to almost six billion dollars in 
1977252 caused a decline in worker remittances. The ratio of imports paid for by
foreign exchange earnings through remittances was 38 per cent in 1974, 28 per cent in 1975, 
19 per cent in 1976, and 17 per cent in 1977.^ ^^  The various costs of the Peace Operation in 
Cyprus (including direct assistance to Northern part of Cyprus, maintenance of army units, and 
several losses of financial resources as a result of the United States embargo) was another 
fector in the increasing balance of payment deficits.
On the face of the world oil crisis, the economically prudent thing to do was to try to 
order the domestic economy through a variety of measures such as restricting wages, limiting 
the rate of growth and increasing productivity. These measures required a stable and decisive 
government, which would be able to take (and implement) painful measures for the sake of the 
long-term stability of the economy. But “behaving as if they were opposition parties”^^ the 
NSP and NAP were a far cry fi^ om supporting a long term economic stabilization program. 
They were rather interested in distributing public resources to party supporters. Furthermore, 
the presence of the NSP in the coalition hindered Turkish governments relations with
Yeaitxx)k of Turkey] (Ankara: DIE, 1992). 4%.
Irvin C. Shick and Ertugrul A. Tonak, “The International Dimension: Trade, Aid and Debt,” 
in Turkey in Transition, ed. Irvin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A.Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 
349.
But that does not mean that if these had not happened, the Turkish economy would have 
remained in good condition. As Keyder remarked what he called an easy phase of ISI (accomplished in 
the periood of 1963-1971, which witnessed rapid industrialisation) had come to an end by 1973.
William Hale, The Political and Economic Development o f  Modem Turkey (London: Groom 
Helm, 1981), 231.
253 Keyder, 5ra/e. 185.
Aruia O. Krueger and liter Turan, “The Politics and Economics of Turkish policy reforms in 
the 1980s,” in Political & Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform, eds. Aruia O. Krueger and 
R.H Bates (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 340.
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international economic organizations that might provide economic aid. The NSP tended to 
perceive these organizations as the representatives of an imperialist-zionist conspiracy to keep 
muslim nations backward.
The JP, which had never freed itself from party patronage, could not manage to get 
prudent macro economic policies implemented. The fear of losing power since he could not 
trust his partners appears to have prevented Demirel from taking painful decisions. Not sure of 
whether he would stay in power to see the benefits of the short term sacrifices, the JP leader 
preferred free-for-all economic policies. Premier Süleyman Demirel once proudly remarked 
that they would not increase the price of oil despite the feet that OPEC has increased the 
prices. The Turkish economy continued to grow with external borrowings with high interest 
rate.^ ** Its growth rates were 7.4 per cent in 1974, 8.0 per cent in 1975, 7.9 per cent in 1976. 
This was obtained at a time when all major economies cut their growth rate. It was achieved at 
the cost of postponing the inevitable foreign exchange crisis.
This imprudence in macro economic management would prove to be highly costiy in 
the long term. The more the necessary economic adjustments were delayed, the more costly (in 
terms of sacrifices required) it became to implement. As Boratav indicated “an economic crisis 
which could easily have been dealt with in 1974 and 1975 with sound and rational measures, 
would come three years later with more severity.” *^* In this sense, political crisis preceded 
economic crisis. Or rather the economic crisis was not the product of striedy economic forces 
which was totally beyond the control of the national governments, but rather political 
misadministration at the top intensified and facilitated the economic crisis.
The chief means of e.\temal borrowing was “Deposits Convertible to Foreign Exchange” 
(Dövize Çevrilebilir Mevduat). Initiated in 1967 and ended in 1974, it was restarted by the NF 
governments. It was designed to attract the savings of migrant workers by using state guarantees 
(including losses incurred by the exchange rate adjirstments) to rapidly obtain large amounts of foreign 
exchange. Instead of migrant workers, principal depositors turned out to be foreign banks. It had provided 
“an exceptionally short-sighted method” of obtaining short-term high interest loans for the treasury. Shick 
and Tonak, “The International.” 349.
^  Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985 [The Economic History of Tirrkey, 1908- 
1985] (Istanbul: Gerçek, 1989), 115.
Valenzuela noted that in Chile, too, political crisis had preceded the socio-economic crisis.
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To sum up the basic argument of this chapter, post-1973 politics was marked by the 
end of dominant position of the JP with the fragmentation of the party ^stem, and the rise of 
ideological polarization between major party elites on a right-left (or communist-fescist as they 
frequently called it) divide. The heightening of polarization was aided by the RPP leadership’s 
radical rhetoric and the right’s (the NAP and the IP’s) reaction to it. The fi'agmentation of the 
party system necessitated the formation of coalitions. Apart from a seven-month-long RPP- 
NSP coalition, the National Front coalitions left their imprint in this period. It has been argued 
that the NF governments were detrimental to the stability of democracy in several respects. 
Through their politicization of state institutions, including the police and educational ones, they 
did considerable harm to the functioning of civilian bureaucracy and the security forces. The 
paralysation of state structures was one of the chief fectors that weakened the state’s 
effectiveness in dealing with terrorism, which paved the way to military intervention. The 
intensification of polarization, at the elite level, showed signs of spreading to mass-level which 
in turn, became a chief contributing fector to increasing terrorism. On the economic front, their 
inability to take concerted measures in the fece of the world oil crisis, and their continuing 
practices of extreme party patronage prepared the ground for the crisis of 1978-1980. Besides, 
in this period many amoral and highly condemned practices of parties and politicians came to 
the attention of public opinion more than before, such as broken promises, accusations of theft, 
even murder, and frequent party changes, which was likely to be associated with the 
democratic regime itself
Despite these detrimental effects, critical actors including the military did not come 
to think that democratic regime was unable to provide solutions to Turkey’s problems. 
Since economic troubles and the problem of terrorism did not seem to be getting out of 
hand, and there were alternatives to NF governments. The JP-RPP dialogue was one of 
them, as the most preferable option. As a second possible option, there was the possibility 
of RPP government.
Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes -Chile (Lx>ndon and Baltimore; The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978), 106.
256
CHAPTER V:THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY IN 
POWER: TERRORISM, ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE LOSS OF 
HOPE, 1978-1979
The second National Front government resigned in 31 December 1977 when it 
felled to secure vote of confidence as a result of an interpellation put forward by the RPP- 
led opposition. The resignation was greeted with relief throughout the country, not so 
much because Ecevit was seen as great savior (though some thought so) but because, it 
seemed for a while that the alternative was hardly better. ‘ The RPP was entrusted to form a 
government. The total number of the RPP deputies was not enough to ensure a majority in 
the assembly. The twelve MP’s who had already resigned fi’om the JP, and Republican 
Reliance Party of Turhan Feyzioğlu and Democratic Party of Ferruh Bozbeyli made their 
support clear soon.
At this stage the RPP leadership did not prefer to enter a dialogue with the JP, 
despite there were some discussions regarding the necessity of such dialogue. Nazh fiicak 
of pro-JP Tercüman wrote that “nothing but the alternative of RPP-JP dialogue, would help 
to secure (political) stability in the country.”  ^Abdi İpekçi of pro-RPP Milliyet argued that 
Ecevit should not close doors to the JP. Metin Toker of Hürriyet, too, defended the same 
view. Similarly, there are indications that the business community was also pushing for such 
dialogue. The head of Turkey’s biggest holding company Vehbi Koç was reported to have 
said that “we need a period of peace. We have to unite again as if we are in the 
independence war. We can go nowhere by making 15 JP members resign. The JP-RPP co-
' The head of the CTWU, Halil Tunç expressed it well when he said that “it does not seem 
likely that we wiU have a government, which is as negaüve as the NF, and which does nothing to 
solve problems but bring them to an impasse. For that reason, I am of the opinion that this 
govermnent would be consistent, persuasive and succesfiil.” Yankı, 9-15 January, 1978.
 ^Tercüman, December 28, 1977. “Ecevit ve İhtimaller'’ [Ecevit and Possibilities]
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Behind the demands for coalition and dialogue lay the tremendous problems that 
the incoming government would have to tackle. The problem of terrorism, which claimed 
nearly ta i persons day, needed an immediate and prompt response that only strong 
government could deliver. The economy was likewise in tatters. Immediate stabilization 
measures with much needed belt-tightening seemed to be inevitable. In fordgn relations, a 
strong and respectable government which would command respect abroad to improve 
relations with the United States and Europe was needed. It was reasonably put forward that 
a weak government (such as the RPP minority government) would not be well-equipped to 
overcome those problems, since the magnitude of the problems was such that only a strong 
government could handle them.
Despite these demands, the RPP preferred to go alone, and did not even consider 
this option. In an explanation that many find unconvincing, Ecevit was reported to have 
said that “nation has become sick of calls for coalition. It is too late for JP-RPP coalition. 
Even if Demirel accepts this, those who resigned their parties are disappointed.” *  He 
argued that if democracy had survived in Turkey, despite all negative factors associated 
with the more than two-year-long NF government, it was because of the hope that elections 
might secure a governmental change.* Now that the opportunity has arrived, Ecevit seemed 
to assume, the RPP could not reject such an offer which may further escalate the erosion of 
confidence in democratic system.* He was reported to have said to Abdi İpekçi that despite 
he knew that the RPP would not be able to implement its programs with such minority
 ^Orhan Ehmi, Ecevit'in Çilesi [The Agony of Ecevit] (Istanbul: Afa, 1995), 52. Ecevit held 
regular meetings with some selected journalists. Dura was one of the journalists who participated in 
those meetings. Therefore, these ideas should not be taken as Ecevit’s own words but expression of his 
ideas by someone else.
* Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1977 Genel Seçimi Radyo Konuşmaları [The Radio Speeches in 
the 1977 General Elections] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1977), 7.
* Indeed, in intellectual circles the JP-RPP coalition was perceived as the drawback for the 
RPP. Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, (associate professor of politics and the RPP candidate in the 1977 
elections) for instance, commented that in the possible grand coalition “Ecevit would be severely 
constrained, leading (sustaining) to a belief that there is no difference between the RPP and the JP. 
This, in turn, would prevent, for the time being, the possibility of the democratic left as.«aiming 
power.” Ytmki, 16-22 May, 1977. Also, Doğan Avcıoğlu indicated that such a coalition would have 
meant the interruption of Turkey’s democratization process for a while. Doğan Avcıoğlu, Devrim ve 
'Demokrasi' Üzerine [On Revolution and ‘Democracy’] (İstanbul: Tekin, 1997), 73.
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government he had to try to form it “so as to arrest the speed of the country’s falling into 
the abyss ” He added that “it might be pernicious to spend time (for coalition). Everday 
more than ten youngsters are being killed in the streets. The country has been turned into a 
‘blood lake.’ It is for these reasons that we are hurrying.”’ Ecevit appears to have supposed 
that as soon as the RPP assumed to power, all of a sudden, the bloodshed was going to 
stop.
On the other hand, it appeared unlikely that the JP would have accepted such 
coalition, even if Ecevit had offered it. Demirel had many times made it clear that any 
coalition between the two parties was unlikely. At this point Demirel was consistent 
throughout. Ecevit, who made so much of talk of coalition between parties, appeared to 
have remembered his promises only when his party was in no position to form a 
government alone. We have noted how Ecevit even rejected to talk with Demirel 
immediately after the 1977 election, but when it became clear that Demirel was forming a 
second NF government he remembered the coalition. The same pattern was now repeated. 
Ecevit did not want to miss the opportunity to become prime minister. He must have 
thought that his leadership position would be threatened if he again missed the chances of 
becoming premier.
The composition of Ecevit’s cabinet exemplified, once again, the ill-operation of 
the Turkish political system. In a move that generated much uproar, Ecevit appointed ten of 
the twelve deputies who resigned fit>m the JP as ministers.*  In their resignation letter these 
deputies have stated that they were protesting Demirel’s uncompromising attitude shown 
towards the RPP. And what they were doing was a miniature JP-RPP coalition. But now 
the other fece of politics was, once again, on display.’ While Ecevit portrayed himself as a
’ Cited in Tufan Türenç, Erhan Akyildiz, Gazeteci, [The Journalist] (Istanbul; Milliyet, 
1987), 442. This is oonfirmed by Arcayiirek. (Cüneyt Arcayürek, Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor-8, 
Müdahalenin Ayak Sesleri [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains-8, The Footsteps of the Intervention] 
(İstanbul; Bilgi, 1985), 348-349.
* The RRP and the DP got 2 and 1 miıüstership req)ectively while the RPP had 21.
’ There were rumours, as it had been since 1973, that both parties tried to seduce each others’ 
MP’s, and to keep theirs, by offering tangible benefits. In one instance, an MP fix>m the JP resigned 
in the morning stating his intention to continue political life in the RPP. In the afternoon, however, he 
changed his mind after meeting with Demirel, saying that he had underwent “psychological distress.” 
Regarding this case, one of the JP MP’s is reported to have said that the MP in question had wanted
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man \\dio have believed’® in their sincerity, many did not find it convincing.”
Despite criticism of Ecevit’s uncompromising attitude regarding the grand coalition 
and composition of its cabinet, the RPP government (which had secured 229 vote, only 
three more than necessary to stay in power)’^  was nevertheless acclaimed with warm 
acceptance both inside and outside the country. The great majority of the press had already 
recorded their support for the RPP government. President Fahri Korutürk claimed that 
everybody but those ‘eccentrics’ could agree on the government program.”  Similarly, 
the general council of TIBA urged political stability and made their support for the 
government clear.”  The Economist noted that the return of Ecevit as prime minister “is 
the second best thing (the first being grand-coalition) that could have happened to the 
country.”” There were surely doubts regarding what a minority government of the RPP’s
the transfer (nakil) p f one of the doctors firom one place to another, but resigned when his wish was 
not fulfilled. He then returned his party when doctor in question had been appointed to his new place. 
Cited in Yankı, 2-8 Januaiy, 1978.
Ecevit was reported to have said that “Oğuz Atalay is very honest man. He is so close to us 
that if everything goes right, he could yet assume even higher positions. Şerafettin Elçi, who had been 
sent to prison from the notorious articles of Turkish penal code of 141-142, is not a Kurdish 
nationalist. He is a progressive. Karaaslan’s family had connections with the RPP. So are Mete Tan, 
(jüneş öngüt. Akova similarly, very honest man and cleric.” Cited in Arcayürek, Sonbahar. 288. 
Similarly in Duru. Ecevit.5\. Of these ten MP’s who obtained ministership, Akova resigned in May 
1979 and returned to the JP in October 1979, Septioğlu and inkaya resigned in June 1979 and then 
entered to the JP. Defending his action in 1985, Ecevit continued to reject the charge that he had 
bargained with them for ministership; “Nobody bargained for ministership. Those ministers were 
leaving their parties very soon after the elections. Besides they were also accepting to contribute to the 
RPP, whose views they might not be sharing. Therefore their ministership was an insurance both for 
the government and themselves.” Cited in Arcayürek, Müdahale. 351.
" Professor Muamer Aksoy was one exception. According to Aksoy, the action of these 
deputies would be written in “the history of Turkish democracy with golden letters as it exemplified 
an act of splitting (yarma harekau), an act of rebellion against those who behaved contrary to the 
principles of democracy and constitution.” He also defended their appointment as mirüster arguing 
that if they had stayed outside the cabinet they might both be alienated from the RPP govenunent and 
be susceptible to JP’s efforts to re-take (retransfer) them through slander, and even through threats to 
their life. Muammer Aksoy, Cumhuriyet, January 14, 1978, “Neden bu Feryat, Bu telaş,” [Why this 
Outcry and Flurry ?]
”  As Time noted, the RPP’s narrow majority “seems to offer too little stability to spare 
Turkey yet another invitation to the dance (of premiers).” Time, January 16, 1978 “Pas de Deux- 
Dance of the Premiers.”
Hürriyet, January 7, 1978.
M Hürriyet, January 22, 1978.
The Economist, January 7,1978. “Poet in Power”
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could do in power as well as the leadership capabilities of Bülent Ecevit*® but it did not 
prevent the government from enjoying widespread support in public opinion in and outside 
the country, if only because the alternative could be worse.
From its days in the opposition the RPP leaders created an image of a country 
whose problems did not require such great sacrifices that a decent government could solve 
them easily. Ecevit, for instance, argued that “when we get rid of this government, the 
economic crisis shall end, the peace shall reign in the country.”’’ It can be said, in 
retrospect, that this factor negatively contributed both to the success of the government and 
ultimately of democracy. The more a government inflated expectations, the more possibility 
of its being seen as unsuccessful increased, since by inflating expectations to a degree that it 
was not likely to satisfy, the government set high standards, against which they would be 
evaluated. If a government promises that terrorism and economic problems will be handled 
in a very short time without much sacrifice, as the RPP government did, h severely 
undermines its chances of success. Nothing less than miracle would led-to its being 
regarded as successful by the majority after raising expectations to such degree. It would 
also not be likely to get a favorable response when it asked for, since the electorate were 
not prepared beforehand. Lastly, such a government seriously damages its ability to ensure 
the trust of its citizens since they are likely to feel cheated. It is in this sense Juan J. Linz 
stated that the principal sources of unsolvable problems was “the setting by the political 
leadership of goals for which it is unable to provide the necessary means, and its 
unwillingness to renounce those goals once it becomes apparent that the means can not be 
provided.”**
In an increasingly interdependent world where many crucial problems are beyond
The Economist, for instance, noted that “where Mr Ecevit would take Turkey if he were 
left to himself is a mystery. He is uncommonly manysided character even by politicans' standards. In 
private, he is a gentle and courteous as a poet is expected to be on the public platform he is a 
demagogue”. The Economist, Ibid.,.
’’ Milliyet, November 24, 1977. Though, Turhan Feyzio|lu tried to soften governments’ that 
attitude arguing that anarchy can not be handled within the couple of months. Yanh, Fd)ruaiy 6-12, 
1978.
'* Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown o f  Democratic Regimes -Crisis, Breakdown, ReequHbration 
(Baltimore and London, The University of Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), 53.
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also not be likely to get a fevorable response when it asked for, since the electorate were 
not prepared beforehand. Lastly, such a government seriously damages its ability to ensure 
the trust of its citizens since they are likely to feel cheated. It is in this sense Juan J. Linz 
stated that the principal sources of unsolvable problems was “the setting by the political 
leadership of goals for which it is unable to provide the necessary means, and its 
unwillingness to renounce those goals once it becomes apparent that the means can not be 
provided.”**
In an increasingly interdependent world where many crucial problems are beyond 
the reach of any national government to tackle, what is more likely to be successful is not to 
inflate expectations. This is easier said than done, of course. Generally the electorate are not 
likely to vote for candidates who promise “nothing but blood and tears” as Winston 
Churchil did in the wake of the second worid war. It is, however, one thing to say 
“everything suddenly will change if you give us power” and another to say “we are beset 
with difiSculties, but we will try as hard as we can, and we are better than the available 
alternatives.”
5.1. TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE
With such heightened expectations the Ecevit government proceed to deal with 
pressing problems. One of the most serious problems was the problem of terrorism, *’ which 
claimed an average of ten people a day. It was noted earlier that the RPP programs, its 
diagnosis and remedies of the country’s problems involved romantic, sentimental, general 
propositions rather than realistic, detailed, well-thought-out viable proposals. When in 
opposition this did not seem to matter much, as Turkey’s intellectual circles, like that of the
'* Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes -Crisis, Breakdown, ReequUbration 
(Baltimore and London, The University of Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), 53.
”  There are many conceptualizations of terrorism. In this study the recent inclusive 
definition put forward by Peter Chalk is used. According to this definition, terrorism denotes “the 
systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as a means to achieve 
specific political objectives.” As such “it is a psychological tactic that seeks to spread fear-inducing 
effects in a target group wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared 
indiscriminate targeting of non-combatant victims and property.” Peter Chalk, West European 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 22.
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March there was sharp polarization between the right and the left, but “during the NF 
period violence remained basically one sided “It was organized,” Ecevit continued, 
“under the protection of the one of the coalition partners of ultra-right-wing government.” *^ 
It must be for this reason that as soon as coming to power Ecevit implicitly threatened the 
NAP and even Demirel “if those who are responsible for violent acts of the past do not 
facilitate our efforts to bind up past wounds, we will have to lance the past.”^^
Parallel to this belief, Ecevit and other RPP prominents inclined to see leftist terror 
mainly as a means of self-defense against the state-backed rightist terrorism, though they 
accepted that a minority group on the left was determined to use terror. Ecevit, for 
instance, argued that activités of the right-wingers led “some ultra-leftists to retaliate 
through recourse to violence.”^  Taken to its logical conclusion, it was assumed that since 
state institutions would be cleared of fescists, and the RPP govamment would no longer be 
soft on them, the m^ority of those who were on the left, too, would leave the weapons. 
Interior Minister Irfan Özaydınh’s statement on the issue of terrorism shows how the 
government was embrassed when it faced the real face of terrorism. Özaydınh confessed 
that:
I had assumed that with our government we could prevent the right-wingers’ endeavors to seize the 
state. I was mistaken. (But) they could still be eliminated. They are now using the cell system. They 
are going to destroy themselves. Leñ-wingers are now being divided into various Actions 
themselves especially alter our government came to the power. After the 16 March incident (at 
Istanbul Univeisity) every class was occupied by different factions that sang marches. A temble 
(horrifying) situation. Ifwe had not been there they were going to tear each other apart^''
In reality, however, the causes of terrorism were much more complex than the RPP 
leaders believed. It was closely related to a complex encounter and interaction of various 
socio-cultural, political and international ^ o r s ,  a serious study of which had not yet been
20
21
Yanh, December, 19-25, 1977.
Ibid.
^  Hürriyet, Januaiy 11, 1978. See, also, his open accusation of the NAP as responsible for 
terrorist attacks. Hürriyet, June 28, 1978.
^  Cited in Yanh, December 19-25,1977. He also added that “if provokators had not been 
involved, the ultra-left would not even have retaliated that much.” Ibid.
Reported in Duru, EcevitJl.
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done. What follows is a rudimentary account (based on available secondary materials) on 
the terrorist organizations and a variety of causes which supported terrorism. In the first 
place, terrorism did not originate fi"om one side (right or left) as the RPP leaders 
themselves, however belatedly, came to admit. There were both left-wing and right-wing 
terrorist organizations. On the left there were illegal organizations which made violent 
overthrow of existing order and its replacement with what they called communist society 
their aim such as Turkish People’s Liberation Front, Turidsh Workers and Peasants 
Liberation Army and Revolutionary Path.^ Drawing inspiration from the guerrilla leaders 
of the 1971-2 period, these clandestine groups engaged in a wide variety of terrorist 
activities (against both the right and other rival leftist groups) from murder to robberies to 
bombing. There were also broadly based legal leftist organizations (such as CRWU and 
Turidsh Teachers Unity and Solidarity Association TTUSA). It was claimed that some of 
these organizations were infiltrated by illegal groups and some members were suspected to 
have been engaged in illegal activities.“
On the right, too, a variety of legal and illegal organizations took part in violent 
battles against the left. These organizations can be divided into two; ultra-nationalist ones 
and those which strived for the establishment of an Islamic state. In many cases such 
organizations tended to use ultra-nationalist and Islamic arguments together. Like those 
on the left, ultra-nationalists, too, preferred to infiltrate l^a l organisations. The members of 
the NAP aflBliated Idealist Youth Associations and other Idealist associations for various 
occupational groups such as teachers, workers, artisans have been suspected to have 
engaged in terrorist activities. Though not as effective as their ultra-nationalist and leftist 
counter-parts, there also were illegal Islamic organizations aiming to establish Islamic state.
The ethnic-separatists constituted yet another form of terroristic organizations 
aiming to establish a Kurdish state in the South East Turkey such as the Woricers Party of 
Kurdistan and Ala Rizgari. The Workers Party of Kurdistan (known as Apocular after its 
leader Abdullah Ocalan) was the most vocal amongst them. The WPK also claimed to be a
^  These organisations have been further divided on the basis of &ctional rivalries. For 
instance, militants of the TPLF origins have established The Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party, 
The Turkish Conununist Labor Party, and the Union of Revolutionary Conununists.
“  Many members of the CRWU and TTUSA have been sentenced to prison by the post-
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mandst organization and as such it had co-operated with many ill^al organizations on the 
left.
These terrorist organizations were hardly an associations of adventurist 
discontented youngsters with little or no links with the larger society as implied in some 
analysis. The second wave of terrorism seemed to differ from the first wave (1968-1972) in 
some crucial respects. While the first wave remained mainly student oriented violence 
having litde relations with the wider society, the second wave was more than that. The 
number of groups multiplied and they involved overtly rightists and ethnic nationalist ones. 
While the students still occupied the central places in these groups, they were not the 
dominant element as in the first wave. Moreover, the capacity of the second wave to 
disturb society' was much greater than the first as it managed to exploit latent ethnic- 
sectarian cleavages.^’
The Turkish social-political structure that underwent rapid modernization and her 
geopolitical situation have been crucial in explaining such diversity and strength of terrorist 
organizations. In the first place one should note the socio-economic change that Turkish 
society underwent through sbcties and seventies. Though we do not argue that Tuikey’s 
less than impeccable industrialization-urbanization process was the chief factor in the 
terrorism, it nevertheless played no ignorable part.^ * In the late fifities and sbcties Turkish 
society were charaterized by large migrant flux from villages to cities. The first generation 
of those migrants tended to vote for the moderate JP, basically because they experienced 
relative betterment (in comparison to their life in village) in their lives. The second 
generation, however, experienced no such thing. The weakening of traditional femily-based 
authority patterns observed in villages gave way to a more demanding protest culture. The 
development of various conununication devices such as television and increasing interaction
intervention military regime.
Sabri Sayan and Bruce Hofiman, Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case, 1976- 
1980, A Rand Note, N-3228-USDP (No date, 10); George S. Harris, Turkey: Coping With Crisis 
(Boulder: Westview, 1985), 144.
“  Ruşen Keleş, Artun Ünsal, Kent ve Siyasal Şiddet [The City and Political Violence 
XAnkara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınlan, 1982), 32; Ühan Tekeli, “Kent 
Suçluluk ve Şiddet” [The City, Criminality and Violence] Türkiye 'de Kentleşme Yazılan (Ankara: 
Turhan, 1982).
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between shanty-towns and cities made them to aspire to the city life enjoyed by inhabitants; 
they no longer felt it necessary to accept traditional values of endurance in the fece 
hardships, to be content with what was available (that disposed the first generation towards 
acceptance of existing order). Experiencing a sense of powerlessness, lacking educational 
and other opportunities that would allow them to integrate into urban society, many of 
those youngsters (alongside their cousins \^ dio came to big cities to study and experienced 
similar feelings)^ easily fell prey to illegal organizations that ofiT^ed them money and
status 30
Secondly, the latent religious sectarian cleavages between Alevi and Sünni sects 
which were exploited by terrorist organizations appears to have been another supporting 
cause of terrorism. While there had not been any legal or illegal organization fighting on 
these terms, it was observed that many of leftist organizations tended to draw support from 
Alevi’s while rightist ones relied exclusively on Sünni’s.^ * In the Kahramanmaraş and 
Çorum incidents, for instance, this intercommunal fighting cost the lives of 109 and 30 
people respectively.
Thirdly, some prevalent cultural properties of Turkish society seemed to constitute
The memoirs of Mehmet Ali Ağca, who imprisoned for the killing of Abdi İpekçi but 
escaped from prison, and who then tried to assassinate the Pope, is telling in that respect. He came 
firom a very poor family and lost his father at the age of ten from work accident. He had to work to 
finance himself in the Ankara, to where he arrived as university student. He stayed in cheap student 
hostel controlled by Idealists and became one of them. See, Mehmet Ali Ağca, Ben Mehmet Ali Ağca- 
Mesih [1 am Mehmet Ali Ağca -Messiah] (İstanbul: Kuşak, no date), 29, 33, 35,41.
^  According to Karpat no other faaor “contributed as much to social and political change 
and, indirecüy, to political unrest in Turkey as the agglomeration of nural migrant setüements around 
the major cities of Turkey.... Alienated youth in the gecekondus and elsewhere in the cities provided 
a large recruitment pool for cveiy militant, radical, and terrorist group.” Kemal H. Karpat, “Turkish 
Democracy at Impasse; Ideology, Party Politics, and the Third Military Intervention.” International 
Journal o f Turkish Studies. (1980-1981), 18. In the same line, Sayan and Hofiman, “Insurgency,” 12. 
In the study of 277 prisoners, who were arrested on terrorism charges in Ankara, striking conclusions 
emerged. Findings of the study suggested that the 93 per cent of these people were under 30 years of 
age while the 80 per cent of them were under 25 years of age. It also found that the majority of the 
prisoners had grown in major cities, that they dominantly came from poor families with three-four 
children, and that they were either graduate of Lycee, or left their higher education uncompleted. 
Doğu Ergil, Türkiye 'de Terör ve Şiddet fTerror and Violence in Turk^] (Ankara; Turhan, 1980), 
112-133.
Terrorists aimed at the polarization of different ethno-religious groups by initiating violent 
incidents. Their idea was, “to break the community into angry Actions through acts of violence and to 
present themselves as ‘defenders’ of minority groups..” Sayan and Hoffinan, “Insurgency,” 14.
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a conducive ground for violence. Şerif Mardin, for instance, noted that Turkish children 
were socialized into a culture that put a high premium on qualities of warriorship with 
aggressive tendencies to be shown towards any available outgroup.^^ Social psychologist 
Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı called this as “core authoritarianism” to denote dogmatic or intolerant 
behavior tendency. In feet, the prevalence of blood folds and honor crimes can also be 
seen as further evidence for the argument that culturally Turkish society well-disposed 
towards the use of violence.
Finally, many of these organizations maintained international links with a variety of 
international terrorist groups and some states. It was widely reported, for instance, that in 
an effort to destabilize Turkey and bring her into its own domination Soviet Union provided 
training and arms to many leftist organizations via Bulgaria and Syria (three of them share 
borders with Turkey).^ ^
Thus, the problem of terrorism in Turkey was much more complex and therefore 
difficult to tackle with than the RPP leadership appears to have assumed. By not properly 
assessing its true nature and causes, the RPP government had a bad start in its fight against 
terrorism. Not only was the government caught in misdiagnosing the problem, but it also 
adopted rather a reductionist sociological approach towards the prevention of terrorism. 
They favored the view that the roots of terrorism should be sought in a social and economic 
environment which nurtures terrorists. Deprivation and subsequent fiustration that derived 
fi'om lack economic opportunities, the RPP leadership appears to have believed, was the 
prime cause of terrorism.^ * The individual responsibility of a terrorist for his (her) acts 
(since social-political conditions, upon which he had no control created him) and the
Şerif Mardin, “Youth and Violence in Tuilcey.” Archives Européennes de Sociologie. 19, 
(1978), 229-254.
Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, “Social Norms and Authoritarianism; A Tuikish-American 
Comparison.” Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology. 16, (1970), 445. For a fuller discussion, 
Paul J Magnarella, “Civil Violence in Turkey: Its infrastructural. Social and Cultural Foundations,” in 
Sex Roles, Family & Community in Turkey, ed. Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (Indiana University Turkish 
Studies, 1982).
^  See, admittedly less than academic work by Paul B.Henze, Goal Destabilization: Soviet 
Agitational Propaganda, Instability and Terrorism in NATO South (European American Institute for 
Security Research, 1981).
35 Dodd. Cm/5.21.
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prevention of terrorism through strict administrative measures (within the rule of law, of 
course) were not given much priority. It was believed that unless socio-political conditions 
are significantly improved administrative-legal measures would not help.^  ^ This 
sociological-reductionist view has lost its salience in recent writings on terrorism.^ ^ While 
social-political conditions are significant, it is mistaken to assume that th ^  are the biggest 
determinants of terrorism. Individual dispositions play a role in whether one should 
establish or participate in terrorist groups. Terrorism “is always choice among 
alternatives.” *^ It is, therefore as much, if not more, important to pay attention to 
administrative measures such as provision of adequate resources, better intelligence 
gathering, establishment of anti-terror squads so as to discourage the potential terrorist 
fi'om becoming an actual one.
One related aspect of this approach is the belief that the more fi'ee and open the 
society becomes the fewer terrorist actions there would be. The RPP leadership seemed to 
assume that terrorists recoursed to violence because th ^  had not been allowed to express
^  For instance, the Justice Minister Mehmet Can once explained the fad that many convicted 
prisoners escaped from prison by reference to 'guardians’ social background.” Hürriyet, Januaiy 11, 1979. 
Note also that this view allows those who are in command positions to cast off their own 
responsibility. Those culprits escape from prison not because, the prisons are badly governed, and 
necesaiy precautions are not taken, which is the responsibility of justice minister, but because of 
guardians' social background upon which the justice minister have little power to control since 
university graduate would not prefer to work as guardian. Similarly, in 1976 Ali Topuz, powerfiil 
faction leader, criticized efforts of the NF govermnent to legislate a traffic law. According to Topuz, 
the problem of traffic was related to socio-economic structure and efforts to solve it through 
adntinistiative measures (zabıta önlemleri) was an example of old-fashioned thinking. Cited in Abdi 
İpekçi who criticized Topuz. Milliyet, July 19, 1976 “Asıl (Jeri Kalmış Düşünce” [A Real Old- 
Fashioned Thinking ]
See, Paul Wilkinsoii, Terrorism & Liberal State, (London; Macmillan, 1986), 35; Martha 
Crenshaw, “How Terrorist Think; What Psychology can contribute to Understanding of Terrorism,” 
in Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, ed. Lawrence Howard (New York; Praeger, 1992), 253; Peter 
Janke, Terrorism and Democracy: Some Contemporary Cases (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 
187.
“  Crenshaw, “How terrorist,” 71. In an attempt to specify relative weight of social conditions 
and individual dispositions in creating terrorism, Friedland offers an interesting hypothesis. 
According to Friedland, when deprivation is intense, when group has well-articulated ideology and 
when group members have strong identity, individual dispositions would play a lesser role. On the 
other hand, when group does not aim to satisfy basic needs and elementary rights, when its ideology is 
not coherent, and when the group is lacking unique separate identity, individual dispositions would 
play a greater role. Nehemia Friendland, “Becoming a Terrorist; Social and Individual Antecedents,” 
in Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, ed. Lawrence Howard (New York; Praeger, 1992), 88.
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themselves in peaceful ways. They particularly emphasized the notorious articles of 
Turkish Crime Law -141, 142 forbidding the communist propaganda. Leaving aside 
whether in Turkey of 1978 any political groups were denied peaceful expression of their 
political views,^  ^this assumption, too, is severely flawed.
While it is true that open societies are likely to fight terrorism more eflfectively than 
authoritarian ones the assumption that in a fi'eer society the terrorist will tend to prefer 
peaceful political activities (since they will be allowed to) is unproved. It should be 
accepted that in the short-term authoritarian governments may deal better with 
terrorism. Since it is difficult for liberal states “to act decisively and ruthlessly against 
insurgents” because unlike authoritarian states they had to respect fundamental rights 
and liberties even in the case of an emergency.^ But on the other hand, democracies 
have inherent advantages vis-à-vis terrorism basically because they have a greater 
potential to alienate the terrorist from the larger public.'** Despite the obvious 
advantages of democracy, we agree with the Jenkins’ comment that the view that “if we 
provided access for terrorist groups to express their causes, they would not be 
bombing and shooting” is a “non-sense.”^^  The range of open societies that face the 
threat of terrorism give credence to this view. Countries such as Britain, Germany, France 
and United States have never been immune fi"om internally generated terrorism, despite the 
feet that they are open societies by any account.
Besides, unlike common perceptions, there is no contradiction between “expansion
True there was many articles (both in the constitution and other laws) prohibiting the 
establishment (and propaganda) of communist and Islamist organizations, but due to lack 
enforcement these were scarcely effective. It seemed that those, who believed in allegedly illegal ideas, 
successfully infiltrated legal associations and became effective in them. Similarly, many legal 
publications (newspapers, union or association weeklies, or ordinary magazines) could easily 
propagate allegedly prohibited communist or Islamist propaganda.
40 Wilkinson, Terrorism. 104.
For a discussion of the strengths and weaknessess of democracy, see Alex P.Schmid, 
“Terrorism and Democracy,” in Western Responses to Terrorism, ed. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. 
Crelinsten (London:Frank Cass, 1993).
Michael B. Jenkins, “Terrorism A Contemporary Problem with Age-old Dilenunas,” in 
Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, ed. Lawrence Howard (New York: Praeger, 1992), 24. Jenkins 
also indicates that “terrorist operate most vigorously in those societies that provide the greatest 
opportunity to communicate via-press.” Ibid.
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of freedoms” and “the strengthening of the state.” Quite the contrary, without a strong state 
to uphold law and order freedoms would not just be possible. Unrestrained by a general 
system of laws and a state to execute this law, self interested individuals might injure and 
even kill others. It is for that reason that John Lxrcke remariced that “where there is no law, 
there is no freedom.” It is true that states have been the biggest threat to individual 
freedoms. But it is equally true that individuals could pose a threat to their fellow human 
beings’ freedoms through private coercion. It is the primary task of the liberal state to 
prevent private coercion of one citizen over the other (to ensure citizens’ security). It is the 
basic premise of the liberal democratic state that it must punish (within the rule of law, of 
course) those who violate or abuse their freedoms at the expense of others’ freedom and 
security. Otherwise private coercion would prevail forcing everybody to take laws in to his 
own hands. In that case the will of the stronger would prevail, leaving weak ones at the 
mercy stronger ones. Therefore, even if freedoms are to be expanded to the utter limits 
there would still need to be coercive function of the state. Since, it is likely that even in the 
more freer societies there will be those who will try to abuse freedoms, and if they go 
unpunished, in the name of freedom, freedom of others will be damaged. For that reason, 
there should be no doubt whatsoever that the enjoyment of liberal democratic rights all 
ultimately depend upon the viability of the liberal state.^ In Linz and Stepan’s words “no 
state, no democracy.” *^
This basic characteristic of the liberal democratic state did not seem to be 
appreciated by the RPP leaders. Ecevit appeared to have believed that there is an inherent 
tension -and an adverse relation- between the law and the freedom. That is, the more laws 
prevail the more limited the freedom becomes. For instance, when Demirel argued that “it 
is very difiBcult to govern the country with this constitution and election laws,” Ecevit
John Locke, Two Treatises o f Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: (Cambridge 
University Press, 1%3), 125.
44 Wilkinson.7error/am.4; Chalk. Western Terrorism.9\.
45 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” Journal o f 
Democracy. 7, 2, (19%), 14. See, also, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Steptan. Problems o f Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation-Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 19%), 17.
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Besides, unlike common perceptions, there is no contradiction between “expansion 
of freedoms” and “the strengthening of the state.” Quite the contrary, without a strong state 
to uphold law and order freedoms would not just be possible. Unrestrained by a general 
system of laws and a state to execute this law, self interested individuals might injure and 
even kill others. It is for that reason that John Locke remarked that “where there is no law, 
there is no freedom.” It is true that states have been the biggest threat to individual 
freedoms. But it is equally true that individuals could pose a threat to their fellow human 
beings’ freedoms through private coercion. It is the primary task of the liberal state to 
prevent private coercion of one citizen over the other (to ensure citizens’ security). It is the 
basic premise of the liberal democratic state that it must punish (within the rule of law, of 
course) those who violate or abuse their freedoms at the expense of others’ freedom and 
security. Otherwise private coercion would prevail forcing everybody to take laws in to his 
own hands. In that case the will of the stronger would prevail, leaving weak ones at the 
mercy stronger ones. Therefore, even if freedoms are to be expanded to the utter limits 
there would still need to be coercive function of the state. Since, it is likely that even in the 
more freer societies there will be those who will try to abuse freedoms, and if they go 
unpunished, in the name of freedom, freedom of others will be damaged. For that reason, 
there should be no doubt whatsoever that the enjoyment of liberal democratic rights all 
ultimately depend upon the viability of the liberal state.^ In Linz and Stepan’s words “no 
state, no democracy.” *^
This basic characteristic of the liberal democratic state did not seem to be 
appreciated by the RPP leaders. Ecevit appeared to have believed that there is an inherent
43 John Locke, Two Treatises o f Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press, 1%3), 125.
44 Wilkinson.7erron57n.4; Chalk. Western Terrorism.9\.
45 Juan J. Linz and Allred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” Journal o f 
Democracy. 7, 2, (1996), 14. See, also, Juan J. Linz and Alfied Stepan. Problems o f Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation-Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore and London; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 17.
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tension -and an adverse relation- between the law and the freedom. That is, the more laws
prevail the more limited the freedom becomes. For instance, when Demirel argued that “it
is very difficult to govern the country with this constitution and election laws,” Ecevit
had responded harshly showing his misunderstanding of the true nature of liberal
democratic state. He argued that “Demirel wishes for a regime of oppression and
brutality by changing the Constitution. He, therefore, proved himself as fascist.
Demirel wants a state that punishes. Let us hope that God never give such men power
again.”^  It is not clear why to argue for a changes in the constitution is equated with
being a fascist. And why to want a state that punishes is such a despisable thing ? It is
because Ecevit almost reflexively defended the 1961 constitution and that he appears
to have failed to understand the nature of liberal democratic state. In other case, Ecevit
argued that “his government would not use (or appeal to) to violence to fight violence”
(..biz şiddetin üzerine şiddetle gidemeyiz)^’ and that the opposition “was pushing the
government toward the use of violence” (hükümeti şiddet tedbirlerine itiyorlar).^ In a
booklet prepared for the RPP activists’ 1979 partial senate elections and by-elections
for the lower assembly, it was stated that;
The Ecevit government has never resorted to violence in unravelling the roots of violence. It 
was possible that activists of various convicüons could be rendered harmless by the use of 
force, but it would have been the realization of the atmosphere of violence they strive to 
establish. The Ecevit government has tried to transform the state, from the one that uses 
violence and resorts to a repression, to a state that attempts to secure an environment of peace 
and security, that generates sense of security on the part of the ciüzens.^’
It is hardly possible not to agree with Ecevit about the argument that the state
should never resort to violence only if the argument is qualified with the following; except
^  Hürriyet, May 29, 1977.
Hürriyet, October 14, 1978.
^  Hürriyet, September 8, 1978.
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Zor Günleri Halkımızla Birlikte Aşıyoruz [We Overcome 
Difficult Times Together with Our People] (Ankara; Ajans Türic, 1979), 93. In the same booklet, 
somewhat contradicting with above statements, it was also stated that the Ecevit government believes 
that police forces should be strong to catch terrorists. Ibid., 97.
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for when it was lawfully entitled to do so, that is when it stays within the rule of law. It is 
indeed the defining characteristic of the state that it possesses the “monopoly of legitimate 
violence.” It spears that Ecevit did not appreciate this last dimension. He seemed to be 
not aware of the distinction between a state that uses force arbitrarily and a state that 
resorts to force within the rule of law, and categorically opposed both.
In so doing Ecevit seems to fall into a feirly common confiision prevalent amongst 
Turkish intelligentsia that there is an adverse relation between the law and/or state and 
freedom.*® The centrality of laws and a state to implement these laws for the ideal of 
fi'eedom is not properiy understood. The root of this confusion should, again, be sought in 
the impact of the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition. As NetU noted, in state societies (or 
societies with strong state) “law is essentially an emanation of the state (law as profession 
of the state par excellence)” while societies without such tradition “law does have a good 
deal of autonomy, not primarily concerned with the state.”** It was primarily in the Anglo- 
saxon societies, which went through the stages of feidalism and Ständestaat, that the 
concept of law as a means for the peaceful regulation of conflicts between individuals and 
individuals and the state crystallized.*  ^ In the Ottoman Turkish polity, which came to
50 .The reaction of a bunch of journalists, who charaterized themselves as “the representatives 
of all press agencies,” to the assassination of journalist Abdi İpekçi was telling in that respect. Their 
statement urged the state to take the first step promptly and decisively to repeal some articles in 
Turkish Criminal law that, in their opinion, regarded freedom of thought and criticism as crime. The 
state should take that step, it continued, to prevent hostility towards freedom of thought that had been 
shown once again by the killing of Abdi İpekçi. Yankı, 12-18 Fd>ruary, 1979. The reaction of 
Professor Hifei Veldet Velidedeoglu of Istanbul University Law Faculty, to the demands for martial 
law likewise, was another example. Velidedeoğlu have criticized Demirel for considering nothing but 
“the measures of violence” (şiddet önlemleri) such as “the proclamation of martial law” and the 
establishment of “the state security courts” to fight with anarchy. According to Velidedeoğlu, 
Demirel “did not appear to have appreciated the fact that the exertion of violence (şiddet uygulaması) 
during the 12 March period did solve nothing.” Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Cumhuriyet, November 1, 
1978, “Ben, ben, ben demokrasisi,”rrhe democracy of 1,1,1]. In the aftermath of the 12 March, on the 
other hand, Velidedeoğlu have blamed the JP government for not “resorting to martial law as in 
western democracies” when it was necessary. Hifa Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Türkiye 'de Üç Devir [Three 
Periods in Turkey] vol 1 (Istanbul; Sinan, 1972), 192.
John P.Netll, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” In The State-Critical Debates, ed, 
John Hall, (London; Routledge, 1994), 322. (first published in 1968)
“  Marshall Claget, “The Medieval Heritage; Political and Economic,” in Chapters in 
Western Civilization, vol 1, eds, Joseph L. Blau, Justus Buchler, (îeorge T.Matthews (New York;
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experience rather different historical trajectory, law came to be understood as something 
that emanated*  ^ from the state indicating what the subjects are prohibited -and sometimes 
allowed- to do.^ “* Lacking a conception of law as means of peaceful conflict resolution, but 
associating it arbitrary state power that commands them what to do or not to do, there 
emerged a tendency to equate law with nothing but as infiingement to freedom.”
Not assessing the true magnitude of the problem of terrorism, misdiagnosing its 
causes, its persistence, and the ways of handling it, the RPP leadership appeared to be 
indecisive and unable follow a consistent course of action regarding terrorism. Due 
basically to hs.misunderstanding of the nature of liberal democratic state and relations 
between law and freedom, the government was hesitant in strengthening legal- 
administrative regulations such as shortening the detention period of suspects, increasing 
police powers for search and capture, strengthening the security forces or recourse to 
martial law. The government’s this attitude had been heavily criticized by several leading 
journalists of various shades of the political spectrum. Nazlı Ilıcak of Tercüman wrote 
that;
What is happening in Turicey is the abuse of freedoms. We are saying that the government 
should prevent this mthin the limits of the constitution and other laws, within the rule of 
law. Ecevit refuses that. He continue to claim that he is going to heal wounds through 
tenderness and compassion. Is he not aware that this tolerance, which has reached a degree
Columbia University Press, 1948), 10-20; Gianfronco Poggi, The Development o f the Modem State 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1978), 33 and ff.
The leading statesmen of the Tanzimat period, Fuad Paşa was reported to have said “if 
there is no law, make one.” (Yok kanun, yap kanun)
^  It is hardly surprising that in the Ottoman-Turidsh lexicon, a code of sultanic laws was 
referred to as “yasak.” Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, ¡300-1600 (London; 
Phoenix, 1993), 226. In modem Tuikish, “yasak” literally means “prohibition.” The fact that both law 
and prohibition was derived from the same word -yasak- is meaningful and tells about how the 
concept of law was closely related to prohibition.
Similar state of a f^ rs  appeared to have been obtained in South Korea which has had a 
tradition of a centralized, absolute state. According to Steinberg, “...modem law gave repressive 
power to a state or a colonial regime and allowed, few, if any, rights for the individuals governed. 
Law, as Conflicious indicated, was a tiger to be feared, not a protector of rights.” David I. Steinberg, 
“The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics,” in Politics in Developing Countries-Comparing 
Experiences With Democracy, second edition, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz, Seymour Martin 
Lipset (Boulder: Lyime Rienner, 1995), 400.
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in which it can be seen as weakness, despite the loyalty of Turkish people to democracy, is
going to lead the countiy
Uğur Mumcu of Cumhuriyet similarly urged Bülent Ecevit to fight against what 
he called fascists with “war methods.” If you do not take such course of action. 
Mumcu continued, “this blood torrent will, in time, drag you down as well.” Abdi 
İpekçi of Milliyet remit'ded Ecevit of the well-known truth that “where the fi'eedom to 
kill is allowed, neither freedom to life nor freedom of thought becomes possible.” *^
Important though these weaknesses in the RPP’s approach towards terrorism might 
be, it should be noted that they were not the only fiictors that hampered the government’s 
struggle against tenorism The quality and the quantity of the security forces (not only 
police but also intelligence serviccj and other supporting bureaucratic agencies) was one of 
the key factors negatively affecting the RPP’s ability to succeed. It goes without saying that 
to secure “law and order” a functioning state requires so as to seize and punish those who 
violated laws In terms of the quality and quantity of security forces the RPP government 
found inadequately equipped, ideologically divided, badly co-ordinated forces with low 
morale Police forces were divided between leftist and rightist associations. Police 
Association (PA) and Police Unity (PU).*’ There was also a lack of co-ordination between 
various state agencies responsible for internal security such as the National Intelligence 
Agency, Gendarmerie and police This state of afiairs in the security forces constituted a
Democracy]
Tercüm an. Oaober 31. I *>78. “Demokrasiyi Bekleyen Tehlikeler” [Dangers that Await
57
5«
C um huriyet. December 25.1978. “Katliam” [Massacre]
M illiy e t. May 11. 1978. *Terörizme Karşı Gerçek Bir Savaş Gerek” [A Real War is 
Needed to Fight Terrorism]
”  The left-wing oriented PA. which was by far the biggest police association, was established 
in 1970. Though we could not obtain the exact number of its members, its president claimed that it 
had more than thirteen thousand meraber. Yankı, 15-22 May 1978. The activities of the both police 
associations and others (such as ‘PolisEnstitüleri Mezunlan Demeği’ and ‘Tüm Emniyet Mensuplan 
Dayanışma Demeği’) had been susperded by martial law authorities during the martiaİ law period in 
February 1979
^  Nur Bilge Criss, “Merceneries of Ideology: Turkey’s Terrorism War,” in Terrrorism and 
P o litics , ed. Barry Rubin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 131.
275
serious constraining conditions for the RPP government that it found it hard to overcome.
The government tried to end politicization in security forces as promised in the 
election campaign, but that was not as easy as Ecevit appears to have thought. In an 
attempt to get rid of detrimental effects of politicization the RPP had to recourse similar 
actions that made them vulnerable to counter-charges of partisanship and politicization. 
This is a vicious circle. To decide who is “partisan” is not easily determined by rational 
criteria but rather rest on inevitably subjective information provided by your own 
sympathizers, which is not always objective. Therefore it is always susceptible to the 
counter-charge of partisanship. Ecevit government was no exception, and did not fare well 
on that score.
What Ecevit seemed to be doing was not that replacing partisans with hard- 
woridng meritios men but, replacing them with his own supporters.^* He had promised too 
much to his own constituency, which was thirsting for the advantages of being in power. 
The RPP, as noted, was no less patronage oriented than other parties and its local 
organisations were now putting enormous pressure on the government to get their share.^  ^
Besides, according to Turkish Civil Servants Law, it was very difficult to remove civil 
servants fi'om their post. What a government could do was either to transfer them to 
elsewhere or create limbo positions in the bureaucracy. Faced with such constraints the
Indeed, Turhan Feyzioğlu (vice premier) resigned in October 1978. He argued that the 
govermnent could not prevent anarchy because it assumed that anarchy was coming from one side 
only and that it replaced nationalist affiliated militants with the leftists. Yankı, 25 September, 1 
October, 1978.
Haluk Olman (an MP from the RPP) was reported to have said that as soon as the RPP 
formed government “rank and file organisation flowed to Ankara to get their share. An ordinary 
servant in the railway management wanted to be the general directorate of State Railways. 
Candidates for governorships (of provinces) continue to come to Ankara.” Cited in Arcayürek. 
Sonbahar, 334. Olman’s observation was confirmed by another RPP member of parliament. See, 
Ömer Eiedeoğlu, Bir MiUetvekiUnin Günlüğünden Anılar [Memoirs From the Diary of a Member of 
Parliament] (Ankara; Demircioğlu, 1998), 51-3. The general director Ziraat Bankası (the biggest state 
bank) Erdoğan Soral, once blamed the finance minister for forcing him to provide unlawful credits (to 
partisans) and to recruit unneeded personel. Hürriyet, October 6, 1978. Likewise, Uğur Mumcu 
criticized the RPP government for appointing their own men to the state economic enterprises. 
Cumhuriyet, June 15, 1978, “Arpalıklar” [Aipalik’s].
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Ecevit government seemed to give up. It is a telling example in this respect that interior
minister İrfan Özaydmb reported to have said that he was uneasy about the (PA) which
threatened (in their meeting with him) to take issue with the ministry by giving it to the
press, if the government wanted to reshuffle some of its members. It was true that Ecevit
government had taken a hard stance against PA^ and governorship of Ankara closed
down both associations in July 1978. But no to avail. Council of state has overturned
governorships decision and associations continued their activities as before until martial law
authorities in 1979 stopped its activity. In another instance, Ecevit (as prime minister in 8
October 1978) had reported to have complained about police forces:
Police forces have lost their morale. Transfer of police (from one place to other) is hanniiil. For 
example, the police forces in Malatya had taken sides in political events. We removed them from 
their post and tried to send them elsewhere. But they did not go there by getting medical rqx>it 
Those newly appointed ones, too, did not go to Malatya. Thus, a vacuum has been created. When 
the events flared up police officers put on their uniforms and helped those activists.*^
In short, to erase partisanship from security forces in particular and civilian
bureaucracy in general was proven to be beyond the reach of the minority government of
Ecevit.
Partisanship, though vital, was not the only problem to be tackled. Years of neglect 
had left security forces in miserable situation in terms of quantity and quality. Not only the 
number of police forces were inadequate in violence ridden society but also professional 
education of police were neglected. Martial law commander Nevzat Bölügiray (covering 
the area of Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Mersin) provides astonishing 
examples regarding the quality the security forces. Among many problems he cites the lack 
of necessary tools and devices comes first. As we learn form his memoirs, guns were 
outdated, bulletproof vests and shields were inadequate, police cars and armor were old 
and due to lack petroleum were not always available for use, maps in rapidly growing cities
63 Duni, Ecevit .li .
^  Some members of the PA had even been caught with imiversity students while sticking 
posters on to walls to protest the RPP’s behaviour.
65 Duru, Ecevit.n.
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and means of communications (wireless) were also inadequate as were the police’s methods
of seizing evidence.^ Likewise education of security forces was much neglected.
According to General Bölügiray, police had been put on duty after only couple of months’
education. In this very short education, they were not provided with enough bullets. Nor
were they provided with any specific education directed towards shooting.*’ Orhan
Eyüboğlu and Faruk Sükan (vice premiers in the RPP government) have also touched upon
similar problems.** The RPP leadership seemed to be aware of the problem but again
financial, legal and political constraints, combined with the general administrative incapacity
of government, proved to be too big an obstacle to overcome. Interior Minister Hasan
Fehmi Güneş’ reported speech in the martial law co-ordination committee reveals,
once again, the miserable situation of the Turkish security forces at that time:
... Our police is very üaditional, fed up, and on the brink of a psychological breakdown. Nfy 
intelligence agencies follow the events from behind. ...We can not prevent the flow of illegal 
weapons. Our intelligence is very p>oor. The soluüon of all these problems requires money. 
Today, we are using the weapons that Germany scrapped and gave as charity. ...it is not easy 
to buy new tools and equipment. ...we do not have any appropriation. Outside the areas that 
are covered by the martial law. we have neither cars, nor wirelesses, nor staff, nor experts 
that are specialists on explosives. We have only one ballistic laboratory, and only one 
microscope. Let us assume that we bought a microscope, we still do not have experts. To 
educate experts, we sent them to England. We have a school that that provides special 
education to police officers who want to work for the intelligence services, but we could 
educate only 20 person per term. It is furmy. We have many police officers, but few 
competent ones. It is only in 17 provinces that we have a camera, in the remaining SO we do 
not have any cameras. ... 1 do my best to improve the situation. ... But when I wanted to 
reshuffle bureaucracy, many of our friends opposed such reshuffling. They should not 
interfere such things. They should not put pressure on ministers to deal with the appointment
of police or nightwatchman.69
^  Nevzat BdlQgiray. Sokaktaki Asker- Bir Sıkıyönetim Komutanının 12 Eylül öncesi Anılan 
[A Soldier in Streets: Memoirs of a Martial Law Commander Before 12 September] second ed. 
(Istanbul; Milliyet, 1989), 54, 55. Similarly, the Scotland Yard ofScers who were invited to provide 
education for the Turkish pohce observed that “the first thing Turkish police did (upon its arrival to the 
place of incident) was to remove eviderKCS.” Hürriyet, July 23,1978.
67
68
Bölügiray, Asker A9.
See respectively. Yankı, 11-17 July, 1978 and 24-30 July, 1978.
® Cited in Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren ’in Anılan [The Memoirs of Kenan Evren] vol 1, 
(Istanbul; Milliyet, 1990), 246-7. Similar remarks of Hasan Fehmi Güneş can also be found in Yankı, 
8-14 October, 1979.
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These sincere confessions by the interior minister provide clues regarding the 
various constraints that thwarted the government’s efforts to cope with the problem. 
One obvious constraint is money as minister found it difficult to secure financial 
means to improve the quality and quantity of the security forces. Another problem 
seems to have been political constraints. It has been noted above how the previous 
interior minister had complained about the PA which threatened to give them to press 
if any of its members were involved in reshuffling the security forces. Güneş’ 
statements give the impression that not only the PA, but also some members of the 
RPP proved to be an obstacle for the reshuffling. In fact, the left-wing of the party, to 
which the RPP government needed to stay in power, opposed any action that aimed to 
strengthen (and improve) the security forces.
In short, while heightening expectations unreasonably, the RPP government 
misdiagnosed and underestimated the problem of terrorism, and found it difficult to 
overcome various legal, political, financial constraints. It was, therefore, unable to take 
necessary measures required for an efiective fight against it. In the coming months, 
terrorism continued to escalate.™ A closer look at the terrorist activities suggests that 
terrorist groups increasingly opted for spectacular and violent attacks which were likely to 
kill as many people as possible. In 16 March 1978, a bomb was thrown at Istanbul 
University students killing sbc students and leaving forty-seven wounded. In 8 August, sbc 
people were killed in Balgat when terrorist shot at coffee house indiscriminately. In 9 
October seven members of the TWP were taken from their house and killed outside the 
skirts of Ankara. The way they chose their victims and the way they executed them 
suggested that they were designed to explode latent divisions and fractions at a mass level. 
Another strategy of terrorism was the murder of distinguished, well known persons. In 
March 24, the vice-prosecutor of Ankara Doğan Öz (alleged to have left-wing sympathies)
The number of deaths from terrorist attacks rose to 319 (in 1977) to 1095 (in 1978) to 
1362 (in 1979). Cited in Ruşen Keleş and Artun Onsal, Kent. 35.
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was killed. In 17 April, mayor of Malatya (from the JP) and member of the prominent 
Hamidoğlu femily was killed when the bomb sent to him exploded. On 11 June, Associate 
Professor (of Hacettepe University) Bedrettin Cömert was killed, followed by Professor 
Bedri Karafakioğlu (of Istanbul Technical University) on 20 October.
In the face of escalating terrorism, the RPP government appeared to be unable to 
take effective action for reasons stated above. Ecevit had underestimated terrorism and 
heightened expectations before he assumed the power. He continued the same way when 
in power, despite being in government should have made the magnitude of the problems 
clear. A number of Ecevit’s speeches show how he tried to inject moral to the country; 
“violent events are now being eliminated through effective and impartial measures”’*; “we 
have ensured peace and security. Now, nobody can speak of the anarchy”” ; “we have now 
veiy close to end this bloody game” ; “I believe that we have now eliminated anarchy.” 
These words helped neither the prevention of terrorism nor his and his party’s standing in 
the country as his persuasiveness (credibility) were being damaged with every unheld 
promises.’  ^Abdi İpekçi of Milliyet criticized Ecevit, noting that the government “could 
not overcome the (terrorist) events for months, despite the fact that they continue to 
claim these were ‘the last flutters.’(Besides) the government could not sustain a belief 
that it would overcome it in the future It is for that reason, İpekçi continued, “what
’’ Hürriyet, May 3, 1978. 
Tercüman, June 18, 1978. 
Hürriyet, October 14, 1978.
74 Tercüman, December 15, 1978.
According to Ömer Dedeoğlu, when Ecevit uttered similar speeches in the RPP group, 
some MP’s were laughing at what they heard. Dedeoğlu, Milletvekili. \'İ9.
Milliyet, October 7, 1978. “Son Çupuuşlarm Sonu Gelmedikçe...” [Unless the Last 
Flutters Really Proved to be the Last...] Similarly an editorial in Yankı noted that “it was a mistake 
for the Ecevit government to claim (upon its assumption of power) that it would be able to deal with 
terrorism in a short time, instead of staying silent until it grasped the subject well. When what they 
said was not realized, it inevitably generated disappointment.” Yankı, “önce Alternatif Bulmak 
Gerek” [First an Alternative Should be Found] 18-24 December 1978.
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Ecevit called ‘the last flutters’ have an influence and create a panic that it aimed.”^
Ecevit also implied and even openly accused the NAP of supporting terrorism. He
believed that because the government was now about to uproot the sources of terrorism,
the NAP increased its activities of instigating terrorism to prevent the government from
doing so. Because it would cleariy be seen that the NAP was behind these moves. He was
reported (in January 3, 1979) to have said;
The JP found itself in a difficult situation as the NAP felt the pressure of our efforts to uproot 
terrorism. Demirel could no longer say that nationalists were not involved in those events. The 
NAP is very hard-pressed. As a result of our quidcened legislative activities the NAP is very 
flurried. The root of terrorism is now clear, what is expected is only a legal proof of it .. .So they 
(the NAP) tried to instigate social events.’*
In other case, after the Istanbul University killing Ecevit said that “those who 
understand that the roots of violence are being effectively dealt with, are now get 
flurried.”^  In 27 July, he openly declared that the NAP was responsible for violent acts. 
Having blamed the NAP for instigating terrorism as prime minister, it could be expected 
that Ecevit would initiate legal proceedings. Ecevit did not even tiy this, leading many to 
think that the accusation of the NAP was merely a political maneuver. If he had any 
doubts regarding the NAP and its affiliations with terrorist organizations (and from the 
speeches it appears that he had), he should have commenced legal proceedings that 
included the right to appeal to constitutional court which could decide to close it 
down.*® Otherwise, he would be blaming without any conclusive proof which made 
him vulnerable to the charge of slander. Besides, Ecevit spoke as if he had a right to
77
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Ibid.
Duni, Ecevit.93.
Hürriyet, March 17, 1978
*° According to the Turkish Political Parties Law (which was promulgated in 1965 and 
remained in effect until the new one was adopted in 1983) article 110/3, Ecevit had a right to appeal 
to the chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic, who would then decide whether to take the party to the 
constitutional court or not. In fact in July 1976 the constitutional court issued, acting upon the appeal 
of the chief public prosecutor, a warning fine (uyan cezası) to the NAP concerning its organisation 
abroad which violated related article of the TPPL.
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make an implicit deal with alleged criminals. He threatened the NAP that they should 
stop violent actions and if they did so, the government would no longer pursue legal 
proceedings. In liberal democratic states, however, elected governments have no right 
to decide whether to pursue alleged criminals or not. Ecevit’s ambivalent attitude was 
criticized by pro-Ecevit journalists. Uğur Mumcu of Cumhuriyet asked “..if these (legal 
proceedings regarding the NAP) are not (or can not be) pursued, is there any meaning 
of the rosy speeches uttered at the party meetings?”** Defending his action Ecevit was 
reported to have said (on 10 November 1979) that “they could not initiate the closure 
of the NAP. Because if they had done so, and could not get a result, it would be bad 
for them as they would be mortified.”*^
In line with his unwillingness to use stringent application of laws to deal with 
terrorism, Ecevit refused to declare martial law, as demanded by the opposition*  ^and some 
segment of the press. Having in mind the NAP’s demand for martial law, he said that 
“murderers are wishing for a regime of dictatorship.”*^  Ecevit’s opposition to the martial 
law derived as much from the familiar argument that it brings army to the center of politics 
as from the fear that the NAP could use the army for its own ends.** In 1985, he also
*' Cumhuriyet, Febniaiy 11, 1979. “Söylemek ve Yapmak” [Saying and Doing]. In yet 
another example showing how common the lack of understanding of the true nature of liberal 
democratic state was in Turkish intellectual circles, the Yankı editorial, confused “impartiality” with 
“indifference” and approved the RPP’s stance. It argued that by not initiating the mechanism through 
which the NAP and its affiliated organisations could be closed down, the RPP had brought “the air of 
impartiality” to the state, (devlete tarafsızlık havası getirmek) Yanh, July 30-August 5, 1979 
“Ecevit’in En Büyük Hizmeti” [The Biggest Service of Ecevit] (my italics).
82 Cited in Duru, Ecevit. 123.
Especially the NAP urged for the declaration of martial law. It even created the suspicion 
that the party favored a military takeover. The NAP general administrative council urged for the 
declaration of martial law, and delegation of responsibility (to administer the country) to the army. 
Hürriyet, October 3, 1978. Though subsequently the NAP leaders made it clear that they did not 
favour military intervention, it is reasonable to state that they would have prefered it to the RPP 
government.
Hürriyet, October 14, 1978. Note that he seemed to equate demand for a martial law with 
demands for a dictatorship. In another speech, he blamed the opposition for wishing to “restrain 
freedoms.” Hürriyet, September 10, 1978
85 Duru, £cev/r.l994.
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argued that he was hoping to overcome terrorism without recourse to martial law up until 
Kahramanmaraş massacres.*  ^ He also knew that the RPP’s left-wing which urged for 
(what to them) fi'eedoms of the fullest possible extent including the establishment of the
• 87communist party, would oppose it.
The two shocking events provided a turning point for the RPP government’s fight
with terrorism. One was the Kahramanmaraş massacre in which more than 100 people,
88including many children, were killed in a sectarian conflict between Alevi’s and Sünni’s. 
Ecevit’s diagnosis regarding the causes of Kahramanmaraş incident was fer fitim realistic. 
He said that those who were uneasy about the RPP’s efibrts to change the existing order in 
fiivor of underprivileged and his governments’ successes in dealing with the terrorism, were 
behind these events. In reality, however, it was an indication of how polarized people had 
become over the years, and how the security forces had failed in their primary task of 
protecting the security of life. In the near absence of state authority, latent conflicts 
between religious sectarianisms was exploited and finally exploded, culminating in the 
bloody massacre. In the face of such cruelty, the RPP government was forced to declare 
martial law in thirteen provinces.*’
86 Area>'ürek, Müdahale.360.
^  It also seemed to be the case that the painful memoirs of the 12 March period, in which 
the military commanders had a virtually hand in dealing with what to them anarchy under the 
pretext of martial law, generated an overt hostility to the idea of martial law within the left including 
the RPP. Ignoring the fact that period in question was a covert military rule in the first place, they 
assumed that any martial law was bound to create similar situations for the liberties.
^  Events in Kahramanmaraş began when a bomb exploded in the cinema known to be 
favourite of rightists. After that incident two teachers (both members of the TTUSA) were killed by 
an unidentifed attadcer. At their ftmeral, both the leftist and the rightist groups clashed with each 
other, leaving three dead. The next day and after rightist groups marched into those areas populated 
by Alevi’s, ensuing clashes resulted in the death of more than a hundred people. The minister of the 
interior, who resigned after the incident, argued that though rightists played a central role in the 
massacre, the left also played a provocative role.
These provinces were İstanbul, Ankara, Kahramaıunaraş, Adana, Elazığ, Bingöl, 
Erzurum, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Kars, Malatya, Sivas and Urfe. The chief of staff wanted Diyarbakır 
to be included in that list. But Ecevit fearing the wrath of left-wingers in his own party, refused the 
military’s demand. Evkil, Anılar. 235.
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It is only after this incident Ecevit appears to have realized that the fight against 
terrorism could not successfidly be waged with civilian security forces alone. He was 
reported to have said that “a civilian administration can not deal with these events. Due to 
lack of proper education police forces does not know how to handle anarchy. ...with 
martial law we now have a state mechanism that functions.
The declaration of the martial law in thirteen provinces, however, did not have 
significant effect on terrorism for several reasons that we shall discuss later. Terrorism 
continued unabated. The assassination of journalist (and editor of Milliyet) Abdi İpekçi on 
Fdîruary 2, 1979 “stunned the entire country.” *^ He was known for his moderate 
tendencies. Despite his pro-Ecevit and pro-RPP posture, he was equally respected by the 
JP sympathizers. İpekçi assassination was remainder to everyone that not only those known 
as partisans, r^ardless of political tendencies, but everybody was in danger. In other 
words, as Chinese proverb put it, it killed one and frightened a thousand.
5.2.ECONOMIC CRISIS
The horrors of terrorism was not the only problem for the RPP to deal with. The 
country was in deep recession and the economy, afflicted by a chronic balance of payment 
deficits and danger of hyperinflation, needed immediate attention. The bitter pill required to 
normalize the economy that the NF governments refused to take, fell to the responsibility of 
the RPP government. The RPP leadership, however, did not seem to appreciate the true 
dimensions of the economic crisis. They appeared to have assumed that the Turkish 
economy was essentially in a healthy situation, and the crisis it was undergoing could be 
dealt with relatively easily.’  ^The view, espoused by international economic organizations
Dura, Ecevit.93.
”  Feroz Ahmad, The Making o f  Modem Turkey (London; Routledge, 1993), 171.
^  Taner Berksoy, “Türkiye’de İstikrar Arayıştan ve IMF,” [The Pursuit of the Economic 
Stability in Turkey and the IMF] IMF İstikrar Politikaları ve Türkiye, der. Cevdet Erdost (Ankara; 
Savaş, 1982), 164. Seyfettin Gürsel, “IMF” [IMF] Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, cilt 2, 
(İstanbul; İletişim, 1983), 500.
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such as IMF and World Bank, that Turkish economy needed radical restructuring that 
required the acceptance of a more maiket oriented strategy in the place of prevailing import 
substitution industrializing (ISI), did not make much impact on the govemment.^  ^ ThQ' 
attributed the causes of foreign exchange crisis and fueling inflation to the faulty policies of 
NF governments '^* without paying enough attention to the structural problems of the 
Turkish economy. They spears to have believed that with an additional foreign financing 
and short-term debt reshuffling Turkish economy could easily weather the crisis. Given 
the fact that the RPP leadership’s somewhat naive assumptions r^arding the actual 
operation of market economy, it was hardly surprising that the diagnosis would be 
inadequate The RPP government appeared convinced “of the paramount virtues of 
government intervention in the economy” ^  and it was “inclined towards a self-suflScient, 
even autarkic view of economic development, which restricted to a minimum the foreign 
role in the economy.”’’
Expectedly, relations between the Ecevit government and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), to which government needed to secure foreign exchange (not only 
because the government needed IMF credits but also without the IMF’s green light private 
banks would not give credit) had a bad start. Many within the RPP appear to have believed 
that IMF was the tool of international capitalist conspiracy to retard the development of the
”  Krueger and Turan noted that serious efforts to balance the economy would require, as a 
minimum, the introduction of tight monetary policy, sharp reductions in public sector deficits and in 
the losses of state economic enterprises, reductions in public investments, and devaluation of the 
Turkish lira. See, Aima O.Knieger and liter Turan, “The Politics and Economics of Turidsh Policy 
reforms in the 1980’s,” in Political & Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform, ed. Aima 
O.Kiueger and Robert H. Bates (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 349.
^  Osman Okyar, “Turkey and IMF: A Review of Relations,” in IMF Conditionality, ed. 
John Williamson (Washington D.C: Institute For International Economics, 1983), 539.
^  Colin Kirkpatrick and Ziya Oni§, “Turkey” in Aid and Power & The World Bank Policy 
Based Lending, vol 2, ed. Peter Moslq^, John Horrigan and Jack Toye (London: Routledge Kegan
Paul, 1991), 11.
Okyar, “Turkey,” 539. 
'"Ibid.
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third world. Though Ecevit did not see IMF as such, he believed that IMF 
recommendations were too harsh to implement in a developing worid.^ He did, 
nevertheless, manage to arrange a standby agreement with IMF in April 1978 promising 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, devaluation and reduction in government spending 
and better debt management. Believing that the government was too weak to implement 
these measures and IMF signed agreement reluctantly private banks preferred to wait to 
give credit to Tuiicey. In August 1978, an IMF commission (visiting Turkey to monitor 
whether she was complying with the conditions) demanded fiuther devaluation and new 
increases in taxes and reductions in public spending. After several visits by IMF oflScials the 
relations were suspended in December 1978.^ The commission concluded that the 
government foiled to meet IMF conditions therefore standby agreement was to be put 
aside.
Unable to meet IMF conditions the government wanted to use Turkey’s 
geopolitical situation and its increasing importance for Western security to force IMF and 
other Western states to secure credit. At the summit meeting in Guadalope leading western 
countries announced that an economic assistance package of 1 billion dollars would be 
given to Turkey provided she signed a standby agreement with IMF. Thus, once again the 
government resumed negotiations with IMF culminating in yet another standby agreement 
in July.**^  Two and half months later, however, the RPP government had to resign leaving 
the last standby agreement in tatters.
Failing to ensure fresh credits (because of its inability to meet IMF conditions), and 
unable to take much needed austerity measures alongside the encouragement of exports 
and foreign investments, increasing productivity through better management of SES, the
98
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Duni, Ecevit. 55. 
Berksoy, “istikrar,” 166.
For details, Okyar, “Turkey,”; Krueger and Turan, 342-345; Also, a less than academic 
account can be found in Yalçın Doğan, IMF Kıskacında Türkiye, 1946-1980 [Turkey in the IMF
Pincer, 1946-1980] (Istanbul; Tekin, 1986).
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RPP government could not stop economic decline. Inflation rocketed (fi-om 27 per cent 
(1977) to 45 (1978) and 59 (1979) per cent), while the GDP growth declined to 2.9 per 
cent in 1978 and -0.4 per cent in 1979. Due to foreign exchange shortages imports had to 
be severely reduced leading to several shortages of most basic goods, such as petrolaim, 
medicine and spare parts. Shortages in these imported goods led to yet more shortages of 
locally produced goods. The double-pricing (one determined by government and the other 
by market) of SEE’s products such as sugar, cooking oil and cigarettes became the order of 
the day. Ordinary citizens had to wait in long queues for ours even for such basic things as 
cooking oil, sugar, tea, light bulbs, and petroleum. Economic mismanagement, particularly 
the government’s feilure to control the black market, and its mistakes in timing of 
devaluation of Turkish lira, helped to generate a new group of businessmen, called as “the 
rich of Ecevit” (Ecevit zenginleri) who made their fortune by exploiting the loopholes in the 
RPP governments’ economic mismanagement.
There are several reasons as to why the Ecevit government’s economic policy 
turned out to be less than successful. The governments’ incomplete diagnosis of the 
Turidsh economy’s problems was one of the chief reason, as indicated above. The 
government tended to insist on this faulty diagnosis and made few serious attempts in 
correcting h.'®' In addition (and perhaps because of this misdiagnosis) Ecevit promised a 
rosy future to everybody, not mentioning the serious sacrifices required to put Turkish 
economy on track. He tried to inject morale into the country by saying, that the economic 
crisis soon will be over, and that the light has appeared at the end of the tunnel, that the 
Western worid was ready to rescue Turkey etc... But the more these promises turned out 
be unrealistic and (felse), the further confidence in government (regarding its ability to deal 
with crisis) declined.
For instance, the government insisted on high growth rates, despite the &ct that the 
Turkish economy just could not sustain it. Ecevit was reported to have proudly said that they upgraded 
the projected (in the Fourth Five Year Development Plan) growth rate from 5.7 per cent to 6.1 per 
cent for 1978. Cited in Duni, Ecevit.51.
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The lack of co-ordination between various governmental agencies that were 
supposed to take decisions and implement it was another reason for its dismal feilure. 
Within the cabinet various fections competed for political influence and it made the 
coherent application of policies extremely diflBcult. In one instance, energy and natural 
sources minister Deniz Baykal, who was the leader of a strong faction within the party, 
attempted to nationalize petroleum refinery -Ataş- while Ecevit was abroad negotiating for 
dd)t reshuffling and new credits with international banks, to which the word 
“nationalization” seemed to be an anathema. In another instance, the trade minister publicly 
criticized finance minister who had to pawn Turkey’s agricultural products to meet the 
requirement of international bank Wells Fargo. Ecevit himself is reported to have said 
that they can not “force bureaucracy to get things done” and were hying to administer 
governmental policy through “ad hoc committees” since various departments “are alienated 
fi'om each other (closed to each other) to such an extent that they behave like different 
states.” Complaining about partisanship of leaders of one faction in 1985, he also argued 
that “every government recourse to partisanship to a varying extent but Ali Topuz (leader 
of one fiiction) has spread it even into the party.”*®^
Having indicated the RPP government’s feilures and weaknesses it should also be 
noted that the implementation of painfiil measures to put the Turkish economy on track 
was a formidable task. Socio-political constraints severely constrained the room for 
maneuver for any government that faced re-election. It was very difficult for the RPP
The rift between the finance minister Ziya Müezzinoğlu and the head of central bank 
regarding the status of the central bank was another example of conflict. See, Hürriyet, April 26, 
1978.
Duru, Ecevit.56,S5. See also, for more examples, memoirs of the RPP MP, Ali Nejat 
ölçen, Ecevit Çemberinde Politika [Politics in the Circle of Ecevit] (Ankara: Omit, 1995), 195, 201, 
203-4,213.
'*^Arcayürek, Müdahale. 308. In 1985, Ecevit explained why he could not exert pressure to 
ensure co-ordination in his government. He argued that “he did not implement strict discipline in the 
party because of the doubt that if the government fell as a result of this, fescism might assume power 
in the country.” Ibid., 312. Ecevit seemed to equate discipline with arbitrary heavy-handedness. He 
did not seem to appreciate the fiict that the ûilure of the government as a result of intra-party 
infighting would better serve, what to him, was fascism.
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government, which had promised to implement more egalitarian policies, to cut back public 
expenditure, to remove price controls on state economic enterprises, to restrain wage 
increases in public and private sectors, to levy new taxes. The major constraint the Ecevit 
government faced was, then, a political one “involving the trade-oflf between the urgent 
need for stabilization and the desire not to alienate its supporters by introducing a 
stronger dose of stabilization measures.”'®^ Years of economic mismanagement had left 
the Turkish economy in such a miserable state that nothing less than Herculean efforts 
would secure its rebalancing. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that it would still have been 
difficult to put the economy on track even if the RPP government had correctly diagnosed 
the magnitude of problems and had stuck to the stabilization package. But in that case, at 
least it could ii^ 'ect a realistic hope to the country (and international organizations) that the 
government had at least seriously began to deal with economic troubles. This was what 
Ecevit government was unable to do.
In the area of foreign relations, the RPP government’s record was perceived to be 
hardly better. The lifting of the US embargo by September 1978, many observers noted, 
was one of the rare successes of the RPP government. Relationships with the US and other 
NATO allies, however, entered a difficult phase for both sides. At the beginning, the RPP 
government was seen in a fevorable light. It was expected that the RPP could make 
headway especially in the Cyprus issue. Relations, however, soured soon after the RPP 
came to power. The RPP, as noted above, has promised to follow more independent (vis-à- 
vis Turkey’s Western allies) foreign policy that included the establishment of indigenous 
defense industry, increased political-economic relations with neighboring countries as well 
as non-aligned countries while staying in western camp. In 1976 Ecevit had argued that 
Turk^ should formulate a “new defense concept” because over the years “ the defense 
needs of Tuiicey are heavily affected by the priorities of NATO and US’ defense needs.”
Fikret Senses, “Turkey’s Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program in Retrospect 
and Prospect.” The Developing Economies, XXIX, 3, (1991), 214.
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Turkey, Ecevit continued, “has become too dependent on NATO and NATO has 
developed the habit (and comfort) of taking Tuikey’s support granted.” Similariy, Hasan 
Esat Işık who was to be a defense minister in the RPP government, asserted ( in 1977) that 
Turkish governments have “behaved not like a member, but as bodyguard (fedai) of 
NATO.”*®*
The government began to take steps in accordance with its stated policy line; it 
encouraged native defense industries, signed various rather symbolic agreements with the 
Soviet Union, Middle Eastern neighbors and Libya.*®® Though these spears to have 
created suspicions,**® it was rather the RPP leadership’s rhetoric, rather than any concrete 
actions, that appears to have led to the western community suspecting A\kether Tuikey was 
sliding further away from the western camp. Ecevit once suggested (in 1978 in an 
extraordinary party congress) that Turkey was living in its most distressful period in the 
history of the Republic. He urged other states and international institutions not to exploit 
her weaknesses. In that case, Ecevit continued, “Turkey might well go to the other side of 
the wall.” “We do not do this now,” he asserted, “not because that Turkey can not do it, 
but because our sense of responsibility prevents us taking such policy line.” *** He then 
warned everybody “not to put pressure on Turkey.”**^ In a booklet prepared for party 
activists for the incoming partial senate and lower assembly by-elections (October 1979) it 
was argued that “in a period in which east-west and north-south relationships increased to
Bülent Ecevit, Ecevit'in Açıklamaları [Statements of Ecevit] (Ankara, 1977), 45, 46. 
Also, Bülent Ecevit, “Tuikey’s Security Policies.” Survival. 20, 5 (1978).
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Ctunhuriyet Halk Partisi, Radyo. 44.
109 The evaluation of these policies from the perspective of the NATO and West can be 
found in Michael M. Boll, “Turkey’s New National Seciuity Concept; What It Means For NATO.” 
Orbis. 23, 3 (1979).
BoU, for instance, asked “whither Turk^ ?” Ibid., 626. 
Cited in Arcaytirek. Sonbahar. 528-9.
112 Ibid.
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an unprecedented degree, it may lead to undesired consequences for both the worid peace 
and Turkey’s national interests if Turkey, which stands in the center of such dialogues, 
wholeheartedly supports (or be certain partisan o f)  one side Likewise, Ecevit’s
hard stance (in American eyes) on the U-2 flights seemed to be yet another factor in 
worsening relations. When American oflBcials asked Turkish authorities to allow the use of 
Turkish bases for U-2 flights over Soviet Union to monitor the SALT II treaty, Ecevit 
showed extreme reluctance, insisting on the point that Soviet Union must consent to it 
first.“ '* In the words of The Economist, this attitude of the Ecevit government, put the 
“Americans into a tizzy.”"* The issue soon faded way as America shelved SALT II treaty 
in response to the Soviet invasion of A^hanistan, but it, alongside the other things, seems 
to reinforced doubts about reliability of Ecevit on the part of the US government."* It is 
not implied here that Ecevit should have bowed to western allies each and every demand so 
as to be regarded as succesfiil in foreign afl&irs. (Indeed, many observers accepted that 
Ecevit’s multi-dimensional policy and his eflforts to widen Turkey’s foreign policy options 
was instrumental in lifting of the US embargo).'"But that national interests can better be 
protected not through emotional outbursts uttered in a moment of anger (whether in public 
or in private) but through well-calculated diplomatic moves; this is what the RPP 
government seemed to ignore.
113 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Zor Günleri. 107. (my italics)
According to Birand, Ecevit opposed such a decision because he though that it might 
provoke the Soviet Union and thus harm Turkish interests. Mehmet Ali Birand, 12 Eylül Saat: 04.00 
[12 September 04:00] (Istanbul; Milliyet, 1984), 97-98. Critics on the other hand pointed out that 
Ecevit’s concern was excessive since “national means of verification had long been accepted and 
monitoring of Soviet compliance with SALT II would have a direct bearing upon the security of 
America’s NATO allies, including Turkey.” George E. Gruen, “Ambivalence in the Middle East and 
the Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy.” Orbis. 24, 2 (1980), 376.
The Economist, May 19, 1979 “Dimming Eyes.”
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the head of US National Security Council, was reported to have 
been angered by Ecevit’s remarics and said that “one can go nowhere with Ecevit.” Birand. 12 Eylül. 
98.
117 Faruk Sdnmezoğlu, ABD ’nin Türkiye Politikası, 1964-1980 [The US Policy Concerning
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In evaluating how the RPP government responded to pressing problems of 
terrorism, economy and foreign relations, the behavior of the opposition needs to be 
mentioned. Since, the JP-led opposition did everything in its power to ensure the 
government’s failure without ever thinking that they were wearing out not only the 
government in power but the democratic system itself In line with Ottoman-Turkish 
tradition of opposition, the JP leader Süleyman Demirel opted for a destructive pattern of 
opposition. He believed that the resignation of eleven MP’s and their subsequent 
participation to RPP government was “ the stealing of national will.” Not totally on 
insecure grounds, he accused Ecevit of seducing his MP’s with cabinet posts, but seemed 
to forgot the fact that he was the politician who have seduced Democratic Party MP’s to 
form a first National Front government (though he did not give them ministership) in 1975. 
Not only Ecevit, but also president Korutüric had been targets of JP attacks. The JP urged 
Korutürk not to ratify Ecevit cabinet."* They even went as far as suggesting that the RPP 
government was an “organized plot.” (organize fesat hareketi).
Infightings, fists, pistol drawings displayed during the process of vote of confidence 
heralded how government-opposition relations would be conducted during the RPP’s 
tenure. To emphasize that the government rested on illegitimate foundations the JP leader 
Süleyman Demirel never called Ecevit as “prime minister” but “head of government” 
(hükümetin başı). Like Ecevit when he was in opposition, he did not refiain in accusing him 
with outrageous words. According to Demirel:
As a result of the activities of the RPP government which has been in power for seventy days, and 
which included interior minister who went to hospital to visit anarchists who fired on police, and 
that is based on immoral tricks, fiaud, intrigues, the state has been seized by militants of the left 
and has become a state of anarchy.”' ’’
Once, he argued that “the hand of head of state is bloody. .. .the government is
Turkey, 1964-1980] (İstanbul: Der, 1995), 111-112.
Journalist Arcayürek reported that Demirel had told him that “they were determined to 
raise the hell if president Korutürk appointed the Ecevit government.” Arcayürek, Sonbahar. 302.
119 Hürriyet, March 21, 1978.
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solely responsible for the bloodshed.”*“  Demirel, who speared to have made no 
distinction between various shades of the left, implied that the RPP was not seriously 
engaged in a struggle against terrorism (derived fi’om the left) since it both sympathized 
their aims and had become indebted to them as they collaborated when the RPP was in 
opposition. He implied that the RPP government was nurturing and protecting the leftist 
terrorists and thus paving way for communism. His speeches that “Ecevit is the chief 
separatist”*^* that “the head of government is the enemy of (existing socio-political) 
order” *  ^and that “the RPP is nurturing anarchists to whom it gives twenty-five thousand 
Turkish liras”*“  reflect that belief*“
The claim that the RPP government was nurturing and protecting leftist terror can 
not stand up to close scrutiny. Despite its riietoric reminiscent of the ultra-left, Ecevit was 
careful in his relations with the extreme-left. When in opposition he consistently rejected 
various calls to form a National Democratic Front (Ulusal Demokratik Cephe) in 
opposition to National Front. He was reported to have said “I am against the RPP entering 
such front. In the first place, it is not clear who would constitute such front. Besides, we as 
a party, have been opposing the very idea of creating fronts (whatever it could be).”*^  ^ In 
power, too, Ecevit repeated the same pattern. When the CRWU urged for a political strike
120 Hürriyet, April 2. 1978. He reiterated this view up until end of the RPP government. He 
said (in July 1979) for instance that “the government was the basic cause of sea of blood, 
destructionism and separatism.” See, Süleyman Demirel, Basin Toplantıları [Press Meetings] 
(Ankara; Ulucan, 1979), 13.
121
122
Hürriyet, September 25, 1978. 
Hürriyet, October 12, 1978.
Hürriyet, November 2, 1978. He also argued, when some work-places had been attacked 
soon after Ecevit’s harsh criticism of the businessmen, that “the government protects bandits and 
bandits protect the government.” Demirel, Basin. 122.
*“  See also his letters to President Fahri Korutürk and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. 
Süleyman Demirel, AP Genel Başkanı Süleyman Demirel 'in Cumhurbaşkanı Korutürk ve Başbakan 
Ecevit 'e Gönderdiği Mektuplar, [Letters that had been sent to President Korutürk and Prime Minister 
Ecevit by Sülqman Demirel} Ankara: 1979, 7,16, 22.
125 Cited in Dutu, Ecevit. 45.
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named “Warning to fascism” to protest Istanbul University massacre in which 6 student 
were killed, Ecevit stated his government’s intention that it was illegal and he would take 
legal steps to prevent it. When the CRWU and TWP leaders tried to meet in Taksim square 
in 1 May 1979, despite the fact that martial law authorities’ prohibited any demonstrations 
there, the RPP government did not raise finger as the prominent leaders of the CRWU and 
TWP (including Behice Boran) were taken under custody. He argued that the ultra-left 
outside the RPP polled only 1 per cent of the total vote in the 1977 elections, while the 
RPP got 42 per cent. Therefore, he argued, the RPP should aim to appeal not to 1 per cent 
but remaining 57 per cent. Otherwise, he noted, “we can not be strong enough if we are 
eclipsed by this 1 per cent.”*“
The JP leader Demirel’s accusations (of the RPP’s alleged protecting of leftist 
terrorists) appears to have been directed towards the aim of securing unity in his own party 
so as to prevent fiirther transfers and to prevent a stiU stronger RPP government and secure 
unity in the right. For that aim, he portrayed the RPP more left leaning than it really was. 
That was a strategy that the JP had stuck to since the 1973 elections. A united nationalist 
front against the storm of socialism represented by the RPP suited Demirel’s party interests 
well. Otherwise, even the loyal supporters of JP did not seem to believe Demirel’s claims 
and criticized him. Nazb Ilıcak, for instance, criticized Demirel’s remark that “the hands of 
head of government is bloody.” Ilıcak asked that “...were we not against the mentality 
that blamed the government (for the anarchy) instead of anarchists ? Were we not 
against the mentality, too, that wore out the state through its actions that aimed to
Cited in, Nazh Ihcak, “CHP ve Aşm Sol” [The RPP and the Ultra-Left] Tercüman, 
October 1, 1978. Even Ilıcak appreciated this attitude of Ecevit. She argued that “the naughiest 
children of the class have now beoime the head (or prefect). It can now be discerned that (Ecevit) is 
tending to behave more maturely.” Tercüman, June 17, 1978. “En Yaramaz Mümessil Oldu.” [The 
Naughtiest have Become the Head (Prefect)]. Yankı editorial similarly argued that it was plain wrong 
to argue that the RPP government tolerated the leftist terror. According to Yankı, the erroneous 
approach of the government was responsible for increasing terrorism. But this derived from 
“ignorance regarding the causes and means of prevention of terrorism rather than a conscious political 
decision.” Yankı, July 28-August 3, 1980, “Tedhiş Karşısında (jlaresizlik” [Helplessness vis-à-vis 
Terrorism].
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wear out the government Similarly, a Yankı editorial noted that “the leaders of the 
JP, like the RPP leaders before, has begun to follow an opposition strategy that is 
irresponsible and destructive and that does not care about the future of the democratic 
regime.” '^ * It warned the JP leadership that “it was a gamble in which democratic 
regime was at stake. The RPP which had played same gamble for long time could not 
gain anything from it. And there is no reason why Demirel would now get benefit from
It. ,129
Demirel did not seem to be moved by such critics. To wear out the RPP 
government, he likened it to the tragic experiences of Salvador Ailende and Kerensky. He 
said that “the way Ecevit government is moving through is the way Ailende moved.” 
Rather than being a sincere warning, it seemed to be intended to further chaos in the 
countiy by implying that the government’s overthrow by armed forces was imminent. 
When the RPP decided to be a member of Socialist International which controlled by 
democratic socialist /social democratic parties of Western Europe and sternly opposed to 
communism, Demirel accused the party of “acting against Turkish constitution and political 
parties law and bang multinational and non-nationalist” (çok uluslu ve gayri milli). He 
never denounced that he would not form a third NF government arguing that this would 
mean to do a service to “oppression.”*^  ^ In JP political mass meetings, people carried, 
banners (probably prepared by party activists) on which Ecevit was accused for being fen of 
IMF. To impede the government’s efforts to put the economy on track, the JP
Tercüman, April 4, 1978. “Bir İpte İki Cambaz” fTwo Acrobats on a Single Rope]
128
129
Yankı, 8-14 January, 1979 “Yeni Yılda Türkiye” [Turkey in the New Year] 
Ibid.
130 Hürriyet, March 20, 1979.
131 Süleyman Demirel, 1979 Yılına Girerken [Towards the Year 1979] (Ankara: Doğuş, 
1979), 33-34.
Interview with Nazlı Ihcak, Tercüman, March 7, 1979. Ihcak thought that if Demirel had 
denounced this possibility, the RPP’s argument that the only alternative to their government was a
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parliamentary group tried to hinder the TGNA’s activities by a ruthless exploitation of legal 
loopholes. When the assembly met to review new tax laws, the JP pariiamentary group 
always called for roll-call (yoklama) so that assembly would lose time before getting down 
to serious business. Proposing more than twenty proposals for a change in a single article 
and directing nearly hundred written question to minister of finance to answer, were other 
innovative means that the JP MP’s excelled in. According to Ecevit, Demirel even criticized 
the then West German Christian Democratic Party leaders for giving a hand to Ecevit 
government.
Just to score against the government, Demirel even did not hesitate to bring the 
military into the center of political discussion. In the first days of his government, Ecevit 
spoke of the e?dstence of “Private War OflBce” (Özel Harp Dairesi) and claimed that 
though it was directed to deal with foreign threat, it was used, in crisis periods, in internal 
affairs. This was less than a prudent act on part of Ecevit. It is not that the existence of such 
institution was to be tolerated in the name of national security, but that he spoke in a 
sensitive issue without necessary proofs (as it later turned out to be). A prudent leader 
would either delve further into legal queries or would not accuse any state institution. 
Demirel had seized an opportunity to score against Ecevit by attempting to incite the army 
against the government.'^ ·* Knowing that Ecevit would not be able to substantiate its 
claims, he accused Ecevit of slandering the army.
He also complained that the RPP was softening martial law through the 
establishment of “Martial Law Co-ordination Committee” (Sıkıyönetim Eşgüdüm 
Başkanhğı). Whether he seriously believed this charge is debatable. It seemed that Demirel 
thought this instance a good opportunity to sow the discord between the army and the 
RPP. Many cynics suggested that in this way Demirel (who appears to have believed that
third NF government, would have been weakened.
133 Cited in Duru, Ecevit. 110.
Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, AP-Ordu İlişkileri -Bir İkilemin Anatomisi [The JP-Army 
Relationships, An Anatomy of a Dilemma] (İstanbul; İletişim, 1993), 142.
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‘the RPP plus army equaled power’ formula was valid) was aiming at manipulating the 
army against the RPP. In fea, Ecevit had spoke of “martial law with human face” and 
asserted that despite the martial law democratic principles were not going to be 
sacrificed. To this end, Ecevit revitalized the Martial Law Co-ordination Committee 
under prime minister’s control to ensure “co-ordination” between military and civilian 
authorities. In fact, as General Evren noted, this institution was not new.*^ * It had 
functioned in the 1971 martial law period. The difierence was that Ecevit had changed its 
name. Its older name “koordinasyon” was replaced by new one “eşgüdüm.” But 
opposition for the opposition sake suited Demirel well. Along the same lines, the JP, which 
had criticized government for delaying declaration of martial law now began to oppose the 
extension of it (required by the constitution) on the grounds that the government had 
diluted it. They claimed that the martial law court judges were not being appointed 
impartially, that martial law did not include ethnic separatism, and that martial law 
commanders were soft on terrorism.*^’ Given the post-1973 sensitivity of Turkish 
military to keep itself in equal distance from all parties, these charges seems to be 
highly exaggerated.
The RPP leadership responded Demirel’s destructive pattern of opposition in a 
similar way. Government-opposition relations were always strained; each leader 
exaggerating differences and accusing other for the ills of the country. In the process, 
government-opposition relations increasingly personalized. It increasingly became blurred 
whether the JP and RPP disagreed on some policies (which they did) or whether the 
disagreements increasingly derived fi^ om personalized Demirel-Ecevit conflict reminiscent 
of pre-1960 period in which Menderes-Bayar/İnönü conflict dominated the political arena. 
An interesting instance reveals how relations between these two men became strained.
Hürriyet, January 2, 1979. 
Evren, Anılar. 236. 
Arcayürek, MOdahale.%2.
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Journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek, who had contact with both leaders, prepared a kind of 
declaration that political leaders should unite against terrorism and in defense of liberal 
democratic order. While Ecevit accepted to undersign it, Demirel hesitated arguing that 
“this can be interpreted as dissimulation (muvazaa) prior to elections.” After couple of 
hesitant days, he accepted the offer, but he undersigned another paper indicating he shared 
the views expressed in that paper, while Ecevit, who had promised to undersign the paper, 
did the same thing as if he had foreseen Demirel’s action.
There were serious warnings issued fi’om various quarters of the society to m^or 
political party leaders urging them to be more responsible and more compromising. 
President Fahri Korutürk warned them at an early stage that “everybody should stop 
accusing each other. Do not put everybody to out of patience.”*^  ^ Journalist Nazh fticak 
warned both leaders:
We wish Demirel and Ecevit to remember that they are not acrobats performing on one rope 
but two responsible leaders that control Turkey’s fate. Because if anarchy conünues at this 
pace, both are going to fall down and both we, spectators, and themselves are going to suffer 
harm that we can not correct.'''^
Professor Turan Güneş, an academic-turned- politician from the RPP, vividly
expressed democracy’s troubles and urged (reminiscent of Juan Linz’s analysis of
breakdown of democracy) both government and opposition to live up to their
responsibilities in a speech made in TGNA Güneş’ speech deserves lengthy quotation:
If our people begin to think that in the assembly so many people and so many parties sit idle, 
we, then will have a great difficulty in maintaining democratic order. Neither foreign powers 
nor illegal organizations (that kill innocent citizens and instigate terrorist events) can ruin 
our political regime and parliament. If anything can min poliücal order, it is only us.''*'
Ibid., 254-260. Similarly, Demirel had sent a letter to President Komtiirk to protest the 
stance of the RPP government when the JP MP of Ur£a was attacked by Kurdish-separatists in his 
hometown. When KomtOrk passed that letter on to Ecevit, who in turn answered Demirel’s critiques, 
Demirel angrily answered back that the original letter was not for Ecevit. Since he did not accept him 
as “an addresse" (muhatap), (my italics). See, Süleyman Demirel, Mektuplar. 13-23.
139 Hürriyet, April 24, 1978.
Tercüman, April 4, 1978. “Bir İpte İki Cambaz” [Two Acrobats on a Single Rope]
'*' Turan Güneş, Araba Devrilmeden önce [Before Car is Overturned] (İstanbul:Kaynak, 
1983), 29.
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But no to avail, major party elites continued to follow their own policy lines.
Unending terrorism, mounting economic problems, several corruption scandals by cabinet
members and destructive party politics all undermined Ecevit governments’ popularity by
the early months of 1979. Few believed that RPP government, which was characterized by
internal divisions, lack of co-ordination and consistency, would be able to deal with
country’s problems.The bulk of the press, which had supported the RPP government
became increasingly critical of Ecevit. His government was blamed for indecision,
uncoordination, lack of will and ability to press on terrorism and economic problems. Metin
Toker of Hürriyet, who was also a member of Senate wrote that, “this country had had
sometimes good sometimes bad government, but it had not so fer had such a bad
government, that even could not see how bad it was.”’^  ^ Uğur Mumcu of Cumhuriyet,
exemplifying the socialist lefts’ dissapointment*'*  ^fi’om the government, remarked that:
If a government can not manage to be in power when in power, this result is inevitable! If a 
government can not make its security forces obey its orders, this result is inevitable. If a 
government watches the events as if it is in tribune (watching soccer), this result is 
inevitable. Government, that does not touch even an ant, wake up from that ignorance ! If 
you can not handle gangs that spread terror in İstanbul, resign in dignity. If people are killed 
like sheep (that are spared for sacrifice) when in you are in government,, and if yoiu 
intelligence services cannot present a report of even a single line, it is you that are 
responsible I Either you go, or do your job properly.”''*^
It was not to be assumed on the other hand that opposition to Ecevit in the press 
was unanimous. Yankı, for instance, argued that unless a better alternative was found, 
which was not yet insight, they would continue to support the Ecevit government and
Parallel to the decline in its popularity, the government was shaken by the resignation of 
several cabinet members. Notable among them were interior minister Irfan özaydınlı, (on January 2, 
1979), defence minister Hasan Esat Işık (on January 14, 1979), minister of state Enver Akova (on 
May 30, 1979), work and social security minister Hilmi işgüzar (on June 7,1979).
Hürriyet, August 19, 1979 “Geçim Değil, Seçim Ekonomisi” [Economic Policy not for 
Livelihood but for the Elections]
CRWU, which had urged its members to support the RPP in the general elections of 1977, 
remained silent in 1979 by elections.
Cumhuriyet, February 3, 1979. “Abdi İpekçi” [Abdi İpekçi]
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regarded efforts to replace it as malevolent.*^
The business community (particularly big business), which supported (with 
hesitation) the RPP government, made its opposition public after governments’ approach to 
the economy seemed to be inconsistent and dangerous for themselves and the country. In 
its rather naive interpretation, Ecevit tended to see big business as an obstacles to be dealt 
with in its efforts to create a more equal society, especially after it began to raise its voice 
against government. Big business and industry were not happy with the governments’ 
failure to end terrorism and its inability to take the necessary measures to put economy on 
track. The most organized and vocal business group, llBA, indicated its opposition to the 
government through newspaper advertisements in the second half of the 1979.* ’^ Ecevit’s 
reaction was overly sensitive.*^ According to Ecevit, these advertisements were well-timed 
in that it was published just when a breakthrough with the IMF was being obtained, to 
hinder governments effort to put economy on track. He threatened to take them to court 
for “being involved in politics.” He called businessmen “exploiters” and said that “this 
government can not be killed as a result of such actions of businessmen. Even if it is killed 
no one shoulder the weight of funeral. The corpse of this government is stronger that the 
possible one (that would come to power as a result of businessmens efforts).” It 
demonstrated that he had lost all hopes for a dialogue with the business community and
Yanh, July 2-9, 1979 “Aldatmacaiun Yaiundaki Gerçeklere Dikkat” [Watch out for 
Realities Behind the Trick)
Business conununity as a whole, however, did not support TİBA. While Istanbul Chamber 
of Industry (ICI) supported it, the majority of Anatolian Chambers representing small business and 
artisans, were openly critical of it. Attila Eralp, “The Politics of Turkish Development Strategies,” in 
Turkish State, Turkish Society, ed. Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sirman (London: Routledge, 1990), 
322. For the cleavages within the private sector and prevalent disharmony vis-à-vis the Ecevit 
government, see, Herui J.Barkey, The State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey (Boulder; 
Westview, 1990), 166-8
Though not agreeing with the bulk of TIBA’s critique, editorial in Yankr criticized Ecevit 
for being less than tolerant against a group that used the freedom to express its own views. Yankı, 
May 21-27, 1979 “İşadamlan Ne İstiyor ?”[What do the Businessmen Want ?]
Hürriyet, May 16, 1979. In 1985, Ecevit argued that these advertisements were published 
soon after he refused to allow the U-2 flights to take place. Cited in Arcayürek, Müdahale. 374.
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needed not to be conciliatory vis-a-vis them.
S3. THE MILITARY VARIABLE
The military high command, like other socio-political groups and in interaction with
them, came to share similar views that the RPP government, too, foiled. The military’s loss
of confidence in the RPP government needs to be detailed since its failure signaled not only
the failure of government in power which had an alternative, but the failure of the
government with no realistic alternative.If critical actors believed that there had been an
viable alternative to the RPP, this might not have counted much. In democracies, the foilure
of one party in power does not necessarily mean the foilure of the democratic system, as
there are usually percevied ahematives. As Linz insightfully observed:
the democratic system allows for a distinction between the system as a method of 
legitimization of authority and the people who exercise power for the time being (until the 
next election). Only when all the parties that sustain the legitimacy of a democratic system 
against an anti-system opposition (or oppositions) are also responsible for its efficiency is an 
acute loss efficiency likely to be detrimental to the legitimacy of the ‘system.’
But in the Turkey of 1979 no such an alternative, in the eyes of the critical actors,
seemed to be in sight. The JP, which did not raise any great hope for democracy, was not
strong enough to form a government alone. The possibility of a third National Front
government was not even considered as a viable alternative. The only remaining alternative,
it appeared, was, JP-RPP co-operation. But since, the animosities between these parties
was well-known (they had accused of each other with the harshest of the words), this was a
remote possibility. The RPP government was the hope for the democracy and since it had
foiled, and no promising alternative was in sight, very survival of the democratic regime was
at the stake. Abdi İpekçi of Milliyet had very neatly summarized the situation;
In other words, in the eyes o f the critical actors there seemed to be no viable alternative to 
the RPP government, except for possible RPP-JP coalition.
Linz, Breakdown. 81. Similarly Dogan observed that “hostility towards the party in power 
is compatible with faith in the soundness of the democratic regime.” Mattei Dogan, “The Pendulum 
Between Theory and Substance- Testing the (Conceptions of Legitimacy and Trust,” in Comparing
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Those, who thought that the situation would be better when the NF government resigned, are 
now disappointed. Their disappointment has increasingly led to widespread pessimism. 
Because, they tend to think that with the failure of an RPP dominated government, an only 
alternative to the NF, there are no democratic solutions. They are anxiously asking; ‘what
.152is going to happen ?’
Obviously the military was preoccupied with the same question. It is during the 
RPP period that the military high command began seriously to think that an intervention 
might be necessary to uphold the integrity of the state and the country. In the following 
section we dwell on how the military came to the that point with particular attention paid to 
political party elites’ contribution to it.
The peculiar characteristics of the Turkish military that determined its volition 
(predisposition) towards intervention in politics needs brief recapsulation. There is 
unanimous agreement among scholars'^ ^that the Turkish military perceives itself as the 
guardian of the Atatiirk’s principles -of republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, 
statism, and reformism/revolutionism- on which the Republican state is based. It is the chief 
state elite that assumes the role of watching over and protecting the Republican state and its 
philosophy, Atatüikism against external and internal enemies. The inculcation of Atatiirkian 
principles starts from the very first day young students enter into the military schools. This 
socialization continues after graduation through a highly competitive selection process 
through which young oflBcers promoted In that sense, the Turkish military did not 
need to develop what Alfred Stepan called “new professionalism” that emphasized not
Nations-Concepts, Strategies. Substance, ed. Manei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994), 304.
152 Milliyet, December 12, 1978. “What is going to happen ?” [Ne Olacak ?]
Dankwart A  Rustow, “The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic.” World 
Politics. 11, (1958-1959); George S. Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics I.” Middle 
East Journal, 19, (1965); Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, “The State, Politics and the Military in 
Turkey.” Comparative Politics. 16, (1983); Metin Heper, “The State, the Military and Democracy in 
Turkey.” Jerusalem Journal o f International Relations. 9, (1987); Kemal H. Karpat, “Military 
Interventions; Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After the 1980s” in State, Democracy 
and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1988).
James S. Brown, “Military and Politics in Titrkey.” Armed Forces and Society, 13, 2, 
(1987), 249. For an insightful account by journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, Emret Komutanım [Yes,
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only military’s traditional role against external enemies, but also the need to fight
internal enemies, alongside the emphasis on national development and ideological
warfare, a shift which, according to Stepan, was crucial in explaining military
interventions in many Latin American countries. The Turkish military did not need to
develop doctrine of “new professionalism” simply because, from very inception it had
internalised such values. A quotation from a former oflBcer is telling in that respect:
The education and training of the Turkish officers does not resemble to that of other armies. 
In these armies, officership is perceived as professional job same as that of civil servants. For 
us, on the other hand, it is held in high esteem, it is not only a professional job but also a 
national duty, and guardianship of the state. Trained with such beliefs in (army) schools, 
these officers spread these beliefs to their environment as move up the ranks, thus the duty to 
watch and to protect the Republic becomes an entrenched belief in their whole life in the 
army. When they deemed it necessary, to do that job (watching and protecting the Republic), 
either they spontaneously act or perform commands that tell them to intervene comfortably as 
if performing a normal duty.’^
The military’s well-entrenched guardianship role, in accordance with the principles 
espoused by Atatürk, has made a mixed (both negative and positive) contribution to the 
development and consolidation of democracy. On the one hand, inculcation with such 
principles has predisposed the army towards respect for civilian democracy and the 
tradition of not involving the military in the day-to-day politics. Mustafa Kemal, who 
witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the hands of young and ambitious oflBcers 
who held the power after the first world war, appears to have appreciated the dangers of 
the army’s involvement in mainstream politics. He therefore always urged oflBcers to stay 
out of politics and to be obedient to civilian authority. His policy of non-involvement, 
however, did not mean that the army would serve any government properly elected with a 
total disregard to its policies, but that, while staying out of daily politics the army would 
always consider Atatüridan principles. His main concern, as Harris noted “with the army
Commander] (Istanbul; Milliyet, 1986).
Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfere and Military Role 
Expansion,” in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, second edition, ed. Alfred Stepan 
(New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1976).
Orhan Erkanli, Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular, [Memoirs, Problems and Those Who are 
Responsible ] third ed. (Istanbul; Baha, 1973), 375.
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was not to keep it out of politics, but to make sure it remained completely loyal to him and 
Republic It is for the fear of his rivals using the army against his ideals that Atatürk 
managed to insert article 24 of the 1924 Constitution which stipulated that “no person may 
be a deputy and hold oflBce under the government at the same time ” Nevertheless, his 
legacy of staying out of politics has been the most significant factor restraining the Turkish 
military to involve itself day-to-day politics.
The fact that the military valued democracy as an end in itself (a system of 
governance that a country ought to stick if it is to be regarded as civilized) is another 
positive aspect of Atatürk’s legacy. As we discussed in ch^ter two, it was Atatürk who 
fevored a rationalist conception of democracy. Inculcated by such values the military, too, 
understands and defends a rational conception of democracy. Democracy for them is not so 
much a means for reconciling various interests, but as a discussion process through which 
the best policy for the country was to be found. The military’s voluntary tendency to return 
barracks after every intervention should be related with the positive legacy of Atatürk. “To 
reach a contemporary level of civilization,” to be regarded as civilized nation, it is necessary 
to have democracy because only democratic countries are to be accorded such status. 
Therefore, Atatürkism worked as an obstacle for the establishment of long-term military 
dictatorship, though there existed a minority (who interpreted Atatürkism in this way) in the 
armed forces.***
On the other hand, Atatürkism was sometimes interpreted in a way that limited 
what elected m^orities could do, which did not, at times, the requirements of democratic 
regimes well. The criteria with which elected majorities were criticized and overthrown 
were determined by according to the requirements of Atatüridsm,**** and it was the military
157 Harris, “role,” 56.
Turkey’s long-standing commitments to NATO and European Union (which were the 
logical result of the westernization policies of Republic in the area of foreign policy) was another 
&ctor disposing the militaiy return to barracks after every intervention.
159 This can clearly be seen in a book that is taught at military academies. It is written there
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itself which decided when these principles had been violated. In other words, “Ataturk’s 
missionary role left the Generals with the task of deciding when they were entitled to 
infiinge the equally Atatiirkist rule that serving oflBcers were not to be responsible for the 
government of the country.”^^ Combined with the opposition which inclined to present any 
act of the government as a violation of Atatiiric’s principles, Turidsh democracy survived 
(and broke down in 1960 and 1971) through tense times in which the military showed its 
resdessness on the grounds that the elected government was violating Ataturk’s principles.
It is mistaken, however, to suggest that the Turidsh military’s interpretation of 
Ataturkian principles and its role in Turkish politics and society remains unchanged. 
Observers noted the Turidsh army’s tendency to learn from «perience.**’ Its interpretation 
of both its role and the (interpretation of) principles that it professed to protect were not, 
subsequently once and for all, inflexible maxims. On the eve of the late seventies the 
military’s interpretation of Atatiirkism and the methods and usefulness of military 
interventions underwent some changes. Especially after the 12 March intervention “(the 
military’s) role in the story thus became a secondary one”‘®^ Events leading to the 12 
March intervention and military interregnum have shown, once again, that tolerance of 
junior level involvement in day-to-day politics carried the risk of dangerous division of the 
army as an institution, particulariy if this division based on an ideology such as socialism. 
The division of armed forces through some ideologies meant the loosening of professional 
discipline and subsequent weakening of the army to perform its principal duty; protecting 
the state against internal and external enemies.
that “unless, the Turkish revolution is in great danger, AtatOrkism never opposed freedom of 
thought.” Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, Türk İnkılap Tarihi [The Histoıy of Tuıkish 
‘inkılap’] (Ankara; Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1973), 184.
William Hale, “Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective,” 
in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin, 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 161.
Ibid., 166.
William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), 215.
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The fact that civilians successfully resisted military men (speared to have been 
fevored by the military) in the presidential elections was also a loss of fece for the military. 
As Evren indicated in his memoirs with the Gürler events “the prestige of the armed 
forces was bruised to a great extent.” One other reason might be that their traditional 
allies, the RPP and the intelligentsia was no longer enthusiastically backed them as they did 
previously. The military’s somewhat secondary posture posed during the National Front 
governments, which seemed to question very values of Republican principles, should be 
explained by these fectors. However, this does not mean, of course, that they approved (or 
remained indifferent to) it.
As we learn from Evren’s memoirs,*^ the military high command, like large 
segments of society, greeted the Ecevit government with relief, despite having some doubts 
whether he would succeed or not. As he approvingly put, “in the eyes of the people, Ecevit 
(or Karaoglan) was perceived as savior. He was a hope.”'** Indeed it was the case that like 
many in Turkish society the army, too, had had too much of the NF governments. Its 
politicization of the state institutions, the uncompromising attitude it showed in the case of 
Cyprus, which resulted in the American embargo that weakened the fire-power of the army 
and the existence of the NSP which questioned very basis of Atatüridan principles were 
reasons for the army’s opposition.'** It also appears that Kenan Evren personally liked 
Ecevit, but that does not mean that (as JP claimed) he was Ecevit’s man.
The warm beginnings between the RPP and the military soon began to turn sour. 
Initially, as we pointed out in the previous chapter Ecevit had talked about the existence of 
counter-guerrilla organization attached to military wdiich was not under the control of the
163 Evren, Anılar.\59.
164 <To expose how the military perceived the situation in the country and subsequent actions 
it should take, we shall look at the military commanders’ speeches appeared in the newspapers and 
written memoirs as well as our interview with General Kenan Evren.
Evren. ^m/or. 183.
166 Ibid., 182.
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167civilian forces without presenting any evidence to substantiate his claims. Evren 
obviously felt imeasy about Ecevit’s act since it implied that the army tolerated illegal 
institutions in its body. The more serious disappointment related to the RPP government’s 
handling of terrorism. Kenan Evren states that in National Security Council meetings they 
recommended to the government what they believed to be essential measures to deal with 
terrorism. Among the military’s recommendations were; the establishment of State Security 
Courts, the prevention of politicization of security forces, particularly closure of police 
associations, changes in the laws concerning the police’ rights and responsibilities and 
like.“"*
From the reading of his memoirs it spears that Kenan Evren came to the
conclusion that «Ecevit was soft on terrorism and Kurdish separatism in the South East.
Ecevit had opposed a general search for guns in the South-East on the ground that “the
gendarme could mistreat the people living there.” Evren, on the other hand pointed out that
this was not the reason for canceling such action if the anyone mistreats the people he can
be punished.Similarly Ecevit’s appointment of Şerafettin Elçi as minister of public worics
made him angry.A pparently in September 1978, Evren had given his realistic judgment
on the RPP government. According to Evren’s opinion, the government, too, was
uncomfortable about increasing terrorism and tried to do something about it but:
they cannot be impartial. They can not take necessary measures and can not strengthen 
intelligence and seciuity services to make them more effective. ...They are bringing experts 
from England but can not implement their recommendations. Perhaps even more seriously 
they can not take legal coercive measures. They can not establish private courts (read state 
security coiuts). They do not see an increase in terror as the number one problem of Turkey.
167
168
169
Ibid., 186. 
Ibid., 197-8.
Ibid., 207.
Evren wrote that “The Ecevit govermnent, that followed the principle of one vote is one 
vote, appointed Şerafettin Elçi, who is said to have been in coUobaration with separatists, to the 
ministry of public works. Elçi, in turn, brought his own men the ministry. It was known that these 
men began to speak Kurdish in the corridors of the ministry.” Ibid., 221-222.
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They appear to have believed that with the passage of the time these could be prevented.
The detailed analysis of this belief of Evren’s is likely to enhance our understanding 
of what disturbed the military most, which specific conditions urged them to think of the 
possibility of intervention. From a careful reading of Evren’s memoirs, it appears that the 
adverse effects of the politicization in the state institutions have very much undermined their 
belief in the state’s ability to deal with the problem of terrorism. His memoirs are full of 
references to how he and his commanders perceived dangers of that phenomenon which 
paralyzed supposedly impartial state institutions. The declaration of martial law after the 
Kahramanmaraş incidents, allowed them to better evaluate the weaknesses of state 
apparatuses that was supposed to deal with terrorism, and appears to have sharpened their 
belief that the situation was more serious than they thought. The general commander of 
Gendermarie, for instance, was reported to have diagnosed the causes of Kahramanmaraş 
incidents as.
The JP and NF governments have collaborated with the NAP and its affiliated organizations 
to come and stay in the power. Thq' have prepared fertile ground that are conducive to 
partisanship for the militants both in administration and in schools. Thus, in that province, 
the militants of the NAP have dominated higher teacher schools and other educational 
institutions, alongside the Roads. Water and Electricity (Yol, Su, Elektrik-YSE) institution 
that provides services to villages, and an institution concerning the forestry and police. ...In 
the RPP’s period, such institutions that have an ability to make an impact on the people’s 
daily life, have been filled by the sympathizers of the opposite view. PA seized the police, 
while TTUSA controlled the education. ...it is my understanding that events resulted from 
the fact that this sense of rd)ellion created by partial administration that continued such a 
long time, came to the point of bursting.’’^
In another instance, martial law commander (of an area including Adana, 
Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep) Nevzat Bölügjray complained about police partisanship in his 
own area;
(alter the killing of Chief Constable of Adana (Dcvat Yurdakul) more than 200 hundred 
police, many of them belonging to PA, in stark defiance of the state, have come to resist side 
by side the extremist-leftist woikers. As a result of their resistance and rejection of woik that
171 Ibid., 224.
Ibid., 232-233. Similarly, Korkut özal remaiked that because of the partisanship of the 
RPP government, the Sünni population had come to support the NAP and that played a crucial role in 
the ensuing chaos. Nail Güreli, Gerçek Tanık- Korkut özal Anlatıyor [The Real Witness-Koikut özal 
Speaks] (İstanbul; Milliyet, 1994), 107.
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is reminiscent of Janisssaries, Adana lacked total security on September 28 and 29, while 
people of Kahramanmaraş spent the day in fear of terror. One of the most important reasons 
for the persistence of terrorism in Adana is the fact that some part of the police, in fact, are 
involved in terrorist activities.
More to the point they did not believe that there was the political will and strength 
to end the politicİ2ation of the security forces. They had witnessed how the NF parties had 
parceled out state bureaucracy. And now the RPP, let alone to preventing it was continuing 
the same practice.
The Ecevit government’s failure was not the only reason for their weakening of the 
belief in democracy. It appears that the behavior of the opposition was as important. True 
they were not happy with the RPP government but th ^  were equally uncomfortable with 
the JP, which did not offer a realistic alternative to the bumt-out RPP government. As 
noted above, the JP continued to repeat the traditional pattern of opposition in Turkey; to 
wear out the government, no principle, no promise, was regarded as sacred. Wearing out 
the government became such an overriding aim that, to this end parties committed several 
actions that undermined the very basis of democratic regime.
It is certain that a disturbingly opportunistic pattern of behavior observed 
particularly in the IP’s leadership was surely one of the crucial reasons of military’s coming 
to the conclusion that democratic system would not solve problems that it feced. For 
instance. Evren writes in his memoirs that “the opposition was happy that the terrorism 
continues with pace. (Because) they are eagerly waiting for (when the government fails) 
their time would come.”*’  ^When Demirel criticized Martial Law Co-ordination Committee 
on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. Evren appear to have became furious. He 
wrote in his memoirs that Demirel did not abolish the institution when he became premier in 
1979 and arrived at the conclusion that:
Let alone siq ^ rt it, the qf^x)sition’s aim is to fetter and to oppose every decision of the 
government in thdr struggle against terrorism Because in their minds, 0(qx)sition means to 
characterize “white” if the government says it is “black” even if it is blade The logic prevalent in
173
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our parties is this. They are not assessing from the point the point of view of whether it would be 
beneficial for the countiy or not But they are tiying (through demagogy) to convince people it is
175not
When this author asked (jeneral Evren whether he could single out the most
important factor that led them to lose belief in the democratic system, Evren remarked that;
The most important &ctor is the tendency of the government par^ (ies) to give every' sort of 
concession to stay in the power and the tendency of the q^x)sition party (ies) to regard every action 
as right and legitimate to bring down the government ...We tend to understand qqx)sition as to 
c^ rpose every decision that the government takes.
As Evren'^states in his memoirs by July 1979, he had begun to think about the 
possibility of an intervention and wanted to have the views of other commanders in the high 
command. Totepeate, political developments that brought Evren to this point can be stated 
(in his accounts) as follows: First, the RPP government had feiled in its struggle against 
terrorism. It underestimated the magnitude of the problem and it could not take the 
necessary measures.*’* Therefore, if timely action was not taken the civil w^r was to be 
expected. Alongside the problem of terrorism, the government was not so successful in 
dealing with economic problems.*”  It should not be thought, however, that the economic
Ibid.. 236. In another instance, when Demirel’s complaints about the implementation of 
martial law was answered by Kenan Evrert, Demiiel accused Ecevit and the army of rejuvenating the 
formula of “RPP + army = power,” Evren appears to have been very disturbed. He wrote that “our 
politicians still did not understand that such imputations does help neither the government nor the 
oppositiorL Now they want to make use of the armed forces for their ugly aims.” Ibid, 250.
Kenan Evren. Interview by the author. Marmaris, March 31, 1998. (Henceforth 
interview) These points have been expressed by seasoned observers of Turkish politics. Kamran İnan, 
a knowledgeable politician, for instance similarly argued that in the assembly (particirlarly in the 
expert commissions) “there always occrtrs a sharp division between government and opposition. 
Nobody seeks consensus even in the most critical and serious subjects as if it woitld be regarded as a
shame....... proposals put forward by the opposition are automatically rgected irrespective of how jirst
and fair they are. (Similarly), proposals of the government parties are automatically opposed. It is so 
strange that realities become a hundred percent different in the ten meters that separate the opposition 
benches fiom the ministers' seats. It is not easy to find similar politicians who in power argue and do 
the exact opposite of the what they said in the opposition.” Kamran İnan, Devlet İdaresi [The 
Administration of the State] (Istanbul: ötüken, 1993), 92.
’’’ Evren. Anılar.116.
Even the several ministers of the RPP government complained in the National Security 
Council meeetings about their inability to take necessary measures, see Ibid., 246-258. Knowingly or 
not they failed to appreciate what sort of impact their speeches might have on the commanders.
179 Ibid., 277.
310
crisis was the predominant reason but rather economic problems further aggravated an 
already tense situation. Second, the viable alternative to Ecevh government was not insight. 
The possibility of second NF governments was a nightmare, but Demirel could not form a 
government alone. The RPP-JP dialogue**® could have been the only way but since 
animosities between two party cadres was not well-known, this possibility seemed remote. 
Evren appears to have believed that if held, (which was difiBcult anyway because MP’s 
would not take such a decision only two years after the election), an early election would 
not open the way towards stable and strong government.
Thirdly, General Evren worried that if they remained silent general division in the 
country could spread into the army. This was more so since the implementation of martial 
law had brought the army into close interaction with other civilian actors. The use of the 
army to provide internal law and order risked (as observed in other countries) the spreading 
of societal cleavages into the army. There occurred several events that reinforced the 
high commands’ worries. Sabotage attempt at Savarona (Atatürk’s private Yatch 
under the responsibility of the army), the increasing number of students that have to be 
expelled from military schools for being involved in political activities, the escape of 
Mehmet Ali Ağca (a person charged with killing Abdi İpekçi) from the military prison 
of Maltepe were among the most publicized ones.*** Evren also told me that they had 
discovered (after the intervention) “that some officers at the rank of lieutenants 
(üsteğmen) and captains (yüzbaşı) had made preparations to participate with those 
under his command in the case of a possible communist takeover of government.”**^ 
Evren also estimated that junior level ofBcers could execute a coup by sidelining them. As 
he reported to have told the other commanders “I am receiving letters almost eveiyday
In October 1978, Evren wrote that (after President KoratOik and the CTWU urged for a 
grand coalition) the idea of a grand coalition as the only way out was beginning to occur in the 
military circles, too. Evren made this message clear in his 29 October speecL Ibid., 226-7.
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from staff officers. I think you, too, are receiving such letters. I even suspect that secret 
organizations have been established within the army. If this state of afiairs goes on like this, 
I fear another 27 May might happen.”**^ Despite Turkish army’s discipline, in the past 
young and ambitious officers had attempted to passed over their seniors and as in 1960 they 
succeeded.
It is also to be added that, with Ecevit’s decline in popularity, Evren correctly 
assessed that and public opinion as well as Turkey’s allies in the NATO were being more 
receptive than they had ever been towards any sort of military action to save the country 
from civil strife. We shall dwell on this point later. But it suffices to note here that he 
seemed to have been moved by visits of an MP (Celal Bucak from JP), and the president 
(and committee consisting of its various representatives throughout the countiy) of CSTA 
and another member of the second chamber (whose name Evren did not ®q>lain), persons 
who all have urged him to “do something” as well as unsigned letters that were sent to him 
by an ordinary citizens.
General Evren ordered in September 1979 the establishment of a working group, 
under the chairmanship of second president of the chief of staff to assess “whether time 
was ripe for intervention, and or intervention or warning was the best option in this 
juncture.”'** He was quite anxious that if an intervention was to be conducted everybody 
should accept that no other possibility within the democratic system had been left 
untried.'*^ Though cynics might rule that out as Justification for the intervention, he seems 
to have been sincere when he worried about the possibility of military’s involvement into 
politics:
EyK.nAmlar.216. He also told me that as a commander “he was able to understand the 
reactions of lower cadres from their particular way of looking whether they were in favour of the 
policy you follow or not.” Interview.
184 Interview.
Evren, Antlar.2S3.
Similarly Hale noted that the high command “were determined to delay any intervention
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We occupy an important place in world af^irs. Should we be like the countries in Latin America 
or Africa? Thnnighout the histoiy, we have seen and experienced that how harmñü the army 
involvement in politics might be. The most recent experience is 27 revolution (ihtilal). We 
know what sort of (deplorable) situation the armed forces have found themselves in 27 M ^. 
Should we repeat the same pattern
Nevertheless as the guardian of principles of Atatüric and the state, Evren 
understood that they could not remain indifferent to it for long. But in that case, he 
believed, everybody should accept the legitimacy of the intervention as history have shown 
that an “intervention launched before the knife had cut through to the bone”*** would do 
more harm than good.
While the high command was assessing what sort of action it should take, the 
country was preparing for a mid-term elections to fill one-third of the seats in the senate 
together with by-elections for five vacant seats in the lower house of the assembly. 
Elections were'perceived as important for the future of the RPP government by political 
parties and public opinion at large. The result of elections spelled the end of the RPP 
government. It was a heavy defeat for the RPP. Its vote fell to 29 per cent fi'om 41.4 per 
cent, while the IP’s vote rose fi'om 36.9 per cent to 46.8 per cent. The JP managed to gain 
all five seats (in the lower assembly) contested and 33 of 50 seats in the Senate. Though 
expected, only a few estimated that the RPP would face such a heavy defeat in the 
elections. Reflecting on the election defeat Ecevit said that the rise in the JP’s vote might 
be a mathematical reality but it is not a sociological reality, he, then, resigned amidst 
the intra-party critiques directed to him. Thus, the period was came to an end. The ball was 
again on Demirel’s court.
To sum up the main points in this ch^ter, the RPP government, seen as an hope 
for the future of democratic system (especially after the NF governments) felled to tackle 
pressing problems of law and order and economy. Its failure was more to do with its
until there seemed to be no alternative and its legitimaqcy virtually unquestioned.” Hale, M ilitary.lil.
187 Evren, Anılar.H I. In our interview Evren seemed to be particularly disturbed by the
impact of the 27 May intervention on the army’s hierarchy. 
Ibid., 262, 277.
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misdiagnosis of the problems (be that in economy, terrorism, or foreign afiairs) and 
subsequent political- administrative mismanagement (lack of co-ordination, inconsistency) 
rather than the gravity of the situation in the country. With the RPP government’s feilure, 
suspicions as to whether the democratic regime might survive for long increased as no 
viable alternative within the democratic system was in sight. It is at this point that the army, 
as the chief state elite and the guardian of republican state, seriously began to consider the 
possibility of military intervention.
The peculiar characteristics of the army high command necessitated that if 
intervention was to be executed as few people as possible should contest its legitimacy. To 
this end, they decided to push for (and made other actors to push it for as well) for a 
dialogue between parties, even if they suspected it would lead nowhere. While the regime’s 
fate was not yet sealed, the process which would culminate in 12 September breakdown 
was set on course.
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CHAPTER VI: THE JUSTICE PARTY GOVERNMENT: THE 
MILITARY’S WARNING, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE 
MISSING OF THE LAST OPPORTUNITY, 1979-1980
The RPP government resigned as the 14 October partial senate and by-elections (for 
lower assembly) results showed a sharp decline in the party’s popularity. The RPP’s votes 
declined from 41.4 % to 29.1 % while the JP’s votes risen from 36.9 % to 46.8 %. All the five 
seats contested (in the lower assembly) were captured by the JP. Ecevit’s resignation took 
nobody by surprise. It was widely believed that the 22-month-long Ecevit government failed 
utterly to combat terrorism and economic crisis.
The ball was now in Demirel’s court. In his resignation speech, Ecevit had already 
suggested that the JP should now try to form a government. There was a range of possibilities 
open to the JP leader Süleyman Demirel. He could form a third NF government. He could seek 
a grand coalition with the RPP. He could form a minority government with the outside support 
of the NSP and NAP. Or he could try to take the country to a general election. Since the 
experience of the second NF governments was all too recent to be forgotten Demirel ruled out 
the first possibility. If he could push to take the country to early general elections, the other 
parties were likely to oppose it since it was likely that, if elections were to be held, the JP 
would come first. He therefore had to rule out that possibility, too. Despite calls from all 
quarters of the society, he ruled out the idea of a grand coalition with the RPP. In feet, Ecevit, 
now in opposition, invited him to review the possibilities for forming a viable government. 
Demirel did not seriously consider this option. He had made it clear several times that he never 
thought that such coalition would have been viable arguing that such coalition was against the 
nature of things. In defending his action in an interview in 1986 Demirel explained (in addition 
his initial beliefs regarding such coalition) that if he had gone to Ecevit and said “Mr Ecevit you 
could not do it, please prop me up, and let’s do it, or let’s become partners in government, it
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would have hurted Mr Ecevit’s honor This appears to be less than convincing, designed to 
dispel his uncomprimising attitude, since he was the man who never called Ecevit as prime 
minister but head of government, who accused him in the most severe terms without ever 
thinking that it could hurt his honour.
He therefore sought the support of the NAP and the NSP, parties which once again 
came to wield disproportional (in relation to support achieved in polls) influence in Turkish 
politics. The two minor parties were more than happy to oblige. Though they did not have 
portfolios, they knew that, dependent on their support, Demirel would not be able to resist 
their partisan demands.^ Since Ecevit made clear his willingness to co-operate with the 
NSP, which in turn strengthened Erbakan’s hand while weakening Demirel’s bargaining 
potential. The NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan expressed it well when he said they were 
supporting government repugnantly (kerhen) giving the message to (both Demirel and Ecevit) 
that he might withdraw support at any time.
The new government was a far cry from creating hope in the country. It was not seen 
as a government that might successfully tackle the problem of terrorism and economic crisis 
and might generate a new hope for troubled democratic system. Critics have pointed out that it 
was not a strong government that Turkey needed at this critical moment. As Metin Toker of 
Hürriyet asked;
How would Eibakan be convinced in Cypnis issue ? Who would prevent the QiWU’s excessive 
demands (likely to be encouraged b> Ecevit) in the incoming collective wage bargainings ? Is it 
possible in an effort towards stienthening the state, the handling of opposing forces can be dealt with 
martial law alone, especially in the lace of the RPP’s screams that ‘now, &scism arrived’ ? Is it even 
possible that a government which is under fire fiom all sides could put the econon^ on a sound basis, 
to deal with an inllation that necessitates painful measures
Even Nazlı Ilıcak of Tercüman was very cautious about governments chances of 
success. She wrote that:
1 Reported in Cüneyt Arcayürek, Cüneyt Arcayûrek Açıklıyor 10, Demokrasi Dur [Cüneyt
Arcayurek Explains-10, Democracy Stop] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), 469.
 ^The JP minority government was able get 229 votes, only three more than required 226 votes.
3
Congress]
Hürriyet, November 11, 1979. “Kumltaym Hükümeti” [Government designed by Party
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Of course Demirel has to say that he will achieve. His government can alleviate some problems. 
It can even create optimism for a couple of months. But unless you are a partisan, it is very 
difficult to argue that this government can cope with the tremendous problems of the country.''
The combined strength of the JP and other parties that supported coalition was just
enough to secure a majority in the assembly. And it was not at all clear that these two parties
would support the government when it needed their support in the assembly. It was known that
the NAP and particularly NSP, even when in coalition, had blocked many proposals that the JP
brought forward. They had behaved “as if they were in opposition.”  ^ Now it was not very
realistic, to say the least, to expect them to provide support to a government they were
supporting “repugnantly.”  ^But at this point, the advantages of being in power as well as his
desire to prevent another RPP led government appears to have led Demirel to ignore these
considerations. Defending his decision in 1986, Demirel asserted that a party can not reject an
opportunity to come to power because in that case its supporters would ask it why it did not
take that opportunity.’ Regarding his thin majority in the assembly, Demirel argued that “as
long as you have enough seats to keep the government in power, to have 100 extra seats does
not mean anything. You can do what you want to do. As long as you have a majority to take
decisions, to look for extra support does not provide additional strength.”*  As perceptively
Tercüman, November 11, 1979. “Azınlık Hükümeti” [The Minority Government] Not all 
commentators were pessimistic, however. Aydın Yalçın of Yeni Forum, for instance wrote that the 
government’s chances to prevent terrorism was much higher than it was two years ago. He pointed out 
that the RPP had put some distance between itself and ultra-left, and the IP’s relations with the army was 
in much better condition now than it ever has been. Yeni Forum, December 1, 1979, n.6, “Anarşi 
Durdurulabilir mi T  [Can Anarchy be Stopped ?] Similarly an editorial in Yankı noted that Demirel may 
succeed, if he seeks compromise with the RPP. It arrived at such conclusion after noting that the RPP was 
in no position to mount effective opposition to the JP government and constitutional institutions (read 
army) were ready, more than they have ever been, to work with the party. Yankı, 26 November-2 
December, 1979. “Demiiel Şanslı Başlıyor” [Demirel has a Lucky Start]
*Anna O. Krueger and liter Turan, “The Politics and Economics of Turkish Policy Reforms in 
the 1980’s,” in Political & Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform, eds. Anna O. Krueger and 
Robert H. Bates (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 340.
* As Eibakan indicated one of the reasons why the NSP supported the government was that they 
wanted the nation to see neither the RPP (which had just resigned) nor the JP could solve Turicey’s 
problems. Hürriyet, October 24, 1979.
 ^Arcayürek, Demokrasi Â10.
Ibid., 469.
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noted by Metin Toker of Hürriyet he confused “the idea of a majority that is enough to form a 
government with a majority that is strong enough to deal with Turkey’s problems.”^
Despite these (percevied) initial weaknessess, the JP government sincerely directed all 
its energies towards the prevention of the terrorism, and then economic problems. Unlike 
Ecevit, Demirel appreciated how serious the problem of terrorism was, though he, too, 
heightened expectations by promising that within 100 days, there would not be any liberated 
zones. He was also ready to push for harsh measures as he believed that the way out of the 
problem of the terrorism was to “get the state to regain its democratic authority.”*** In the first 
martial law coordinaton committe meeting he promised the commanders to provide “further 
authority if necessary, newer and better weapons if necessary, money if necessary, new cadres 
if necessary.”'* He argued they should extinguish the fire, because the martial law is the last 
device that the state had.*^
But in politics good-will alone does not guarantee success. The JP government was 
not strong enough to take concerted measures to deal with terrorism. In die meeting, the 
martial law commanders came up with a detailed package, which was basically same as that 
presented to the RPP government. One part of this package involved the enactment of some 
laws and changes in others. Chief among these were; the enactment of law of extraordinary 
ordinances, the establishment of “judicial police” (adli kolluk), changes in both criminal and 
criminal procedure laws that would increase authority of security forces, changes in Turkish 
Criminal Law (TCL) that would make punishment*  ^ harsher, the enlargement of the security
’ Hürriyet, December 16. 1979. “Bu da Demirel Marka Laf Üretimi” [This is Another Empty 
Utterance of Demirel’s]
Süleyman Demirel, Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi [Verbatim Report of the TGNA Debates] 
Birleşim 7, Ошішп, 3, 22.11. 1979.
" Cited in Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren'in Anıları [The Memoirs of Kenan Evren] (Istanbul; 
MiUiyet, 1990), 300.
Ibid., 300.
They wanted, for instance, that the punishment for the propaganda of ethnic separatism (article 
142 of TCL) should be made more severe.
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forces’ right to use weapons, changes in martial law that would enable martial law courts to 
look at those cases related to illegal sale of weapons and the like.
The other package was related to administrative measures that would ensure prompt, 
eflBcient and impartial functioning of the state machine. These included; the strengthening of 
police forces in terms of quantity and quality through better education, the use of new tools and 
better wages as well as ending the prevalent partisanship, the betterment in intelligence 
gathering and evidence evaluation services, and the better protection of prisons.
6.1. THE WARNING LETTER
The fulfilment of these measurements, many (including the high ranking oflBcials in the 
military) believed, was beyond the reach of the minority government of the JP. The enactment 
of new laws or changes in existing laws required the full compliance of the NAP and the NSP, 
while the RPP was likely to block them. Understandably, the ending of politicization and 
partisanship was all the more difficult. In the first place it was diflBcult for Demirel to take such 
a line, even if he wanted to. Since patronage-oriented Turkish political parties’ well-being 
depended heavily on support they provided to their clients. A problem with a deep roots in 
social-political structure of the country, this could hardly be changed in the short-term. Besides 
the NAP and the NSP would oppose (especially when it affected their clientele) such move. 
The betterment of security forces required not only a good will but also financial means which 
the government could hardly afford as the economy was also in tatters. Thus, the vicious circle 
of politicization and partisanship continued unabated. The first serious action of the P  
government was to change 67 of the 67 province governors followed by the change of 52 chief 
of police (emniyet müdürü) .
Believing that the P  government could hardly cope with the pressing problems, the 
military high command decided to do something. This was not only because that they saw 
themselves as the ultimate guardian of state, but also because Evren was seriously worried
For that package, see, Evren, Anılar. 301-306.
15 Hürriyet, December 4,1979.
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about junior oflBcers executing a 27 May like intervention, as noted above. The working group
that Kenan Evren established to assess whether an intervention might be necessary or not
presented its report, according to Evren, before Ecevit’s resignation.** This supported the view
that, with the RPP’s government’s failure, the military’s belief in the civilian regime’s ability to
deal with pressing problems had been much weakened. Demirel’s decision to go alone only
reinforced their that belief, as they come to such a conclusion without bothering to see how
the minority JP government would perform in government.
According to Evren, the report stated that unless the military tookover the reins of
government and abolished the assembly, anarchy and separatism could not be prevented and
the country would drift into civil war with a resultant division of the country. *’ It also warned
that the more such a state of affairs continued, the more the armed forces were likely to drift
into civil war and faced the risk of being divided. The peculiar preferences of the high
command, however, affected to a significant degree what course of action the military would
pursue. It was noted above that General Evren was determined that the military would not
move unless knife cut through the bones. He then preferred to wait. He told me that these
reports were prepared by somewhat young oflBcers who were much more “reckless” than
senior ones implying that he did not take these reports at face value. He also added that;
only those, who happen to have been in a position to decide whether to stage a takeover or not, are 
likely to know how difficult such a decision is to take. It is not an easy thing. You take all 
lesponsibihty of the state with its economy, foreign poUcy, internal and e.\lemal security, all of it. And 
it is not in our area of competence. Therefore we have resisted not to take over for a long time.'*
Evren does not give an exact date. Given that he claimed to have ordered the establishment of 
such group in 11 September 1979, it seems that this report was prepared fairly quickly, in less than one 
month. In our interview, Evren told me that he can not remember the exact date.
n Evren, Anılar.296.
18 1' Kenan Evren, Interview by Author. Marmaris, March 31, 1998. (henceforth interview). In fact, 
even those who did not like some of Evren’s post-intervention policies accepted that he had never been 
one of these ambitious officers who craved for a military intervention. Turgut Sunalp, the leader of the 
Nationalist Democracy Party which (while seemed to be favored by the military) lost the 1983 elections, 
and blamed the military high command led by Evren afterwards for not giving enough support for his 
party, argued that “Evren was not a Pinochet.” According to Sunalp, Evren had never shown any great 
interest in politics during the turbulent years in which many of his colleagues were involved in a variety of 
plots. Sunalp continued that Evren has led the 12 September intervention, because he had to as there was 
no way out for the country. See, Milliyet, August 17, 1989. Similarly, retired officer Osman Kdksal, who 
was a member of the National Unity Corrunittee established after the 1960 intervention, was reported to
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He wanted that the necessity (and therefore legitimacy) of the intervention should have 
been accepted by as wide spectrum of society as possible. Evren appears to have been seriously 
concerned that the army in his command should not commit what seemed to him past mistakes. 
He had witnessed how the legitimacy of the 27 May intervention has been questioned by 
political parties. And how the subsequent portrayal of 27 May intervention as solely against the 
DP created divisions in the country. Similarly, he had learned from 12 March experience that, if 
the decision to intervene is taken, the military should be clear in its aims and prepare a detailed 
program of how to execute it and it should not trust major political parties to work out that 
program.’’
Therefore to be able to say that they had tried everything possible the military high 
command decided to issue a letter to warn all political parties and constitutional institutions. 
That this was so clear can be gathered from Evren’s memoirs. There, Evren stated that after 
the preparation of the letter he had told other commanders in the high command that; “I am not 
of the opinion that this letter would secure any tangible progress. As you will see nothing will 
change. Nevertheless, we should perform our duty so that history will not criticize us.” ’^ 
According to Evren animosities between political parties in the assembly had reached such 
horrific proportions that they Just could not expect them to unite with that letter. Evren 
nevertheless, did not forget to add “I was not totally hopeless. I could think that out of the fear 
of intervention they might unite.”
The letter was given to President Fahri Korutiirk. How it would be presented to the 
public was left to Korutiiik’s discretion. Evren did not want the letter to be read on state radio
said that (in 1978 when Evren became the chief of general staff) Evren did have neither a political 
ambition nor favored military intervention in politics. Cited in Uğur Mumcu, İnkılap Mektupları fThe 
‘inkılap’ Letters] fifteenth ed. (İstanbul; Tekin, 1995), 157.
’’ According to rumours, some officers in the high command were not as patient as Evren and 
wanted quick action. We do not have any evidence to sustain that claim. Even if that is the case, Evren 
appears to have convinced them. And in the final analysis the military high command as a whole appears 
to have shared Evren’s this belief
20 Evren, Anılar. 330. He reiterated same view in our interview. 
Ibid., 333.
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and television, a practice followed in the 12 March intervention. President Korutiiric decided to 
not make the letter known before the new year. According to Evren’s account, Koruttiik did 
not want to spoil new year celebrations both at home and abroad.^ The letter, t\iiich was made 
public on January 2, stated that;
our nation can no longer tolerate those abusers of freedoms provided by the Constitution who 
sing the communist international instead of our national anthem, those who try to establish every 
kind of fascism in our country instead of democratic system and those instigators of Islamic law, 
anarchy and desctructionism and secessionism.
It added that;
The employment in the statecraft of those who act according to the political views if their 
respective parties in power that hire them will inevitably divide the civil servants and citizens. 
This division created by political parties causes the formation and strengthening of domestic 
sources that support anarchy and secessionism and discrimination among the police, teachers and 
many other establishments as opposing camps which are each others’ enemies.
Therefore, it continued;
The Turkish armed forces have decided to warn those political parties which could not introduce 
solutions to the political, economic and social problems of out anarchy and separatism that have 
grown to dimensions threatening the integrity of the country. They have given Æoncessiotrs to the 
secessionist and subversive groups and continued their intransigent attitude as a result of 
unfruitful political bickerings.
After noting that commissions in the assembly had been formed 1,5 months after the 
elections and still there was no consensus on the agenda for the discussion of urgent problems 
in the assembly, letter concluded;
In the face of today's vital problems in our country, the Turkish Armed Forces, fully conscious of 
its duties and responsibilities ensured by the Internal Service Code, hereby persistently demand 
all our political parties' to unite in the direction of the principles of the Constitution and 
Kemalism by taking into consideration and giving priority to our national interests, in order to 
take every measure against all sorts of movements such as anarchy, terrorism and secessionism 
aiming at the destruaion of the state, and all other constitutional institutions extend efforts and 
assistance to this end."
The letter was as clear as it could be. It stated the army’s uneasiness regarding the
^  Ibid., 334. According to Evren, Komtürk had told him that if they had had the letter read on 
the radio, he would have resigned. Ibid., 333.
^  For the full text. General Secretariat of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi) 
(a botfy formed after the intervention and distinct from the National Security Conunittee ‘Milli Güvenlik 
Kurulu’ as functioned under democratic system) 12 September-Before and After{Axisaa: Ongun, 1982), 
160-161.
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terrorist and separatist events (those who aimed at the establishment of fascist or communist 
states) and the fact that the state could not punish those abusers of freedoms. It complained 
about reigning politicization of state institutions. It also complained about the fiict that “parties 
have given concessions” to secessionist and subversive groups and continued their “intransigent 
attitude as a result of unfruitfiil political bickering.” It warned all political parties and other 
constitutional bodies to unite in the free of pressing problems and reminded all the sides 
concerned that the Turkish armed forces were “fiilly conscious of its duties and responsibilities 
ensured by internal service code” a code that in the past used by the military to secure “legality” 
for its interventions.
President Korütürk called two party leaders to Çankaya and presented the letter to 
them there. The leaders’ response to the letter was a gross dis^pointment for the public 
opinion and other elites but not the military. As Evren expected, nothing came out of h. The 
RPP leader Bülent Ecevit, totally ignoring the gravity of situation, did try to get a political 
benefit for his own party. He argued that:
...the RPP has never, whether in power or in opposition, received a warning of such magnitude (from
the armed forces). But this government came to receive such a warning after only its 51st day in power.
This shows the difference between us and them.^ “*
Ecevit, then reiterated his calls for a dialogue (that he remembered only when his party 
was in opoosition) between the two major parties. The JP leaders’ reaction was more balanced. 
Demirel argued that they had not built this fire, and they were taking pains to extinguish it. 
Therefore, he continued, “I can understand it if the existing government were the cause of 
current events or such an allegation were leveled at us. But it is not possible to interpret it like 
that.”^^  As they had done what could be done in 35 days. Demirel chosen to behave as if his 
party had not governed since 1973 and as if its power to affect the course of events when in 
opposition was totally insignificant.
According to Evren’s account Demirel sent defence minister Ahmet Birincioğlu to 
General Evren and let him know that he was seriously considering resignation. Evren explained
Milliyet, January 3, 1980.
25 Milliyet, January 3, 1980.
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(to Birincio^u) that this letter was not a warning issued to government but to all political 
parties and constitutional bodies. He assured him that the situation then did not necessitate 
resignation,^  ^ and it might even help them if it could move the opposition to support the 
government in the assembly. Evren, then, visited Demirel and reiterated the view that the letter 
was directed, not at the governing party, but at all political parties and constitutional bodies. In 
interview, Evren said that he had told Demirel that “the letter was a warning to all parties. We 
know that you are not directly responsible for this state of afiairs because you assumed power 
just a month ago and this letter even might help you in the assembly if it affects the opposition 
to take more constructive stance.” ’^ After that meeting Demirel told the Justice Party group 
that “he had been assured (in his meetings with president and the chief of general staff) that the 
letter was not directed to government.”“  In 7 and 9 January Demirel again came together with 
commanders. There, according to Evren’s account, commanders complained of partisanship 
and increasing terrorism and urged Demirel to seek co-operation with the RPP. But while 
Demirel agreed with commanders regarding the gravity of the situation and what sort of 
measures should be taken to prevent them, he did not say a word on cooperation with the
29RPP.
From this point on, the letter was left to sink into oblivion. The RPP leader Ecevit 
continued his calls for a dialogue while, Demirel resisted such demands, though he met Ecevit a 
couple of days later with no tangible agreement. Regarding the letter, Demirel seems to have to 
assumed that since his party was trying to do what the commanders asked for, the burden was 
on the shoulders of the opposition to support the bills in the assembly. Therefore, he pretended
26
27
Evren, Anılar. 341.
Interview.
28 M illiyet, January 5, 1980.
® After the meeting Evren noted (in his memoirs) that “What Demirel says is very good. He 
agrees to nearly all of our proposals. But he did not say anything on the JP-RPP co-operation, despite the 
fact that Ecevit has several times offered such cooperation. I think that this state of affairs can not go long. 
Because, what we want can not be fulfilled with outside support of the NAP and the NSP.” Evren, Anılar. 
345.
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to behave as if his party was somewhat relieved of the burden of the letter.^ ® According to an 
argument, President Korutiirk had “played down the chances of a coup, thus giving the 
premier the firm impression that there was no such danger.” *^ Though we do not know 
what really happened betwen these two, this appears to be an exaggeration. Instead, it is 
more to the point to argue that Demirel preferred to give such an impression so as to 
justify his own policy line which was based on the refusal of any dialogue with the RPP 
and continuation of his minority govemment.^^ Not only because the wording of the letter 
indicated “all political parties” but also the commanders made it clear that, if he tried to go 
alone without ensuring the support of the RPP, his government might not be successfid. What 
the country needed was more than a handful of laws to combat the anarchy and terrorism, but 
all-out effort to cope with grave situation, one that many, including the military believed that it 
could hardly be achieved with a minority government. As Oktay Ekşi of Hürriyet perceptively 
noted, the country was governed by two major parties since 1973 therefore they could not 
relieve themselves of the responsibility by arguing that they had been in government for 
only a month (in the case of the JP) and /or they are not in power (in the case of the RPP). 
Ekşi, then, argued that “ ...nobody should deceive himself It is you that the letter is 
adressed to. You, political leaders and members and administrators of the constitutional 
bodies.”^^  No to avail, party elites ignored all these arguments behaved as if they had been
“  Nazlı Ilıcak, too, wrote that “this warning rather directed to opposition.” Nazh Ilıcak, 
Tercüman, January 3, 1980. “Mini-Muhtira” [Mini- Warning]. Even in 1990, Demirel could write that he 
had believed that the lener reflected uneasiness of the military for the failure of the martial law and “that 
there was nothing in the letter that had been directed to themselves.” Süleyman Demirel, Am Değil İtiraf 
[Confessions, not Memoirs] (Ankara; Ayyildiz, 1990), 49.
235.
William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London and New York; Routledge, 1994),
32 1He was reported to have said to Arcayürek that “it is the feeling of feintness (on the part of the 
high command) with the martial law that did not bring success despite more than one year, that prepared 
the way for the letter.” Cüneyt Arcayürek, Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor- 9, 12 Eylül’e Doğru Koşar Adım 
[Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains-9, Rushing Towards 12 September Kİstanbul; Bilgi, 1986), 363.
33 Hürriyet, January 4, 1980 “Muhatap” [To Whom the Letter is Adresssed to]. In the same line, 
örsan Öymen, too, criticized party leaders for trying to avoid the burden of the letter. ()rsan öymen, 
“Tasada Ortaklık” [Partnership Concerning Troubles], Milliyet, January 4, 1980.
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relieved of the burden of the letter
Thus, the letter was left without an effect. As amiable politician Disan Sabri ^aglayangjl 
was reported to have said “both those who gave and received the letter were happy, only 
worried ones were those who read the letter!”^^  Only couple of weeks later, politics in Turkey 
was being conducted same as before, as if the military had not warned them by reminding that 
they “are fiilly conscious of its duties and responsibilities ensured by the internal service 
code.”^^  Post-letter developments reinforced the militaiy’s belief that the civilian governments 
was unable to provide solutions. It may be speculated that since the commanders did not 
expect much from the letter they did not push too much in making it to have an effect. Indeed it 
was issued, as Evren honestiy indicated, to enable them (in the case of intervention) to say that 
they did everything possible. It was also the case, as indicated above, that Evren personally 
assured Demirel (who was inclined to interpret the letter as warning to opposition) the situation 
did not require fesignation as the letter was not directed to the JP alone. While this argument 
involved some elements of truth, it should also be considered that the commanders can not be 
expected to openly say that ‘if you are not going the way we showed we are going to 
intervene.’ That would have been another 12 March-Uke intervention that the high command 
did their best to avoid.
What was called the package of measures, prepared by the JP government was brought
This opportunism of political party leaders appears to have been well-noticed by the military. 
In a book prepared by General Secretariat of National Security Council this is stated as follows; “One of 
the parties made an effort to pass a "package of measures’, most of which was prepared by the former 
government, through the asseemblies under the pretext of the letter. The other one meanwhile, was taking 
advantage of the letter as an opportunity to become a coalition partner in order to regain the prestige it 
had lost in the elections, without expressing its views on the whole of this legislation.” General 
Secretariat, 12 September. 164.
35 Cited in Arcayürek, 12 Eylal.356.
36 Journalists seemed to possess a more realistic understanding of the situation. Çetin Emeç of 
Hürriyet, for instance, argued that that they should leave aside the question of whom the letter was 
adressed to since everybody had a share of responsibility in the making of such a state of affairs. Implying 
that, if this continued, the army would not stay silent, he finished his writing reminding everybody that 
postman knocked twice. Hürriyet, January 7, 1980 “Postacı Kapıyı İki Defa Çalar” [The Postman Knocks 
Twice]. On the other hand, Yanki’s editorial wrote that “there is not even a little inclination among the 
commanders today towards intervention.” Yankı, 21-27 January, 1980, “Ecevit ve Demirel Sik Sik 
Görüşmeli” [Ecevit and Demirel should Frequently Come Together].
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into assembly in post-letter dialogue atmosphere. The package of measures included the 
enactment of new laws and changes in the existing bills favoured by the military. In the inital 
stage none of the political actors dared to be seen as uncomprimising. In the process of their 
being enacted, the persisting habits of Turidsh political life, once again, showed themselves. 
The RPP opted for a strategy that, while giving an appearance of supporting it, actually 
hindered its actual enactment. This the party had done through introducing in the legislative 
process new motions aiming at insertion or deletion of articles, usually of minor importance. 
True to tradition, the RPP leadership assumed that whatever was deemed to benefit the 
government was to be interrupted by any means, even if had they introduced the same 
motion.^’ Like what the JP had done in opposition, they did everything at their disposal to 
prevent government fi'om passing these laws.^ * The RPP leaders did not seem to understand 
the fact that “it was not only the the bough that the JP sits on that was on the brink of collapse 
but also a tree named democracy. If that happens, the RPP, too, would not remain on its 
foot.”^^  This stance on the part of the RPP impeded already very slow legislative process.^
One of the reasons for Ecevit’s opposition to package of measures appears to have derived from 
his less than realistic views on the prevention of terrorism that, it seemed, continued despite his 22 
months of premiership. In a seminar organized by Journalists Associations (Gazeteciler Cemiyeti) to 
discuss terrorism in Turkey. Ecevit, who was at least expected to make some positive remarks on the hotly 
debated package of measures in the assembly, did not even mention it. He said that the “in coping with 
terrorism, alongside the social and/or state measures, (sosyal ve devlet önlemleri) priority should be given 
to solving it in people's minds, and souls.” He then criticized Turkish novelists and artists for not 
dwelling on the theme of terrorism. He urged them to produce novels, plays that “would easily be 
understood by those who resorted to terrorism, who became an instrument of it, and that would allow 
them to see themselves.” “Alongside this function of demonstration, it should”, he continued, “also try to 
erase the sources and causes of terrorism in their mind and soul.” Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, Türkiye'de 
Terör-Abdi İpekçi Semineri [Terror in Turkey- The Abdi İpekçi Seminar] (İstanbul; Gazeteciler Cemiyeti 
Yayınlan, 1980), 30, 32.
“  To be fair to the assembly, some parts of the package of measures was accepted. See, Resmi 
Gazete [Official Gazette], “Kamu Güveıüiğine ve Kolluk Hizmetlerine İlişkin Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik 
Yapılması ve Bunlara Yeni Hükümler Eklenmesi Hakkında Kanun” [A Law Regarding the Changes and 
Additions of New Provisions to the Laws Related to Public Security and Security Services] n. 16909, 
(Ankara: Prime Ministiy, Fdiniary 23, 1980). But the parties could not agree on such vital parts of the 
passage as the establishment of State Security (Courts and the changes in the Martial Law.
Tercüman, Fdiniary 10, 1980, Güneri Civaoğlu, “Sıkılmaktan da Sıkıldık” [We are Bored with 
Being Bored]
^  Unfortunately, we do not have an academic study on the functioning of the lower assembly. 
For an acute observations of insider. Turan Güneş, Araba Devrilmeden önce [Before the Car is
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The NSP, on the other hand, went far more than the RPP in ingenuity. The NSP had provided 
its support for the Demirel government. But they have made it clear that it was a provisional 
support. Erbakan was quite determined to walk a tightrope road. He exploited Demirel’s 
reliance on him, while flirting with Ecevit that they could form a government together. He 
fi'equently argued that “kadayifin alt lozarmadi” (Kadayıf -a Turkish sweet- is not yet ready for 
service) meaning that they are not yet going to withdraw their support fi'om the government. 
He, therefore, provided to be another hindrance. It was not the opposition alone, however, that 
blocked legislative process. Even some members of the JP failed to turn to the assembly in the 
crucial meetings.“*'
While package of measures were being debated in the assembly, the JP government 
was taking pains to right the economy as well. The inability of the RPP government on the 
stabilization package made the implementation of painful measures, (demanded by the 
international economic organisations) all the more urgent. The overall economic situation 
continued to deteriorate. Alongside the accelarating rate of inflation, ‘Toreign exchange 
reserves were non-existent and the government was heavily in arrears on foreign dd)t.’ 
While, as table showed, industrial unrest mounted followed by factory shutdowns as a result of 
the difficulties in importing.
Table 12. Number of Strikes and Workdays Lost, 1975-1980
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Number of strikes 90 105 167 175 190 227
Nuntof workers in 
strike
25389 32899 59889 27208 39901 46216
Workdays lost in 
strikes
1102682 1768202 5778205 1598905 2217347 5408618
Overturned] (Istanbul: Kaynak, 1983), 31-35
Nazlı Ilıcak, for instance, wrote that “Gentlemens, cancel your appointment with the tailor or 
dentists leave aside afternoon sleep and personal business so that you could say that the draft bill is being 
hindered by the RPP and the NSP.” Tercüman, January 17, 1980, “Tasarıyı Kim Engelledi T  [Who 
Prevented Draft Bills Being Legislated ?]
Krueger and Turan, “Turkish,” 351.
T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1983 [Statistical 
Yearbookof Turkey, 1983]. (Ankara: DİE, 1983), 208.
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What was known as the 24 Januaiy measures was taken by the government in that dire 
situation. These measures were not discussed in cabinet so as to prevent lobbying by the 
powerful special interests. Even cabinet ministers have became aware of the program only 
on January 24 . The real architect of the measures was Turgut Ozal (an undersecretary of 
the State Planning Organisation) and his small team. While, the government played down 
the IMF connection, it was clear that Ozal and his team established and maintained 
informal relations with them.'** The immediate objectives of the program were to restore the 
economic growth and to control the spiralling inflation and to overcome balance of payment 
crisis. The program, however, differed from those of 1978- and 1979 stabilization programs in 
that it was a first step of replacing the import substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) with 
an export-oriented one.^ The main objectives of the the new stabilization package were; a 
reduction in government involvement in productive activities and an increased emphasis on 
market forces, and the attraction of foreign investment.“*^ It involved devaluation of the Turkish 
lira vis-à-vis the US dollar by 33 per cent with the announcement that afterwards flexible 
exchange rate policy would be followed so as to maintain attractiveness of exports. Several 
subsidies on fertilisers and petroluem products were reduced followed by the removal of price 
controls on most state economic enterprise’s (SEE) products. While the import regime was 
liberalized to a considerable extent, the government introduced new incentives for the 
exporters. Moreover, it also made institutional changes within the economic bureaucracy. In 
retrospect, it can be said that it was courageous attempt to put the economy on track. The fact
44 Krueger and Turan, “Turkish,” 354.
Colin Kirkpatrick and Ziya ôniç, “Turkey,” in Aid and Power & The World Bank Policy Based 
Lending, vol 2, ed. Peter Mosley, John Horrigan and Jack Toye (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1991), 
13.
46 Krueger and Turan, “Turkish,” 356. Indeed, the JP election manifesto for 1973 election 
promised that ISI, which was taken as dominant critera in the third five year development plan, would be 
replaced by a new export oriented one. Adalet Partisi, AP Seçim Beyannamesi-1973 [ The JP Election 
Manifesto- 1973] (Ankara, 1973), 40.
OECD, Economic Surveys: Turkey (Paris: OECD, 1980), 24.
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that the minority JP government dared to take such unpopular measures can be interpreted as 
the proof that its decision-making ability was not that low/** But it should not be forgotten that 
Demirel attempted to take these measures only when he became convinced that there remained 
absolutely no way out other than taking the painiiil pill.
The RPP leader Bülent Ecevit harshly reacted these measures. As a social democrat 
who believed the intrinsic superiority of the visible hand of the state over the invisible hand of 
market, he criticized the program for increasing Turkey’s dependence to international coital, 
opening up country’s resources to foreign exploitation, economic anarchy and chaos and 
limiting social welfare rights of the majority of the population. According to Ecevit, “(with 
these measures) the government was trying to implement a Latin American model.”^^  He 
believed that under a democratic system these measures did not have a realistic chance of being 
implemented, and suspected that an authoritarian regime, to better implement the measures, 
might follow. He, then, called workers to rise up against the implementation of these measures. 
Thus, 24 January measures ended what remained of the post-letter dialogue atmosphere in the 
assembly.
Meanwhile, the terrorism continued to increase. On the one hand, it targeted well- 
known figures. In 19 November 1979, the NAP sympathizer journalist Ilhan Darendelioğlu was 
killed. The next day, Istanbul University Professor Ümit Yaşar Doğanay was killed. In 7 
December another Professor (Cavit Orhan Tütengil) at Istanbul University was killed. On the 
other hand, violence in the streets and universities continued and spread into factories in which 
various factions competed for control. Moreover, in the fece of striking absence of state 
authority, the number of “liberated zones” (an area exclusively controlled by one faction) 
increased considerably. Even moderates and impartial citizens had to bow and accept the
“Demirel Shakes the Ground” was the The Economist’s reaction. The Economist, Fdjruaiy 2, 
1980. “Demirel Shakes the Ground.”
Milliyet, January 30, 1980. He also said that “Grey-wolves control the streets while the 
economy is also controlled by wolves” (Sokaklar bozkurtlara, ekonomi kurtlara birakibyor.) See, the 
collection his speechess concerned largely with economic situation after 24 January measures, Bülent 
Ecevit, Sömürü Düzeninde Yeni Aşama [A New Stage in the Order of Exploitation] (Ankara; İleri, 1980), 
121.
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authority of one side, simply because they faced the staric choice of being killed or removed 
from the area in question.
The fact that the martial law in many provinces did not seem to be effective to cope 
with terrorism, led many^° to argue that the military, preparing for a total takeover, did not 
wholeheartedly and vigorously embarked on the struggle against terrorism. To 
substantiate the point, they had argued that after the intervention the number of those who 
were killed as a result of terrorism and number of terrorist attacks had sharply declined as 
if cut by a knife. The then prime minister Süleyman Demirel particularly reacted that 
“blood shed on 11 September was stopped in 13 September.”** According to Demirel, 
while he was at pains to beat terrorism without sacrificing democracy, the high command 
had already decided that it was not possible and was trying to justify (and plan) the 
takeover.*^ In other words, Demirel claimed, there was a double talk on the part of the 
military. They asked assembly for more power, which they did not really need it.** They 
asked for this, Demirel implied, because they knew that the assembly would never be able 
to deliver it and then the military would use this inability of the assembly to justify the 
intervention.
On the basis of available evidence, these claims can not stand up to close scrutiny. 
In the first place, the number of those who lost their lives in terrorist attacks did not 
decline as sharply as it was claimed. It was reported that from 12 September 1980 to 11 
February 1982, 330 people, including 66 security forces lost their lives in terrorist 
events.*“* Demirel himself accepted that (in an interview in 1986) from 12 September
^  The then prime minister Süleyman Demirel has been the chief propagator of this idea. 
Journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek implied the same. Similarly, Nur Bilge Criss, argued that Demirel’s 
contention “...seems reasonable in that terror stopped immediately after the September 12 1980.” Nur 
Bilge Criss, “Mercenaries of Ideology; Turkey’s Terrorism War,” in Terrorism and Politics, ed. Barry 
Rubin (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1991), 141.
Demirel, v4m. 15.
Ibid., 41-42.
”  Ibid., 94.
^  T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Türkiye'deki Anarşi ve Terörün Gelişmesi, Sonuçları ve
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1980 to 30 December 1985, 972 people had lost their lives in terrorist events.**
Secondly, unless supported by some other measures, martial law itself was not a 
panacea for terrorism. The quantity and quality of the security forces and civilian bureaucracy, 
as well as the prompt operation of the judiciary was as much important. A close co-operation 
between the military and all branches of the bureaucracy (police and other civilian bodies) 
would have been necessary.*® Indeed, in Fdjruaiy 1980, Demirel, as a prime minister, has 
issued a circular (genelge), which warned civilian bureaucrats not to expect everything from 
martial law authorities and urged them to help the soldiers.*’ The general climate in the 
country, too, just as important; if the citizens believe that the political authority as a whole is 
bent on overcoming anarchy and has the potential strength to do so, they are likely to help the 
state rather thaA simply wait in vain or to give up in the face of terrorists’ demands. This is even 
valid for deeply divided civilian security forces. Citizens and security forces were not likely to 
hold such beliefs, on the other hand, when political elites continued to tear each other apart, 
engaged in political bickerings and unrestrained partisanship.
Thirdly, martial law does not mean that the state forces have a free hand in dealing with 
terrorism. Martial law is a constitutional device, it does not mean the total removal of all 
constraints on state power that limits it to protect individual rights.
If the military managed to fight effectively with terrorism only after the intervention, it 
was because, that they reshuffled security forces and civilian bureaucracy as they saw fit, that 
they made necessary changes in several laws (deemed to be necessary to deal with terrorism, 
which the TGNA have failed to deliver) in a minute as the ruling National Security Council
Güvenlik Kuvvetleri İle önlenmesi [The Develc^ Jinent, Consequences and Prevenlion by the Security Forces, 
of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey KAnkara, 1983), 210.
55 An interview with Cüneyt Arcayürek in 1986. Cited in Cüneyt Arcayürek, Demokrasi.450.
^  Kemal H. Karpat, “Military interventions; Army-Civilian Relaitions in Turkey Before and 
After 1980,” in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet
Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 150. 
Milliyet, February 16,1980.
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took over legislative and executive powers,^ * that they dealt with terrorists without being 
constrained by any legal hindrances as they would under democracy even with martial law,^ ’ 
and that the public at large trusted (and therefore helped) them as they were able to generate 
the belief that they would handle the problem of terrorism.®’ Finally, they freed themselves 
from the so-called Mustafa Muglah complex.*' Knowing that they would not be tried for their 
acts during the military interregnum they showed scant respect for individual rights, a 
protection that no civilian regime could provide.
Therefore, the claim that the military did not properly deal with terrorism so as to 
justify (or prepare a conducive ground for) takeover seems to be an exaggeration.*^ What can 
be said, at most, is that the high commanders, who concluded that the struggle against 
terrorism could not successfiiUy be waged under a democratic regime and who were planning
** See, T.C. Başbakanlık, Milli Güvenlik Konseyince Kabul Edilen Kanunlar, Yayınlanan Bildiri 
ve Kararlar ile 'önemli Mezuat [Laws, Declarations, Decisions and other Regulations that Had Been 
Adopted and Issued by the National Security Council] (Ankara: Başbakanlık, 1981).
”  Indeed, this point was expressed by General Evren (prior to intervention) i.e that they could 
beat terrorism through special measures but it would also harm democratic procedures. He had argued that 
''they just did not want to shed blood” and added that “if we risked that we can prevent the terrorism.” 
Milliyet, Fdiniary 15, 1980. After the intervention, the high command did that and suppressed (for the 
time being) the terrorism as it promised.
See, for an insightful observations on why the martial law in itself was not enough to combat 
terrorism under democracy, by martial law commander, Nevzat Bölügiray, Sokaktaki Asker -Bir 
Sıkıyönetim Komutanının 12 Eylül öncesi Anıları [A Soldier in Streets: Memoirs of a Martial Law 
Commander Before 12 September], second ed. (Milliyet: Istanbul, 1989), 643-650.
(jeneral Mustafa Muğlalı was sentenced to life (in the DP period) in prison as he was held 
responsible for the killing of 33 people in özsip  county of Van province. In feet, (îeneral Necdet Urüğ, 
who was a martial law commander of Istanbul, was reported to have argued (in martial law coordination 
committee meeting held on December 4, 1979) that “security forces were hesitant to fire (to use weapons) 
as they feared that they could be held responsible for undue firing.” Cited in Arcayiirek, 12 Eylül. 215.
In our interview. Evren seemed to be deeply distressed by these charges and always 
emphasized that these allegations were grossly unfair. He asked that whether any sensible person could 
think of a chief of general staff who tells martial law commanders that they should not do their job 
properly so as to justify the high commands plaimed takeover. If any such implication had taken place, he 
added, it would, sooner or later, have come to the attention of the public. Interview. In fact, according to 
one martial law commander, “our commanders never in any way implied that we should ignore our duties 
so as to prepare a conducive ground for military takeover.” Nevzat Bölügiray, Sokaktaki Askerin Dönüşü 
(12 Eylül Yönetimi Dönemi) [The Return of a Soldier in Street (12 September Administration 
Period)KAnkara: Tekin, 1991), 15. Bölügiray has criticized the post-intervention military regime “for 
tending towards the right.” Ibid., 54.
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the timing of the takeover, were likely to be less than imaginative and enterprising in 
performing their usual duties. This is not, however, same as to say that they consciously 
ignored their duties, let alone prepared the ground for takeover. If the military is to be 
criticized, it is more ^propriate to criticize it for arriving too easily to the conclusion that the 
struggle against terrorism can not be waged under the civilian rule rather than for preparing the 
ground for takeover.
6.2. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Increasing terrorism and continuing economic crisis were soon to be complicated by 
yet another political crisis. That was the election of a president. The reigning president Fahri 
Korutiiik’s term was to expire on April 8,1980. Political parties did not pay sufBdent attention 
to the fact that when on 22 March 1980 the assembly met to elect a president, it had to 
postpone the meeting because there were no candidates. It was true that parties were 
prohibited from officially nominating candidates for the presidency by article 95 of the 
constitution. This was result of a consideration that a president should be the president of 
all parties, not the one party alone. But in effect, of course, parties supported or opposed 
of candidacy of aspirants. What we mean here, therefore, is that main parties procrastined 
the whole event as if the country could afford yet another crisis.
Though mathematically possible, the distribution of the seats in the both lower 
assembly and senate required that unless two major parties agreed on a candidate, a president 
would not be eleaed. The article 95 of the 1961 Constitution stated that in the first two ballots 
a two thirds m^ority of the assembly (both senate and lower assembly) was required, if that 
was not secured an absolute majority would suffice. The total amount of seats was 634. 
Therefore at least 318 vote was required. The number of RPP seats in both assemblies were 
267, for the JP it was 263, >\diile NSP and NAP 29 and 18 respectively. Though in the senate 
National Unity Group and Qutoa senators had 18 and 14 seats respectively, and independents 
in the lower assembly amounted to 14 seats. That meant the RPP needed at least 51 extra votes
63According to martial law commander
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while the JP needed 55. And this was required if all the RPP and JP deputies voted for their 
parties’ candidates, which was by no means a foregone conclusion since there were many 
factions (which was bent on preventing other factions’s candidates being elected) within the 
parties.
The JP appears to have adopted a two-tiered strategy. In the first place Demirel wanted 
to make sure that the president would not be an RPP men. He preferred a wait-and-see attitude 
and did not drop any hints that he favoured any of the possible candidates within the JP. 
Sadettin Bilgiç of former Demokratik Party Ihsan Sabri Çaglayangil and General Faik Türün 
were being mentioned as possible candidates.
Secondly, he appears to have wanted to delay presidential elections -by preventing an 
RPP candidate fi’om being elected and by not giving support to any JP candidate- with his 
uncompromising attitude, because, he wanted presidents to be elected by general vote or if he 
could not do it, he wanted to take the country to eariy elections.*  ^Demirel had A\diat Toker 
called “negative power.” He was able to block every solution that he opposed but was also 
unable to push for his own solutions.** When the RPP candidate -General Muhsin Batur came 
close to securing necessary majority, he threw in his weight and prevented him fi’om being 
elected. He also did not support General Faik Türün fevoured by some JP MP’s. The feet that 
Disan Sabri Çağlayangil, as senate chairperson, became an acting president (which legally bears 
same responsibility and authority as presidents have) made Demirel content with what was at 
stake, since, his party men was an acting president. When Çağlayangil began his work as 
acting president Demirel said that the fact that “president could not be elected did not 
create any void in the state structure.”**
As it was perceptively noted by Metin Toker of Hürriyet, “Kara Mizah ve Bazı Gerçekler” 
[Black Humor and Realities] Hürriyet, May 11, 1980. Also, Hikmet özdemir. Cumhurbaşkanlığı 
Seçimlerinde, Ordunun Olağandışı Rolü- Türkiye örneği [The Extra-Ordinary Role That the Army Plays 
in the Presidential Elections-The Turkish Case Kİstanbul: İz, 1994), 346-350.
Hürriyet, May 25,1980. “Allahım Aklımız Sana Emanet!...” [ O God, We Entrust Our Mental 
Health to You!]
66'Hürriyet, April 9, 1980.
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This was what many commentators called “strategy of crisis.” That is, to continue the 
crisis, to exploit already tense situation so as to make your strategy prevail. Demirel was 
reported to have answered to those who urged him to agree with Ecevit on presidential 
elections by saying that “we will have a dialogue, when the time is right.” ’^ This showed his 
determination to insist on this uncompromising attitude so as to make others to accept his own 
particular policy üne. Demirel seemed to assume that, if he continued to muddle through in the 
presidential elections, the RPP would agree either to choose it directly by general vote or to 
hold an early election. It was, on the other hand, certain that Demirel’s proposals would not 
find any support in the assembly, simply because without the RPP’s support the constitutional 
change was not possible. And the RPP leadership was determined to protect the 1961 
constitution. As to the early elections, here, too, parties other than the JP just would not vote 
for it as long as they suspected that the JP would come first.
This strategy of the JP leaders was proven to be highly detrimental for the legitimacy of 
the democratic regime. Not only because it added a new crisis upon already existing ones, but 
because it also reinforced the beUef, already held by miütary and other critical eûtes, that even 
in such a grave situation poUticians do not forsake their own particular poücy üne despite its 
being highly detrimenal to the democratic regime. It was true that poüticians around the worid 
resorted to similar strategies to force their poücies prevail. But Demirel did not seem to 
consider whether the Turkey of 1980’s could afford it long. If the economy was in a healthy 
situation, if terrorism had not been a problem, if the miütary had not warned them to unite in 
the face of these problems just three months ago, and if Demirel had the comfortable m^ority 
in the assembly, this strategy could have easily been justified, as perceptively noted by 
Arcayiirek,** but even that for not long. However, in the Turkey of the early 1980’s none of 
these conditions held. And Demirel carried on pushing this poücy, at the cost of fiirther
67 Reported in Arcayürek, 12 Eylûl.447.
“  Cüneyt Arcayürek, “Bunalım Stratejisinden Beklenenler” [Expectations From Strategy of 
Crisis] Hürriyet, May 8, 1980.
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weakening the leghimacy of the democratic system .^
The RPP leader Ecevit, on the other hand, did not seem to be wholeheartedly 
supporting any of the RPP supported candidates. Many believed that if the RPP leader had 
fiilly supported General Muhsin Batur’s candidacy, he could have been elected.™ He 
continued his calls for dialogue in presidential elections. It was clear that Ecevit ranembered 
the idea of dialogue between the two parties only A^en the power was not in his own grasp. 
While calling for a dialogue, he did not refrain from calling Demirel a fascist.’  ^In 19 May 1980, 
he argued that “Turkey just can not afford Demirel’s destructiveness. If there had been another 
(destructive) person like Demirel, this country would have been ruined.”^  Two days later, he 
asserted that “the government has been seized by the NAP and frsdsm. Turkey is now going 
under the occupation of fascists or Nazi forces.”™ Besides, he also continued to flirt with the 
NSP to bring the government down.
The fact that no one took the election of president seriously in the assembly was one 
of the contributory fectors in its weakaiing legitimacy.™ Despite warnings at various 
quarters,’  ^ party leaders did not endeavour to find viable solutions. In time MP’s began to
Fazla.
See for Oktay Ekşi’s angry critique of Demirel’s strategy. Hürriyet, May 8, 1980. “Bu Kadan 
” [This is Just Too Much...] The Yankı editorial also warned Demirel, “Başbakan Demirerin
Sorumluluğu Büyüktür” [The Responsibility of Premier Demiiel is Great] Yankı, 21-27 Temmuz 1980.
Ecevit is reported to have said that “he very unwillingly had to support Batur’s candidacy, 
which had not been discussed in the party, and had been declared prior to his consent. Cited in Oral 
Çalışlar, Liderler Hapishanesi [Prison of Leaders Xlstanbul; Milliyet, 1989), 135.
’’ In an effort to relate (to use) presidential election to increase his party’s chances to come to 
power, Ecevit also argued that “when a president is elected, the government should resign as president is 
constitutionally entitled to appoint the prime minister.” Yankı, 7-13 April, 1980.
Hürriyet, May 19, 1980.
73 Hürriyet, May 21, 1980.
How the military perceived these events and how its trust in civilians further declined can be 
seen in the post-intervention book; “...everyone observed that the political parties had driven into an 
impasse the election of the highest authority of the State due to calculations of their political interests. 
...In no country of the world has the election of president been turned in to instrument for political 
interests. This situation was a new example clearly demonstrating the impasse of the Turkish parliament”. 
General Secretariat of National Security (Council, 12 September. ISl.
Evren reports that he told the defence minister that “their patience also has its limits.” Evren,
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regard elections as if it were a game. In the ballot-papers for presidency such words was 
reported to have been appeared,“we want a female president,” “Çaya Necmi Efendi,” “Aynur 
Aydan.”’®
Because presidential elections consumed most of the assembly’s working time and 
parties in opposition (assuming that Demirel benefitted from it) did not agree to spare an extra 
day for other bills, the assembly was blocked. Apart from unproductive presidental voting, it 
only discussed interpellations that the RPP opposition put forward against the government. The 
Turkish political system appeared to be deadlocked, offering no solutions to the pressing 
problems of terrorism and economic crisis. The efficacy (capacity to find solutions to problems) 
of the democratic system had been undermined with adverse consequences for its legitimacy. 
The JP leader, who appeared to have hoped to benefit from this deadlock, defended his action 
(in 1986) by saying that “what is important is not that the parliament should be a ‘law 
faaory’ (kanun fabrikası), but that it should be open, that it should be free and that it 
should constitute a forum where the country’s problems can be discussed.””  While this 
contains some elements of truth, Demirel is on shakier ground in ignoring ‘efficiency 
considerations. ’ If the parliament is seen as unable to produce much needed solutions 
(efficacy in Linzian terms) the fact that its being open or debating the country’s problems 
would hardly secure and/or enhance its legitimacy.
In such a grave situation in which terrorism and economic problems continued to 
inaease, political party elites appeared to be unable to find solutions, despite the military’s 
warning that such state of affairs could not continue for long. At this stage, there appeared to 
be several policy options that might have aeated (in the eyes of the critical aaors-the military.
Anılar. 427. Journalist Metin Toker wrote; “One should not make others say that "we can live without a 
president’... Because (once these words are heard) one can easily come to the point that we can do without 
other things, (and) it might even be better. ... Would not it be the case that to tomorrow similar things 
might not be said of parliament T  Hürriyet, May 11, 1980. “Kara Mizah ve Baa Gerçekler” [ Black Humor 
and Realities]
See, an interesting asssesment, Yavuz Donat, “Haysiyet Nasıl Korunur T  [How is Dignity 
Protected ?], Tercüman, April 2, 1980.
’’ Cited in Arcayürek, Demokrasi. 471.
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the press, the businessmen and international actors) a new hope r^arding the democratic 
system’s ability to tackle the pressing problems. Let us try to assess what these apparent 
possibilities were and why were they not pursued.
First, the two major parties could have formed, as demanded by many since 1973 
elections, a grand coalition that would agree on a presidential candidate, that would enact a 
package of measures to deal with terrorism, that would take measures to end partisanship and 
politicization in the bureaucracy, and that would implement stabilization programs. After a 
period of renewal and restoration, it might take the country to elections. This was the least 
likely possibility especially when the animosities between leaership cadres and their difiering 
recipes for the problems were considered. Secondly, without forming a coalition, th ^  could 
agree on presidential candidate, or on reform bills in the assembly, and th ^  could agree on 
changes in the* election laws that would allow the emergence of a strong government by 
reducing the role of the small parties and then go to the elections. Third, without agreeing 
either on a presidential candidate or on reform bills or on an economic stabilization package, 
they could agree on changes in electoral laws and could take the country to the elections. 
Finally, they could take the country to the elections without an agreement on all these issues 
and without a change in electoral laws. None of these apparent possibilities could not be 
pursued by party elites. A complex interaction of culturally grounded beliefs regarding 
coalition, compromise, state, law and democracy, and party elites’ perceptions of each other as 
well as short-term political considerations seemed to have played a role in such outcome.
The JP leader Süleyman Demirel was consistent throughout in his rejection of the idea 
of a grand coalition. His opposition derived as much fi'om the nature of coalitions as from his 
perception of the RPP. He did not believe that a grand coalition was workable since a coalition 
mean time-consuming bargaining and there might be the cases “where you are expected to take 
decisions in half an hour even in ten minutes.” *^ He seemed to be particularly negatively 
efiected by the coalition experiences of the 1961-1965 period in which the JP-RPP coalition 
was formed. He also opposed the coalition of two major parties because in the case of the
78 Ibid., 470.
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feilure of such government, there would not remain any alternative within the democratic 
system.™
His perception of the RPP was another factor. He was reported to have said to 
journalist Abdi İpekçi (in 1975) that “the JP and the RPP represents two distinct theses, and 
there is no possibility of them governing together.”*® Since the early seventies he has made 
clear that the coalition between the two parties was against “the nature of things” that the two 
parties could come together only in the case of war.*' The JP leader spoke as if the JP and 
RPP differed so much from each other that no coming together was possible. True, the 
ideological polarization at the leadership level was significant and based on serious differences 
regarding the causes of the problems and means of dealing with it, despite the feet that neither 
party appealed to one segment of the society at the ©q)ense of others and the social 
background of flie two party MP’s were not greatly differentiated from each other. In 1986 
Demirel was reported to have said “how could we come together with the RPP, to which we 
have blamed for instigating anarchy ? .. .how could we enact law of extraordinary ordinances 
with the RPP ? how could we take the 24 January decisions ?”*^  Demirel had a point in 
arguing such a line, but he is less than justified in presenting the RPP as a party, whose 
ideology was so different, and with which no rational dialogue was possible. He does not, for 
instance, tell us why they could not agree on a presidential candidate or changes in election 
laws that would help major parties or any other solutions that, while being unseen beforehand 
might have e/nergeJ if leaders had maintained a finitfiil dialogue.
This brings us to the related point of his perception of “bargaining” and 
“compromise.” True to the Ottoman-Turkish political tradition, the JP leader tended to see 
them in a pqorative way. In 1975, weekly magazine Yankı asked Demirel whether he was
353.
79 Cited in Tufan Türenç, Erhan Akyildiz, Gazeteci [The Journalist] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1987),
Türenç and Akyildiz, Gazeteci. 353. 
Cumhuriyet, July 29, 1977.
82 Cited in Arcayürek, Demokrasi.AlO.
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thinking of meeting with Ecevit about the problems of the democratic regime. Demirel’s 
answer was telling in many respects:
Of course, we can meet at any time, but democracy is not ‘regime of dissimulation’ (muvazaa lejimi). 
It is not something that are conducted through mutual compromises. If it is done in this w ^, it 
becomes a guided democracy. It is a regime of qjenness in which evertxxfy can s ^  what he thinks. 
Parties come together when great national problems emerge irrespective of other conditions. Did we 
not come together on the Cyprus issue
He seemed to equate compromise with dissimulation (muvazaa). He also implied that 
“mutual compromises” which is the crux of democratic system of governance, meant for him a 
“guided democracy.” Similarly, in an interview with Arcayiirek (in 1986), he argued that 
compromise can not solve everything, and added that “if everything can be solved through 
compromise, there would not be any dispute or conflict.”*^  In a sentence that suggests that he 
meant compromise as one’s giving away what at one’s disposition to rivals for ^peasement, 
Demirel argued that “as a matter of fact, Chamberlain attempted to compromise everything 
with Hitler, but in the end the war broke out despite the fact he had given everything.”
When these views are taken into consideration, the JP leader’s actions could be better 
understood. Holding such beliefs, Demirel did not seek a compromise candidate for the 
presidency. Because he believed that if president were elected, it should either be the candidate 
that they wanted or elections should continue. A compromise candidate, he seemed to think, 
would be a drawback and defeat for his party. By the same token, his attitude on the package 
of measures was similar. He insisted upon his point, while disregarding what the opposition 
was saying. He did not seek to incorporate the demands of the opposition to convince them to 
support the bills in the assembly. As Ecevit, too, complained, Demirel “tend to understand *
83 Yankı, December 29-January 4, 1976. (my italics)
84 Arcayûrek, Demokrasi. 466. He had expressed that view in the aftermath of the 12 March. See, 
Süleyman Demirel, Oniki M art ve Sonrasi-lkinci K itap [12 March and Its Aftermath-The Second Book] 
(Ankara: Ayyildiz, 1972), 14.
** Ibid., 468. This state of affairs, like many things, is not uniqe to Turkey. Richard W. Weather 
noted that in Latin America “ ...compromise as a political craft has little prestige and scant effectiveness. 
Indeed compromise has clearly deragatory overtones. The verb transigir, broadly meaning to “to 
compromise” implies giving in, in a very prejudicial sense.” Richard W. Weatherhead, “Traditions in 
Conflict in Latin America” in Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, ed. Politics o f  Change in Latin 
America (New York: Praeger, 1964), 37.
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»86compromise as the opposition’s full compliance with those bills it brought into assembly;
At the root of this view of compromise lies the assumption that there is only one true 
or correct policy, known only to one of the sides, to be followed in each case. The central 
premise of liberal democracy that the apart from basic principles policies to be followed in each 
case are to be determined by discussions and mutual compromises is an anathema to that 
assumption.* *^ Earlier we noted that Turkish state elites have been sympathetic to similar 
assumptions that there was a one best way and true policy, which emerged through rational 
ddjates and are known only to themselves. Demirel, who had at times wehemently criticized 
them, seemed to have more in common with this group than he was willing to admit.
On the other hand, it would be misleading to attribute Demirel’s uncompromising 
attitude to only his beliefs regarding compromise and bargaining. Demirel’s uncompromising 
stance was reinforced by his distrust of the RPP and Ecevit and his short-term political 
considerations. Years of political bickering, mutually harsh accusations, broken promises, 
personalized nature of conflict had generated an atmosphere of distrust between party leaders 
that hindered co-operation. As Dahl remarked “polyarchy requires two-way or mutual 
communication, and two-way communication is impeded among people who do not trust one 
another.” ** In that respect distrust between party leaders’ had reached terrific proportions. 
When he was asked, for instance, whether he had told Ecevit that commanders were urging for 
co-operation between parties, Demirel was reported to have answered that in that case “Ecevit 
would have divulged the whole conversation to the public by saying that the government is 
puuting pressure on them through the military.”*’ Indeed, In May 1977 Ecevit revealed then 
premier Demirel’s letter, that urged him to annul pre-election meeting as the government
86 Hürriyet, August 13, 1980.
Indeed, it is the basic premise of the liberal democracy that the “truth” is relative concept, and 
that no one has the monopoly of truth. It is the virtue of liberal democracy that by bargaining by 
discussion by compromise diverse views can be reconciled so that peaceful co-existence becomes possible.
** Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy-Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1971), 151.
89 Cited in Arcaytirek, 12 Eylal.415.
342
was suspected of plans for assassination, to the public. That distrust between party leaders 
was significant for explaining the lack of dialogue. It appears to have led them not only 
disagreement on crucial issues but also prevented the possibility of their finding new points 
of convergence that were not conceived beforehand but might have emerged if leaders had 
trusted each other and maintained a fiuitfiil dialogue.^
Finally, the JP leaders appears to have sincerely believed that they could take the 
country to elections in which, they assumed, they were likely to win an overall majority. That 
was yet other reason for them not to seek a compromise. The JP leadership assumed that their 
success in the 14 October elections was not a surprise. It showed the degree to 'wdiich the 
electorate had became estranged fi"om the RPP under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. They 
also appeared to have assumed that the near-coUapse of the Demokratik Party and decline in 
the votes of thç NSP were other factors operating in fevour of the JP. Short-term political 
considerations also appears to have been effective for the JP leaderships’ opposition to change 
in electoral laws that would strengthen the major parties at the expense of smaller ones. 
Because, they tend to believe that with an only small swing of the vote, comfortable majority 
was within their reach.’’
In comparison to Demirel, the RPP leader Ecevit was much less consistent regarding 
co-operation (including coalition) between parties. As noted above, Ecevit became a staunch 
defender of the idea of co-operation and dialogue when he himself could not form a 
government. For instance, when his government foiled to ensure a vote of confidence in June 
1977, he offered a JP-RPP coalition, forgetting that only a month ago he had accused and even 
refused to see Demirel, whom he labelled as fascist. When he had another opportunity to form 
a government in December 1977, he again did not seek the support of the JP arguing that he 
did not want to lose time to stop bloodshedding in the streets. It is only after resignation in *
** Even ten years after the intervention Demirel insisted that the JP-RPP coalition would have 
done nothing but presented General Evren ftuther justification for the intervention since in that case he 
would have said that parties could do it neither alone nor together in coalition so there remained no other 
way but intervention. According to Demirel, such a coalition might have prevented the coup only if they 
had elected General Evren as president. Demirel. Am. 116.
Clement H. Dodd, The Crisis o f Turkish Democracy, second ed. (London; Eothen, 1990), 43.
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October 1979, he began calls for a dialogue between parties. His sincerity was further put into 
doubt by his constant accusations of the government as fascist. ^
As remarked upon in the previous chapter, his conceptualisations regarding state, law 
and democracy, led him to reject some specific proposals in the package of measures. In an 
excellent example that revealed how Ecevit interpreted law and constitution, he opposed 
the establishment of state security courts which the constitution ordered. He argued that 
the article had been inserted in the 12 March interregnum and therefore it should not be 
regarded as an intrinsic part of the constitution, and, by implication, what it ordered 
should not be established.’  ^ Ecevit seemed to have forgotten the fact that in liberal 
democratic polity, however, everybody, whether he likes it or not, must obey the 
constitution until it is changed. Believing that there is an inverse relations between law and 
freedom, he also opposed the strengthening of the state. He argued that “all right let us 
increase powers of the state, but what would happen afterwards ? The Shah of Iran had 
the best of these powers, but did they help him to retain his throne?”’  ^Here, too, Ecevit 
appears to have confused the issues. In liberal democratic regime, state should be strong 
(in the sense of effectiveness and capability) within the rule of law. And the strength of the 
democratic state is qualitatively different from that of the strength of authoritarian state.
As in Demirel’s case, short-term political considerations and distrust of the JP and 
Demirel also played a role in his uncompromising attitude. For instance, one of the reasons for 
the RPP’s opposition to the package of measures was related to his belief that, it would not
^  There are other evidences that cast doubt on Ecevit’s sincerity. According to Arcayürek when 
he told Ecevit (in 24 April 1980) about Evren’s views that even if the two parties came together, there 
would not be any signiEcant change, Ecevit had answered back that “he shared the same view.” 
Arcayürek, Demokrasi. 22.
”  In fact the law regulating the state security courts had been adopted in 1973. Resmi Gazete 
[Official Gazette], Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemelerinin Kuruluş ve Yargılama Usulleri Hakkındaki Kanun 
[Law Concerning the Establishment and the Judicial Procedures of State Security Courts], n. 1773. 
Ankara; Prime Ministry, July 11, 1973. But when the constitutional court, acting upon the appeal of 
İzmir slate security court, found the two articles of the law (which constituted the cornerstone of the law) 
as unconstitutional, law as a whole became null and void in Ortober 1976.
^ Cited in Arcayürek, Demokrasi.227.
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help the state but the political party in power (that is the JP). He argued that state structures 
had been subjected to great destruction due to political parties’ tendency to fill supposedly 
impartial bureaucratic positions. Therefore, Ecevit was reported to have said that, if enacted, it 
would strengthen not the state but those public servants who were appointed by a government 
which led by a person who argues that “the source of anarchy is the RPP.” Instead, Ecevit 
first offered to reduce the elected governments’ leverage on public administration and later to 
strengthen it.
He also did not want early elections to be held. This did not suit his short-term political 
calculations In public, he argued that without preventing bloodshed the country could not hold 
proper elections, but many believed that it was a cover. He spears to have assumed that, if 
held, early general elections might provide a comfortable majority for the JP. Short-term 
political calculations also made him to lukewarm regarding possible changes in electoral laws 
that would reduce the significance of minor parties. Like Demirel he also believed that only a 
small margin of the vote might secure him overall majority in the assembly.
In short, both parties had their own policy lines that hindered the development of co­
operation between parties. And party elites did not want to compromise, due to complex 
interaction of culturally grounded beliefs regarding coalition, compromise, state, law and 
democracy, and their perceptions of each other as well as short-term political considerations. 
That was so, despite the feet that there was a danger to democratic political order that allowed 
them to pursue their interests in the first place. This is a fairly common dilemma found in many 
democracies. The nature of the competitive party system is likely to force each party to insist 
on their own particular policy lines. Actors tend to believe that if they carry on insisting their 
policy lines just a little more, other parties either out of conviction or desperation, will come to 
accept their solutions. The question is where the limits ends and for how long democratic 
system can endure. In other words, how long a political party, that pursue its short term 
interests, can insists upon policy which is likely to be detrimental to the legitimacy of 
democratic system. The answer to that question is inevitably subjective. However, responsible
95 Cited in Ibid.257.
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and prudent party behaviour requires that when the system seems to be strained and when there 
seems to be a grave danger to the survival of democracy, parties should be ready to make 
concessions on their policies. This is in their own interest so that when the normal situation 
resumes they can back to follow previous policy lines. On that score, Turidsh political party 
elites did not seem to fere well. They insisted on pursuing their own policy options, despite the 
(plenty of) signs that the system could no longer endure such party lines and feced the risk of 
breakdown.
6.3.THE MILITARY’S DECISION TO INTERVENE
Amidst continuing terrorism that neared proportions of civil-war, economic problems, 
and endless bickering between party elites the military high command finally came to the 
conclusion that with existing political parties and leaders such grave problems would not be 
solved and there remained no other possibility for way out but intervention. According to 
Evren’s account in March force commanders came to the conclusion that they should decide 
when to take over the administration whilst Evren have not yet been convinced about the 
timing of the intervention.’* The high command’s coming into such conclusion needs detailed 
exposition.
We know that even when presenting the letter the military did not expect much. They 
were proven right. The letter’s positive impact lasted only for a couple of weeks and as 
expected this did not produce any tangible result. With Ecevit’s harsh critique of the 24 January 
measures, and his reaction to Tari§ events, post-letter dialogue atmosphere were faded away. 
Moreover, the JP government appeared to be powerless in the face of the pressing problems. 
Demirel’s hopes, that his government would be able to enact new laws and change existing 
ones, was totally blocked by the oppositions’ incessant bickering. Evren is reported to have 
written (probably on 20-25 March) in his memoirs that:
I do not have any hope that the functioning of state institutions, which is so degenerated, could be put
right I do not beUeve also there will be changes in laws. Because, the RPP and the NSP oppose each
96 Ibid., 391.
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and every proposal. The NSP had promised to support the JP, but in practice they did the reverse.”®^ 
The examples Evren provided to exemplify politicization of the state institutions 
deserve long quotations as they sustained his belief that it could not be corrected under the 
civilian regime. Evren reported what Cemal Altmok, martial law commander, told the martial 
law co-ordination committee:
We could find neither the head official of district (kaymakam) nor chief of pohce (emniyet amiri) in 
Siverek coimty (which is controlled by Apocu’s and in which many violent events had taken place), 
that is in my area The ministry appointed a head official of district but he did not come. I tell you 
another interesting case. (The ministry) sent chief of pohce fiom Bitlis to Siverek. But that person 
supposed to be in Bitlis was not actually there for two years. He is still in his former place. The chief 
Police Headquarters (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü) assumed him to be in Bitlis and asked Bitlis whether 
they were going to sent him to Sivetdc and ask their views.^
In the face of such disorder and politicization, the civilian leadership, it seemed to 
Evren, appeared to be unable to put things right. He blamed Ecevit for his inflamatory 
speeches and hii blockage of package of measures in the assembly.^  ^Likewise he held Demirel 
responsible for insisting on the NSP while it was all to clear that Erbakan was interested only in 
his own party’s standings and was ready to withdraw support when it suited his own 
interests.As if these were not enough the presidential crisis intensified. According to Evren, 
he told (on 31 March and on 24 April) defence minister Ali İhsan Birincioğlu “not to take 
presidential elections lightly.”'®* Like many at that time he, too, believed that Demirel was
97 Evren, Anılar.
Ibid., 376. Similarly, 16 province governors who met premier Demirel dwelled upon the same 
theme of partisanship and politicization of bureaucracy. Cited in Arcayürek, 12 Eylül. 398-407.
^  Ecevit’s response to the 24 January measures and to Tariş events appears to have seriuously 
upset General Evren and played a role in making him believe that nothing could be done with these party 
leaders. Ecevit’s response to the Tariş events was, according to Evren, “to extinguish fire with gasoline.” 
Ecevit had said that “there is no possibility that Demirel could implement his economic policy outside the 
dictatorial regime. For that reason bandits (of government) that wore police uniforms began to torture 
people. We, too, want terrorists to be cleaned up from Tariş. But the government aims at filling it with 
rightist militants, and its (Tariş) exploitation by powerful interests.” Ibid., 360.
Evren was not alone in arriving this conclusion. Nazlı Ilıcak, too, shared similar views. She 
reminded the JP leadership that “what is important is not to stay in power but to be really be capable 
when you are in power.” Tercüman, January 20, 1980. “İktidar Olmak ve Muktedir Olmak” [Being in 
Power and Being (Tapable in Power]
lOI Evren, ^m/ar. 411.
347
happy to see !^aglayangil*°  ^as acting president and therefore he was not hurrying to elect the 
one.’°^  Besides, presidential elections occupied most of the TGNA’s time nothing but 
interpellations put forward by the RPP were to be debated. As a result of all these 
developments, Evren finally ordered (in 18 May according to his memoirs)*®  ^ that all 
preparations for the take over were to be finished by the first week of July. In his coming into 
such conclusion his belief that political parties (as they were) would not find a solutions to 
country’s ills were the chief fector.*®^  But equally important factor was his belief that the 
critical actors would not oppose, or at least stay neutral, to military intervention.
As we remarked in the first chapter, by critical actors we mean those social-political 
groups whose support or at least neutrality is essential for any regime to survive. Since, 
however authoritarian it might be, any regime needs a kind of public acceptance for survival, 
the most important critical actors can be said to be citizens. But citizens do not spoke from one 
voice, and what they think could be estimated, however imperfectly, through by thdr organized 
and vocal representatives as well as through imperfect inferences derived from their reactions 
to past events. Here too, one should be carefial not to over-generalize. In some political
The military high command was not prepared to see Caglayangil (whose name was mentioned 
for the presidency) as president. Evren told me in our interview that “he was to partisan to be a president.”
Evren appears to have got angry when Demirel told him that they were going to meet with 
Ecevit at Yugoslavian President Joseph Tito’s funeral. Evren noted (in 5 May 1980) that “I became 
certain that the premier wants to deceive us, that he was using the strategy of delaying us.” Ibid., 432.
104 Ibid.. 434.
It would not be inaccurate to argue that the cabinet instability was not the prime factor for 
Evren to arrive at that conclusion. It was rather his belief that there was no strong government in sight, 
strong enough to tackle pressing problems, which is not the same as the cabinet instability. This is because 
less than strong cabinets just can continue to survive while having no effective power to affect the course 
of events. In fact, during the 1973-1980 period Turkey can hardly be said to have a cabinet instability in 
terms of the criteria put forward by Juan J. Linz. Linz noted that in the Europe of interwar period (which 
he also divided into two as predepression and postdepression period) amongst the seventeen countries in 
which governments lasted less than nine months, in only one country democracy survived, while within 
that group of countries in which governments lasted longer than nine months, only one experienced a 
regime change. Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes- Crisis, Breakdown & 
Reequilibration (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1978), 44. When we look at 
the Turkish case, we observe that during the seven years between the October 1973 elections and 12 
September 1980, Turkey had seven cabinets, average duration for cabinets being one year. If we exclude, 
only one-month-long Ecevit government in 1977, average duration for cabinet rises to the fourteen 
months, higher than Linz’s threshold of nine months.
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contexts where people at large do not look to democratic political system with a sense of 
belonging (or where they do not see democracy as qua sine non) this might not matter much. 
Or where there is traditional respect for the state and the military institution, as the core of 
state, or where there is no tradition of opposition to what comes from the state either out of 
sense of nicompetence or voluntary acceptance, the question of whether people would support 
the move or stay neutral becomes much less significant.
In Turkey a similar state of affairs appears to have been obtained. One of the most 
important factors was the perception of the Ottoman-Turkish state. As noted above, the belief 
that the state is a distant power that took, sometimes quite arbitrarily, decisions regarding their 
life (on the making of which they had little power to influence) appears to have been prevalent 
amongst the citizenry. It was perceived as something that preceded their existence and made it 
possib le .I t  was not, however, seen as totally repressive apparatus but as provider of order 
and welfare. It is seen as fether and “father is the guardian of the family and whether good or 
bad at it, he is nevertheless the father”*®^ and by implication should be not rdjelled against.
This conception of state appears to have hindered the development of a concept 
resembling anything like the right of resistance (implying as it is contractual relations between 
the state and citizens) to take root in the public conscience as formulated in western political 
theory. It was true that in the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition under the influence of Islamic 
doctrines rulers were held responsible to God but this had little practical value as the exact 
mechanisms of its enforceability were left ambigjous. As Bernard Lewis remarked though, 
especially in earlier times, the Islamic doctrine had came to be interpreted in the sense that 
it was the duty of muslims to resist the impious government. In time, however, for a 
variety of reasons, “disobediance was hedged around with restrictions and qualifications
The Turkish idiom that “ya devlet başa ya kuzgun leşe” (either there must be a state, or ravens 
would crowd around the carcass) reflects this mentality.
107 Engin D. Akarli, “The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in 
Turkey,” in Political Participation in Turkey Historical Background and Present Problems, ed. Engjn D. 
Akarii and Gabriel Ben Dor (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Pubiications, 1975), 138.
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and was in effect forgotten in the general acceptance” and it came to be understood 
that, “good government was a duty of the ruler, not a right of the subject, whose only recourse 
against bad government was patience, counsel, and prayer.” *^^
This islamic notion of absolute obedience to ruler seemed to survive in the Ottoman- 
Turkish polity. It was understood that to keep each person in its proper place and to prevent 
him to violate others’ right a ruler with absolute authority was required. It was thus formulated 
that “without Padişah there would be no order, leading to people’s devastation.”"® More to 
the point, in the absence resources outside the state to support any countervailing power, and 
the segmented structure of the periphery made it extremely difficult for social-political groups 
to oppose state in an organized way. No such tradition appears to have developed. Whatever 
comes from the state, or whatever has happened to be in the court, tended to be accepted in 
fetalistic fashion.*" If there was any expression of grievances it was rather through 
spontaneous, sudden, sproadic mass uprisings (“a flash in the pan” in Mardin’s words) which 
was suppressed (at least in the long-term) by the state. Moreover, in these uprisings the 
“concept of state” (its organization, its philosophy, its relationships with its subjects-citizens) as 
such did not came under attack, they were rather against the given set of people who came to 
control the state. “The conception of state” as Akarh perceptiely noted, “has been keep 
separate from the given set of people who controlled the state.”
Bernard Lewis. Islam in History -Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East, revised and 
expanded edition (Chicago and Lasalle. Open Court,: Illinois, 1993). 314.
109 Ibid., 324.
Halil İnalcık, “Osmanli Padişahı.” fThe Ottoman Padişah] Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal 
Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, vol XIII, 4, (1958), 75.
Popular historian Ahmet Refik’s assessment is revealing in that respect: “The palace was the 
heart of the all Ottoman lands. But any move in the ‘Bab-i Hümayun’ would have no effect on the nerves 
of the empire. Even the great Ottoman provinces never raised opposition or gesture of approval to any 
facit accomplices in the palace.” Ahmet Refik, Lale Devri [The Tulip Age] (Istanbul: Timaş, 1997), 98.
Akarli, “state,” 138. Similarly, Karpat noted that squatters tend to attribute the state’s failure 
in its protective mission “to the men who acted on behalf of the state” assuming that “as a sort of moral 
being” it, “could not do wrong.” Karpat, “political attitudes,” 94. The similar attitude can be observed in 
Turkish politicians. Suleyman Demirel, who accused Evren for not seriously engaging with terrorism so 
as to justify military takeover, is at pains to distinguish (jeneral Evren and Turkish Armed Forces, putting 
the blame solely on the former. Instead of questioning militarys’ ideology, attitude and its organisation
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Yet another peculiarity of the Ottoman-Turldsh polity was the privileged status 
accorded to the military. The military elements played a crucial role in the initial stages of the 
Empire. The modernization efforts first began in the military institutions and was led by them 
afterwards. In the independence war, similarly, it was the military that occupied leading place. 
Most of the revered Ottoman-Turldsh heroes came fi'om the ranks of the military, and 
traditionally the military was held in high esteem by the people at large. ‘ In military service, in 
the schools, in the mosques, people are socialized into norms that recommends them to defer 
to the state, the prime representative of which is the military.“ ^
In addition to these socio-cultural properties of the Turkish society, widespread 
terrorism put people in a position in which they could register hardly any major response to 
what happened. In these tense times in which nobody feels secure the man in the street is likely 
to be more worried about his and his loved one’s security rather than, what might seem to him, 
the niceties of democracy. S(he) is likely to defer any authority that promised law and order 
and protected his (her) right to life, without which no other right can be enjoyed. Or more 
commonly s(he) is likely to become resigned to whatever was happening and whatever was 
being done at the top."*
All of these considerations suggested that any military intervention in Turkey was not 
likely to face any resistance and military knew that tendency well."** When I asked Kenan
within the state structures, Demirel criticized the persons who came to control it for a while. See, Demirel, 
Am. 4, 54, 117.
See, for an insightful analysis, Dankart A. Rustow, “Turkey (military),” in Political 
Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. Dankwart A . Rustow and Robert E. Ward (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1964).
*'■* Akarli, “state,” 137. Ahmet Kemal (Murat Beige) emphasized especially the role of the 
military service, for the promotion of such a concept of the state. According to Beige, those who 
performed compulsory military service, “acquire a feeling of total helplessnes which they retain for the 
rest of their lives.” Ahmet Kemal, “Military Rule and the Future of Democracy in Turkey.” MERİP 
Reports, 122, (1984), 14.
As Bingham Powell remarked “the failure of govenunent to maintain order and security leads 
citizens to look more positively on authoritarian alternatives.” Bingham Powell., Jr, Contemporary 
Democracies -Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1982), 154.
It was not only the military but also some MP’s in the assembly that emphasized the same 
point. Oğuz Atalay, an independent MP from Konya argued that “nation would not find it strange if the
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Evren whether they were considering the possibility that there might be resistance to 
intervention, he answered that “of course, we thought of that possibility. But I told my friends 
that I was 90 per cent of sure that there would not be any such thing and people would support 
us.” (Halkm bizi destekleyeceğini de % 90’la ümit ediyordum). He also added that he was “98 
per cent sure of the success of the military (to prevent terrorism).” His answer, to my following 
question of why it was the case, was revealing in many respects. Alongside the terorism and 
failure of the civilians to come up with solutions. Evren noted that Turkish people placed high 
confidence in the military because:
It was tlie militaiy that established the lepubhc, that brought democracy. Whatever new came to Turkey 
after the abolition of Saltanat, and even before it, was brought through the channels of the army... for 
that reason people placed trust in the military. The soldiers do not behave partially (They are not 
partisan), (besides) there is a tradition as result of a military service experience. (People) does want an 
authority, and does not like disorder. * * ^
Thus, as Evren too correctly estimated, the legitimacy of military intervention was not 
likely be widely questioned. Be that as it may, (îeneral Evren and high command were still 
anxious not to push the button until “knife cut through the bones.” It was because, they wanted 
to protect (what to them) the highly esteemed privileged status of the army as the nations true 
representative and protector. One way of doing this was, they appears to have thought, to 
avoid the mistakes of the previous military interventions.
In the Turkey of the 1980’s amidst continuing terrorism, economic crisis and little 
realistic hope left for civilian democracy the organized and vocal channels (that could be 
assumed to represent the citizens view) seemed to be content to accept the military authority. 
The press as representative (and makers) of the people’s opinion had begun to drop hints that 
they had become so sick of civilian hagglings and bickerings that anything that would secure 
state authority would be welcomed. It was not that majority of them openly urged for
military intervenes provided that it is impartial. (This is because) democratic regime is diluted to such an 
extent and the state is in grave danger.” He then warned political parties that “they should well know well 
this fact.” Yankı, 28 July-3 August, 1980. Yankı editorial in the same issue noted that many MP’s from 
various parties were coming to the conclusion that the military should intervene as the JP could not beat 
anarchy and there did not seem to be an alternative government in sight. Yankı, 28 July-3 August, 1980 
“Tehlikeli Bir Eğilim Doğuyor” [A Dangerous Tendency Emerges]. Likewise, Evren told me in interview 
that many MP’s and senators (which he declined to give names) came to visit him to encourage takeover.
Interview.
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intervention (though some did) but that they made it clear that this state of afîàirs could not 
continue for long, thus indicating their dissatisfaction and readiness not to oppose an alternative 
regime that might be established.*^* In fact, journalists despised politicians (whether in 
opposition or in power) such a degree that it was all too clear to anyone that they would hardly 
show any negative reaction, if somebody removed them from power. Oktay Ekşi of Hürriyet 
for instance, once asked whether Turkish politicians “were leaders or scourges.”**^  Evren, too, 
perceived the press’ attitutude in this way. He wrote that the press’ reaction to the letter had 
shown that in search of a leadership that would deal with terrorism the press had not refrained 
to express their gratitude and relief*^ Perhaps because of this attitude of the press’ (they 
made it so clear that any authority that restores order would be welcomed) Evren also told me 
that the military did not seriously concern itself with how the press would react to intervention. 
He said that alongside the above mentioned factors, “they thought that the press could easily be 
controlled through martial law.”*^ ‘
Businessmen as a whole, too, were worried about the country’s situation and longed 
for political stability. Their support was important for the success of the intervention, despite 
the fact that the Turkish economy was heavily dominated by the state. As part of their 
peripheral mentality, businessmen, too, lacked the tradition of raising an organized opposition 
to the state. To expolit loopholes, not making its views known in an organized way vis-a-vis
"* Headlines all expressed that feeling. In July 16. 1980 Tercüman’s headlines read “This is 
Enough” (Yeter Artık). Newspaper editorial (in the first page) urged politicians to find solutions and 
finished with warning that “tomorrow will be too late.” In July 23, 1980 Milliyet’s headlines read “Stop 
Discussing.” (Tartışmayı Kesin). It argued that “stop discussing... Come together to devise action plan to 
extinguish that fire... Do it as soon as possible. Otherwise it will be to late tomorrow.”
Oktay Ekşi, “Kadayıfça” [Kadayıfçı] Hürriyet, June 7, 1980. In another writing, after 
expressing its embanasment how parliamentary regime was able to survive in Turkey, Ekşi provided the 
answer by saying that leaders of Turkey were incompetent to such an extent that they could not even ruin 
the democracy, despite the fact that they seem to want to ruin it. Oktay Ekşi, “Meğer Dokuz Canlı İmiş” 
[It is More Resilient than We Thought], Hürriyet, June 9,1980.
Kenan Evren, Ne Demişlerdi ? Ne Dediler ? Ne Diyorlar ? [What had They Said ? What did 
They Say ? What are now They Saying ?] (Istanbul; Milliyet, 1997),71.
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Interview.
See, Ayşe Buğra, Devlet ve İşadamları [The State and Businessmen], trans. Fikret Adaman
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the state has been the strategy of Turkish businessmen. They appears to have dropped hints 
that they would support military intervention in the hope that it would provide a political 
stability and that help to control already inflated wages. Evren, for instance, told me that some 
businessmen had complained about inflated wages. Businessmen, according to Evren, said that 
“they cannot cope with unreasonable wage increases and have even offered unions the 
opportunity to run the fectories they owned.”*  ^ Some businessmen were worried, too, that a 
new direction that the Turkish economy under 24 January measures might coU^se in the 
unpredictable political environment of Turk^. Despite some of them (especially those which 
have not been export-oriented) were uneasy about the 24 January measures, they all seemed to 
appreciate the fact that the international community would not provide help to Turkey unless 
these measures was rigorously implemented.Not only the big business, but also various 
representatives of Anatolian traders and small business, through their actions and non-actions 
made it known that they would support the military move. For example, according to Evren 
(which has not been subsequently denied) the President of Confederation of Small Traders and 
Artisans (CSTA) complained about the situation asked him “should we, as more than two an 
half million people, be armed as well
The situation for trade unions was likewise. The biggest trade Union, CTWU (which 
had always maintained close relations with the mainstream center parties and the state) was 
continously calling for a dialogue and they dropped hints that they would not oppose possible 
military intervention. For instance, in September 1980 the president of CTWU raised the issue 
on the socio-political crisis the country had been dragged into and asked what the parliament 
was doing to deal with it. He then answered:
(Istanbul; İletişim, 1995).
Interview.
In the aftermath of the intervention, for example, the head of Turkey’s biggest holding 
company, Vehbi Koç in a letter to President Evren, stated that to follow the direction of 24 January 
measures would be beneftcal for the country. Can Kıraç, Anılarımla -Patronum Vehbi Koç [My Boss 
Vehbi Koç Through Memoirs] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1995), 266.
125 Interview.
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we are as hopeless as we can easily say nothing. Pohtical party groups are fighting and obstructing each 
other every day for power struggles. The parliament, which even nnahle to elect head of the state, has 
been made an instrument for sterile squabbles, while hundreds of bills and ptqxrsals which could be a 
remedy for the illness are waiting for inclusion in the agenda.”'^ *
The military did not appear to be concerned too much with how the CRWU and other 
radical trade unions would react to them as they saw them part of the Turkey’s problems and 
determined to stop their activities. Evren told this author that they were considering the 
possibility that these radical unions might try to build up resistance the military intervention. It 
seems the military high command was seriously concerned with the pre-intervention militancy 
and radicalism of the trade unions. Indeed, prior to intervention, the only group that was 
perceived to have the potential to mount resistance to the intervention was, as Evren 
emphasized to me, the workers that were organized by CRWU and other smaller radical trade 
unions.'^ ’
The military high command was concerned equally, if not more, with how the outside 
actors, particularly Turku’s allies in NATO and European Economic Community, might react 
to possible intervention. It is not our argument that the military needed western encouragement 
or a green light to conduct an intervention. That would, on the basis of available evidence, be 
an exaggeration, given the well-known sensitivity of Turkish armed forces to protect its 
independence. But rather, in line with their policy of ensuring the maximum legitimacy and 
approval to intervention, they wished to estimate the possible reaction of outside world as they 
tried to estimate the possible reaction of the critical actors at home.
Up until 1945 Turkey had striven to maintain a policy of non-alignment in its foreign 
policy. The division of the worid literally into two camps (the western camp of democratic 
nations led by the United States, and the Socialist camp led by Soviet Union) after the second 
world war made this policy untenable. Turkey was amongst the participants in the San 
Fransisco conference in which the foundations of the United Nations was laid. Beginning fi’om 
Truman doctrine (in 1947) that pledged to Turkey and Greece support against Soviet
126 Cited in Secretariat, 12 September. 186.
Interview. Evren also emphasized the relief that thq^ felt when they saw that “95 per cent of 
the working people supported their action.” Interview.
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expansion, Turkey’s fate was closely linked to the US led Western camp. In 1947 Turkey was 
admitted to OECD. In 1951 she applied for the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and admitted in. In 1963, it signed association agreement with what was 
then European Economic Community (EEC).
Turkey’s pro-western stance was the legacy of Republican project of modernization, 
which regarded the western club of nations as the examples of “contemporary civilization” to 
which T urk^ should aspire to catch up with. The ties that bound Turkey to the western Camp 
were economic and political. It was economic in that Turkey continued to receive a foreign aid, 
and conducted her external trade heavily, though not exclusively, with the western camp. It 
also suited her guest for security against the traditional antagonist neighboor Soviet Union 
(USSR). The US led Western Camp, in turn, saw Turkey as an invaluable ally against USSR’s 
expansionist policies both as the first hindrance against the possible Soviet attack and a base 
through which to gather intelligence regarding Soviet military might. Despite the occasional 
emergence of some problems,’^ * Turkey’s western oriented policy remain unchallenged. If on 
anything both state elites and the major political parties (despite Ecevit’s flirtations with the 
non-aligned world) were in fuU agreement it was the Turkey’s pro-western stance.
In the eve of the 1980’s events around the world increased Turkey’s importance to the 
western camp. After the first cold war in fifties and late sixties, the seventies had ushered a 
detente in US-USSR relations symbolized by the Salt I and Salt II agreement in 1972 and 1979 
respectively. Parallel to that detente and presence of problems between Turkey and the US, 
Turkey appeared to have been losing its strategic value to the west. But this detente was more 
in rhetoric than in reality. When the Soviet Union invaded Afganistan in December 1979, it 
became clear to US policy makers that the USSR was not as benign as it was portrayed to be. 
The invasion of Afganistan was not the only event that negatively affected US interests in the 
world. A couple of months earlier the world had witnessed the fall of Shah in Iran and the
128 The President Johnson’s letter in 1964 was one example. The President Johnson argued that 
Turkey if she had intervened militarily in Cyprus and if it provoked any direct involvement from the 
Soviet Union, the US would not honor NATO guarantees. The poppy growth debate and arms embargo 
after the 1974 Cyprus intervention were other examples.
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129Iran’s new rulers did not hide their anti-US (anti-westem) stance.
All of a sudden, Turkey, whose importance seemed to have been declining, had regained its 
former situation as the most important ally in the Southern flank of NATO. In April 1980, 
Turkey and US signed a new defence agreement. Defence and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (DEÇA) covering US-Turkish military cooperation. This agreement, according to 
The Economist, “may mark a milestone in Turkish foreign policy. It advertises the world that 
Turkey is now anchored to the west; the flirtation with Russia and non-aligned world which 
was part of Mr. Ecevit’s ‘multi-dimensional’ diplomacy has been abandoned.”'^ ® It was 
followed by the significant increases (fi"om 125.2 million dollar in 1977 to 406.4 million dollar 
in 1980 and to 453.8 million dollar in 1981) in the US credit and aid to Turkey.*^*
Parallel to Turkey’s increasing significance for the western camp as a whole, the US 
became more and more interested in Turkey’s internal problems. A politically unstable Turkey, 
they rightly assumed, might easily fall prey into civil-war and come under Soviet influence. 
Under the influence of cold war doctrines, they seemed to have assumed that securing political 
stability (read the prevention of spreading communism) should have a priority over the 
promotion of democracy.That is, even an overtly repressive and authoritarian regime might
It was also important that the alliance called CENTO (established to function like NATO) 
between US, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran had been dissolved in March 1979.
The Economist, April 5, 1980. “Reocddentation.” The then US President Jimmy Carter had 
sent a letter to Premier Demirel stating that agreement “marks an important milestone for both the 
Republic of Turkey and the United States of America.” According to Carter, the agreement “recognizes 
Turkey’s crucial contribution to the Alliance and it adresses critical questions of defense and economic 
cooperation.” He then added that it was his “firm conviction that Turkey should be assisted in every 
feasible way” and he “regard this eflfort as a high personal priority.” For the full text of the letter and 
Premier Demirel’s answer to it, see, George E. Gmen, “Ambivalence in the Alliance; US Interests in the 
Middle East and the Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy.” Orbis. 24, 2 (1980), 378.
Cited in Oğuz Babüroğlu, A Theory o f Stalemated Social Systems and Vortical 
Organisational Environments (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1987), 155.
Baburoğlu shows Turkish Embassy in the US as his resource.
132 According to Packenham, US economic aid was guided by three considerations; promoting US 
security interests by strengthening anti-communist forces, promoting US economic interests which, in 
turn, help to create stability and new markets for the US and promoting democracy through the rewarding 
of liberal democratic polities. Packenham argues that except for brief period under Kennedy 
Administration, the first and second policy objectives had priority over the third. Robert. A Packenham, 
Liberal America and the Third fVorld (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
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be supported provided that it were anti-communist and did not harm the vital US interests.
It appears that like many segments of Turkish society and the military, the US policy­
makers, too, had come to share the view that Turkey’s civilian democracy would not, 
successfully, be able to cope with pressing problems. Rightly diagnosing that the US desired a 
stable (but not necessarily democratic) Turicey, many journalistic accounts of the 12 September 
intervention seemed to imply that the US was somehow involved in both the preparation and 
execution of the intervention.*^  ^ In the light of available evidence, we think that, this view is 
flawed. It is true that the US actively encouraged, and even itself tried to provoke military 
intervention in many countries, notably it instigated a takeover against Salvador Ailende in 
Chile in 1973.*^ "* But, to infer from these cases that same thing happened in Turkey would 
surely a gross exaggeration. In the first place, as we discussed above, the Turkish military was 
disposed to see itself as the guardian of the Republic and they did not need to be encouraged by 
the United States to takeover. It can be argued that, on the basis of other country’s 
experiences, the US could have been more assertive if the Turkish army had been 
unwilling to intervene. In Chile, where the military had been reluctant to engage in politics 
until the 1973 intervention, the military might have needed to be encouraged by an outside 
force, but not in Turkey.
What the Tuiidsh military high command appeared to have done is to carefully estimate 
how the US and other NATO allies would react in the case of the intervention. When I asked 
General Evren whether they had considered how the NATO allies would react to intervention, 
he told me that “of course, we considered what the NATO and other foreign countries (‘dış 
alem’) would say about the intervention.” But he was very carefial to emphasize the point that 
even if these countries had given signals that they would have opposed such a movement, it
133 Çetin Yetkin, Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Amerika [America and the Coup d'etats in 
Turkey] (Ankara: Omit, 1995); Mehmet Ali Birand, 12 Eylül - 04:00 [12 September- 04:00](İstanbul; 
Milliyet, 1984). Cüneyt Arcayürek also implies that in his several books on the subject.
Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes -Chile (London and Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 57. See also, the US role in the breakdown of Guatemalaen 
democracy in 1954, Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f Intervention 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).
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would not have affected them, “ff you began to consider,” Evren told me, “what America says 
(about intervention), what NATO says, or what Russia says, you can not handle such a thing” 
as what was important for them was “the prevention of the possibility of civil war in 
Turkey.”^^^
When I asked him in which ways they tried to assess the possible reaction of outside 
world, Evren told me that particularly in NATO meetings many officals came to ask him what 
was going to happen in Turkey, and where anarchy and terrorism might lead to. I also asked 
him whether he was aware of the alleged efforts of the then commander of the navy and post­
intervention premier Admiral Bülent Ulusu to try to discover the reaction of the outside world. 
According to Cüneyt Arcayürek, Admiral Bülend Ulusu told him (in 6 September 1979) 
that:
I went to a dinner in American Embassy where I met with 10 American senators and NATO 
staff. I told them that Afganistan is out, Iran is similarly. We are even more important than they 
are as we are in the Southern flank of NATO. What would your attitude be if anything happens 
here ? (Ulusu probably speaking of the possibility of intervention) The senators have told me that 
there would be no negative response fix)m us. We do not interfere internal afiiairs of the states. 
Every state must take care of its internal order.
He told me that he was not aware of this and did not particularly authorize Ulusu 
to perform such duties. But he did not seem to be particularly embarrassed by this and 
seemed to regard it as normal arguing that “Ulusu himself might have felt the need to 
prowl it.” ‘^ "
It seems that US and NATO allies behaved in the way that suggested that in the case of 
intervention by the high command, they would not make much fiiss about it, while Turkish 
officials quietly tried to assess what their reaction might be. It was not much because without 
such signals the military would not conduct the operation (but surely would think twice) but 
because they wanted to ensure maximum legitimacy for the intervention through their 
encounters in several meetings. That this interpretation is more to the point can be gathered
Interview.
Arcayürek, Müdahale.112.
Interview, (“demek ki o orada kendiliğinden bu işi bir kolaçan edeyim diye sormuş olabilir.”)
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from Paul Henze’s RAND Corporation paper entitled “Turkish Democracy and American 
Alliance.” Paul Henze served as assistant to Zbigniew Brzerzinsld in the US national security 
council at the time. He vehemently denied that “US government encouraged the generals or at 
least gave advance approval of their September 1980 assumption of power.”*^* He argued that 
true to Turkish tradition General Evren was “wishing to avoid even the remotest appearance of 
need or desire for advance foreign approval of the action he and his colleagues took in 
September 1980, or subsequently.” He concluded that “the Carter Administration would not 
have discouraged takeover, if informed in advance, but it preferred not to be.”’^ ’ To the extent 
that Henze’s views represent the US governments views, the statement suggests that US, too, 
did not have much confidence in Turkish democracy’s ability to cope with pressing problems 
and was expecting the military intervention to take place. Besides they were more than happy 
to support it “if informed in advance.” And Turkish army commanders correctly estimated the 
United States’ this posture and a kind of tacit understanding was thus secured.
Along the same line, James Spain, the ambassador for the US at that time, noted in his 
memoirs that the embassy staff had concluded in the various meetings within the June and July 
1980 that “a major political upheaval was virtually inevitable, but it was not likely to happen in 
the next few months.”'^  He also noted that “the U.S military staff that worked most closely 
with the Turkish military were virtually unanimous in saying that this (military 
intervention) was going to happen.” '^' Yet, Spain continued, “all of our uniformed 
advisers admitted that they had received no direct indication of an intention to act from
Paul Henze, Turkish Democracy and American Alliance -RAND Paper- P-77% (Rand: Santa 
Monica, 1993), 45.
Similarly, James Spain, the US ambassador at that time, argued that “1 personally did not 
know anything that would give the signals that the US would favourably respond to intervention. And 1 
did not give any signals amounting to that. ...But like everybody, America, too, could estimate that the 
army was going to takeover.” Cited in Ufuk Giildemir, Kanat Operasyonu [An Operation in the Southern 
Wing], second ed. (Ankara: Tekin, 1986), 24.
James W. Spain, American Diplomacy in Turkey-Memoirs o f an Ambassador, Extraordinary 
& Plenipotentiary (New York: Praeger, 1994), 12.
H I Ibid., 12.
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their Turkish colleagues.” They learned, Spain added, military intervention on 11 
September night from the head of US Military Assistance and Training Mission, whom a 
high level Turkish officer had phoned on the same night.
Similarly, the military’s decision to continue the 24 January measures should be seen in 
this line. It is not because the militaiy decided to take over the administration of country to 
better implement 24 January measures as is sometimes implied by those favouring 
‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ state thesis. This was especially so, they pointed out, since even 
Turgut Ozal accepted that without an intervention foil scale implementation of program was 
just not possible .The fact that new administration officially informed (within the forty-eight 
hours of takeover) the the IMF and the World Bank and that they intend to continue same 
economic policy and that they did not remove Ozal and his team are also stated in support of 
this view. The military appears to have continued these policies both because they assumed 
that, if they did not, international economic organisations would not provide much needed 
support for the new regime. They just did not want to take the responsibility for the 
troublesome area of tackling the economy on themselves. It was also the case that themselves 
appeared to have believed that there is no viable alternative to it.*^ * Otherwise, th ^  have not
H2 Ibid.. 12.
Indeed. Spain wrote that he had told one junior US military official, who warned him military 
intervention woirld take place in the morning of 12 September on 11 September night, that “if a coup were 
as imminent as he said. I thought we would have had some kind of a direct hint from the military 
leadership.” Ibid., 18. This young officer, Spain tells us, has arrived that conclusion because he had seen 
many tanks at Balgat ready to go into the city. Besides, one of his Titrkish officer friends had retirmed 
from the US four days earlier than plarmed on 10 September and explained to his friend that his wife had 
to undergo a critical operatiorr. while American officer saw his wife, supposed to be in critical condition, 
was well and healthy. Ibid.. 17.
Cited in Osman Ulagay. Oza/ Ekonomisinde Paramız Pul Olurken Kim Kazandı Kim Kaybetti 
? [Who Gained, Who Lost, while Our Money became Worthless in Ozal Economics ?] (Ankara: Bilgi, 
1987), 63. See for the same view, Şenses, “structural,” 214.
The military high command were briefed by Turgut Ozal on January 8, which was not 
reported in the press. In the briefing Ozal spoke of the need for increasing exports and reducing inflation 
and gave the direction of measures to be taken. It appears that cormnanders were impressed by this 
meeting and the necessity of the measures. Krueger and Turan, “Turkish,”3.56 Regarding the 24 January 
measures General Evren have wrote that “I think that these decisions had to be taken. Because there was 
no other way for the country to overcome scarcities.” Evren, Anılar. 354. In our interview, he repeated the 
same view arguing that they had seen harmful effects of “excessive stalism” (aşuı devletçilik) and gave the
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become free-marketers overnight, rather they followed what appeared to them the most 
pragmatic economic policy.
Thus, the military high command came to the conclusion that there remained no other 
way but military intervention only after it carefully estimated that the critical actors would 
support, or at least stay neutral to it.’“*’ The high command wanted to be sure of that because 
they very seriously concerned to ensure that the intervention was seen by critical actors as a last 
resort to save the country from falling into civil war. On May 18, General Evren finally 
ordered that the takeover would take place in the first week of July,’^  subsequently deciding 
(on July 1) the day of takeover as July the 11*.
In retrospect, it can be said that after that stage regime’s chances of survival were low. 
But it seems that up until the final point there was still a possibility of saving, albeit diminishing 
day-by-day, the regime. There is an important example suggesting that the military was 
sensitive to any hope for the regime and might, at least, delay the intervention if such 
opportunity arised. As we noted above, initially the first week of the. July had been 
decided as the date for takeover. When the JP government secured vote of confidence as a 
result of interpellation put forward by the RPP in 3rd of July, Evren delayed the whole 
operation to 12 September. He argued that in that case they would give Demirel an 
opportunity to say the RPP + Army = Power formula was back on the agenda. Evren also 
added that between 8-10 June an important meeting would be held in Paris to reschedule 
Turkey’s debts.*'”
example of the differences in treatment of customers in private sector and in Siimeibank Store managed by 
state.
'■’* General Evren’s memoirs indicates that he was far from happy with what appeared to him 
ultra-liberal policies’ of the 1980s. For instance, he was worried that the country was importing 
unnecessary products such as bananas. He, as president, had warned premier Turgut özal that if this 
continued the country might run out foreign exchange. Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren 'in Anıları [Memoirs of 
Kenan Evren ] vol 5 (Istanbul; Milliyet, 1990), 362.
It goes without saying that the military could not be 100 per cent sure of its success. Every 
military intervention involves risk of failure. While this can be minimized, it can not be removed.
148
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Evren, AnılarA34, 456. 
Evren, Anılar. 460.
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In our interview Evren told me that if the parties could agree on holding elections, 
they would have to postpone the whole operation to see what happens after the elections. 
He said that they could not conduct an intervention because in that case, “we would have 
seen to intervene against the holding of the elections.”***’ When I asked him whether 
election of a president could have made difference, he told me that “they might again have 
postponed their plans” but they would not abandon it, as it was not the election of 
president but the prevailing anarchy that they were moving against. I also asked him that 
what would have happened, if the RPP and NSP had managed to establish a new 
government, he answered that “it would not have made a difference.” It seems that if 
unaccompanied by a strong government to tackle anarcy, even the election of a president, 
or formation of another weak government, would not make much difference but only 
prolong the process. The only way that might create a strong government, the military 
appears to have thought, might be the holding of the early general elections.*** This 
suggests that in Turkish case Juan Linz’s contention that “...at any point in the process up 
to the final point, chances remain, albeit diminishing chances, to save the regime” **^  
appears to have been valid.
From that date to 12 September 1980, unaware of the military’s plans, political party 
elites continued to tear each other apart thus reinforcing and providing further justification for 
the commanders’ decision. The JP leadership was determined to pursue what has been called 
above crisis strategy in the presidential elections. To force the constitutional change that would
150 This point has been repeated by Süleyman Demirel as well. See, Yeni Yüzyıl, April 9. 1995. 
Bul here Demirel accused “those who have presented him a report which argued that people did not want 
elections.”
ISI Interview. I also asked him what they would have done, if their plans had been discovered by 
the government in March or in April 1980 and government had tried to retire the high command as a 
whole. Evren answered that they (as high command) did not decide what they would do, but added that 
“if high command as a whole had been retired, they would not have said all right and gone.” He ai«^ 5 told 
me that from 11 July onwards, if the government had attempted to retire them, they would have 
immediately begun to implement the program. He also added that even if they had been retired, he was 
sure that new commanders would not think differently.
152 Linz, The Breakdown. 11.
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ensure the election of president by the general vote and to call for an early general election, 
Demirel procrastinated presidential e lec t ions .He consistently rejected calls for the RPP-JP 
co-operation. Instead, he argued that if the dialogue was desired the RPP should provide 
support for the bills in the assembly.
The RPP leader, on the other hand, was much less consistent throughout. On the one 
hand, he continued to make calls for dialogue between his party and the JP, but on the hand he 
blamed it in most severe terms. He charged Demirel for “arming at least 200.000 people, as a 
result of a plan implemented by himself”**'* When in Çorum, 33 people were killed as result of 
sectarian killings, Ecevit argued that “today the government is led by a person, who is enraged 
in a hurry to bring fascism into the country”***
The RPP leadership also rejected Demirel’s early election proposal which might have 
led to the postponement of military intervention for a while. He argued that conditions were 
inconvenient and that a healthy election just could not take place. Election security, according 
to Ecevit, was to be ensured under a impartial government and only then the country could 
hold elections. He asked that “ if even funerals can not be brought on stone on which the 
coflHn is placed (musalla taşı), then how are we get people voting ?”**^  Arguing that the state 
had lost its impartiality, and was helping, what to him were, fascists, he also argued that 
“if we go to elections with this government, it would not only be a shaded but also be 
bloody elections.”**’
153 He argued that in his view “it is meaningless to insist on a method (of electing president) 
which leads nowhere. Mutual accusations between parties also would not be enough to elect the president. 
Let’s go to citizens (electorate).” Hürriyet, May 23, 1980.
154 Hürriyet, June 4. 1980.
155 Milliyet, July 12, 1980. For the Çorum events, Ecevit blamed the government; “Despite its 
being known that right-wing militants started the events, the government preferred to conceal this fact 
and pretended as if there was a communist danger. ... It is clear that the government was not partial in 
(^orum events, it cooperated with one of the sides and it tried to smother up their crimes.” Milliyet, July 8, 
1980. Regarding Ecevit’s outbursts. The Economist noted that “Mr Demirel and the JP have been 
denounced as ‘fascists” so often that many Turks have stopped listening.” The Economist, August 23, 
1980, “U t’s Vote Again.”
Cited in Arcayürek, Demokrasi. 268. 
Hürriyet, June 3, 1980.
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Many believed, however, that Ecevit was fearfiil of possible election defeat, and waited 
for the JP government to become worn out over time. Meanwhile he continued to flirt with the 
NSP just to bring down the government.*^* In 24 June 1980 Ecevit, brought forward an 
interpellation against the government. Erbakan promised him support in the voting. But, when 
Demirel persuaded him not to support the RPP, Erbakan backed down. Then the motion of 
interpellation was rejected. (In this way, Erbakan increased his power vis-a-vis Demirel 
government). In other instance, the RPP even supported an interpellation against foreign 
minister Hayrettin Erkmen, for his conduct of Turkish foreign policy regarding Israel. It was 
not that Ecevit in any substantial sense opposed Turkey foreign policy toward Israel but that he 
thought it might be a convenient opportunity to bring the government down.*’  ^Both leaders 
seemed to be enslaved by the NSP, a party which ruthlessly exploited its position as key to 
formation of any government.
While economy showed signs of improvement due basically to 24 January measures, 
terrorism continued to increase.*^ There appeared many more ‘liberated zones’ in which 
neither the security forces nor those opposing viewpoints were allowed to enter. The sectarian 
killings in Çorum, Yozgat and other places claimed many lives. The murder of well-known 
persons continued, too. In 27 May 1980 the general secretary of the NAP, Gün Sazak was 
killed. In 15 July, the RPP Istanbul MP Abdurrahman Koksal was killed followed by (only four 
days later) former premier Professor Nihat Erim who had been a prime minister during the 12 
March interregnum.
The last attempt by acting president Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil to solve the political 
stalemate foiled. Çağlayangil had managed to hold a meeting between Ecevit and Demirel on 
24 June in Çankaya. To respond calls for dialogue, and not to portray themselves as
158 In 8 June 1980, he also talked about a coalition between the JP, the RPP and the NSP under a 
leadership of non-party premier. Cited in Arcayürek, DemokrasiM.
Metin Toker of Hürriyet commented on Ecevit’s decision “...the the RPP is now degraded to 
such a degree that it even became a prop to those who threaten republic and democracy. It is patheüc !” 
Hürriyet, September 7, 1980. “Hükümet Böyle Kalamaz” [Government can not Continue Like This]
According to Yanki’s estimation between November 1979 and August 1980 death toll 
resulting from terrorism rose to 1942. Yanh, September 1-7, 1980.
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uncompromising, both leaders, in the face of mounting public pressure, were compelled to 
attend the meeting. But nothing tangible did come out of it. Ecevit blamed Demirel for asking 
for his party support while not even considering what the RPP thought about the bills in the 
assembly. Arguing that there was a need to end politicization of the bureaucracy first, he 
rejected Demirel’s offer for an early general elections as well as preventing his efforts to 
strengthen the state. Demirel, on the other hand, offered that if the RPP does not support the 
JP in the assembly they should take country into the elections.
The meeting ended with no tangible result. The political party leaders continued to 
stick their own particular policies thus pushing the limits of democratic system so as to make 
other politicians accept to their own view. They did so without appreaciating the fact that their 
stance might be detrimental to democratic regime, which allowed them to pursue these policies 
in the first place. As The Financial Times correspondent Metin Münir noted politicians seemed 
“like passengers in a sinking ship quarrelling about cabins.” '^  ^ They did not trust each other, 
suspecting that any compromising move by one side could be presented by other as victory. 
Nor did they try to understand what constraints their rivals were under. What Valenzuela wrote 
for Chilean case equally applies to Turkish one. He wrote that (in the last months of Ailende 
regime) “neither side knew what the other side really wanted: neither side was fully prepared to 
believe that, even if the other side were sincere, it would be able to keep its word.” '^  ^And that 
“neither Ailende nor Christian Democratic leadership seemed fiilly to ^predate the enourmous 
political constraints the other was under
At this stage, it appears that party leaders, did not seem to expect the military to 
intervene. They did not seem to ask the question The Economist had asked “Is the Army losing
patience 7164 and that seems to be one of the chief reason for them to allow “the state of the
Financial Times, July 10. 1980.
Valenzuela, Chile.91 
Ibid., 98.
The Economist, August 2, 1980, “Is the Army Losing Patience T
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regime to deteriorate so disastrously.”*^  ^ In the Çankaya meeting (July 24, 1980) for instance,
Bülent Ecevit was reported to have said that;
despite the fact that restoration is more necessary than in the past, the possibihty of military 
intervention is so low that it is almost non-existent Why is this so ? Because they (the mihtaiy) became 
experienced They are intelligent people. They ai^redated that interventions do not work, and that th ^  
can not prevent conflicts at mass level.'®*
Demirel’s position on whether he was expecting the military intervention or not is not 
that clear-cut. On the one hand, Demirel several times appears to have indicated the possibility 
of military intervention. In 17 January 1980, when journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek told him about 
the NSP’s decision to block package of measures in the assembly, Demirel was reported to 
have said that “God damned those, they would get the assembly closed down.”*^ ’ Similarly in 
15 February 1980, Demirel was reported to have said (to Arcayürek) that “The military is 
planning something. This assembly will have itself abolished by the military. I am sincere in my 
belief that this will happen. If the assembly delays the election of president many things could 
happen.” '** On the other hand, in an interview in 1986, Demirel told Arcayürek that “up until 
11 September he did not think of the possibility of intervention.”'*^  Similarly, James Spain (US 
ambassador at that time) reported that in early August he twice had a chance to ask Demirel 
whether he expected a military takeover and was assured by him that he was not expecting 
such thing.'™
It appears that Demirel was not as certain as Ecevit regarding the likelihood of military
I6S Hale, Military. 238.
'** Arcayürek, Demokrasi.259. Bülent Ecevil came to this conclusion only couple of days after 
General Evren’s sharp warning. General Evren, in the celebrations for the six aimiversaiy of Cyprus 
intervention, argued that “ ...there are those who. while calling themselves followers of Atatürk’s 
principles to deceive others, have actually deserted his principles. I. as the head of armed forces, indicate 
that we shall not allow this country, entrusted us by Atatürk, to be overrun by them. We will punish those 
traitors soon." Cited in Evren, Anılar.465. (my italics)
Arcayürek, ¡2 Eylal.359.
Ibid., 414.
Arcayürek, Demokrasi. 287.
Spain, Memoirs. 14.
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intervention. Unlike Ecevit, Demirel (who was more realistic and down to earth) seemed to 
think that intervention was a possibility. What he could not estimate was, when the intervention 
might take place. There are indications that even if he had known the exact date, he would not 
be able to affect the course of events. Interestingly enough and revealing much about Demirel’s 
leadership style, in an interview in 1986, he said that “by July, I became certain that we would 
not be able to overcome the anarchy, that the soldiers will not do it.”*^* Despite that, he even 
did not attempt to change the direction of events. In a mbcture of feeling of desperation and 
fatalism reminiscent of the Ottoman-Turkish conception of acceaon to power that are 
determined by God’s will alone,Demirel argued that he just could not change commanders 
because Gaglayangil was an acting president and the opposition would make fuss of it. He 
could not take the country to the elections because other parties just did not want it. And he 
did not think of resigning because “he had proceed in this way and tried to go as long as he 
could.”’’  ^ “Governing (hukiimetfilik)”, he argued, “is not something that you could take when 
you want, and give up when you did not wish.”'^  ^Thus, believing that the intervention was not 
imminent (in the case of Ecevit) or even believing that it might be imminent but not feeling 
himself strong enough to affect the course events (in the case of Demirel), both party leaders 
continued to put their own policy agendas first.
171 Ibid., 284.
Exempliiying such conception of accession to throne, İnalcık cites, Süleyman I’s remarks to 
his son Bayezid, who had plotted for the throne, that “in future you may leave all to God for it is not 
man's pleasure, but God’s will, that disposes of kingdoms and their government. If he has decreed that 
you shall have the kingdom alter me, no man living will be able to prevent it.” Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman 
Empire, The Classical Age /500-/600 (Phoenix: London, 1993), 59.
’’^Arcayürek, Demokrasi. 284.
Ibid., 284. This attitude of Demirel can also be seen his evaluation of the 27 May intervention 
and Menderes’ reaction to it. He was reported to have told (to Cüneyt Arcayürek) that “Menderes knew 
that the intervention was coming. Three days earlier, people told him. I ask those who blame Menderes 
for being imprudent (basiretsiz): What could Menderes have done ? what sort of measures might he have 
taken ? There can not be any viable measure against the armed forces. What is important is to prevent the 
armed forces’ involvement in politics as being part of a tradition. Cüneyt Arcayürek, - Cüneyt Arcayürek 
Açıklıyor- 5, Demirel Dönemi, 12 Mart Darbesi 1965-1971 [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains 5, Demirel 
Period, The 12 March C^up D’etat] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1985), 286.
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Meanwhile the military finished all preparations for the takeover and began to wait for 
the morning of 12 September. The two critical events in the interim provided an additional 
justification for intervention and reinforced the military’s belief that if they did not move, if they 
waited a little bit more, it might prove to be too late. In 30 August 1980, the national day, the 
NSP leader Erbakan did not attend the “Anıtkabir” (Atatürk’s maosoleum) for the celebrations. 
In 6 September the NSP organized a meeting called “A Meeting to Rescue Jerusalem.” In the 
meeting, a group of hardliners sat down while Turkish National Anthem were being played. 
They also shanted slogans such as “we want Şeriat,” an anathema for military. In 12 
September, the military finally stepped in, ending Turkey’s troubled experience with 
democracy.
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION
This dissertation aimed to analyze the behavior of the major political party elites during 
the 1973-1980 period and how their actions seemed to have contributed to the breakdown of 
Turkish democracy in 1980. Following Juan Linz, we assumed that the breakdown of 
democracies is not determined by structural (economic and-or cultural) fectors alone, however 
important they might be. Structural characteristics of societies “constitute a series of 
opportunities and constraints for the social and political actors, both men and institutions that 
can lead to one or another outcome.”* Political actors, particularly those who profess 
commitment to democratic regime, have room for maneuver so as to affect the unfiivorable 
effects of these structures. Corollary to this argument was that political actors were not the 
mere bearers of the structures, that is their behavior is not completely determined by 
structures into which they had been socialized.
With this fiamework in mind we began to examine the advent of democracy in Turkey 
expounding a series of opportunities and constraints for political party elites at each political 
juncture. We argued that the trials and tribulations of Turkish democracy can best be 
comprehended if we take into consideration the larger social-political fiamework within which 
it evolved. That larger fiamework, as conceptualized in this study, consists of the complex 
encounter and interaction of Ottoman-Turkish strong state tradition and the modernizing 
social structure. This particular combination, it is argued, did not present a particularly 
favorable conditions, when Turkey began its experiment with democracy in 1946. At the mass 
level, available research suggested that in terms of the existence of ‘civic values’ such as belief 
in one’s competence, limited partisanship, propensity to co-operate with others and tolerance, 
Tuikey of late fifties and sbcties did not fare particularly well. It was related to various socio­
economic indicators -GDP per c^ita, literacy level, associational life, rate of urbanization and
' Juan J.Linz, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdowns and Reequilibration 
(The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1978), 4
370
industrialization- as well as the particular trajectory of the strong state. At the elite level too, 
the impact of the same fectors were discernible. State elites tended to perceive themselves as 
true guardians of state and public interests, and possessor of ultimate truths. Political elites, on 
the other hand, tended to see democracy as the majority’s unlimited power to do w ^ev er it 
please. Apart from specific understandings of crucial concepts, the strong state tradition has left 
its imprint on the political culture of both elite groups -tendency to see power in absolute 
terms, tendency to personalize conflicts, lack of tolerance of opposition, pqorative view of the 
compromise,- as the majority of them had been socialized into politics in the RPP.
It is misleading, we have continued, to argue that the interaction in question generated 
only unfavorable conditions. State elites opted for a rationalistic conception of democracy, 
believing that to be regarded as civilized country one should have a democracy. Their insistence 
on democracy as political system, despite they perceive it as something that might encourage 
(from time to time) those who challenge the bases of the Republican state, was one fevorable 
factor. The feet that Turkey had securely -at least in comparison to other devetoping countries- 
established its national identity was another. At the mass level, too, one can speak of some 
favorable cultural traits. Turkish people were familiar with the idea of the state representing 
public good, bounded by some definite rules, from which one can expect feir treatment. 
Turkey has also relatively tong experience with the ideas of rule of law, limited state, and 
experiences of elections and party politics beginning with 1830s.
The first experiment initiated by the ruling RPP in 1946 ended with military 
intervention in 1960. The uneasy coalition which constituted the DP consisted of diverse 
elements, the common denominator being the opposition to the RPP rule. It was led not by 
those with penpheral origins but those who left the RPP for basically intra-elite conflict. In the 
single party period, local notables (whose power was based on land ownership, kinship, or 
ethno-religios leadership) had provided the main link between the party (and state) and the 
periphery. With a transition to multi-party regime, the situation did not radically change, 
linkages between parties and social groups remained weak and based on vertical, clientelistic 
relations as they had been in one-party period. The rank and file organizations of the DP was
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dominated by already existing factions and clientelistic networks, which, for a variety of 
reasons had left the RPP and/or had been rivals to an RPP faction. This state of afiairs helps to 
explain why the two m^or parties did not greatly differ in the social background of their 
deputies. True there were undeniable differences, but it was not the case that the parties draw 
support heavily from one segment of society at the expense of other. It also helps to explain 
why “party patronage” has been crucial part of the politics in Turkey, since leaders of these 
factions promised bloc of votes to party leaders in return for various benefits for their clients. 
With the emergence of the DP, securing benefits to supporters by exploiting advantages of 
being in power (which were plenty due to state’s weight in the economy) rather than 
aggregating/reconciling various conflicting interests, as well as formulating clear-cut policies 
for the good of the community as a whole, has been the prime occupation of the political 
parties.
The DP had no intention of questioning the central tenets of the Republican regime, 
though it favored rather relaxed understanding of laicism and statism. Impressed by its electoral 
strength it tended towards a majoritarian understanding of democracy, believing the m^ority 
could do anything it please. In doing so, they referred to Atatürkist (influenced by Rousseauean 
conception of General Will) idea that the assembly was the true representative of the nation and 
that its authority could not accept any limitation. Atatürk had used this argument against the 
Caliphate and Sultan and he had not placed much emphasis on whether the assembly was 
elected on the basis of electoral compietition. The DP leaders, hoping that competitive elections 
would give them comfortable m^orities, used the same argument, but this time putting the 
emphasis on elections.
The DP did not feel secure in government and continued to exercise power under 
constant suspicion that they would be overthrown by a plot led by İsmet İnönü, whom they 
believed to control civilian and military bureaucracy. The RPP, on the other hand, could not 
easily accept being in opposition and opted for a harsh opposition style. True to tradition, they 
appear to have assumed that there was only one correct policy, known by them, to be followed 
in each case. The DP, in turn, did not seek a modus vivendi either. This ten year period.
372
therefore, was characterized by extensive government-opposition conflict, a cultural trait that 
had its roots in the Ottoman strong center tradition. In the absence of any great socio­
economic differentiation upon which political parties might be established abstract ideological 
dd)ates played the role of filler.^  Each party exaggerated its difference from other, intensifying 
elite polarization at the top with a danger of its spreading into mass level. Political conflicts at 
that time evolved not on the articulation/aggregation and reconciliation of various interests but 
on whether the government was violating Ataturk’s principles (and/or democracy) or on 
whether the opposition had been involved in divisive activities that aimed to overthrow the 
government. The DP’s lack of tolerance of opposition (based on the idea that the opposition 
was planning a coup to overthrow government) led to it to push for various pieces of 
legislations that can hardly be reconciled by democratic system.
These extensive government-opposition relations as well as the efforts of the press and 
universities wefe crucial in some junior officials’ coming to the conclusion that Ataturk’s 
principles as well as the integrity of the state were in grave danger, a belief that forced them to 
intervene against DP rule. The intervention was widely supported by the RPP, civilian 
bureaucracy and intelligentsia, actors 'v^ diich percdved themselves, alongside the military as 
guardians of state and Republican principles.
The 1960’s ushered in a new era in Turkish politics creating new opportunities as well 
as constraints for democracy depending to a large extent how political actors (both state and 
political party elite) were to respond to unfolding events. In that sense, post-1960 
developments constituted a backdrop without which the 1980 breakdown can not be properly 
understood. The new Constitution of 1961 cherished political participation and recognized 
both classical and socio-economic rights but, somewhat contradictorily, it also put checks on 
the power of elected majorities. The new participatory atmosphere of that era allowed the 
emergence of various ideological parties and movements as well as the radicaUzation of 
intelligentsia, who increasingly tended towards socialist ideas. Alongside changes in the 
political landscape and in interaction with it, Turkish social structure also underwent significant
■ Metin Hq)er, The State Tradition in Turkey (LondoniEothen, 1985), 99.
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changes as a result of the quickened modernization process. Since the late fifties, 
industrialization and its concomitant features like increase in the number of urbanized workers 
and migration to the cities acquired fiuther momentum.
Politics in this new era was characterized by the JP’s dominance until the 1973 
elections. The JP was a successor to the DP in that it did not question the basic tenets of 
republican regime. It, too, fevored a softer approach to laicism, and majoritarian democracy in 
which “national will” would reign. Continuing its predecessors’ patronage-oriented outlook, it 
fevored a mixed (moderately planned) economy in which state would play a significant role. 
The JP difiered from the DP in its attitude towards the military. What is possibly a result of a 
learning effect, the JP leadership showed utmost care in its relations with the army.
The RPP, too, underwent significant changes in that period. To appeal to educated, 
urbanized middle class and newly emerging workers, who were increasingly drawn by socialist 
ideas, İsmet İnönü adopted a “left of center” policy which was a little more than polishing of 
the old RPP principles. The RPP did not undergo significant change, both in terms of ideology 
and bases of social support, until Bülent Ecevit took over it and replaced the old guard. Bülent 
Ecevit began to use eloquent socialist-sounding rhetoric to appeal to the underprivileged. Be 
that as it may, the new RPP program was based on the realization of such aims as economic 
development through mixed economy, social security, equality of opportunity, and 
participatory democracy. The new policy appeared to pay off as the RPP’s share of vote 
tended to increase.
The main problems that democracy feced in that period were related with both socio­
economic cleavages (workers versus industrialists, big industrialists versus small Anatolian 
businessmen) and law and order problems created, in part, by student activism. The 
participatory atmosphere of post-1961 era encouraged various socialist and marxist groups to 
emerge and to affect political landscape significantly. The emergence of the Turkish Workers 
Party and various associations promoting socialist ideas and student activism, almost instantly 
produced a backlash from ultra-nationalist groups (particularly the NAP and its afSliated
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associations) who perceived themselves as the protectors of the Turkish nation from 
communism.
Street fights between these groups, increasing militancy of the woridng class, and the 
perception of the JP as unable to come up with a solution were the chief reasons that lay behind 
the 12 March military intervention. Though, power struggles between junior oflBcers and the 
high command within the military played a crucial role, both government and opposition 
committed to grievous mistakes that triggered the intervention. The governing JP, which 
despised by military, intelligentsia and nations’ other elites, and much weakened by intra-party 
conflict, appeared to be unable to cope with unrest in the streets. Meanwhile the RPP 
opposition tried to wear out the government without paying enough attention to the feet the 
democratic regime itself was likely to be damaged in the process. The two interim governments 
under the direct influence of the military muddled through, unable to make any significant 
contribution to solving Turkey’s problems except for the suppression of terrorism, for the time 
being, through martial law.
The 1973 elections produced a party system which was both polarized and Augmented. 
Though, the Turidsh party system has never been free from polarizing tendencies, the 
emergence of Ecevit and his efforts to move his party towards further left (though still not 
makmg it socialist) and his radical-socialist rhetoric was one of the contributory factor. As was 
the emergence of strictly ideological parties (the NAP and the NSP) which gained 
representation in the TGNA. Finally, assumptions of the IP’s leadership, that the party can 
regain its former dominance if it unites the right against the ‘storm of socialism’ which entailed 
the strengthening of anti-communist rhetoric and the portrayal of the RPP more left leaning 
than it really was, was instrumental.
The post-1973 period, therefore, witnessed a Turkey which, despite considerable 
modernization of traditional social structures through not insignifleant industrialization and its 
concomitant feature urbanization, was fer from performing well on basic socio-economic 
indicators. For a variety of complex reasons, Turkey’s urbanization-industrialization process 
did little to spread ‘civic values’ nor did it significantly help to moderate the latent religious-
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sectarian cleavages. The feilure of industry to absorb immigrants, led to a large informal sector 
and phenomenon of gecekondu with its distinctive values. The Turidsh economy, completing 
the easy phase of ISI needed immediate attention (for both internal and external reasons) that 
would require serious sacrifices.
But on the other hand, there were other fectors tending to support the democratic 
regime. Opportunities, so to speak. There was not a strong anti-democratic movement (with 
mass base) bent on overthrowing the democratic regime. Whatever the degree of civility it 
displayed, the Turkish electorate consistently voted for two major parties which did not diflTer 
much either in their programs (both fevoring mixed economy, and social security, both fevoring 
Republican principles) or drew support fi'om one segment of society at the ©qiense of the 
other, despite radical rhetoric of its leaders. Besides, in the aftermath of the 12 March the 
military firmly came to the conclusion that, unless “knife cut through the bones” its 
involvement in jxilitics damaged its internal unity and prestige and they were determined to stay 
out of politics. In the previous interventions they had come to be identified with the RPP. In the 
post-1973 period, however, the RPP (alongside intellectuals and part of the civilian 
bureaucracy) was no longer perceived as the party of state elite by the army. In that period the 
military saw itself as the only true guardian of the state. Finally, the 12 March intervention and 
its aftermath seriously undermined arguments of those intellectuals, who looked down liberal 
democracy as practicised in Turkey by labeling it as “nice” (dci) democracy and \^dio agitated 
for a progressive military rule.
These constraints and opportunities, which do not fully determine whether democracy 
survives or not, left a space for maneuver for political party elites. Post-1973 developments, 
however, demonstrated that that political party elites were not so successful in building on 
these opportunities, thus increasing the democratic regime’s legitimacy. After a short RPP-NSP 
coalition and long haggling, the NF government were established. The central features of this 
paiod had been increasing polarization at an elite level, extreme politicization of the civilian 
bureaucracy and party patronage. The rationale behind this government was, in the words of 
Süleyman Demirel, “to unite nationalist against leftist” thus defining the situation in black and
376
white terms. With the help of Ecevit’s relentless allegations that the government was soft on 
the NAP and treated rightists (i.e fascists in Ecevit’s lexicon) leniently, the country had been 
drawn into elite polarization spreading into mass level where latent conflicts had prepared an 
already fertile soil. The extreme politicization of bureaucracy (especially the security forces) 
that the NF governments practiced presented another problem as without a well-functioning 
impartial, eflBcient state, liberal democracy would not perform its expected fimctions. It is in 
that period that terrorism was on the way to becoming an acute problem. Finally party 
patronage led to uncoordinated, piecemeal, fi'ee-for-all economic policies that triggered the 
economic crisis that would show its full effects in 1978-9.
The RPP minority government that replaced it in 1978 was seen as a hope for 
democracy by critical actors. It was expected to deal with increasing terrorism and economic 
problems. The twenty-two-months long RPP government was a dismal failure in both 
accounts. Not properly assessing the causes and true magnitude of the problem terrorism, the 
RPP government stumbled along for a while. Even when it seemed the - appreciate true 
dimensions of the problem, both the ideology and composition of the government made it 
diflBcult for it take effective measures to cope with terrorism. In economic policy, due to both 
its approach and composition of its power base, as well as sheer administrative incapacity, the 
government had been unable to take painful measures to put Turkish economy on track. With 
the RPP’s failure hopes in the democratic regime’s survival severely diminished as the 
opposition JP was not perceived viable alternative. It is at this point that the military came to 
think that it might have to intervene. Both because they did not want the legitimacy of 
intervention to be contested and because due to army’s pressure politicians could put their 
house in order, they issued a letter to all parties and constitutional institutions demanding their 
co-operation. Political party elites, once again, failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation 
and did not move after the military’s warning. When the assembly even foiled to elect a 
president, let alone find remedies for mounting terrorism, the military intervention became a 
foregone conclusion.
It has been our basic thesis that political party elites, through their actions and non-
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actions, were unable to increase the democratic regime’s eflBcacy and effectiveness and 
undermined the belief on the part of the critical elites, in the democratic regime’s ability to 
solve pressing problems, thus paving the way to its breakdown in 1980. Let us now broadly 
outline how Turkish party elites behaved in the face of pressing problems, and offer 
explanations as to why they tended to behave in the way they did.^
First, Turkish party elites were not good at in diagnosing the causes and roots of the 
problems that the country faced. A good marie of the leadership, as Tucker indicated, is to 
properly identify the problem, mobilize resources and then act deciavely.^ When problems are 
not placed in proper context with all its dimensions, it is difficult to envisage effective solutions. 
In the Turkish case, somewhat falsified analyses of the roots and prevention of terrorism on 
the part of the party elites, appears to have undermined the democratic regime’s efficacy and 
effectiveness in4ts fight against terrorism. M ^or party leaders identified the causes of terrorism 
differently, tending to downplay left-wing and/or right-wing terrorism in the case of the RPP 
and in the case of JP respectively. It seemed that for the sake of petty party interests they ^ e d  
to condemn it unanimously regardless of where it sprung ifrom. While Bülent Ecevit sometimes 
accepted that those in the left recoursed to terrorism, Demirel showed extreme reluctance to 
accept what he called nationalists involved in violence.’ As late as July 1979 Demirel still stuck *
 ^As has been noted in the first chapter, we do not claim to explain fully why party elites behaved in 
the way they did. This is because such an e.\planation requires; the consideration of various constraints 
and opportunities that larger social-political framework presented to them; culturally grounded beliefs, 
ideologies and short term political considerations of elite; their socialization patterns and more personal 
faaors which have an impact in making of these ideologies and beliefs as well as their perceptions of 
what their interests are. Our e.\planation is concerned only with the impact of environment and elite 
beliefs, ideologies and short-term political considerations, but not with their socialization patterns or 
personal factors that surely have an impact in the making of these belief and ideologies and their 
perceptions short-term political considerations. This is chiefly because the study does not aim to explain 
the behavior patterns of a single leader, but two major party elites as a whole in the specified period. 
Therefore, despite our attempt to consider culturally grounded orientations, beliefs, ideologies, and short­
term political considerations of party elites, we can not delve into the origins of these beliefs and 
ideologies. That would require detailed consideration of their pre-adult political socialization process and 
more personal factors.
* According to Tucker three elements that are analytically successive constitute the core of 
leadership. These are “diagnosis,” “prescription of the course of action,” and “mobilization.” Robert C. 
Tucker, Politics as Leadership, revised edition (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 19
* In an interview with Abdi İpekçi in 1976 Detnirel argued that “today, there is no rightist
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to this attitude. When asked, once again, whether nationalists had been involved in the 
violence, Demirel did not say that they had, as surely was the case.* *But, instead, he argued 
that “nobody was above law and nobody had a privilege to kill others and that whoever was 
committed to killing authorities must catch him up.”’ Party elites’ failure to condemn terrorism 
regardless of where it came from did much to undermine the legitimacy of democratic system. 
As Linz noted, one-sidedness in excusing or condemning acts of violence was “both an 
indicator and a cause of loss of legitimacy of participants in the political process.”*
Not only they could not agree on causes of terrorism but also, and perhaps because of 
differing diagnoses, they also differed on how to prevent it. The JP put an emphasis on legal- 
administrative measures to get the state to regain its democratic authority, while the RPP urged 
socio-economic improvements and expansion of freedoms. Assuming that there is an adverse 
relation between law and freedom, the RPP leadership in particular did not seem to understand 
the true nature of the liberal democratic state. Failure to agree on the causes and means of 
prevention of terrorism was one of the prominent reasons why the parties could not unite 
against it -a sine qua non, if democracy is to survive. That failure to find remedies for increasing 
terrorism was the chief reason for the critical groups’ loss of belief in democracy. Likewise, 
party elites’ flawed diagnosis of the Turicey’s economic problems appears to have negatively 
affected their ability to put the economy on track. Both major party elites appear to have 
underestimated the true magnitude of Turkey’s economic problems. Consequently, instead of 
coming up with compact packages to put the economy on track, they preferred ad hoc, daily 
measures that did not help the troubled Turkish economy, which in turn, exacerbated the
terrorists that robs banks or kills people. You caimot show me a single person (with rightist convictions) 
that disturbs people in the university.” Though in the same interview he accepted that “rightists had been 
involved in mutual clashes in the schools” he insisted that they did not “initiate” these events in and 
outside the schools. Milliyet, July 22, 1976.
* Even Alparslan Tüıkeş had accepted that “yes, there had been people within our rank who 
committed crimes but they did not do it to fulfil party’s orders.” Yankı, January 2-8 1978.
’ Süleyman Demirel, Basin Toplantıları [Press Meetings ] (Ankara: Ulucan, 1979), 47,65, 89.
* Linz, The Breakdown. 61.
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economic cnsis.
Ignorance on the part of the party elites regarding the causes of problems and their 
solutions, can better be understood if it is linked with structures of political parties. Political 
parties in Turkey have hardly emerged as direct, mass-membership parties representing various 
social groups aggregating and articulating their interests, devising policies formulating goals for 
the community. Internally created, being based on professional cadres, having litde horizontal 
links with social groups, and aiming rather to exploit the advantage of being in power through 
patronage, poUtical parties had little incentive to devise well-thought out proposals, to state as 
explicitly as possible what are they going to do if th ^  assume power. Reinforcing the political 
parties’ that attitude can be related to that of the expectations (or what leadership believed to 
be as expectations) of the mass of the electorate. As noted, the majority of the electorate in 
Turkey appears to have been concerned with the satisfaction of immediate, local, and personal 
needs rather than long-term, national issues as well as being politically unsophisticated. As long 
as a party could satisfy these needs, the electorate did not seem to ask more. Thus, parties have 
become oriented to coming power and distributing special favors to supporters rather than 
formulating concise policies for the community since, the leadership seemed to assume, it might 
not always be appreciated by electorate.’ For party leadership it seemed like a burden to devise 
well-thought out policies. Various platforms, that were expected to discuss issues intelligently, 
were dominated by hagglings between intra-party factions related to who would get what 
positions when the party assumed the power.
Second, Turkish party elites, whether in power or in opposition, inclined towards 
heightening expectations. All leaders tend to play down the magnitude of the problems ahead 
and promised all good things to everybody, hardly mentioning inevitable sacrifices required. 
Both claimed that the problem of terrorism and economic crisis could easily be handled, if they 
were given an opportunity to assume power. The more they inflated expectations, the more the
’ It was true that the RPP showed some efforts to change this state of affairs by establishing a 
research bureau within the party and by preparing more elaborate programs. But in terms of feasibility 
and viability of these programs, its efforts remained less than successful possibly because of the low 
quality of the intellectual-scholarly community that prepared or backed up these programs.
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|X)ssibility of their being seen as unsuccessfiol increased. Since by heightening expectations to a 
degree which they were not likely to satisfy, governments set high standards against which they 
would be evaluated. This tendency did not bode well for democratic system since, it severely 
damaged belief in their ability to solve problems.
Third, both major parties exaggerated their differences and portrayed the others, not as 
benign forces with whom they differed on specific policy questions while agreeing on the basic 
rules of democratic game, but as an hostile force with malign intentions. The fact that 
democracy requires at least a minimiim amount of civility between parties and commonly 
subscribed shared values'® on the rules of game seems to be not to have been understood by 
party elites. The RPP leadership, for instance, easily labeled the JP as the protector of fescists 
(and sometimes even being fascist) while the JP accused the RPP for being (and-or being soft 
on) communists and ethnic separatists, despite the fact that these characterizations could hardly 
be justified. It has also been common occurrence to see Turkish party elites ferociously 
accusing each other of being ‘head of bandits,’ ‘robber,’ ‘mad,’ ‘enraged,’ and the like. They 
did not even refiain from characterizing each other as the sole reason for the country’s 
problems. With the passing of time, conflicts tended to become highly personalized. It became 
difficult to distinguish whether it was the policy differences between major parties or 
personalized fights of the leaders that led to such state of afl&irs.
The exaggeration of differences and such use of language did not bode well for 
democracy’s survival. Democracy is more likely to survive if elites try to bridge their 
differences by emphasizing what they share rather than differ and arrive at decision acceptable 
to both sides. Besides, the sharp exchange of words tended to heighten the tension 
unnecessarily. The fight at the top involved a potential danger of spreading into mass level 
which was already beset with various latent ethnic and sectarian cleavages as well as the 
prevalence of less than civic values. The image of a political arena in which party elites have 
been involved in a fierce exchange of words surely undermined belief in the democratic
In other words, a belief that opposing parties are not impecxable enemies. Robert A. Dahl, 
Polyarchy-Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1971), 152.
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regime’s ability to solve problems. Since it is these party elites that are expected to deal with 
these urgent problems, and when they seemed to be tearing each other apart with no realistic 
chance of them being replaced in short term, people are likely to look at elsewhere for the 
solution. And finally, it made their coming together more diflBcult especially when such patterns 
continued for long. The longer they continued to accuse each other with the harshest of the 
words, the less the likelihood of their coming together to seek remedies. *'
A closely related feature has been party elites’ tendency towards what can be called 
‘opposition for oppositions’ sake.’ To oppose meant to them literally to oppose everything 
deemed to be in the interest of other party(ies). Whether the policies in question were beneficial 
to the country as a whole or whether the same policies had been advocated by them previously 
or whether their opposition were likely to wear out not only the parties in power but 
democratic system itself did not seem to matter. The desire to oppose wdiat deemed to be 
beneficial (or is likely to make government successful) to government appears to have 
overridden all other considerations. If the government and opposition parties q>pear to have 
agreed on one single point, it was an agreement on not to agree.
The examples, as we put it throughout the dissertation above, abound. The new RPP 
government in 1978 had to campaign for the budget prepared by the NF government. When in 
opposition the RPP had staged a strenuous campaign to prevent its acceptance by the 
assembly. In power the RPP defended the same budget, while the former NF parties opposed 
it. A similar thing happened in package of measures designed to deal with terrorism. When in 
power both parties became its staunch defenders, when in opposition they tried to prevent its 
being legislated. In another example, the JP leadership, hoping that it could wear out the RPP 
government, complained that the RPP was trying to dilute martial law and opposed its 
extension. Despite the fact that only a couple of months ago they had criticized the RPP for
” According to La Palambora, the use of ferocious language does not necessarily have to hinder 
co-operation and collaboration. He argues that the Italian political eUte tend to use fierce language in the 
public arena but “in those less transparent places, where pubUc policies are actually forged, poUtical elite 
collaborate.” Joseph La Palambora, Democracy -Italian Style (New Haven, London; Yale University 
Press, 1987, 265. In Turkey, on the other hand, no such pattern was observed. The only thing 
parliamentarians of all persuasion easily agreed on was related to ensuring various benefits for themselves 
such as increases in MP’s wages as the press has fiequently brought to the public’s attention.
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not declaring martial law, and despite their knowing that the military felt incensed about what 
appeared to them an effort to involve the army in party politics. Similarly, Bülent Ecevit tried to 
exploit such a grave situation for his party interests when the army issued a letter by saying that 
“this government had such a warning in only 32 day whilst the RPP never had such thing.” It 
goes without saying that such behavior on the part of party elites helped neither their credibility 
nor increased the critical actors’ trust in them. Rather, they were seen as opportunistic egoists 
concerned only with their narrow party interest, which undermined the democratic regime’s 
legitimacy. As Kenan Evren said in interview, Turkish party elites’ tendency towards 
‘opposition for oppositions’ sake’ was the most important factor that led him to believe that 
democratic system could, and would, not be able to cope with problems.
As to why party elites tended to behave in such ways regarding government opposition 
relations, no simple answer can be offered. It is not the elite political culture, nor the structure 
of parties, nor the party system, nor specific beliefs and short-term political considerations of 
the elite alone, can help to explain elite behavior. It is rather the complex interplay of party 
systems and party structure, and elite political culture as well as short-term political 
considerations of elites seems to have played a role. There is an almost unanimous agreement 
that the fi'agmented party system of the post-1973 period encouraged centrifugal tendencies. 
The RPP, hoping that with a margin of the vote it could secure an absolute majority, began to 
use radical slogans so as to attract votes fi'om the left. It chose to present the JP as the 
protector of fascists and themselves as the only party to stop them gaining power. Moved by 
similar motives, the JP leadership, too, had benefited in characterizing the RPP as the protector 
of communists and the only party to stop them coming to power. In that way, the JP leaders 
assumed that they could attract votes fi'om right, while forestalling the possibility of a RPP- 
NSP coalition. These accusations also appears to have served party elites’ aim of keeping their 
parties intact. The feet that in the fiagmented party system even one vote might be decisive for 
the fete of government, party elites appear to have chosen to characterize other party(ies) as so 
different fi'om them in order to prevent them transferring to the other party.
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A closely related factor was the structure of Turkish political parties. They were hardly 
direct, mass membership parties, being the representative of sodal groups, articulating 
aggregating their interests and carrying them into the public arena, but rather they emerged 
largely as a result of an intra-elite conflict. They were less of party A^ iiich articulated 
(aggregated) and reconcile various interests than parties which were dominated by professional 
cadres and which were more interested in distributing public resources along party patronage. 
Political conflicts between parties, thus, centered less on how to reconcile various interests, 
gear economic growth, reduce unemployment and inflation or strategies of fighting with 
terrorism. T h^  were rather centered on largely personalistic intra-elite conflict and accusations 
of corruption that were in the main unrelated to broader social problems and tensions. When 
parties are all'alike in crucial respects, as Turkish parties had been, the personalistic conflicts 
tended to dominate the scene because parties could diflferentiate themselves largely on these 
terms.
The impact of the party structure and party system is, however, less than adequate in 
explaining the character of the government-opposition relations. The elite political culture 
defined as “the set of politically relevant beliefs , values, and habits of the leaders of the 
political system” '^  needs also to be taken into consideration. In the making of the elite political 
culture history is likely to play a crucial role. The imperial-patrimonial Ottoman principles of 
government left no room for the concept of loyal opposition. If one is in opposition, then one 
is not loyal since one could be loyal only to an individual (sultan) and not the concepts of 
governance. It also prepared a fertile ground conducive to personalistic conflict. Personal
Robert D. Putnam, “Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology.” American  
Political Science Review. 65, (1971), 651. The concept of elite pohtical culture rests on the assumption 
that “even in the most stable systems and the most homogeneous populations there will be significant 
differences in the outlook of political leaders and common citizens.” Lucien W. Pye, “Identity and 
Political Culture,” in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, by. Leonard Binder et.al.
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1971), 103. Almond and Verba, on the other hand, tended to 
downplay differences between elite and mass political culture. They argued that “though our data can not 
demonstrate this, there is a reason to believe that political elites share the political culture of the non-elite.
.. .Elites, after all, part of the same political system and exposed to many of the same political socialisation 
process as are non-elite.” Gabriel A  Almond and Sidney Verba, The C ivic Culture -Political A ttitudes 
and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1963), 486.
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rivalry was endemic to the Ottoman system of government as the rulers concentrated decision­
making in their hands, politics tend to be exclusively a center-orieirted activity having little 
contact with the wider society. The central problematic of the polity in such system was to gain 
the confidence of the absolute power-holder as he alone decided who would get what. Since 
there was fierce competition to acquire such acclamation competitors used everything at their 
disposal to outstrip others. Combined with widespread insecurity, also a central characteristic 
of the system, anything that could be called political activity turned around gossip, intrigue, 
mutual accusations and bickerings confined to palace. This was because the easiest way to 
remove personal rival was to convince the Sultan that person in question constituted harm to 
higher interests of the state. The traces of that tradition appears to have been reproduced in the 
second constitutional period and in the Republic. From the very inception of party politics in 
Turkey, Turkish party elites have tended to characterize and blame (accuse) the opposition 
(and or government) with the harshest of the words. Especially in the Young Turk era party 
struggles resembled those between competing religious sects. With the Republic accusation of 
opposition for the violation of ‘Ataturk’s principles’ and ‘treason’ and ‘progressive­
reactionary’ lines continued. In the seventies government-opposition relations polarized on left- 
right (or fascist-communist) terms. It is has been an almost unchanging feature of Turidsh 
political life that the government blames the opposition for having divisive motivations and the 
opposition accuses the government of violating basic principles of state and-or democracy. 
Thus, accusations of government and-or opposition with outrageous words and tendency 
towards personalistic conflict has become a “tradition”*^ and part of elite political culture*’ that
13 1For a work on pre-1979 Iranian elite political culture, which exemplifies how the patrimonial 
regime of Shah helped to generate widespread insecurity, distrust and cynicism within the political elite. 
He sums up basic characteristics of elite culture as follows; “An inability to predict with surety, the 
behaviour of others; a disbelief in the sincerity and integrity of others (and, in the real sense, of oneself); 
absence of cooperation and mutual independence; a flight from responsibility and decision making; and 
pursuit of personalized, systematically nonsubstantive goals...” Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite o f 
Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 336.
We use Edward Shils description of tradition as “...the recurrence, in approximately identical 
form, of structures of conduct and patterns of belief over several generations of membership or over a long 
time within single societies -with a more or less delimited territory and a genetically continuous 
population- and within corporate bodies as well as over regions extending over several bounded 
territorially discrete societies which are unified to the extent of sharing in some measure a common
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the party elites find it hard to overcome.
It may also be argued that party elites assumed that a harsh style of opposition was 
appreciated by their electorate and would secure them extra votes. In the democracies, 
members of the elites need to be responsive to needs and wishes of the people simply 
because they need votes to stay in power.’® In other words, as Linz put it, “some of the 
quality of political class will be determined by the ‘quality of the electorate,’ the readiness 
of the voters to support leaders with clearly negative characteristics on the one hand and 
on the other a public opinion disinterested in the quality of leaders.”’’ We do not have any 
hard data to sustain such conclusion, but admittedly less than scientific impressionistic 
evidence might lead one to suggest that it appears to have been appreciated, or more 
significantly political leadership think it as being appreciated, by the masses at large. 
Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, an academic who was also minister o f culture in the RPP 
government, answered the question of why Ecevit, while calling for a dialogue, was so 
harsh towards Demirel as follows:
The moderate style of opposition could not find resonance in the JP. By contrast, it began to 
generate reactions within the rank-and-file members o f  the RPP. If Ecevit had not expressed 
reactions of people, we might have came across terrible developments. Therefore, Ecevit was 
right to increase dose of opposition while not withdrawing calls for dialogue.”'*
culture -which means common traditions.” Edward Shils, “Tradition,” in Center and Periphery -Essays in 
M acroSociology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975), 183.
Accusation of opponents or rivals with outrageous words and tendency towards personalistic 
conflicts seem to be valid not only for political elites but also for other elites in Turkish society as well. 
Emin Karaca, for instance, documented “fights” between various influential journalists fix>m second 
constitutional periods to day (1997). What strikes the reader is the personalistic nature of the clashes. 
Rather than defending principles in an intelligent way, journalists in Turkey, with a few notable 
exceptions, have come to accuse each other by “treason” by being “corrupt,” “communist,” “reactionary,” 
“stupid,” “immoral,” not being “a real Turic” and like. Emin Karaca, Türk Basınında Kalem Kavgaları 
[ Clashes of Pen in Turkish Press] (Istanbul; Milliyet, 1998).
Putnam, Comparative. 143. In the similar line of argument, Almond and Verba suggested that 
“law of anticipated reactions” plays a key role in mass influence over political elites. Almon and Verba, 
Civic. 487.
”  Juan J. Linz, “Some Thoughts on the Victoiy and Future of Democracy,” in Democracy's 
Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 422.
'* Yankı, 28'July-3 August, 1980. (my italics)
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Korkut Özal, likewise, noted that in 1975 a partial senate election campaign how 
the head of his party in Pınarbaşı county warned him to be more harsh, saying that “he 
should rebuke aggressively others so that people would listen you well” (ona buna 
vuracaksm bu millet duyacak). While he refrained from such style, party men did exactly 
what he said and attracted enthusiastic support from the crowd, which had remained very 
silent when Özal tried to talk intelligently about Turkey’s p ro b lem s.In  yet another 
example, Ömer Dedeoğlu, an MP from the RPP, recalled that a member of the RPP in his 
local province asked him “why could they neither see or hear that he has been involved in 
fights in the GNA, despite the fact that they sent him there in the hope that he could knock 
down the rivals with a single punch as he was tall and strong.”^  These might be specific 
cases and by no means constitute satisfactory evidence to speak confidently on the matter, 
but what can be said with confidence, is that even if the electorate did not like that style of 
opposition, it did not seem to make their discomfort known to leaders so as to compel 
them to change their behavior.^ *
”  Nail Güreli, Gerçek Tamk-Korkut ö za l Anlatıyor [The Real Witness-Korioit özal Speaks] 
(Istanbul: Milliyet, 1994), 211. In yet another example, Orhan Erkanh, soldier turned RPP politican (who 
became member of parliament between 1965-68) recalls how in the election campaign the local head of 
his party warned him by saying that ">'ou should use ferocious language (sert konuşun) as the attacks of 
the ‘A’ party’s deputy on last Sunday have undermined our men’s morals..” Eikanli, then, continues, 
“what they understand by 'using ferocious language’ is to attack and even insult the rival parties. The 
more you use ferocious language, the more applause you will get and satisfy your partisans. If you have 
not become harsh enough (towards your rivals), they complain about your attitude to head of province.”
He even notes that every party has its own special speakers who excelled at “provoking a quarrel” and 
parties sent them to “necessary places.” Orhan Erkanli. Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular [Memoirs.
Problems and Those Who are Responsible] (IstanbuliBaha, 1973), 255. The same can be said for clashes 
between journalists. According to Emin Karaca, journalists behave in the way they do because “people 
like fights. Even they see a fight in the street, they stop and watch it to a degree that they forget 
appointments.” He also noted that how in the recent “live” clashes on TV between two journalists (Emin 
Çölaşan-Mehmet Barlas) boosted the rating of the private television station which days before began to 
announce occasion. Emin Karaca, “Basin Tarihimiz, Bir Tekrarın Öyküsü...” [öur History of Press is the 
Story of Repetition] A/////ver, May 31, 1998.
^  Ömer Dedeoğlu, M illetvekilinin Günlüğünden Anılar [ Memoirs From the Diary of a Member 
of Parliament] (Ankara; Demircioğlu, 1998), 63.
This, of course, does not mean that there is, or there should be, one-to-one correspondence 
between the wishes of the electorate and the policies of the elite. In many cases, elites themselves help to 
shape, even sometimes create, the preferences and values of the masses to a varying extent. Even when it 
is not the case, political elites do not necessarily be simply responsive to demands of the electorate. As 
Sartori remarks, a “government that simply yields to demands, that simply gives in, turns out to be a
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Fourthly, Turidsh party elites had shown distaste for -the notions of bargaining and 
compromise- perhaps the most significant feature of democratic regime. Their feilure to agree 
on ways and means of oflfering remedies for economic troubles and terrorism, wWch clearly 
had to do much with their inability to bargain and compromise, did much to undermine in 
democratic regime’s efficacy and effectiveness and subsequently its legitimacy. Despite its 
leadership fi^ equently called for dialogue and claimed to seek compromise, the RPP did not 
convince many in its sincerity. The RPP leadership appeared to have remembered the virtues of 
compromise only when it was in their party’s interest, that is when the RPP did not have a 
realistic chance of forming a government. The JP leadership was even more strictly opposed to 
the notion of compromise. Believing that there was only one correct policy to be found (and 
followed) in each case, compromise seemed to them to be giving away concessions to 
adversaries. Finding a middle way with mutual concessions speared something bad to be 
avoided.
It is necessary to introduce a distinction here. Somewhat paradoxically both major 
party elites seemed to have become uncompromising only against each other, otherwise they 
were more than willing to bargain and compromise with semi-loyal elements especially when 
there was an opportunity to wear out the government or to form a new one.^ The RPP, for 
instance, made a coalition with the NSP (in 1974) which questioned the very basis Republican 
state the RPP have proclaimed to have upheld. In another instance, the RPP supported the 
NSP when it put forward an interpellation against the JP government’s foreign policy 
regarding Israel while not totally agreeing with its substance. Similarly, the JP proved to be 
quite adept at bargaining (it left two ministerships to the NAP, which had only three members 
in the parliament) to form second National Front government, despite widespread opposition 
against it. It can be suggested that Turkish party elites bargain and compromise only when they 
think that compromise promotes their short-term, immediate, visible interests. The democratic
highly irresponsible govenunent that does not live up to its responsibilities.” Giovaimi Sartori, The Theory 
o f  Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987), 170.
^  Sabri Sayan, Parlamenter Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri [Coalition Governments in 
Parliamentary Democracies] (Istanbul; Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1980), 204.
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notion of compromise, however, requires that elites should be adept at compromise when there 
is a danger to democratic system, even if it is contrary to their short-term interests.
In explaining the lack of bargaining and compromise we should again refer to the 
complex interaction of elite political culture, policy differences between parties and distrust of 
leaders as well as their short-term political considerations. As noted, the belief that there is one 
correct policy to be followed in each case is in the Ottoman-Turkish political tradition. So is the 
belief that compromise is something “demeaning” and to be avoided. Political party elites, 
especially, the JP leader Süleyman Demirel, continued in the same tradition.
To say that it has been a tradition does not explain much. One should also take into 
account other factors that allowed/supported such tradition to regenerate (to support itself) 
itself One factor seems to be short-term political considerations of the party elites. They 
seemed to believe that if they stick to (or insist on) uncompromising policy lines, they could 
achieve short-term policy agendas. In the last months of the regime, as we noted, Demirel 
seemed to believe that he did not need to bargain with Ecevit because he could take the 
country to early general elections in which he expected to gamer a majority. Similarly, Ecevit 
guessed that he could unseat the JP government with the support of the NSP. Widespread 
distrust between party elites as a result of years of political bickering, mutually harsh 
accusations, broken promises, personalized nature of conflict, had also become one of the key 
factors that hindered co-operation. Distmst between leaders reached such a degree that each 
leader suspected that any compromising gesture would be presented as sign of weaknesses by 
its adversaries.^ This brings us to the related point of their assessment of possible mass 
reaction to any compromising gesture. Though we do not have any hard data to support it, at 
mass level, too, values such as compromise and bargaining did not seem to be highly praised, at 
least to an extent that forced party elites to be more compromising. One can suggest that 
leaders’ chose or afford to be uncompromising because they might have assumed that any
^  Some policy differences (especially regarding the roots of terrorism and economic crisis and means 
of preventing them) between parties, though it was not as great as leaders portrayed it to be, m ^  also have 
played a role in their uncompromising attitude. But on the otha, conqjromise is not something that you do with 
those whom you are in agreement but a way to reduce differences with those whom you differ in many re^)ects.
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compromising move would cost them votes. Süleyman Demirel, in an interview in 1986, for 
instance, presented himself as one who sincerely believed that the electorate did not crave 
compromise and his party’s attitude reflected that of the electorate. He argued that “do 
you assume that the RPP and JP consist only of MP’s, administrative elite? Behind these, 
there are masses.” “^* Similarly, when he said that the coalition between the RPP and the JP was 
“against the nature of things,” he had added that “citizens also would react (or oppose) to 
this.”^^  According to Oğuz Aygün, a prominent JP MP, “both the RPP and the JP perceive it 
(cooperation between parties) as faintness towards their electorate.” ®^ This is by no means 
enough evidence to state this is the case but again, one can safely conclude that even if the 
electorate did· not approve of parties’ uncompromising stance, they were not ‘pounding on’ 
their doors to be more compromising.
Fifthly, party elites of the period observed did not refiain from politicizing bureaucracy 
as well as resorting to widespread party patronage. Politicization was particularly observed in 
the civilian bureaucracy, including the security forces. When in power, parties (especially 
during National Front governments) scattered about civilian bureaucracy as they please 
constrained, if at all, only by legal rules. The RPP was, it seemed, no less partisan either. The 
first thing every new government did was to ‘clean’ bureaucracy from what appeared to them 
harmfijl (read other party sympathizers) elements. Such extreme partisanship virtually 
paralyzed civilian bureaucracy and security forces as the positions were filled (or civil servants 
were promoted) not on the base of merit but whether the appointee in question was a party 
men or not. The politicization of bureaucracy appears to have had grave consequences for the 
survival of democratic regime. It, as might be expected, severely damaged the state’s 
eflfectiveness as the state could not perform what it was expected to perform from punishing 
those who violate the law, to ensure law and order, to secure enforceability of contracts, to the
Cited in Cüneyt Arcayürek, Cüneyt Arcayûrek Açıklıyor, 10 Demokrasi Dur -12 Eylül 1980, 
[Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains-10, Democracy Stop, 12 September 1980] second ed. (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), 
470.
“  Cumhuriyet, July 29, 1977.
26 Yankı, January 14-20, 1980.
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tax collection, health service, and maintenance of the roads. Low effectiveness is, as we 
remarked, likely to be detrimental for regime loss of legitimacy.
Particularly important was the state’s failure against terrorism, in which the paralyzed 
civilian bureaucracy played no ignorable part. Not only because the security forces just could 
not gather information (about terrorist activities), could not catch and could not keep convicted 
ones in prison, but also because it led to the state’s being perceived as partial in its application 
of laws. This, in turn, prepared the ground for their taking laws into their hands and/or made 
them ready to defer strong one’s authority. We also know that paralysis of the civilian 
bureaucracy played a particularly important role in the military’s coming to the conclusion that 
unless the civilian bureaucracy was radically restructured (^ \1ıich they did after the intervention) 
the fight against terrorism could not be won, and that political party elites did not give a clue 
that they intend and able to erase politicization.
Similarly, party elites have frequently been involved in party patronage distributing 
public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support. Through the- large economic 
resources that the state had in its disposal, governing parties tended to award many advantages 
for its supporters while depriving others. It took many forms such as securing credits to fellow 
businessmen, improving the infiastructure of those districts that voted for a party, appointing 
party men to state economic enterprises, directing public investment according to political 
criterias and the like. This extensive party patronage did not fit well with sound economic 
management and did pave the way for the economic crisis that played no ignorable part in the 
democratic regime’s loss of legitimacy.
To explain why party elites engaged in widespread politicization and party patronage, 
we should again refer to the complex interplay of the structure of political parties, elite political 
culture and their short-term political considerations as well as the impact of the modernizing 
social structure. In Ottoman-Turkish polity, as noted in chapter four, the bureaucracy strictly 
adhered to what Heper called ‘bureaucratic empire tradition.’ It was assumed that public 
interest would be best served not through conciliation of various interests but instead through 
the discussion of intelligent people. Public interest, they believed, is best represented and
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protected by bureaucrats who are free from electoral pressures. This attitude, in turn, 
reinforced oppositional mentality in the political elites.^’ To cut short what they perceived as 
unresponsive bureaucracy, they used whatever they could at their disposal, including staffing it 
by their own sympathizers regardless of merit or established recruitment patterns. Similarly, 
widespread party patronage is also related to the peripheral mentality displayed by party elites. 
They tended to behave as if resources to be distributed derived not from tax-payers money but 
somewhat mysteriously happened to be in the treasury controlled by oveijealous bureaucrats.
These cultural dispositions, however important, should not be overemphasized. The 
traditional social structure undergoing rapid modernization process provided a fertile ground 
which increased political parties’ predisposition towards patronage. From the inception of the 
transition to a multi-party regime party patronage came to play key role in determining a 
party’s success in elections. Especially the DP and its successors, heavily relied on local 
notables and other faction leaders, which promised them bloc of votes in return for various 
benefits. The tradition of fether state -expecting the state to help ensure decent life for people 
as father expected of his children- as well as governments’ control of vast economic resources 
reinforced this patronage orientation.^ * With the advance of the industrialization-urbanization, 
and the emergence of somewhat stronger private sector, the situation did not significantly 
change. If anything changed it was the forms of the patronage as the private sector relied 
heavily on state protection in the forms of favorable credits, tax exemptions, allocation of 
limited foreign exchange, tariff and import quotas. It was not the private sector only which 
craved for patronage. The urban-migrants, like peasants and private industry, followed the suit. 
The inability of the private industry to absorb migrant workers, the central and local
This explanation is rather valid for, what is conunonly called, right-wing parties. In the case 
of the RPP-led partisanship and politicization, strictly ideological factors and desire to clear the heavily 
politicized bureaucracy seemed to play prominent role.
^  Though Hayek seems to exaggerate when he stated that “if the government has the power to 
grant their (various special interests) demands, it becomes their slave,” he had a point in indicating direct 
positive relations between the resources at the disposal of the political elite and their disposition to 
patronage. Frederick A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty- The Political Order o f a Free People, vol 
3. (London: Routledge and Kegan Pairl, 1979), 11.
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governments’ failure to ensure decent life for the migrants who had to live in squatter houses, 
all led these people to turn to political parties. Political parties, which are “viewed as networks 
through which public patronage is distributed”^  found it hard to resist these pressures as their 
electoral success was very closely related to their ability to secure specific benefits for their 
supporters.
To sum up, this dissertation argued that democracy in Turkey did not find 
particularly favorable soil in which to flourish. Complex encounter and interaction of both 
the legacy of Ottoman-Turkish state tradition and the traditional social structure 
undergoing modernization appears to have created several constraints for the stability of 
democracy. But these constraints did, by no means, require that democracy in Turkey was 
doomed to fail as they also generated some opportunities for democratic development. 
Political actors, particularly those who professed open commitment to the democratic 
system, did have room for maneuver so as to affect these constraining conditions (in the 
making of which they also played a role) and enhance the likelihood of democracy’s 
survival. It was also assumed that the behavior of the political actors is not totally 
conditioned by the environment as they are not mere bearers of these structures. It is the 
basic thesis of this dissertation that political party elites, far from taking such a stance, 
through their actions and non-actions -particularly important was their reactions to 
problem of terrorism and economic crisis- undermined belief in the democratic system and 
paved way to its breakdown in 1980. That does not mean, on the other hand, that the 
breakdown was solely the result of the failure of party elites. It was not the case that 
social-political conditions of Turkey presented very favorable conditions for the 
democracy to flourish but party elites spoiled it, as some analysts (and the military high 
command that led the intervention) implied. Quite the contrary, socio-political conditions 
of the seventies generated considerable constraints that necessitated courageous, 
innovative, insightful leadership. That sort of leadership would require the ability; to
^  liter Turan, “Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic,” in Perspectives on 
Turkish Democracy, ed. Ergun Ozbudun (Ankara:Sava$, 1988), 105.
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diagnose problems correctly and devise eflfective ways to deal with them, to build up of 
coalitions, to reshape the preferences and values of the electorate, to soften the latent 
conflicts within them, to convince the electorate necessity of the short-term sacrifices for 
the long-term good of the community and the like. However, party elites found it 
impossible to overcome the impact of these constraints -cultural, economical, 
institutional. In term of the categories formulated by James Mac Gregor Bums,^” they 
could not show the ‘transforming’ pattern of leadership or became ‘leaders’ but proved to 
be mere ‘power-holders’ and, many would argue not totally unjustly, less than competent 
even in that role.
^  James MacGregor Bums, Leadership (New York; Harper & Row, 1978), 5, 20, 425.
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